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Abstra 
This thesis investigates the organic relationship between OT exegesis and 
hermeneutical theory while using Ecclesiastes as a focus of the investigation. 
The introduction argues that such an investigation is particularly relevant at 
this time of pluralism and fragmentation in OT studies. 
Chapter one surveys philosophical hermeneutics as a diverse context for OT 
interpretation and argues that hermeneutical awareness is vital to it. Chapter 
two outlines the different ways in which Ecclesiastes has been read during 
its history. The post-Enlightenment period is identified as the watershed in 
the interpretation of Ecclesiastes and it is demonstrated that up until the 
present there is no consensus about the message of the book. 
In modernity the historical critical method has become the regnant paradigm 
within which interpretation of Ecclesiastes occurs. Chapter three examines 
the renarrating of modernity that is taking place at present and then analyses 
the origins of the historical critical method within modernity. The 
reductionistic effects of this hermeneutic upon readings of Ecclesiastes are 
noted and the importance of attending to the prejudices of the historical 
critical method is stressed. 
Chapters four and five explore important reactions to historical criticism. 
Chapter four examines Childs' canonical approach, New Criticism and 
structuralism. Wright's and Loader's approaches to Ecclesiastes are explored 
as examples of a New Critical and a structuralist reading of Ecclesiastes 
respectively. These approaches are valuable in focusing the literary aspect of 
Ecclesiastes. Chapter five examines Sternberg's poetics of biblical narrative 
and Fox's narrative reading of Ecclesiastes. The genre of Ecclesiastes is 
analysed as a developed wisdom form of a royal testament or autobiography 
cast in a narrative frame. 
Chapter six analyses the postmodern turn as a time of foundational crisis and 
explores its implications for OT studies and the reading of Ecclesiastes. 
Postmodernism reinforces the need to take philosophical presuppositions 
seriously. Chapter seven draws together the investigation by arguing for a 
religious (Christian) hermeneutic in the context of a genuine pluralism in 
Old Testament studies, outlining a tentative hermeneutic for reading the OT 
and then applying it to Ecclesiastes. Particular attention is paid to the 
structures of repetition in Ecclesiastes. It is concluded that Ecclesiastes is an 
ironical exposure of an empiricistic epistemology which seeks wisdom 
through personal experience and analysis alone. 
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"The economist J. M. Keynes once remarked that those economists who disliked 
theory or claimed to get along better without it, were simply in the grasp of an 
older theory. This is also true of literary students and critics. " 
(Eagleton, 1983: viii) 
"Whether we see a whole text or a defective one involves a range of beliefs. To 
engage in our work as Biblicists means we must exercise our beliefs. " 
(Greenstein, 1986: 90) 
Sternberg (1985: 21,22) argues that biblical study is not a discipline but the 
intersection of the humanities par excellence so that "the progress it so badly 
needs is conditional either on all-round expertise, not given to humans or on 
a truly common pursuit of knowledge. " While it is debatable whether 
biblical study is a discipline or not, Sternberg is right to alert us to the 
importance of being aware of the different disciplines that impinge upon OT 
studies. The increased specialisation that characterises modernity makes it 
harder and harder to look beyond one's own discipline and to take 
cognisance of broader influences. 
Furthermore, as with all disciplines, scholars naturally tend to get on with 
the hard work at the many work sites in OT studies, operating within the 
regnant paradigm. However, every now and again it is important to re- 
examine the larger picture. Indeed there is good reason to suggest that 
progress in OT studies at present will, as Sternberg suggests, depend on just 
such a re-examination of the relationship between the discipline and the 
larger issues. There is a growing sense of hermeneutical pluralism and 
fragmentation in OT studies. Historical criticism, until recently the dominant 
paradigm for OT studies, is increasingly being relativised as one approach 
among many. And there is no consensus among OT scholars about what to 
do in the contemporary situation. Should we retreat into the familiar grounds 
of historical criticism? (Cf. Collins, 1990) Do we, like Brett (1991), Morgan 
(1988)1 and Barton (1984), deny the possibility of an integrated hermeneutic 
and opt for more of a smorgasbord approach? 2 Do we, like Childs (1979) 
and Levenson (1993), try and keep a foot in the historical critical camp while 
1Morgan, with Barton, (1988) stresses that in reading the balance of power shifts to the reader so that 
readers' aims become decisive in interpretation. See Morgan (1988: 269-296) for a nuanced presentation of 
his position. 
2See Barton (1984: 198-207), who argues that a basic flaw in much OT hermeneutical discussion is the 
expectation that the question 'How should we read the OT? ' can be answered. Barton argues for a focus on 
literary competence rather than normative hermeneutic. 
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increasingly shifting our weight to the foot in the literary camp? Do we wait 
out the present crisis until a new consensus emerges3? Or do we reclaim the 
Bible for the Church? 4 In typical postmodern fashions there is a plurality of 
responses to the fragmented situation in which OT scholars find themselves, 
and even advocates of a hermeneutical pluralism like Morgan, Brett and 
Clines appear to exclude certain approaches from their smorgasbord. 
In my view the pluralism in OT studies requires closer attention. There are 
different aspects to this pluralism and it is problematic when they are 
confused. There is a methodological pluralism which relates to different 
aspects of texts being focused upon. Thus discourse analysis, form criticism, 
redaction criticism and feminist criticism need not be contradictory - they 
are legitimate methods which focus upon different aspects of the text under 
consideration. Then there is a deeper philosophical pluralism in OT 
hermeneutics which is problematic. This is often less visible than 
methodological pluralism because it operates at the subterranean level which 
still receives relatively little attention. This philosophical pluralism shapes 
methods of exegesis, and cannot so easily be seen in complementary terms. 
Often these philosophies are rooted in antithetical views of reality. Thus, for 
example, Derrida's philosophy of language is irreconcilable with Ricoeur's, 
and OT hermeneutics shaped by these are not just different ways to arrive at 
a larger truth; one has to decide between them6. 
Consequently an examination of the relationship between OT studies and the 
larger philosophical issues that impinge upon it is crucial if a constructive 
way forward is to be found for OT studies. In terms of the larger issues that 
impinge upon OT studies there are two that I have identified as crucial and 
which are the focus of this study, namely philosophy and literary theory. 
Both these elements are key means by which movements in the broader 
academy impinge upon OT studies and they are the focus of our attention 
under the rubric of `hermeneutical theory' 7. At a theoretical level an OT 
hermeneutic will always carry with it philosophical i. e. epistemological, 
ontological and anthropological, presuppositions. These are like the 
3A South African theologian, van Aarde (1988), has suggested that the emerging paradigm may be holism. 
Although Van Aarde is somewhat critical of this `emerging' paradigm, he implies that we need to wait and 
see what paradigm emerges. 
4See, for example, Braaten and Jenson, 1995. 
5See chapters one and six for a discussion of postmodernity. 
6Cf. Valdes, 1991: 6. 
70r 'philosophical hermeneutics. ' 
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scaffolding in a building and are always present in theory construction, 
whether acknowledged or note. And because of its textual character, OT 
studies is particularly vulnerable to the influence of literary theory, which 
has in any case recently exercised a powerful influence way beyond its 
disciplinary `boundaries'. 
This thesis is an attempt to examine how these major elements of the larger 
picture do and should shape work at one OT work site, namely the reading 
of Ecclesiastes. Ecclesiastes has been chosen for the focus of this study in 
order to give it exegetical bite. Ecclesiastes is reasonably short and a limited 
amount of secondary literature has developed in relation to it, thereby 
making this kind of cross-disciplinary work feasible. Ecclesiastes is also 
most intriguing in terms of the reading process, because, despite all the 
historical critical work done on it, there is still no agreement about its 
message. Scholars remain divided as to whether it is basically a positive 
book or decidedly negative. In this sense Ecclesiastes cries out for analysis 
of the different elements that constitute the reading process and how they 
shape the result. 
As Sternberg points out in the above quote, the sort of expertise required for 
an integral investigation of this sort is "not given to humans. " Indeed a 
danger of this thesis is that the range and the word limit conspire to make it 
impossible to be comprehensive at either the hermeneutical or the exegetical 
poles of the investigation. Nevertheless I regard the context described above 
as justifying the attempt to explore the interface between these two poles, 
and every attempt has been made to be as thorough as possible. 
There is at present a growing recognition that one's presuppositions shape 
one's scholarship. This is certainly so with this thesis. A starting point is that 
Christianity is public truth and that it is unhelpful to bracket out one's 
ultimate beliefs in one's scholarship. As Greenstein points out, "To engage 
in our work as Biblicists means we must exercise our beliefs. " This will be 
argued for in the course of the thesis and particularly at the outset of chapter 
seven, but it is as well for the reader to note my orientation at the outset. 
Theory, as Eagleton points out, is indispensable in scholarship, and I would 
8Note the quote from Eagleton at the outset of this introduction. Ignoring theory will not make it disappear, 
it simply goes underground as it were! 
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argue that for the Christian scholar this theory ought at root to be shaped by 
a religious (Christian) perspective. 
The course of our investigation is as follows: 
Chapter one surveys the terrain of philosophical hermeneutics as an 
inescapable background of contemporary OT interpretation. Chapter two 
surveys the history of the reading of Ecclesiastes. Chapter three examines 
the origin of the historical critical method in the context of modernity and 
the readings of Ecclesiastes that this has produced. Chapter four investigates 
the reactions to mainline hermeneutics embodied in Canon criticism, New 
Criticism (NC) and structuralism and their implications for OT studies and 
the reading of Ecclesiastes. Chapter five examines the narrative turn in OT 
studies and its application to Ecclesiastes. Chapter six explores the 
postmodern turn and its effect upon hermeneutics and OT studies. Chapter 





THE CONTEXT FOR READING ECCLESIASTES TODAY 
"For we see ... how decisive is our underlying theory of knowledge and our theory 
of the ontological status of a work, for they determine in advance the shape of our 
theory and practice in literary interpretation. " (Palmer, 1969: 80,81) 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is only during the last three hundred years that hermeneutics has become a 
discipline in itself (Mueller-Vollmer, 1992: 2). This development is the 
inescapable context in which biblical interpretation now takes place, so that 
any academic interpretation of Ecclesiastes has to take account of 
contemporary philosophical hermeneutics and its relationship to OT 
exegesis, and more specifically to the exegesis (reading) of Ecclesiastes. 
That exploration is the project of this thesis. In this chapter our concern is to 
survey the philosophical hermeneutical context which forms the backdrop of 
contemporary biblical interpretation. 
By `hermeneutics' we understand the theory of text-interpretation which we 
take to include the relationship between the general problem of 
understanding and the specific focus of text interpretation 1. Our orientation 
is of course towards the `theory of biblical text interpretation. ' This 
understanding of hermeneutics differs from traditional ones in its integration 
of the historicity of the interpreter as well as the historicity of the text into its 
approach2. This is what we mean by the `general problem of understanding, ' 
and it is the recognition of this second horizon of the reader in interpretation 
that undermines the naive realism that has dominated much of modern 
biblical interpretation, and problematises the process of `correct' 
interpretation. As Thiselton (1980: 11) says, "hermeneutics in the more 
recent sense of the term begins with the recognition that historical 
conditioning is two-sided: the modern interpreter, no less than the text, 
stands in a given historical context and tradition. " Interpretation thus 
1See Palmer (1969: 33-71) for a useful discussion of six modern definitions of hermeneutics and an 
examination of the meaning and scope of hermeneutics. 
2See Thiselton (1980: 10-12) on the difference between this understanding of hermeneutics and the 
traditional one of hermeneutics as method of biblical exegesis. 
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involves the fusion of the two horizons of reader and text in the reading 
process, the process which hermeneutics seeks to understand. 3 
Hermeneutics in this sense "bears the signature of modernity. " (Grondin, 
1994: 17) We will therefore briefly examine relevant aspects of premodern 
biblical interpretation, deal succinctly with the emergence of modern 
hermeneutics with particular reference to Spinoza, Kant and Schleiermacher, 
and then focus on Gadamer and post-Gadamerian hermeneutics4. 
Hermeneutics covers a vast terrain; our intention is to survey the most 
important developments as they relate to biblical interpretations. 
II `PRE-MODERN' HERMENEUTICS 
There are three major periods in the history of Western hermeneutics 
(Jeanrond, 1994: 13)6: firstly that of classical Greek literary theory and 
philosophy. Secondly that of Jewish and Christian theories of biblical 
interpretation and finally that of modernity. Post-modernity might suggest a 
further period but these developments are better seen as part of modernity7. 
Greek philosophy is the major source from which Western philosophy is 
derived, as the Greek revival in the Renaissance and Enlightenment 
demonstrates. As regards textual hermeneutics, the Greek contribution arose 
from the need to determine the meaning of literary texts, and especially 
Homer, in ancient Greek society. Indeed, as Jeanrond (1994: 13,14) points 
out, "Homeric criticism may be called the cradle of literary theory: it offered 
a scope, a terminology and a methodology for all future literary criticism in 
the West. " Two distinct methods of reading developed in this context, 
3Such an understanding of hermeneutics raises the important question of whether any room is left for a 
meaningful distinction between Hermeneutik and Rezeptiongeschichte. Is there a way of discerning a right 
from a wrong interpretation? As will become apparent I believe that it is possible and important to make 
such distinctions but that we cannot escape the historicity of interpretation. 
41 am well aware that this is to privilege Gadamer. On the centrality of Gadamer for philosophical 
hermeneutics see Grondin, 1994: 2. 
5Aspects of this history that receive detailed attention in later chapters will be dealt with briefly and 
forward references given in footnotes. 
61 am aware that periodisation is not a straightforward issue. Postmodern theory has made this clear (Cf. 
Preziosi, 1989 for example). I have put pre-modern in quotation marks to indicate awareness that my 
periodisation revolves around modernity, and that this may not be satisfactory. On the one hand it 
privileges the "modern" too much, and secondly it is far too blunt a tool for the surgical work that cultural 
analysis requires. For an example of a Christian (Reformational) analysis of modernity see Strauss (1995). 
7The significance of 'the postmodern turn' is discussed later in this chapter and in chapter six. 
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allegorical interpretation8 and grammatical interpretation, both of which 
played a dominant role in early Christian interpretation. 
At the centre of Christian biblical hermeneutics stands the Jesus event. Jesus 
clearly saw himself as fulfilling the OT, thereby ensuring that typology 
constituted an important part of Christian hermeneutics from the outset. The 
establishment of the canon focused the hermeneutical question for the 
Christian church, with two major hermeneutical schools developing: the 
allegorical school associated with Alexandria, and the literal, grammatical 
school associated with Antioch. These schools were not necessarily kept 
apart; Augustine's influential hermeneutic represents a synthesis of the two 
approaches (Jeanrond, 1994: 22). All this interpretation took place within a 
theistic, communal perspective with a trust in the contextual framework of 
tradition'°. This trust hardened into a rigid control in the Middle Ages 
(Jeanrond, 1994: 26), but prior to this there was a careful balance between 
tradition and Scripture in interpretation". 
The Reformation, building on the humanist rediscovery of ancient languages 
and texts, represented the triumph of literal, grammatical interpretation over 
allegorical interpretation and theological speculation in Protestant 
Christendom12. Sola Scriptura meant that correct interpretation became a 
critical issue in the life of the church. Scripture was regarded as self- 
interpreting but this did not mean that reason had no role to play. The 
Reformers recovered the tradition-Scripture balance that we witnessed in 
Irenaeus and Augustine. Thus, "Luther's hermeneutics is circular: the 
Scriptures provoke first a principal existential decision for or against `spirit', 
and secondly, only on the basis of such a principal decision in favour of 
spiritual existence can the reader embark on the detailed task of interpreting 
8Allegorical interpretation became dominant among Stoics in order to yield a philosophically acceptable 
meaning to the myths of Greek popular religion. Philo of Alexandria popularised the same method in 
interpretation of the OT for similar reasons. See Grondin, 1994: 23-32. 
9For an overview of Jewish hermeneutics see Jeanrond (1994: 15-17) and Loewe (1990). 
10See Thiselton, 1992: 145-173 for a discussion of the nature of tradition in pre-modern Christian 
interpretation. This communal emphasis of pre-modern Christian interpretation has a parallel in postmodern 
trends, as Thiselton points out, in contrast to the individualism of modernity. A difference is that whereas 
for pre-modern Christians their corporate values and beliefs were to be respected and trusted, for post- 
modern thinkers these corporate values are often thought to need unmasking. 
11Jeanrond, 1994: 22-26 argues that Augustine's hermeneutic is a model of such balance. See Grondin, 
1994: 32-39 on the contemporary importance of Augustine's hermeneutics. Heidegger and Gadamer revert 
to Augustine. 
12Mueller-Vollmer (1992: 2) and Grondin (1994: 42-44) regards Illyricus as the most important Protestant 
theorist of biblical interpretation. 
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the Scriptures. " (Jeanrond, 1994: 33) Calvin13 and Luther are both agreed that 
correct Scriptural interpretation arises out of a life lived coram deo. 
III MODERN HERMENEUTICAL THEORY 
Mueller-Vollmer (1992: 1-5) discerns four streams that flow together into 
modern hermeneutics. They are the hermeneutics of the Reformers, the 
resurgence of interest in Greek and Roman classical texts and the resultant 
philological developments, the development of a special hermeneutics of 
jurisprudence resulting from renewed interest in Roman law and finally the 
influence of Enlightenment philosophy. The latter was particularly 
significant since it was only as philosophers focused on hermeneutical 
problems that general hermeneutics emerged as a discipline in its own right. 
Certainly for biblical hermeneutics the philosophical paradigm shift that 
modernity entailed was fraught with significance since it effectively called 
into question the role of Christian tradition in interpretation, as is particularly 
clear in the hermeneutics of Spinoza and Kant in which human autonomy is 
central. 
In the seventeenth century an initial universal hermeneutics was developed 
by Dannhauer, Meier and Chladenius along rationalist lines14. However, 
Kant's critique of reason "dissolved the rationalism to which Dannhauer, 
Spinoza, Chladenius, and Meier owed their allegiance" and in Kant's 
"distinction between phenomena and things in themselves lies one of the 
secret roots of Romanticism and the emergence of hermeneutics. " (Grondin, 
1994: 64) The Romantic hermeneutics of Schleiermacher made room for 
religion but very much within the emerging paradigm of modernity and still 
in an ahistorical way. Droysen and Dilthey were key thinkers in setting in 
motion a focus upon the historical dimension of hermeneuticsls, which is 
developed by Heidegger and brought to fruition by Gadamer, who has in the 
process thoroughly resurrected the notion of tradition and prejudice in 
hermeneutics. And Gadamer is the central figure of philosophical 
hermeneutics in the twentieth century. 
We cannot review this history in detail, and shall confine ourselves to 
examining the crucial Enlightenment figures of Spinoza and Kant, with 
13See Torrance (1988) on Calvin's hermeneutics. 
14See Grondin, 1994: 45-62. Note that Dannhauer preceded Schleiermacher in universalising hermeneutics. 
15See Grondin, 1994: 76-90. 
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particular reference to the role they assign religion epistemologically. We 
will then move on via Schleiermacher and Heidegger to Gadamer and the 
main reactions to his hermeneutics. 
1. SPINOZA 
In contemporary texts on biblical hermeneutics little attention is given to 
Spinoza (1632-1677)16. Norris (1991b) by contrast insists that Spinoza is of 
major significance not just for Scriptural interpretation but because he 
anticipates and gives a helpful perspective upon many of the issues that 
concern literary theorists today'7. Spinoza's Jewish background and his 
conflict with his Jewish co-religionists and Dutch Calvinism ensured that he 
gave sustained attention to religion and the interpretation of Scripture, and 
particularly the OT. This combination makes him particularly interesting 
with respect to philosophy and OT hermeneutics. 
According to Spinoza the world is understandable by reason, and falsity is 
the result of privation of knowledge resulting from inadequate ideas. 
Adequate ideas are universal ideas which are logically connected with other 
ideas. The key to successful human life, according to Spinoza, is the 
development of adequate ideas. Democratic society, which protects freedom 
of inquiry is the best political context for such ideas to develop, and Spinoza 
is concerned to undermine anything that subverts adequate ideas and 
tolerance. Thus it is not surprising that his detailed consideration of Scripture 
and its proper interpretation occurs in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. 
Spinoza was well aware that concepts of reason, religion and Scriptural 
interpretation have immense implications for society. 
Spinoza's scriptural hermeneutic is shaped by his philosophy, although he 
does insist that "the Bible must not be accommodated to reason, nor reason 
to the Bible. " (195)18 He rightly makes the point that a high view of 
16In his two volumes Thiselton (1980,1992) has only six references to Spinoza. Jeanrond (1991) has one 
brief reference. Most remarkably Reventlow (1984) has no reference to Spinoza whatsoever in his nearly 
seven hundred pages on the authority of the Bible and the rise of the modern world! Grant (1984) devotes 
four pages to Spinoza and notes that "Spinoza's method is very much like that followed in modern 
introductions to the Bible. It is clear and rational. It avoids all the theological questions involved in the 
interpretation of scripture; for scripture has no authority over the interpreter's mind. " (Grant, 1984: 108) 
17Norris (1991b), in a remarkably interesting text, seeks to show how Spinoza continues to influence 
current debates in literary theory and is relevant to gaining a perspective upon the postmodern turn. 
18A11 quotes from Spinoza in this section come from A Theologico-Political Treatise, translated by Elwes, 
published 1951. After quotes I have put the relevant page numbers in brackets. 
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Scripture should result in a method of interpretation that ensures it is 
Scripture that is heard and not just our prejudices and traditions. For Spinoza 
this is particularly important since Scripture often contains what cannot be 
known to reason, but only by revelation. Spinoza aims to read Scripture in a 
fresh and impartial manner and argues for a literal reading by means of 
natural reason. A major element of such an approach is the historical 
dimension of Scriptural texts: "The universal rule, then, in interpreting 
Scripture is to accept nothing as an authoritative Scriptural statement which 
we do not perceive very clearly when we examine it in the light of its 
history. " (101) Spinoza eschews the sort of allegorisation undertaken by 
Maimonides which seeks through subtle means to secure agreement between 
Scripture and reason. Meaning and truth must be clearly distinguished 19, and 
scriptural meaning must be judged by reason. 
There is a tension here since while on the one hand Spinoza acknowledges 
that Scripture regularly contains what can be known only by revelation, on 
the other hand he is opposed to submitting reason to Scripture. Much of this 
tension is defused by his distinguishing between the Word of God and 
Scripture and by his categorisation of much of the OT historical and 
prophetic material as imaginary and adjusted to the masses. Spinoza prefers 
the NT to the Old, since it contains more intelligible argument. Furthermore 
Spinoza distinguishes between theology and philosophy by arguing that 
although Scripture contains a small core of ideas "the sphere of theology is 
piety and obedience" whereas "[t]he sphere of reason is ... truth and 
wisdom. " (194) "Philosophy has no end in view save truth: faith, as we have 
abundantly proved, looks for nothing but obedience and piety. " (189) The 
practical limits of theology are made quite clear in Spinoza's statement that 
"[t]heology tells us nothing else, enjoins on us no command save obedience, and 
has neither the will nor the power to oppose reason: she defines the dogmas of 
faith ... only in so far as they may be necessary for obedience, and leaves reason to determine their precise truth: for reason is the light of the mind, and without her 
all things are dreams and phantoms. " (194,195) 
Although Spinoza thus maintains that "the Bible leaves reason absolutely 
free" (9) and argues that reason should not be submitted to Scripture nor vice 
versa, in practice his philosophy determines the understanding of Scriptural 
ideas, as for example his treatment of the OT theme of election makes clear. 
19See Norris, 1991b: 194ff for a critique of Kermode's appropriation of Spinoza as one who blurs the 
distinction between meaning and truth, thereby generating a plurality of meanings. 
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By `the help of God' Spinoza understands the fixed order of nature and since 
no one can do anything except by this order "it follows that no one can 
choose a plan of life for himself, or accomplish any work save by God's 
vocation choosing him for the work or the plan of life in question, rather 
than any other. " (45) 
Spinoza's hermeneutic is an important early opponent of the orthodox model 
which subjugated critical reason to religious or doctrinal truth. In practice he 
reverses this relationship, making the meaning of Scripture accountable to 
the bar of critical reason. Although a rationalist Spinoza's historical 
emphasis anticipates many elements of the historical critical method of 
biblical interpretation that would develop in nineteenth century Germany20. 
Already at the end of the seventeenth century Spinoza is stressing the need 
to re-evaluate traditional authors of biblical books and their contexts of 
origin. For example, he rejects Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and 
argues that Ezra is the author of the larger narrative of the history of the 
Jews from their beginning down to the destruction of Jerusalem. 21 And he 
insists that these types of historical questions are crucial for correct 
understanding of the OT. Finally it is refreshing to note that Spinoza was 
well aware that a critical issue in the debate over the interpretation of 
Scripture is that of the relationship between faith and reason, theology and 
philosophy. It is rare to find biblical scholars addressing this issue 
nowadays, but it is a foundational issue that shapes the direction any biblical 
hermeneutic takes. 
2. KANT 
"No thinker ever placed greater emphasis on reason's boundaries than Kant; at the 
same time, none has ever been bolder in asserting its unqualified title to govern 
our lives. " (Wood, 1992: 414) 
The issue of the relationship between faith and reason was central to German 
philosophy in the second half of the eighteenth century. 22 Enlightenment 
rationalism received strong opposition from the Pietists who saw rationalism 
20See Preus (1995) for a useful analysis of the difference between Meyer's philosophical hermeneutic and 
Spinoza's historical one. Preus (1995: 367) comments that "Spinoza's definitive substitution of history for 
philosophy as the categorial matrix for biblical interpretation makes the Treatise paradigmatic in the sense 
of an exemplary work that systematically formulates a new historical, critical, and comparative approach to 
" the Bible. " 
21At an elementary level Spinoza in this way anticipates debates such as that over the deuteronomistic 
history. 
22This was made particularly clear to me by Beiser (1987). 
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as a threat to faith and in the 1740's and 1750's their opposition received 
new impetus through the writings of Crusius. The effect of this controversy 
was that the rationalists seemed to be faced with the dilemma of either a 
rational scepticism or an irrational fideism. The main task of Kant's 
philosophy in the 1750's was to provide a new foundation for metaphysics in 
the light of Crusius' criticisms, and although he later became sceptical about 
the possibility of metaphysics the question of the vindication of reason 
remained central to his mature philosophy. Kant sought to secure reason 
through a synthesis of the best insights of rationalism and empiricism23. 
For Kant the human mind is the ultimate source of meaning and 
understanding; objective reality can only be known as it conforms to the 
structures of the knowing mind. In this way Kant acknowledges both the 
value and limitations of reason. The world can never be known as it is in 
itself, but only through the point of view by which it is perceived. "The 
world is as we think it, and we think it as it is. " (Scruton, 1982: 23) Kant's 
Copernican revolution consisted in making our cognitive capacities primary 
over nature. 
As the quote above from Wood indicates, if Kant stressed the limitations of 
reasons he also stressed its autonomy. Rationalism is too ambitious, in his 
view, and he compares it to the builders of the tower of Babel (O'Neill, 
1992: 289,290). However, the desire for autonomy that motivates the project 
is quite right; what is required is a more modest plan. We need to ask what 
can be built with the labour and materials available to us. 
"Kant represents attempts to ground practices of reason as a matter of proceeding 
with the `materials' and `labor power' that our daily practice of defective 
reasoning has made available to us, and rebuilding these in ways that reduce 
dangers of collapse or paralysis in thought or action. " (O'Neill, 1992: 291,292) 
Kant proposes that we think of reason as a discipline which rejects external 
authorities, and is reflexive in that it involves self-discipline and is lawlike. 24 
In terms of the relationship between reason and faith/religion the character 
of reason as negative in the sense of rejecting external authorities is 
particularly significant. For Kant autonomy is a fundamental characteristic 
23Scruton, 1982: 11-21 indicates that Leibniz (1646-1716) and Hume (1711-1776) form the particular 
background to Kant's thought in his Critique of Pure Reason. Scruton (1982: 38) maintains that one might 
call Kant's synthesis an attempt to give a fully enriched account of the objectivity of the physical world. 
24See O'Neill (1992) for a very useful discussion of Kant's mature view of reason. 
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of reason: "Reason is indeed the basis of enlightenment, but enlightenment is 
no more than autonomy in thinking and acting - that is, of thought and action 
that are lawful yet assume no lawgiver. " (O'Neill, 1992: 299) Judgement is 
possible with phenomenal objects alone, and not the noumenal. The latter 
can be used only negatively in order to demarcate the limits of experience. 
This limitation arises from the fact that all attempts to embrace the noumenal 
world in a rational system will ultimately fail since they always end in 
unresolvable contradictions or antinomies. 
Religion is made subservient to morality in Kant's scheme which defines 
religion as "the cognition of all duties as divine commands. "25 Kant was 
opposed to religious ceremonies and regarded creeds as an imposition upon 
our inner freedom of thought. Morality leads to religion and we can be 
justified practically in holding religious propositions, but religious beliefs 
are necessary only in so far as they support our sense of morality. Religious 
tutelage is strongly rejected by Kant and as Scruton (1982: 78) puts it, 
"Kant's writings on religion exhibit one of the first attempts at the 
systematic demystification of theology. " Worship of God is translated into 
veneration of morality, and faith into certainty of practical reason. "The 
object of esteem is not the Supreme Being, but the supreme attribute of 
rationality. " (Scruton, 1982: 78) In this way Kant's philosophy epitomises 
the move from providence to progress26. 
Plantinga (1995: 30-37) argues that Kant's understanding of reality 
represents a turning on its head of a Christian perspective, especially if taken 
to its logical conclusion in what Plantinga calls "creative anti-realism. " From 
a Christian perspective God's knowledge is creative; from a Kantian 
perspective our knowledge is creative. Plantinga suggests that it is an easy 
step from the view that we are responsible for the way the world is to the 
postmodern view that we do not all live in the same world. Thus Plantinga 
suggest that the creative anti-realism of postmodernity has its roots in 
Kantian idealism and that this tendency is profoundly unchristian27. 
25See Wood, 1992: 406-408. 
26See Lyon (1994: 5) for the description of modernity as a move from providence to progress. 
27Cf. this with Norris' (1990b) suggestion that postmodern indeterminacy has its roots in Christian readings 
of the Old Testament. For a very different analysis of Kant by a Christian philosopher to that of Plantinga 
see Westpahl (1993). 
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Kant's idealism does take account of human finitude but his insistence on 
human autonomy makes it difficult to reconcile his account of reason with a 
Christian perspective. In the latter sense he reinforces the essential 
Enlightenment belief in the authority of reason. The extent to which this is at 
odds with a view of Christianity as public truth is well captured by the title 
of Wolterstorff's (1984) Reason Within the Bounds of Religion. Gruenler 
(1991: 38) is right that "the biblical interpreter who accepts the Kantian 
dichotomy will confine religious experience to the domain of personal, 
transcendental faith (which cannot be touched by historical criticism) and 
confine the historical-critical method to analysis of natural cause and effect 
without recourse to matters of faith or supernatural revelation. " The 
subjective realm of the transcendental ego is reserved as the one area of 
freedom where God can be experienced but only subjectively, so that 
"encounter with God will be confined to the subjective realm, while the 
Bible will be subjected to naturalistic criticism according to the rational 
canons of purely historical research. " (Gruenler, 1991: 40) Such a shift is 
evident in Kant's own readings of Scripture (Cf. Edgar, 1992), and amply 
supported by De Wette and other OT theologians who were deeply indebted 
to Kant28. 
Kant shares with Spinoza an emphasis on human autonomy, but his 
articulation of the limits of reason undermined the rationalist presupposition 
that the mind could penetrate the logical construction of the world. As 
Grondin (1994: 63ff) points out this problematising of rational access to the 
world dissolved the rationalism of Dannhauer and Spinoza and opened the 
door to the subjectivism of Romanticism, in which, along Greek lines, the 
unity of the whole is discovered through `intuition'. 
3. SCHLEIERMACHER 
Schleiermacher's significance lies in the synthesis he developed between 
religion and human autonomy in a context that increasingly saw religion as 
irrelevant29. Religious reality is to be understood, according to 
Schleiermacher, through an analysis of human consciousness focused on 
28See Rogerson, 1992: 26-32 for the major influence of Kant upon De Wette, the father of OT criticism. 
29For a useful discussion of this see Vander Goot (1979). Vandergoot (1979: 177) points out that 
Schleiermacher's Reden "effected a resolution of the problem of the relation of culture and religion, or 
reason and faith, that became widely acceptable to Christians in the nineteenth century. " Reardon (1985) 
and Vandergoot stress Schleiermacher's indebtedness to Kant and in particular to Spinoza. 
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feeling and intuition30. In this way Schleiermacher developed a romanticist 
interpretation of religion which fits with the Enlightenment insistence upon 
human autonomy. As Reardon (1985: 57,58) points out, 
`overall the impression he leaves in the mind of the reader is that of a theology 
subtly transformed into a philosophy of idealist monism. ... The traditional landmarks are all there: revelation, the Bible, the articles of faith, the church. Yet 
all show up in a perspective new and somehow altered. ... The viewpoint has shifted, that is, from a theocentrism to an anthropocentrism, so that what really 
has happened, one begins to suspect, is that Christian dogmatics has been covertly 
translated into a philosophy of the religious consciousness, for which a variety of 
elements have been drawn upon. "3 t 
In line with Romanticism32 Schleiermacher recognised the limits of reason in 
achieving understanding. Authors were understood as creators and their 
productions as works of art so that understanding involved re-living and re- 
thinking the thoughts and feelings of an author33. Thus Schleiermacher 
speaks of interpretation as an art and compares the process to that of getting 
to know a friend34. 
The transcendental turn to Schleiermacher's hermeneutics is significant. "For 
Schleiermacher, hermeneutics was ... above all concerned with illuminating 
the conditions for the possibility of understanding and its modes of 
interpretation. " (Mueller-Vollmer, 1992: 9) This universalisation of 
hermeneutics was not new35; Schleiermacher's original contribution lay in 
his "universalisation of misunderstanding, " whereby he stressed that 
understanding needs to proceed kunstgemäss at every point (Cf. Grondin, 
1994: 63-75). This transcendental turn has received increasing attention 
among twentieth century philosophers, and it is here that Schleiermacher's 
major contribution lies. 
30Schleiermacher's understanding of religion and Christianity is more complex than this brief description. 
See Reardon, 1985: 29-58. 
31Reardon (1985: 10) points out that the Romantic understanding of religion with its subjectivising 
tendency marks the start of "that process of immanentizing religious reality which was characteristic of the 
nineteenth century in general and which, despite the neo-orthodox reaction, has continued through the 
present century as well. " 
32On the nature of Romanticism see Reardon, 1985: 1-28. Cf. Thiselton, 1992: 209-216 for the diverse 
influences upon Schleiermacher. 
33Reardon (1985: 8) points out that it was in the personal imagination that the romantics located the real 
creative principle. 
34This implies a very positive approach to a text: "We may assume that the author is at fault only when our 
overview of the text uncovers evidence that the author is careless and imprecise, or confused and without 
talent. " (Schleiermacher in Mueller-Vollmer, 1992: 88) 
35See Grondin, 1994: 50. 
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Understanding a text involves re-experiencing the mental processes of the 
author. Schleiermacher discerns two aspects to such understanding, a 
grammatical and a psychological or technical. The first concerns the 
understanding of an expression solely in terms of its relationship to the 
language of which it is a part. The second concerns the expression as part of 
the author's life-process and involves the comparative and the divinatory 
method36. As Thiselton (1992: 206) points out, "Schleiermacher therefore 
explicitly raised for the first time a question which remains of permanent 
importance for hermeneutics: can we interpret the meaning of texts purely 
with reference to their language, or purely with reference to their author's 
intention, or does textual meaning reside somehow in the inter-relation or 
inter-action between both? " 
With Schleiermacher we are also well on the way to a developed 
understanding of the hermeneutical circle37. The process of understanding 
must begin with a preliminary attempt to understand the whole, only then 
can one apply oneself to the details. This spiral moves between the 
grammatical and psychological, between the general and the particular and 
between the divinatory and comparative. Schleiermacher believes that 
through this process it is possible to understand a text better than its author; 
indeed this is the task of interpretation. 
Schleiermacher's focus of hermeneutics upon the process of understanding 
is to be welcomed but there is a tendency in his approach to make the real 
focus of interpretation the author's thoughts and experience which lie behind 
the text rather than the text itself (Grondin, 1994: 71,72). The divinatory 
aspect of interpretation is related to Schleiermacher's romantic tendency to 
focus on human subjectivity as the key to understanding reality so that the 
intuition of the reader is privileged as the means - and the subjective 
experience behind the text become the focus - of interpretation. This is 
evident in Schleiermacher's approach to Scripture, which is seen as a 
symbolic account of religious consciousness. This experience is the crucial 
element and can be reproduced because it is in our consciousness as well. 
Thus scripture is only a mausoleum, a monument that a great spirit who once 
was there is there no longer. 
36For an explanation of the divinatory and comparative by Schleiermacher see Mueller-Vollmer, 1992: 96. 
37Already Wolff and Ast had developed this idea. 
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Schleiermacher's reading of Scripture through the grid of his analysis of 
religious consciousness alerts us to the extent to which his understanding of 
religion operates within the modern worldview. His perspective on reality is 
Kantian in its starting with an analysis of reality as we experience it, and 
then finding room in this for religion. Hence Thielicke's description of his 
theology as `Cartesian'38. Thus, although Schleiermacher makes room for 
religion, it is very much within the bounds of human autonomy. 
Palmer (1969: 75) correctly alerts us to the atemporal dimension in 
Schleiermacher's hermeneutic. Dilthey sought to introduce a critique of 
historical reason through his development of the psychological emphasis in 
Schleiermacher's hermeneutic. 39 This historical turn in hermeneutics is of 
great significance for biblical hermeneutics, for as Nicholson (1981) 
explains, it was nineteenth century historical philosophy which shaped the 
historical critical method. 
"To a remarkable extent, indeed to a greater extent than has often been realized or 
acknowledged, it was this historical thinking that provided the basis of biblical 
hermeneutics in the nineteenth century, and more than the theologians and biblical 
scholars themselves it was the leading figures of the German historical school - Barthold Gustav Niebuhr, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Leopold von Ranke, Johan 
Gustav Droysen, Theodor Mommsen, and others - who created the interpretive 
framework and provided the method. " 
(Nicholson, 1981: 16)40 
In chapter three we will examine this historical turn in more detail. In this 
survey we proceed to Heidegger who introduced the element of radical 
historicity into hermeneutics41. 
4. HEIDEGGER 
Heidegger's philosophy is strongly ontological and his epistemology is 
rooted in his ontology of Dasein. Sein can only be investigated if one begins 
with Dasein, which does not have a viewpoint outside of history. In this 
sense "[t]he phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic. " (Heidegger, 
1962: 62) This approach allowed Heidegger to rethink the subject-object 
38See Thielicke, 1974: 38-45 and cf. Thiselton, 1992: 230ff for a critical assessment of Thielicke's view. 
Overall I think Thielicke is correct. 
39See Bleicher, 1980: 16-26 for a brief discussion of this development in hermeneutics. 
'See Grondin, 1994: 76-90 on historicism and hermeneutics. 
41Heidegger built in this respect upon Dilthey's historical hermeneutic. For a discussion of Dilthey's view 
of history and hermeneutics see Grondin, 1994: 84-90 and Plantinga, 1979 and 1980. 
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relationship in knowing along historical lines, and it is here that his most 
significant hermeneutical contribution lies42. "Worldhood" refers to that 
whole in which the human person finds herself immersed. It is ontological 
and apriori, given along with Dasein and prior to all conceptualising. To 
conceive of objects as merely "present-at-hand" involves secondary 
conceptualisation. The primary relationship of humans to objects is as 
"ready-to-hand. " This contrasts with the Cartesian scientific orientation 
which makes secondary conceptualisation primary (Cf. Thiselton, 1980: 157- 
161,187-191). 
Understanding is related to interpretation in that interpretation is not the 
acquiring of information about what is understood but the working out of the 
possibilities projected in understanding. What is understood has the structure 
of something as something. Interpretation is grounded in a "fore-having" 
(Vorhabe). "An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of 
something presented to us. " (Heidegger, 1962: 191,192) When this as- 
structure becomes explicit the object has become meaningful for us. 
Interpretation thus inevitably involves the hermeneutical circle: "Any 
interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have 
understood what is to be interpreted. " (Heidegger, 1969: 194,195) 
In this way Heidegger opened the way for the recognition of the radical 
historicity of hermeneutics; indeed the question of Being can only be asked 
within time in his view. Gadamer (1989: 242,243) says of Heidegger: "But 
the concept of substance is in fact inadequate for historical being and 
knowledge; Heidegger was the first to make generally known the radical 
challenge of thought implicit in this inadequacy. He was the first to liberate 
Dilthey's philosophical intention. " This historicity of the interpreter has 
radical implications for hermeneutics and is central to Gadamer's 
hermeneutic. 
5. GADAMER 
Gadamer ascribes primary importance to understanding and insists on the 
historical nature of understanding itself: 
42Speaking of the tension between objectivity and prejudice Thiselton (1980: 27) comments that "Heidegger 
has paid closer attention to the two-sidedness of this problem than perhaps any other thinker. " 
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"Heidegger entered into the problems of historical hermeneutics and critique only 
in order to explicate the fore-structure of understanding for the purposes of 
ontology. Our question, by contrast, is how hermeneutics once freed from the 
ontological obstructions of the scientific concept of objectivity, can do justice to 
the historicity of understanding. " (Gadamer, 1989: 265) 
Schleiermacher understood hermeneutics as the means of overcoming the 
historical distance between the interpreter and the object of his 
interpretation. However, for Gadamer "[a]ny interpretations of the past, 
whether they were performed by an historian, philosopher, linguist, or 
literary scholar, are as much a creature of the interpreter's own time and 
place as the phenomenon under investigation was of its own time and period 
in history. " (Mueller-Vollmer, 1992: 38) 
Part one of Gadamer's Truth and Method is concerned with the question of 
truth as it emerges in the understanding of art. Gadamer argues that 
experience and not abstraction is the key to understanding art. He attacks the 
Enlightenment exaltation of theoretical reason, as articulated by Descartes in 
particular, and appeals to Aristotle's notion of practical knowledge and the 
sensus communis. This has significance for hermeneutics in general; 
hermeneutics must be so understood as to do justice to the experience of art. 
In part two of Truth and Method Gadamer analyses the hermeneutic tradition 
stemming from Schleiermacher and develops his own historical approach. In 
contrast to Enlightenment attitudes Gadamer sees all interpretation as always 
guided by its own prejudice (Gadamer, 1989: 265-285). This prejudice is not 
just negative and it cannot be simply discarded: "Using Heidegger, Gadamer 
rejects the Enlightenment prejudice against one's having presuppositions and 
working prejudgements, and the concomitant Enlightenment emasculation of 
tradition - as if one who does not question the prejudices of his own age is 
therefore a model knower. " (Seerveld, 1978: 488) The Enlightenment 
manifests a prejudice against prejudice whereas Gadamer refuses to set 
reason in opposition to tradition. Indeed understanding takes place as an 
event within a tradition. In contrast to existential thinking Gadamer tries to 
locate meaning in the larger context of the community, as his view of 
tradition demonstrates. 
In the light of the historicity of all interpretation, how is understanding 
possible? Certainly for Gadamer, the historicity of all interpretation makes 
Schleiermacher's aim of reconstructing the original world of the text 
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impossible. What makes understanding possible is Wirkungsgeschichte 
(ever-interacting history). This refers to the overriding historical continuum 
and cultural tradition of which both interpreter and historical object are part. 
Thus hermeneutics aims at prejudgements that will foster a fusion of the past 
with the present which facilitates the miracle of understanding, the sharing 
of a common meaning by temporally distant consciousnesses. In this fusing 
of horizons distance and critical tension are never completely obliterated; 
indeed the hermeneutic task is to foreground the tensions. Nevertheless 
interpretation always involves application. 
Interpretation proceeds through a dialectical process of question and answer. 
Gadamer is opposed to trying to fix once and for all the meaning of a text. 
Our interpretation is only one actualization of the historical potential of a 
text so that correct interpretation will be characterised by unending dialogue. 
Knowledge is inherently dialectical and we humans are conversations. The 
interpreter is to melt into the continuing, enlarging, ever-interacting-history 
of tradition, or risk hubris. 
This does not mean that the interpreter is free to simply dominate the text 
with imposed meanings. The good interpreter lets the text speak and 
convince the receiving interpreter. 
"One could say that Gadamer is pointing out the philosophical reason why so 
much literary criticism ... and critical analysis of `the other's' scholarship is judgmental rape of the text, when it should be a love affair, if hermeneutical 
activity is meant to be humane. Interpretation in the humanities went wrong, and 
remains obstinately wrongheaded, for Gadamer when it tried to understand art, 
literature, and research in the cultural sciences as if it were dissecting bugs and 
smashing atoms. " (Seerveld, 1978: 488) 
In part three of Truth and Method Gadamer offers a draft for an ontology of 
language-in-action. He proposes an ontology in which all understanding 
rests in language itself and seeks to explore systematically the universal 
conditions for just interpretation which will not presume interpretation can 
be ahistorical. 
Since Gadamer's approach no other really ground-breaking hermeneutical 
innovations have appeared, but his hermeneutics has generated numerous 
debates. Indeed Gadamer is a pivotal figure between modern and 
postmodern paradigms of thinking. Thiselton (1992: 314) draws attention 
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"to Gadamer's role in focusing for hermeneutics, and addressing, a cluster of 
metacritical questions concerning the basis of understanding and of our possible 
relation to truth. Gadamer's distinctive way of addressing these questions not only 
constitutes a point of transition towards a new paradigm of hermeneutical theory; 
it also places him firmly on the boundary-line between modern and post-modern 
thought. " 
According to Thiselton (1992: 318) the focus on metacritical issues that one 
finds in Gadamer emerges from three directions: firstly the problem of 
radical historical finitude; secondly the problem of the constitutive role of 
language in understanding and thirdly the unease that has beset academic 
disciplines as they submit to reappraisal what have been regarded as 
foundations for their methods. 
In the remainder of this paper we will makes some further comments about 
the postmodern turn and then examine the main ways in which Gadamer has 
been appropriated in contemporary hermeneutics. 
6. POSTMODERNITY 
Gadamer is 'appropriated by Habermas who wants to get the project of 
modernity back on track, by a postmodernist pragmatist like Rorty43, and by 
Ricoeur. We will briefly explore the nature of the postmodern turn before 
examining the different ways in which Habermas, Rorty and Ricoeur 
develop Gadamer's thought. The specifically `postmodern' debate began as 
a reaction to modernism in the arts in the 60's and was extended to a critique 
of Western culture in its entirety in the 80's as philosophers joined the 
debate in earnest44. There are cultural, social (late capitalism) and 
philosophical elements to the `postmodern condition'. Philosophically 
postmodernity involves a foundational crisis in the project of modernity. A 
marked pluralism characterises epistemology, ontology and anthropology as 
the modern `consensus' is increasingly questioned. This pluralism has major 
implications for hermeneutics, as the writings of Rorty, Derrida, Foucault 
and Lyotard demonstrate. The relativistic extremes of the postmodern 
debate, exemplified by Baudrillard and Lyotard, are however only one 
stream in the contemporary philosophical scenario. Habermas, Ricoeur, 
431 have found Warnke (1987) particularly useful in terms of the reactions of Habermas and Rorty to 
Gadamer. 
44See chapter six for a more detailed discussion of the postmodern turn. 
21 
Norris and many others discuss many of the same issues but from a 
perspective of refining the project of modernity. 
The philosophical diversity of `the postmodern turn' has been powerfully 
experienced in biblical hermeneutics, as in virtually all disciplines. Within 
biblical studies this influence has generally been mediated through literary 
theory which has itself come over the past decades to exercise a powerful 
influence far beyond its disciplinary boundaries45. The turn to literary theory 
is related to the crisis in the nature of philosophy as it has been practised in 
the Western tradition. 
The effect of the literary turn, especially in biblical hermeneutics, should not 
be underestimated. It provides the most radical challenge to traditional 
models which has yet arisen. The very possibility of determinate and true 
readings of texts has been called into question by much postmodern literary 
theory. Author, reader and text and their interrelationships have come under 
fresh scrutiny and a variety of positions has developed. Hirsch (1967) 
maintains that textual meaning is inseparable from authorial intention46; 
Barthes (1988), Foucault (1984) and others have pronounced the author 
dead. Burke (1992) has recently declared the return of the author! The reader 
and his/her role in the construction of meaning has received close attention 
with a whole variety of proposals made (Cf. Suleiman, 1980, Freund, 1987 
and Holub, 1984) 
The nature of textuality itself has become highly problematic. New Criticism 
(NC) focused literary theory on the text itself, and as a result of 
structuralism, deconstruction and poststructuralism the nature of textuality 
has come under close scrutiny. Up until recently the classical-humanist 
paradigm of textuality had dominated the history of biblical interpretation. 
According to this tradition, texts are stretches of language which express the 
thoughts of their authors, and refer to the extra-linguistic world. Texts were 
seen as mediating inter-personal communication. The new approaches have 
called every aspect of this tradition into question. 
45Cf. Norris' (1994: 114) reference to literary theory's colonizing drive into other disciplines. In the process 
of this colonizing activity the boundary between philosophy and literary theory has been blurred, so that 
literary conferences have often become predominantly philosophical. This blurring serves as a reminder 
that in reality literary theory has mediated and actively promoted the influence of certain philosophies 
rather than literary theory per se being the origin of the postmodern 'literary' turn. This is important, 
because as Thiselton (1992: 472) says, "If there is any area at all in theology and biblical studies where 
attention to method and to theory is crucial, it is here. " 
46Cf. Betti's hermeneutic. See Grondin, 1994: 125-129. 
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7. RICOEUR 
"Beyond the desert of criticism, we wish to be called again. " (Ricoeur, 1969: 349) 
Ricoeur is particularly significant for his understanding of interpretation as a 
semantic event, of the fusion of text and interpreter through the interplay of 
metaphor and symbol in a reading along the lines of a second naivete47. In 
contrast to Gadamer, Ricoeur seeks to bring together explanation and 
understanding48. For Gadamer, in Ricoeur's view, the two collapse into each 
other so that there tends to be no space for critical testings of understandings. 
For Ricoeur `explanation' embodies a hermeneutic of suspicion: the 
willingness to expose and to abolish idols which are mere projections of the 
human will. Ricoeur (preface to Ihde, 1971: xv) is critical of the 
Enlightenment insofar as it locates meaning in the subject; he professes 
"a permanent mistrust of the pretensions of the subject in posing itself as the 
foundation of its own meaning. The reflective philosophy to which I appeal is at 
the outset opposed to any philosophy of the Cartesian type ... the understanding 
of the self is always indirect and proceeds from the interpretation of signs given 
outside me in culture and history ... the self of self-understanding 
is a gift of 
understanding itself and of the invitation from the meaning inscribed in the 
text. "a9 
However, Ricoeur has no desire to be pre-modern. We cannot, nor should 
we, try to escape the lessons of the masters of suspicion, Nietzsche, Marx 
and Freud. Hence `explanation' is an imperative part of interpretation5O. 
However explanation alone is inadequate: "to smash the idols is also to let 
symbols speak. " (Ricoeur in Reagan and Stewart, 1978: 219) An effect of 
Cartesian epistemology is that Western civilisation has lost a sensitivity to 
symbolic language (Mudge, 1980: 4). Secularisation has led to an 
estrangement from the kerygmatic situation so that we need to move beyond 
suspicion to recover this sensitivity: "Myth's literal function must be 
suspended, but its symbolic function must be affirmed. " (Mudge, 1980: 8) 
`Understanding' entails a willingness to listen with openness to symbols and 
to indirect language in such a way that we experience being called again. 
47The range of Ricoeur's work is staggering and it is impossible to do justice to the breadth and 
development of his thought in this section. Clark (1990) is a helpful survey of Ricoeur's thought, and I have 
found Fodor (1995) and Vanhoozer (1990) helpful in terms of Ricoeur's approach to and significance for 
biblical hermeneutics. 
480n this issue see Ricoeur, 1981: 145-164. 
49Note here the phenomenological rootage of Ricoeur's philosophy (Cf. Mudge, 1980: 9-15). 
50See Ricoeur's "The Critique of Religion" (Reagan and Stewart, 1978: 212-222) for a concise statement of 
Ricoeur's insistence upon demystification in interpretation. 
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In his later writings Ricoeur focuses particularly on metaphor and narrative. 
Unlike conceptual language which reflects already-perceived actualities, 
metaphors create possible ways of seeing. Ricoeur develops a theory of 
metaphor in which the basic unit is the sentence and in which metaphor 
makes new connections through the use of creative imagination. His more 
innovative and influential contribution emerges in the way he connects 
metaphor with narrative. For Ricoeur the synthesis of the heterogeneous 
brings narrative close to metaphor. Narrative orders scattered sequential 
experiences and events into a coherent structure of human time. This 
refigured world becomes revelatory and transformative. Narrative constructs 
a world of the possible. 
There is good reason for the positive appropriation of Ricoeur by 
theologianssl. Ricoeur's positive stance towards symbol makes him open to 
religious experience, and although Ricoeur (1980: 156) retains a commitment 
to the autonomy of `responsible thought'52, he also wants to secure a 
fundamental place for religion and theology. Not only has Ricoeur written 
extensively about literary theoretical and hermeneutical issues53 but he has 
specifically focused on biblical interpretation. 54 
Remarkably Ricoeur (1980: 73-118) specifically addresses the issue of a 
hermeneutic of Scripture as revelation. He recognises that revelation is the 
first and last word for faith and seeks to develop a hermeneutic of revelation 
which overcomes the opposition between an authoritative understanding of 
revelation and an autonomous view of reason. He rightly insists that such a 
hermeneutic must focus on the originary level of revelation as confession of 
faith rather than on the derived propositional levels. Scripture contains an 
ensemble of genres of discourse: prophetic, narrative, prescriptive, wisdom 
and hymnic. Ricoeur focuses his attention on the `last' text, i. e. the final 
form and understands the Bible as a whole as testimony. Testimony 
generates revelatory discourse and Ricoeur explores just how a revelatory 
51Fodor and Vanhoozer are two such examples. Fodor (1995) appropriates Ricoeur's philosophy for the 
development of an adequate understanding of reference in theological statements. Vanhoozer (1991) 
appropriates Ricoeur to explore how biblical narrative functions. 
52Fodor (1995) repeatedly refers to Ricoeur's concern to keep theology and philosophy distinct and to 
preserve the autonomy of philosophy. Frei's insistence upon a theological hermeneutic forms an interesting 
comparison with Ricoeur. See Fodor, 1995: 258ff. 
53Ricoeur's (1976) Interpretation Theory is a concise statement of his theory of interpretation. 
54Cf. Ricoeur (1980) and note that his Sarum lectures, Time and Narrative in the Bible: Toward a 
Narrative Theology, have still to be published. 
24 
text comes to be. Central to Ricoeur's notion of Scripture is its capacity to 
poetically disclose an alternative world and thereby to name God for us: 
"Apprehended as a whole, the Bible forms one large living intertext where its 
constitutive heterogenous elements are allowed to work on one another, 
simultaneously displacing their respective meanings but also mutually drawing 
upon their overall dynamism. These various modes of biblical discourse ... are not merely juxtaposed with the result that the meaning of the Bible is cumulative ... Rather, a veritable augmentation of meaning occurs by virtue of these intertextual 
dynamics. " (Fodor, 1995: 252) 
In OT study Ricoeur's approach has been explored in relation to Job, and 
especially Job 38 (See Crossan, 1981). Clearly Ricoeur's metacritical 
hermeneutic phenomenology is of great significance for biblical 
hermeneutics, as theologians and biblical scholars are starting to realise. Not 
only has Ricoeur addressed virtually every major theoretical issue in literary 
criticism, but his irenic approach mediates the interests of Gadamer and 
Habermas, and possibly redirects hermeneutics away from Derridean 
extremes55. Ricoeur shares a central ontological concern with Gadamer but 
his hermeneutics is focused on the written text and contains a clearer critical 
moment. 
8. SOCIO-CRITICAL HERMENEUTICS: HABERMAS 
Although Habermas uses Gadamer in opposition to positivism in the social 
sciences he has also strongly criticised Gadamer's understanding of 
hermeneutics as a fusion of horizons leading to consensus because, in 
Habermas' view, it fails to take account of the possibility of systematic 
distortion in the communication process56. This has led to an ongoing debate 
between Habermas and Gadamer which has highlighted the meta-critical (or 
lack thereof) dimension of Gadamer's hermeneutic. Habermas is deeply 
concerned that our understanding of `understanding' be able to account for 
550n the relationship between Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur see Clark, 1990: 110-115. Clark (1990: 110) 
suggests that Ricoeur's provision of a modus vivendi with structuralism may indicate that Anglo-American 
literary theory has been unhelpfully distracted from the main issues by the French intellectual debate 
centred on post-structuralism. 
56Jeanrond (1988: 8-37) focuses on this issue in relation to textual interpretation time and again. Norris 
(1991b: 201) says of Gadamer's hermeneutic that "this version of the hermeneutic paradigm ends up in a 
prison-house of its own elaborate devising where there is no longer any role for the values of truth and 
falsehood, since everything is decided by preemptive appeal to beliefs that hold good for us (or our own 
`interpretive community'), and which therefore operate to screen out any evidence that doesn't fit in with 
the prevalent consensus-view. " Norris (1991: 230) describes this type of approach as "the hermeneutic hall 
of mirrors. " Thiselton (1980: 326) is more optimistic that Gadamer's hermeneutic has the resources for the 
maintenance of critical distance in interpretation. 
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the complexity and deeply entrenched nature of ideologies. Habermas 
describes Gadamer's approach as a linguistic idealism which needs a 
reference system outside of itself to analyse systems of power and 
domination in society. Habermas uses the analogy of psychoanalytic theory 
to show how such a reference system would work in relation to the 
hermeneutic process. 
Gadamer denies that one can escape the hermeneutical process in this way 
and stresses that Habermas' account of the rational structure of 
communication is itself traditioned. 57 Habermas acknowledges this but 
maintains that this does not necessarily imply that a universalistic concept 
of rationality is fictitious. Indeed Habermas suggests that Gadamer 
overemphasises what `we' can learn from `the author' in the process of 
understanding; this needs to be balanced by a sense of what the author could 
learn from `us. ' 
Habermas' response to his critics has been his project of universal 
pragmatics in which he seeks to establish that the possibility of ideal speech 
is implied in the structure of language. Any act of raising validity claims 
implies the possibility of unrestrained communication so that the 
communicative practice of everyday life assumes the possibility of discourse 
in which speakers examine arguments in idealised conditions. In appealing 
to reasons speakers assume that their claims could be substantiated through 
rational discourse alone. Thus communication in general points to something 
like Habermas' ideal-speech situation. 
In terms of the debate about modernity Habermas has reacted strongly to the 
post-modem notion of its end, proposing instead that we think of modernity 
as an unfinished project58. Modernity is in crisis but the answer is to get it 
back on track, not to abandon it. Habermas acknowledges the problem of 
logocentrism and foundationalist understandings of rationality but still 
argues that politically a privileging of rationality is indispensable. Problems 
have developed in modernity because theoretical, practical and aesthetic 
reason have become separated from each other, and capitalist modernisation 
has resulted in theoretical reason dominating the other two modes. The 
structures of language itself offer a way out of this impasse. Habermas 
57See Warnke (1987: 107-138) for a summary of the debate between Gadamer and Habermas. 
58See Habermas (1987b) and Bernstein (1985). 
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elaborates on this with his philosophy of intersubjectivity revolving around 
communication and consensus. "Progress comes about by untiring attempts 
to achieve an ever more enlightened consensus on the basis of reasoned 
debate, not by way of a permanent crisis that refuses to resolve itself. " 
(Bertens, 1995: 117) 
Within theology and biblical studies Habermas' work has been appropriated 
in a variety of ways. It is particularly relevant to those approaches to the text 
which seek to get beneath its surface-function in order to expose its role as 
an instrument of power, domination or social manipulation. Habermas' type 
of hermeneutic is distinct from the pragmatism of Rorty in that it seeks to 
establish a metacritical or universal dimension distinct from the texts or 
traditions in question, on the basis of which their power functions can be 
exposed. Thus while it shares in the post-modern critique of positivism it 
does not abandon the search for universals. 
9. SOCIO-PRAGMATIC HERMENEUTICS: RORTY 
Rorty uses Gadamer to support his project of overcoming what he sees as the 
false distinctions between all forms of knowledge, between natural and 
human sciences and also between these and creative enterprises in general59. 
The value of hermeneutics, according to this view, is that it shows that all 
knowledge is traditioned and that the idea of the accurate representation of 
reality that underlies the Western concern with epistemology is a myth. All 
forms of knowledge are closer to making than to finding and have this in 
common with creative enterprises in general. Consequently the legitimation 
obsession of Western epistemology is irrelevant and wedded to an outmoded 
metaphysic. 
According to Rorty we ought not to think of science as progressing towards 
a more accurate description of reality as it is; different scientific paradigms 
are better thought of as ways of coping. Here Rorty stresses Gadamer's 
notion of Wirkungsgeschichte, whereas Habermas and Apel stress the 
dialogical element in Gadamer's hermeneutic. The idea of ever-interacting 
history appears to fit with Rorty's pragmatism in which one is not interested 
in what happened in history or what is out there but what we can use for our 
59See Warnke, 1987: 156-166. Warnke's chapter five is a useful critique of Rorty's appropriation of 
Gadamer. See also Norris (1985). 
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own purposes. In place of the epistemological concerns of the Western 
tradition Rorty proposes the goal of `edification. ' He sees this as the 
equivalent of Gadamer's Bildung. Rather than trying to justify our beliefs we 
should foster conversations in which we are exposed to and can explore 
other options and thus find better ways of coping. 
Rorty denies that his approach is relativistic or irrational. He openly 
acknowledges that it cannot be philosophically legitimated but insists that its 
merits become clear from its practical advantages. We cannot escape being 
traditioned; we can only defend our commitments by continuing to think and 
explain them as important to have until shown otherwise. Rorty thus 
develops Gadamer's notion that there can be no determinate criteria of 
interpretation along thoroughly pragmatic lines. For Rorty hermeneutics is 
not a way of knowing but a way of coping. 
Similarly he has expounded a pragmatic version of postmodernity, which 
Bertens (1995: 141) describes as fitting between Lyotard and Habermas. 
What is required is not a new quest for legitimation but a detheoreticized 
sense of community. From such a position one could accept Habermas' 
privileging of undistorted communication without needing to ground it in a 
theory of communicative competence. Thus for Rorty postmodern bourgeois 
liberalism is "the Hegelian attempt to defend the institutions and practices of 
the rich North Atlantic democracies without using [the traditional Kantian] 
buttresses". (Rorty, 1983: 584,585) 
For such postmodern liberalism-morality is stripped of its transcendent 
grounding and becomes equivalent to loyalty to a society. Rational 
behaviour is simply behaviour which conforms to that of other members of a 
society. This implies a modest understanding of the self as a network of 
beliefs and desires with nothing behind it and the necessity of an ungrounded 
communitarian solidarity. As Rorty explains, liberals disown cruelty, but 
liberal ironists (i. e. like himself), while they too disown cruelty have no 
answer to the reason for not being cruel! Bertens rightly critiques Rorty's 
pragmatic postmodernism for his easy and imaginary optimism. Rorty's 
position lacks the political edge that Lyotard seeks to retain and, as Norris 
has clearly pointed out, Rorty's position easily becomes a buttress for the 
political right. (Norris, 1990a: 1-48) 
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IV CONCLUSION 
This survey alerts us to the complex factors that have shaped the discipline 
of hermeneutics and the diversity of approaches that have developed. Issues 
like one's view of reason and the human person, one's view of history and 
tradition, one's philosophy of language, one's understanding of religion - 
these all influence the shape of the hermeneutic one adopts. And there is no 
consensus on any of these issues. In the context of modernity the relative 
philosophic stability allowed a tacit set of philosophical presuppositions to 
be easily taken for granted. That is no longer possible today as some of the 
assumptions of modernity have increasingly been problematised in the 
context of the postmodern turn. 
But this lack of consensus should not detract from the decisive importance of 
philosophical hermeneutics for biblical interpretation. It is especially clear 
from our discussion of Spinoza and Kant that philosophical hermeneutics 
has decisive implications for biblical hermeneutics. Enlightenment 
rationalism and idealism which exempted religious prejudice from the 
interpretive process and insisted that Scripture should be read in terms of the 
modem worldview resulted in very different ways of reading Scripture. 
Gadamer, however, reverses much of this in his call for prejudice to be 
appropriated positively as part of the hermeneutic process. And Ricoeur 
argues that Christians will require a hermeneutic of revelation for the 
interpretation of Scripture. 
Thus there are a plurality of philosophical hermeneutical approaches, and 
different ones will result in one approaching and interpreting the OT 
differently. These different hermeneutics have been, and are, active in OT 
studies so that, if we are to understand different readings of Ecclesiastes and 
to find a way ahead in the diversity of contemporary OT studies, then we 
must attend to the different hermeneutical options available and their 
influence within OT studies. 
In chapter two we will review the history of the interpretation of Ecclesiastes 
and then in chapters three to six we will explore the theories of interpretation 




HOW ECCLESIASTES HAS BEEN READ: 
THE HISTORY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF ECCLESIASTES 
"Research into the book also shows that it reflects the interpreter's world view. 
That is why, I think, opinions vary so widely with regard to such basic matters as 
Qoheleth's optimism or pessimism, his attitude towards women ... and his advocacy of immoral conduct. " (Crenshaw, 1988: 47) 
"It is always interesting to see where the `interpretative sweat' breaks out in dealing with such an iconoclastic book; moreover, the history of interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes sheds an important light on contemporary exegesis. " (Newsom, 
1995: 191) 
I INTRODUCTION 
Just as an academic reading of Ecclesiastes cannot ignore today's 
hermeneutical context, so too awareness of the tradition of approximately 
2300 years of readings of Ecclesiastes is vital. In all sorts of ways the post- 
Enlightenment period represents the watershed in the interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes, and its historical critical fruit presses in upon the reader of 
Ecclesiastes as the immediate and weighty scholarly context in which to read 
the text. Nevertheless there are continuities in the interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes between pre-critical and critical readings (Cf. Murphy, 1982), 
and since the progressive relativising and questioning of modernity, in the 
context of the post-modern turn, there are signs of a re-appropriation of pre- 
critical readings of Ecclesiastes, albeit in a post-critical model. 
In this chapter we examine the dominant ways in which Ecclesiastes has 
been read during the past 2300 years. A vast amount of literature has 
emerged on Ecclesiastes and it is not possible to review this history in detail. 
Our concern is to map out the main contours of the history of the 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes3. Although certain links with the hermeneutic 
history described in chapter one will be obvious, our intent at this stage is 
not to trace such links. That is the concern of the rest of this thesis. 
II use `modernity' to refer to the Enlightenment legacy in the West. See chapter 3 for a full discussion. 
2Childs (1979) and Dell (1993) are good examples of this post-critical reassessment. 
3Note that Ginsburg (1970) has written a thorough overview of Jewish and Christian interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes up to 1860, which I have regularly drawn on in this chapter. In chapters 3,4,5 and 6 of this 
thesis we focus in more detail upon readings of Ecclesiastes from 1860 onwards. 
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II PRE-CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF ECCLESIASTES 
1. INTER-TESTAMENTAL INTERPRETATIONS4 
Ecclesiasticus (approximately 180 BC) and the Wisdom of Solomon5 are 
both wisdom texts and chronologically fairly close to Ecclesiastes. Their 
relationship to Ecclesiastes has been much discussed6 but according to 
Murphy (1992a: xlvi) there is no serious sign of dependency between 
Ecclesiasticus and Ecclesiastes, and although the Wisdom of Solomon is 
often seen as anti-Ecclesiastes "[t]he general run of claims and counter- 
claims has the appearance of being more impressionistic than substantive. " 
(Murphy, 1992a: xlvii)l Holm-Nielsen (1976) seeks access to early 
interpretations of Ecclesiastes through analysing the LXX and the Peshitta. 
However neither these versions nor the Qumran fragments8 yield much in 
terms of how Ecclesiastes was read at this early stage. 9 
2. PRE-CRITICAL READINGS OF ECCLESIASTES 
Murphy (1982) argues that because of common presuppositions of exegesis 
there is a real homogeneity in the history of interpretation of Ecclesiastes. 
This is certainly true of the pre-critical era. Murphy identifies three such 
common assumptions: Solomonic authorship, the interpretation of ýWl 
VPt i against the perspective of immortality in the next life and the 
recognition of tensions within the book. The assumption and foregrounding 
of the immortality of the soul is more dominant in Christian than in Jewish 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes, where the stress is rather on obedience to God 
and the blessings of the afterlife'0. However in both cases this difference in 
nuance alerts us to a deeper assumption which they share, namely their 
41 have not included a section on the interpretation of Ecclesiastes in the biblical canon because in the OT 
the relationship is one of Ecclesiastes 'reading' other OT material and not vice versa, assuming that 
Ecclesiastes' origin is around the third century BC. As regards the NT there are no unequivocal references 
to Ecclesiastes. 
5According to Perdue (1994b: 291) the author probably lived in Alexandria as early as the first century. See 
Witherington, 1994: 100-103 for a brief discussion of the background. 
6Cf. Murphy, 1992a: xlv-xlviii. 
7Cf. Crenshaw, 1992: 278. 
8See Muilenberg, 1954. 
9For a useful, brief discussion of these early texts and versions see Murphy, 1992a: xxiv-xxv. 
10Cf. Murphy, 1992a: liv, where he argues that the Rabbis reinterpreted Ecclesiastes in the light of the 
Torah whereas Christians reinterpreted it in the light of their beliefs. With its strong emphasis on creation 
the OT and Jewish tradition were less amenable to the influence of Greek dualism, which strongly 
influenced Christianity at an early stage. 
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recognition of Ecclesiastes as Scripture. This is a powerful assumption 
which dominates the interpretation of Ecclesiastes up until the end of the 
nineteenth century. As regards interpretative method Jewish and Christian 
exegetes use both literal and allegorical interpretative approaches, and of 
course mixtures of both. 
a. Pre-critical Jewish readings of Ecclesiastes". 
That the literal sense was not neglected by the Rabbis is indicated by the 
well known Rabbinic disputes as to whether or not Ecclesiastes "pollutes the 
hands" and whether or not it should be "stored away. "12 This controversy 
about the divine inspiration of Ecclesiastes centred around its secular 
character, the great difficulty of harmonising its contradictions 13, and the 
passages with heretical tendencies like 1: 3 and 11: 914. The Mishnah reports 
the difference on Ecclesiastes between the Pharisaic schools. Beth Shammai 
maintained that Ecclesiastes does not make the hands unclean but Beth 
Hillel the reverse. These two groups were the disciples of the two great 
Pharisaic teachers who taught up to about 10 AD. Their disciples were active 
throughout the first and into the second century, although after the 
destruction of the temple in 70 AD, the house of Hillel gained the upper 
hand. The origin of this particular dispute is uncertain15 but the rabbinic 
debate about the inspiration of Ecclesiastes indicates the tendency to read it 
literally in the period of intense exegetical activity in the second century BC 
to the third century AD. 
However, from Jerome's commentary it is evident that by the fourth century 
the Jews largely allegorised Ecclesiastes (Ginsburg, 1970: 34). The 
allegorical and spiritual approach dominated Jewish reading of Ecclesiastes 
in the following centuries, as is evident from the Talmud and the Chaldee 
paraphrase; the latter was the first entire commentary on this book. In it, for 
The pre-critical history of the interpretation of Ecclesiastes is thoroughly investigated by Ginsburg 
(1970), on whom I am dependant for much that follows. 
12See Beckwith, 1985: 274-337 for a thorough discussion of the early disputes over Ecclesiastes' 
canonicity. 
13The Talmud mentions the conflicts between Ecclesiastes 7: 3 and 2: 2 and between 8: 15 and 2: 2 (Bab. 
Shabbath 30b). Beckwith (1985: 284-287) rightly points out that the rabbis were experts at Scriptural 
harmonisation so that their problems with Ecclesiastes meant that they found its contradictions especially 
difficult to harmonise. 
14These verses are instanced in the Peskita of Rab Kahana 68b; Leviticus Rabbah 28.1. 
15See Beckwith, 1985: 297-302. 
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example, the carpe diem passage in 2: 24 is explained as the gathering of 
strength for the service of God. 
A breakthrough for literal interpretation came with Rashbam (1085-1155). 
He interprets according to the principle that the text has only one, single 
meaning. Rashbam displays great sensitivity to the literary nature of 
Ecclesiastes16 and was the first to realise that Qoheleth was set within a 
framework; 1: 1,2 and the last seven verses were written by those who edited 
the bookl7. Rashbam locates the essence of the argument of Ecclesiastes in 
1: 2-11. Ecclesiastes here contrasts the transience of human life with the 
permanence of nature, thus showing the latter's advantage. None of the 
experiments in Ecclesiastes are successful in dispelling this melancholy; the 
only adequate response is to live in conformity to traditional values, to enjoy 
life calmly while resigned to providence. Present mysteries will be rectified 
in the future life. 
In the following centuries as literal interpretation progressed the sceptical 
passages in Ecclesiastes attracted closer attention from Jewish exegetes. In 
the thirteenth century the Zohar argued that in Ecclesiastes Solomon quotes 
ignorant unbelievers in order to expose their folly. However, this 
foregrounding of the sceptical passages in Ecclesiastes also drew forth an 
allegorical and spiritualising response, particularly evident in the Kabbalistic 
interpretation of Lonz (1631) and Landsberger (1724). Lonz defends the 
retention of Ecclesiastes in the canon by proposing a spiritualistic 
interpretation of it. In the introduction to his commentary he writes, "Now, 
why the sages did not burn it, but intended to hide the book, is because 
Solomon was no infidel; on the contrary, if his words are properly examined, 
it will be seen that they are perfectly true, and becoming such a wise man as 
he was. That an empty-headed man may shelter himself under the literal 
meaning of the words, is no reason why the wise men should have burned a 
book of such sublime sentiments. " (quoted in Ginsburg, 1970: 76) Lonz 
argues, for example, that the reference to rejoicing in one's youth is to be 
understood as referring to the mind, which reaches its highest stage by 
studying the law. 
16See Japhet and Salters (1985). 
17See Japhet and Salters, 1985: 34ff. They point out that Gordis (1968: 349) attributes the recognition of this 
framework to Döderlein, but that it is Rashbani who first reached this conclusion. 
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In the tradition of Rashbam Herzfeld (1838) strongly reasserted the literal 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes. Herzfeld argues that Qoheleth seeks to show 
the universal vanity of life and thereby to comfort the Israelites in their 
experience of life as vain. It is a sign of the developing ethos of biblical 
criticism that seventeen years later in 1855 Herzfeld felt free to explore the 
tradition of upholding the Solomonic authorship of Ecclesiastes. Herzfeld 
argues that Solomon could not be the author of Ecclesiastes and that it was 
written shortly before the era of Alexander the Great18. 
By the end of the nineteenth century those assumptions common to pre- 
critical Jewish reading of Ecclesiastes were beginning to unravel. Rosenthal 
in his work on Qoheleth published in 1858 still maintains Solomonic 
authorship. Solomon, in his view, wrote the book to demonstrate that 
wisdom is only useful when combined with the fear of God and the keeping 
of his commands. By contrast in 1860 Professor Luzzatto developed a 
strikingly contemporary view of Ecclesiastes. In his view it denies the 
immortality of the soul and recommends carnal pleasure as all that is left. It 
was written in the post-exilic period by one Coheleth who ascribed it to 
Solomon in order to give it authority. Contemporary sages recognised this 
forgery, deleted `Solomon', inserted `Coheleth' and left in `son of David, 
king in Jerusalem, ' knowing that such a juxtaposition would ensure 
recognition of the book for what is was. Later sages never knew this and 
thinking it to be Solomonic, they added verses to make it more orthodox. 
b. Pre-critical Christian readings19. 
Ecclesiastes is passed over in silence in the first, second and early part of the 
third centuries AD by the early Christian writers. 20 Gregory Thaumaturgus' 
(210-270) A Metaphrase of the Book of Ecclesiastes is the earliest extant 
Christian work on Ecclesiastes. In his view Solomon speaks to the whole 
Church of God and shows them the vanity of servitude to transient human 
18See Ginsburg, 1970: 94-96 for Herzfeld's reasons. 
19See Ginsburg, 1970: 99-243. 
2013ecause of the relative silence on Ecclesiastes in the first two centuries, it is harder to determine whether, 
as with the interpretation of the Proverbs 31 woman, there is first of all a literal interpretation, later replaced 
by an allegorical one. Commenting on the interpretation of Proverbs 31 Wolters (1987: 58) says, "it is 
remarkable how similar the patterns are in both the Jewish and Christian traditions. Both began with a 
literal understanding, both moved to a variety of allegorical interpretations, and both developed a standard 
allegorical reading in the Middle Ages which crowded out the others. For the Jews the Valiant Woman 
represented the Torah; for the Christians she symbolized the Church. For more than a thousand years, in 
both traditions, there was an overwhelming consensus that the Valiant Woman should be understood 
allegorically. It was this consensus which was challenged by the Reformation. " 
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things in order to lead them to contemplation of heavenly things. In his 
comments Gregory recognises the unorthodox sayings in Ecclesiastes but 
seeks to defuse them. In his comments on chapter one he presents Solomon 
as reflecting on a time when he thought that he was an expert on the nature 
of things but that he now realises that such pursuits achieve no purpose. In 
chapter two on the discussion of pleasure Gregory presents Solomon as 
coming to the orthodox conclusion that "the perfect good does not consist in 
eating and drinking, although it is true that it is from God that their 
sustenance cometh to man ... But the good man who gets wisdom from God, 
gets also heavenly enjoyment. " (10)21 
The tendency to allegorise the reference to joy and eating is evident in the 
above quote. However, there is a tension in Gregory's understanding of the 
carpe diem passages in Ecclesiastes. On the one hand they are allegorised to 
refer to heavenly enjoyment, but on the other they are read as a 
manifestation of folly. At the same time Gregory recognises that a Christian 
understanding of creation necessitates a positive approach to eating and 
drinking. In his paraphrase of chapter five he attempts to reduce this tension: 
"I am persuaded, therefore, that the greatest good for man is cheerfulness 
and well-doing, and that this shortlived enjoyment, which alone is possible 
to us, comes from God only, if righteousness direct our doings. " (11, italics 
mine) Not surprisingly, the epilogue is understood by Gregory as Solomon's 
apt conclusion to Ecclesiastes. 
The affirmation of Solomonic authorship of Ecclesiastes is very early in 
Christian interpretation. It goes back at least to Origen22 (185-254) who in 
the preface to his commentary on the Song of Songs notes that in Proverbs 
Solomon taught moral science, in Ecclesiastes natural science - by 
distinguishing the vain from the profitable and essential he counsels us to 
forsake vanity and cultivate things useful and upright, and in the Song of 
Songs inspective science in which he instils into the soul the love of 
heavenly things. 
The tradition of Solomonic authorship is affirmed by Jerome whose 
interpretation dominated the patristic and mediaeval period. The preface to 
Jerome's commentary informs us that some five years previously he had 
21The numbers after the quotes from Gregory's Metaphrase are the page numbers in the 1978 edition of his 
text in The Ante-Nicene Fathers VI. 
22Origen, 1957: 41. 
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interpreted Ecclesiastes to one Blesilla in order to "provoke her to contempt 
of the world" and thus encourage her to adopt a monastic vocation. In the 
process Jerome asserts the vanity of every enjoyment under the sun and the 
necessity of an ascetic life devoted to the service of God. The references to 
eating and drinking are allegorically interpreted as references to partaking of 
the sacrament, and inconvenient passages are put into the mouths of sceptics 
and opponents. Jerome's commentary was widely influential; for example, 
his equating of eating with the Eucharist is followed by Philastrius (380), 
Ambrose (333/40 - 397) and Augustine (354 - 430)23. 
Tradition dominated mediaeval interpretation of Scripture and so it is not 
surprising that allegorical interpretation characterises most mediaeval 
exegesis of Ecclesiastes24. However, just as the early Christians were 
influenced by secular methods in their reading of Scripture25, so too were 
theologians in the Middle Ages, and towards the end of the Middle Ages this 
led to a renewed interest in the literal sense. Smalley (1983: xxxi) points out 
that for theologians in the mediaeval schools the rediscovery of Aristotle's 
Politics led to a renewed interest in politics and ethics, and thus to a fresh 
examination of the sapiential OT literature which shared these interests. 26 
The result was an increased output of commentaries on all the sapiential 
books in the thirteenth century. The neoplatonic influence mediated by 
Augustine and Jerome privileged the spiritual reading whereas the influence 
of the rediscovery of Aristotle favoured the literal reading. Thus, in his 
postill on Ecclesiastes, Bonaventura (1221-1274) exploits the possibilities in 
the literal sense that Guerric had opened up as a result of the growing 
influence of Aristotle. 27 He reads Ecclesiastes as teaching contempt for the 
world, but makes more use of speculative philosophy to do so. Bonaventura 
expounds his favourite theme, wisdom as the means to sanctification. He 
discusses contempt of the world and in an effort to explain how the world 
can be regarded as vanity compares the world to a wedding ring. The wife 
must regard the ring as nothing relative to her love for her husband, and our 
attitude to the world must be the same. 
230n these three see Ginsburg, 1970: 103-105. 
240n the interpretation of the Bible in the Middle Ages see Lampe (1969) and Smalley (1983). 
25See chapter one section II. 
26See Smalley, 1983: 308-328. 
27See Smalley, 1983: 292ff. 
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The main difference that the Reformation made to the interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes, accompanying its insistence on the literal sense as the method 
of interpretation28, was its reassessment of Qoheleth's attitude to the earthly, 
material realm. This reassessment is apparent in the first Protestant 
commentary on Ecclesiastes by John Brentius (1528). Brentius comments, 
"There is nothing better than to be cheerful, and enjoy one's life; to eat, drink, and delight in one's employment; ... Some foolish persons, not understanding these things, have absurdly taught contempt for and flight from the world, and have 
committed many foolish things themselves; as we read in the lives of the Fathers 
that there were some who even shut themselves up from ever seeing the sun ... living above the world is not living out of the world. " (Ginsburg, 1970: 112) 
The fresh understanding of Ecclesiastes that emerged out of the Reformation 
results from a new emphasis upon the text in its original language interpreted 
literally, and a strong recovery of the doctrine of creation with a 
corresponding stress on the priestly vocation of all believers in all spheres of 
life. The resulting reassessment of Qoheleth's attitude to the earthly and 
material is evident also in Luther29, Melanchton and Piscator (1612). 
According to Melanchton (1556), Ecclesiastes "shows us that we are to be 
submissive in every station of life, and perform the duties of our calling ... 
that we should know that to follow our calling is pleasing to God. " (quoted 
in Ginsburg, 1970: 113) Catholic interpretations of Ecclesiastes continued to 
stress the contempt for the earthly (Ginsburg, 1970: 123ff). 
Luther is also significant in his anticipation of the modern rejection of 
Solomonic authorship. In contrast to his commentary30, in his Tabletalk he 
maintains that "Solomon himself has not written the book of Ecclesiastes, it 
was compiled by Sirach at the time of the Maccabees. ... It is like the 
Talmud, made up of many books, which perhaps belonged to the library of 
King Ptolemy Euergetes in Egypt. " (quoted by Ginsburg, 1970: 113) 
Although it is only at the end of the nineteenth century that the historical 
critical method was resolutely applied to Ecclesiastes, modern biblical 
criticism has much earlier roots31, and these roots gradually become manifest 
in readings of Ecclesiastes. Grotius (1644) argues that we have in 
28Melanchton took the lead in rejection of the allegorical method of interpretation. 
29Luther (1573: 11,12) insists concerning Qoheleth's vanity assessment that, "All this he speaketh not 
against creatures themselves, but against the heart of man, that abuseth the creatures to his own hindrance. " 
30See Luther, 1573: 9, where he affirms Solomonic authorship of Ecclesiastes. 
31See chapter three. 
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Ecclesiastes a collection of different opinions concerning happiness which 
the author mixes up with his own arguments before giving his final opinion. 
Grotius is particularly significant with respect to the authorship of 
Ecclesiastes. He is the first since Luther to argue against Solomonic 
authorship: "I believe that the book is not the production of Solomon, but 
was written in the name of this king, as being led by repentance to do it. For 
it contains many words which cannot be found except in Ezra, Daniel, and 
the Chaldee paraphrasts. " (quoted in Ginsburg, 1970: 146) 
After Grotius the view that Solomon was not the author gradually gained 
ground. In 1751 Michaelis argued that Ecclesiastes was written by a post- 
exilic prophet who wrote the book in Solomon's name so as to be able to 
philosophise more tellingly about the vanity of happiness. Similarly Bishop 
Lowth (1753) maintained that Solomon is `personated' in Ecclesiastes and 
that the language of the book is `low'. (Cf. Ginsburg, 1970: 178) Herder 
(1778) by comparison knew of no book in antiquity which describes the sum 
of human life more impressively than Ecclesiastes. He defended the 
interruption theory first advanced by Dean Yeard whereby two voices are 
distinguished in Ecclesiastes, the enquirer and the teacher. Döderlein (1784), 
Jahn (1793), Schmidt (1794) and Ewald (1826,1837) also rejected 
Solomonic authorship of Ecclesiastes. 
In 1838 an intriguing article on "The Philosophy of Ecclesiastes" by 
Nordheimer appeared in the American Biblical Repository. Nordheimer 
anticipates Michael Fox's32 recognition of the need to examine Qoheleth's 
epistemology. Nordheimer argues that Ecclesiastes is a philosophic didactic 
poem which seeks to determine the duties of man. Ecclesiastes entails a 
warning against philosophical investigation of human relations without first 
examining the limits and powers of the human mind. If the epistemological 
limitations of human reason are not observed at the outset such an 
investigation is liable to lead one to scepticism. 
"To set bounds to this sinful endeavour, and to warn mankind of the danger 
attendant upon it, appear to have been the principal aim of the author of this book. 
... he adopted ... the Socratic, or sceptical method of induction. The main feature 
of this method consists in a suspension of the final decision until the truth has 
been rendered perfectly evident, and the writer has it in his power to make 
assertions that shall be incontrovertible; hence it is the most perfect mode of 
attaining absolute certainty that can be conceived. In this manner it is that the 
32See chapters five and seven for a discussion of Fox's approach to Ecclesiastes. In drawing this analogy 
with Nordheimer I am thinking in particular of Fox's analysis of Qoheleth's empiricism. 
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author of Ecclesiastes institutes his examination into the powers of the human 
mind, which he carries to such fearful lengths that reason itself threatens to totter 
from its throne. All this is done in order to test its strength, and to bound its sphere 
of action accordingly. " (Nordheimer, 1838: 207) 
The father of modern OT criticism, De Wette, published his mature views of 
Ecclesiastes in 1844 in the final edition of his introduction to the OT. De 
Wette maintains that Qoheleth asserts the vanity of all things and the reality 
of enjoyment alone. Qoheleth gives no hope of a future life and his life-view 
inclines towards fatalism, scepticism and epicureanism. Although far more 
positive in his assessment of the message of Ecclesiastes, Hengstenberg was 
the first to deny Solomonic authorship of Ecclesiastes in an orthodox 
English encyclopaedia33. In his commentary on Ecclesiastes Hengstenberg 
(1860) argues that the aim of Ecclesiastes is to encourage the fear of God in 
the difficult circumstances of its hearers. 
As an example of the state of Ecclesiastes-scholarship prior to the 
application of the historical critical approach at the end of the nineteenth 
century we will examine Plumptre's commentary on Ecclesiastes. Plumptre 
(1881: 7) finds Ecclesiastes enigmatic, yet fascinating. He regards it as 
remarkably and providentially relevant to his day "to meet the special 
tendencies of modem philosophical thought, and that the problems of life 
which it discusses are those with which our own daily experience brings us 
into contact. " (Plumptre, 1881: 11) 
Plumptre (1881: 19-34) has an extensive discussion of Solomonic authorship 
but concludes that the evidence is against it. He takes `Qoheleth' to mean 
`debater', and suggests that Qoheleth was a debater in the Museum at 
Alexandria. He dates the book between 240 and 181 BC. Plumptre (1881: 35) 
describes Ecclesiastes as "autobiographical confession" and devotes twenty 
pages to a `biography' of Qoheleth. 
He suggests inter alia that "[t]he wealth of his parents had attracted a knot of 
so-called devout persons round them, and his mother had come under their 
influence, and in proportion as she did so, failed to gain any hold on her 
son's heart, and left no memory of a true pattern of womanhood for him to 
reverence and love. " (Plumptre, 1881: 37) The hypocritical religion of 
331n an 1845 article on Ecclesiastes in Kitto's Cyclopaedia. Hengstenberg (1860: 6ff) insists that the picture 
of Qoheleth and Israel in Ecclesiastes could only come from the time when the Persians had dominion over 
Israel. He discerns strong affinities between Ecclesiastes and Malachi. 
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Qoheleth's wealthy parents and their friends was disillusioning for him. As 
he entered his adult years Qoheleth travelled to Alexandria, where he was 
exposed to the royal court. He lived an extravagant life and indulged in 
reckless sensuality. Qoheleth experienced one great love, but had been 
terribly disillusioned by this woman; she had proved to be `more bitter than 
death. ' Deeply effected by this broken relationship he sought meaning in 
Greek philosophy, where for a time he found solace. However the dark days 
returned and finally he reawakened to the fear of God with the help of a 
male friend who was a great help to him at this and other times. 
Ecclesiastes is thus in Plumptre's view an intensely personal book whose 
main purpose is to warn those in quest of the chief good against the 
quicksands in which Qoheleth nearly sank. Qoheleth desires to deepen the 
fear of God in which he at last found the anchor of his soul in his readers. 
Plumptre discusses the relationship between Ecclesiastes and Ecclesiasticus 
and the Wisdom of Solomon (56-74), and has sections on Jewish and 
patristic interpretations of Ecclesiastes (75-97), plus an analysis of the text 
(97-101). At the conclusion of the commentary are three appendices: the first 
on Shakespeare and Koheleth, the second on Tennyson and Koheleth, and 
the third on a Persian Koheleth of the twelfth century! 
Although Plumptre denies Solomonic authorship34 and in this sense agrees 
with the modem critical consensus, in most ways his work remains within 
the pre-critical framework. The type of speculative biographical analysis of 
Qoheleth he develops is rare in twentieth century works35, and his 
introduction addresses none of the source, form and tradition critical 
questions that are common place in twentieth century commentaries. In line 
with the pre-critical tradition Plumptre's reading is an orthodox one 
theologically in which the epilogue provides the key to the message of the 
book and resolves the tensions in the text. Commenting on the epilogue 
(12: 13,14) Plumptre (1898: 229,230) writes, 
"This is what the Teacher who, as it were, edits the book, presents to his disciples 
as its sum and substance, and he was not wrong in doing so. In this the Debater 
himself had rested after his many wanderings of thought ... From the standpoint 
of the writer of the epilogue it was shown that the teaching of Ecclesiastes was not 
inconsistent with the faith of Israel ... From our standpoint we may say that it was 
shown not less convincingly that the book, like all true records of the search after 
Truth, led men through the labyrinthine windings of doubt to the goal of duty, 
34Note however that he feels the need to devote 15 pages to the issue in his relatively small commentary. 
35zimmerman (1973) is a notable but eccentric exception. 
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through the waves and winds of conflicting opinions to the unshaken rock of the 
Eternal Commandment. " 
III CRITICAL READINGS OF ECCLESIASTES 
In the second half of the nineteenth century the critical reading of 
Ecclesiastes gathered momentum, but it was only with the source-critical 
commentaries of Siegfried (1898), Lauer (1900), McNeile (1904), 
Podechard (1912) and Barton (1912) that historical critical reading of 
Ecclesiastes emerged in the way that it had done for the Pentateuch during 
the nineteenth century36. By the end of the nineteenth century pentateuchal 
criticism had already accrued the contributions of de Wette and Wellhausen. 
Driver published his An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament 
in 1898. A comparison of his extensive treatment of the source criticism of 
the Pentateuch with his treatment of Ecclesiastes is instructive. The source 
criticism of Ecclesiastes is still in its infancy37. 
There were reasons for this relative lack of interest in Ecclesiastes and 
wisdom literature in general. Wellhausen paid almost no attention to wisdom 
literature since he regarded it as late and secondary. He was especially 
concerned with the history of Israel's religious institutions and there was no 
clear indication how wisdom was related to these. Duhm also affirmed the 
secondary status of wisdom; wise men were heirs of the prophets because 
they took the great moral principles of justice and applied them to everyday 
life (Clements, 1976: 100). 
Two developments challenged the belief in the secondary and late 
emergence of wisdom. Firstly there was the application of form criticism to 
wisdom by Gunkel. The forms and character of wisdom teaching were 
discerned to be so distinctive that they could not be derived from prophecy 
or law. They must have emanated from a special class of wise men who 
were concerned with education and man's general progress and 
advancement in life. (Clements, 1976: 102) Form criticism has been 
particularly important in identifying wisdom as a specific genre of literature 
within the OT. This is taken for granted nowadays, but it was really only at 
the beginning of the twentieth century that wisdom was `discovered' (Cf. 
36Cf. for example the development of the historical critical approach to Deuteronomy in the nineteenth 
century. See Bartholomew, 1992: 13-19. 
37Cf. Driver, 1972: 1-159 and 465-478. 
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Crenshaw, 1976: 3-5)38. The second stimulus was the discovery in 1888 of 
the Teaching of Amen-em-ope. Erman recognised the original of Proverbs 
22: 17-23: 11 in this text39, and this led to a heightening of interest in wisdom 
literature against its background in the ANE, especially during the years 
1924-1936 (Cf. Crenshaw, 1976: 5,6). 
However, towards the end of the 1930's this interest waned. OT wisdom 
literature might have early and international roots but it seemed to have little 
to contribute to the theology of the OT40. Zimmerli (1976)41 had argued that 
its central concerns were exclusively anthropocentric, and the notion that 
earlier wisdom had been secular and utilitarian was widely endorsed (Cf. 
Wright (1966: 102-105) and McKane (1965: 48ff)). Recent decades however 
have seen a re-awakening of interest in OT wisdom literature. Zimmerli 
(1964) showed that creation was fundamental to OT wisdom and it became 
increasingly apparent that like ANE wisdom OT wisdom was deeply 
religious42. Von Rad (1972) himself came to argue that wisdom is a branch 
of Yahwism. These developments have led to renewed interest in the 
ideology of wisdom, its development within the OT and its relationship to 
other strands of OT thought43. Scholars are divided over how to understand 
wisdom and its relationship to the rest of the OT, but at the end of the 
twentieth century it is firmly on OT and theological agendas44. 
The interpretation of Ecclesiastes in the twentieth century needs to be seen 
against this background. All the issues that have dominated wisdom study 
have had their impact on the interpretation of Ecclesiastes. Characteristic 
methods of historical criticism have been source, form, redaction and 
38The debate has continued throughout the twentieth century as to what exactly constitutes a wisdom 
writing in the OT. See Whybray, 1974 and Crenshaw, 1969,1976: 3-5. 
39See Reventlow, 1985: 172,173 for bibliographic references. 
400r at least to the theological interests of contemporary OT scholars. Especially through Von Rad's 
influence the doctrine of creation which is fundamental to wisdom literature was made subsidiary to 
redemption. Only in the last few decades has there been a renaissance of interest in creation in the OT (Cf. 
Reventlow, 1985: 134-186). 
41 Originally published in 1933. 
42See Reventlow, 1985: 174-178. 
43Reventlow, 1985: 181 suggests that "[i]t is at this point, i. e. over the question of the relationship between 
the various areas of Old Testament thought, that the discussion will have to be continued: in other words, 
between the conception of order which is characteristic of wisdom (and not just wisdom) and the areas 
governed by the tradition of salvation history. " 
44 A number of overview essays have been published this century which help one to get a feel for the 
development of wisdom study. See Baumgartner (1951), Scott (1970), Crenshaw (1976), Emerton (1979) 
and Reventlow (1985: 168-186). Most recently see Day, Gordon and Williamson (1995). Recent 
monographs on wisdom are those by Von Rad (1972), Clements (1992), Perdue (1994) and Witherington 
(1994). For a useful overview of the current issues on the 'wisdom agenda' see Murphy (1992b). 
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tradition criticism. These were applied to Ecclesiastes at the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, and their influence 
remains strong in the most recent commentaries on Ecclesiastes, albeit in 
modified form45. As we outline the application of these methods to 
Ecclesiastes we shall note their continuing legacy before going on to note 
reactions to historical critical readings during this century. 
Siegfried (1898) pioneered the source critical approach to Ecclesiastes, 
identifying nine different sources in the book. Within English-speaking 
circles McNeile (1904) and Barton (1912) developed more moderate source- 
critical approaches to Ecclesiastes46. As the twentieth century has progressed 
a radical source critical approach to Ecclesiastes has become rare, and the 
book has come to be seen more and more as a unity47, with the exception of 
the epilogue, which is almost universally seen as a later addition. The prime 
legacy of source criticism in the interpretation of Ecclesiastes is this 
tendency to read the book without the epilogue. By comparison, in almost all 
pre-critical interpretation of Ecclesiastes the epilogue provides the 
interpretative key. 
Gunkel initiated form critical analysis of wisdom literature (Clements, 
1976: 101,102), and assessment of the forms used in Ecclesiastes has 
continued to play a fundamental role in the interpretation of the book (Cf. 
Michel, 1988: 76-81; Crenshaw, 1985: 377,378; Murphy, 1981). Crenshaw 
(1992: 275) suggests that the dominant literary type in Ecclesiastes is 
reflection arising from personal observation. He notes that scholars have also 
drawn attention to mashal, diatribe and royal testament forms, and that 
Qoheleth also uses autobiographical narrative, example story, anecdote, 
parable, antithesis and proverb. 
Galling (1932,1940) developed a form critical interpretation of Ecclesiastes 
in which he divided Ecclesiastes up into a large number of originally 
independent sayings. Such an approach clearly militates against reading 
Ecclesiastes as a strongly unified text. However on the macro level of the 
form of Ecclesiastes no consensus has been reached as regards its genre and 
45Very little redaction criticism has been done on Ecclesiastes. It has been suggested that Childs' approach 
is really a redactional one, but see Murphy (1980: 41) for a contrary view. 
46Note that the readings of Ecclesiastes in modernity and late modernity are dealt with in detail in the 
following chapters. 
47Gordis (1968: 73) notes the growing recognition of the unity of Ecclesiastes. 
43 
structure48, although Wright's New Critical analysis of the structure has 
convinced a number of scholars49 (Cf. Michel, 1988: 9-45; Murphy, 
1992a: xxxii-xli). The problem of whether Ecclesiastes is prose or poetry 
remains, with the majority of scholars treating it as a mixture of both (Cf. 
Murphy, 1992a: xxvi-xxxii). 
The tradition history of Ecclesiastes has been a matter of concern throughout 
this century (Cf. Michel, 1988: 66-75). Within the OT wisdom tradition 
Ecclesiastes has regularly been seen as a negative, sceptical reaction to 
mainline wisdom as represented by Proverbs50. Gese (1983) identified 
Qoheleth with a crisis of wisdom in Israel, but scholars remain divided over 
the existence and extent of this `crisis'51. To what extent do we have a rigid 
doctrine of retribution in the OT and to what extent is Ecclesiastes a reaction 
to this? 52 At the end of this century there is no consensus about the 
development of the wisdom tradition and how Ecclesiastes fits into that 
development. Using sociological analysis Brueggemann (1990: 129) has 
suggested that "Ecclesiastes articulates a conservative ideology that reflects 
social control and a concern for stability. ... The emancipatory side of 
wisdom is reflected in the embrace of creation in the Song of Solomon, the 
ideological dimension is articulated in Ecclesiastes. "53 This view is a 
development of Brueggemann's (1979) discernment of a royal (order) and a 
liberative trajectory in the OT54. 
The relationship of OT wisdom to international wisdom has been an issue 
throughout this century. Ranston, for example, published a monograph in 
1925 in which he explored the relationship between Ecclesiastes and the 
early Greek wisdom literature. He concludes that 
"[t]he evidence strongly suggests that Ecclesiastes was not widely or deeply 
acquainted with the early Greek literature, i. e. he had not read much of it. ... The 
conclusion reached is that Koheleth, in his search for suitable proverbs (ix. 9f. ), 
moved for a time in circles where the minds of the people were stored with the 
wisdom-utterances of the early sages mentioned by Isocrates as the outstanding 
48Wright (1968) and Schoors (1982) contain useful overviews of the great variety of structures that have 
been proposed. 
49Wright's analysis is for example followed by Murphy (1992a) and is drawn upon by Perdue 
(1994: 203ff). 
50Cf. for example Baumgartner, 1951: 221-227. 
51Cf. Crenshaw, 1980,1985: 381-382 and Murphy, 1992b. 
52Cf. Van Leeuwen, 1992. 
530n the sociological analysis of Ecclesiastes cf. also Crüsemann, 1984. 
54Cf. Middleton's (1994) critique of Brueggemann's view of creation order and Brueggemann's (1994) 
reply. 
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teachers of practical morality, Theognis being the most important. " (Ranston, 1925: 149,150) 
Studies of Ecclesiastes continue to concern themselves with Ecclesiastes' 
relationship to Mesopotamia, Egypt and Greece (Cf. Michel, 1988: 52-65; 
Murphy, 1992a: xli-xlv). During this century the Jewishness of Ecclesiastes 
has received greater recognition but its relationship to Greek thought in 
particular continues to be debated55. 
As regards the message of Ecclesiastes historical critical scholarship differs 
notably from pre-critical readings in its general rejection of the need to 
harmonise Qoheleth with theological orthodoxy. This loss of theological 
constraint has not however produced agreement about the message of 
Ecclesiastes, as for example, the huge variety of proposals about how to 
translate ý=Ts1 indicate56. Some like Crenshaw (1988) regard Qoheleth as 
deeply pessimistic, others regard him as also positive but to differing 
extents57. Crenshaw (1992: 277) writes, 
"Qoheleth taught by means of various literary types that earlier optimistic claims 
about wisdom's power to secure one's existence have no validity. No discernible 
principle of order governs the universe, rewarding virtue and punishing evil. The 
creator, distant and uninvolved, acts as judge only (if at all) in extreme cases of 
flagrant affront ... 
Death cancels all imagined gains, rendering life under the sun 
absurd. Therefore the best policy is to enjoy one's wife, together with good food 
and drink, during youth, for old age and death will soon put an end to this 
`relative' good. In short, Qoheleth examined all of life and discovered no absolute 
good that would survive death's effect. ... Qoheleth bears witness to an intellectual crisis in ancient Israel. " 
In similar vein to Crenshaw, Watson (1994: 283-287) describes Qoheleth's 
vision as "rigorously hope-less. " "Nowhere else in holy scripture is there so 
forthrightly set out an alternative vision to that of the gospel, a rival version 
of the truth.... In the light of the gospel, nothing could be more illusory than 
55Cf. for example Lohfink (1993: 7-9), who tends to assume the Hellenistic character of Ecclesiastes, with 
Murphy (1992a: xly) who is far more cautious. Lohfink thinks that Ecclesiastes may have been written 
between 190 and 180 BC, just before the Macabbean revolt. In this context Judea belonged to the 
Hellenistic world and Hellenistic ideas were pervasive and competed with the Jewish tradition. "Das Buch 
Koh kann nur verstanden werden als Versuch, so viel wie möglich von der griechischen Weltdeutung zu 
gewinnen, ohne dass dabei die israelitische Weisheit doch ihren Eigenstand aufgeben musste. " (Lohfink, 
1993: 9) Lohfink assumes a high degree of Hellenistic influence whereas Harrison (1991) argues that it was 
minimal in Judea. Harrison, however, argues that Ptolemaic economic policy was deeply effecting Judean 
society. 
56Murphy (1992a) sticks with 'vanity', Fox (1989) proposes 'absurd', Ogden (1987) proposes 'enigmatic', 
the Good News Bible translates 5Z1 as 'useless', Lohfink (1993) suggest 'Windhauch. ' 
57Cf. for example Murphy (1992a) with Ogden (1987). 
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the consolation of Qoheleth's celebrated `realism'. " Loader (1979,1986) 
likewise argues that Ecclesiastes is a negative witness to the gospel. 58 
Whybray (1992) by contrast has recently argued that Qoheleth was mainly a 
preacher of joy. And Ogden (1987: 14) asserts that Ecclesiastes' thesis "is 
that life under God must be taken and enjoyed in all its mystery. " Ellul 
(1990: 31) sums up Ecclesiastes' message as: "In reality, all is vanity. In 
truth, everything is a gift of God. " 
Despite this polarisation with respect to the message of Ecclesiastes, it 
should be noted that a certain consensus has emerged out of a historical 
critical interpretation of Ecclesiastes. Very few scholars nowadays defend 
Solomonic authorship; most regard Ecclesiastes as written by an unknown 
Jew around the late third century BC. Most scholars regard the book as a 
basic unity with the exception of the epilogue. With the possible exception 
of the discernment of different voices/strands in Ecclesiastes, all three 
assumptions that Murphy identified as common to pre-critical interpretation 
of Ecclesiastes have been undermined by historical criticism. However, as 
regards Ecclesiastes' structure, message, relationship to OT traditions and to 
international wisdom there is no consensus. 
To a great extent historical criticism has sought, to exclude theological 
presuppositions from its methodology by insisting that the OT should be 
read in the same way as any other ANE text. In the latter half of this century 
there has been a growing reaction to that tendencyS9. Childs (1979) has 
sought to develop a hermeneutic which takes the OT seriously as canon. The 
intriguing effect of his canonical approach upon his reading of Ecclesiastes 
is that in what we might call a post-critical move he reappropriates the 
epilogue as the key to the canonical function of Ecclesiastes, thereby 
undermining the one universal fruit of source-criticism of Ecclesiastes. In 
Childs' view the epilogue alerts us to Ecclesiastes' nature as a corrective 
within the broader wisdom tradition. 
58Hertzberg (1963: 237,238) concludes his commentary on Ecclesiastes as follows: "Hier war das Alte 
Testament im Begriff, sich totzulaufen. Hinter diesem völligen Nichts auf der Menschenseite war nur noch 
die »neue Kreatur« des NT als Hilfe möglich. Das Buch Qoh, am Ende de AT stehend, ist die 
erschütterndste messianische Weissagung, die das AT aufzuweisen hat: ' 
59Most recently Watson (1994) has pleaded for "Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective. " 
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Barton (1984) has suggested that the canonical approach of Childs stands or 
falls with NC. We shall argue that it is more likely that Childs' approach is 
part of a general reaction to positivism in the humanities, but it is important 
to note that the application of NC to Ecclesiastes has resulted in new 
insights. Wright (1968) has sought to analyse the structure of Ecclesiastes by 
means of a close reading of the text along New Critical lines, and Lohfink 
(1995: 160) describes his creative approach to Ecclesiastes as that of 
Werkinterpretation, the German equivalent of NC. Although both Wright 
and Lofhink see the epilogue as an addition to Qoheleth by another hand, 
their approaches indicate the developing tendency to read Ecclesiastes as 
carefully crafted literature. Loader (1979,1986) also fits with this literary 
trend in his modified structuralist reading of Ecclesiastes whereby he 
discerns polar opposites as at the heart of its structure. Fox (1977) proposes 
that we read Ecclesiastes as a narrative and wisdom text, with an openness to 
distinguishing between narrator, implied author and Qoheleth. 
Perry (1993) too has recently argued for a literary reading of Ecclesiastes, 
but one in which Ecclesiastes is approached as the transcript of a debate 
between Koheleth (K) and the presenter (P). This dialogical approach, 
according to Perry, is the correct way to understand the `contradictions' that 
have plagued commentators for so long. Ecclesiastes is an essay, a 
collection, a debate, and the reader's task is to discern the alternating voices, 
which is what Perry attempts in his translation and commentary. Perry 
argues that Ecclesiastes elaborates on the paradigmatic contradiction in 
Hebrew Scripture which is introduced in the creation story of Genesis. It has 
to do with the way religious consciousness distinguishes itself from 
empirical or experiential modes of viewing life. 
"What seems clear is that, as against the empirically based conclusions of K that 
all is vanity, P counters with a series of concepts that take on the density of myths 
of beginnings and ultimate ends, challenging the narrowness of experiential 
empiricism with notions that cannot possibly be verified by the same methods. P 
creates a tension by reinterpreting K's devalued image of total vanity with a 
reenergised version of the same: `less than All cannot satisfy man' (Blake). " 
(Perry, 1993: 36) 
Post-structuralism and postmodernism have yet to impact the reading of 
Ecclesiastes in a major way. As regards deconstruction Ecclesiastes might 
appear to be a prime candidate. The failure of twentieth century scholars to 
reach any kind of consensus about its meaning could indicate radical textual 
indeterminacy. As regards women's experience and Ecclesiastes attention 
4Z-, 
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has tended to be focused on 7: 23ff in particular, in an attempt to determine 
whether Qoheleth was a misogynist or not. 60 
Psychoanalytic readings are in vogue61 and there has been a serious attempt 
to read Ecclesiastes along these lines by Zimmerman (1973), using insights 
from Freud, Rank, Jung and Adler. Zimmerman maintains that Qoheleth was 
a court official who had respect for the wealthy but was himself poor. He 
was married and had a son. Zimmerman (1973: 8) analyses his psychological 
condition as follows: 
"He is a pathological doubter of everything, stemming from a drastic emotional 
experience, a psychic disturbance. He is doubtful about himself as a person of 
worth and character. He has no self-esteem or value of himself. His doubt has 
destroyed all values. He is an inferior, of no account, and he demeans himself 
constantly. His doubt comes from a parapathy, a disease of the mind which he 
shares with many neurotics. " 
"A time to murder" in 3: 1-8 indicates criminal elements in Qoheleth's 
makeup. These drives are however repressed but at the cost of the 
disintegration of his psyche. "To throw stones" indicates Qoheleth's 
suspicion that his wife was adulterous. "To sow" is indicative of Qoheleth's 
latent homosexuality. Indeed Qoheleth struggles with sexual impotence as is 
evident from chapter 12. The picture is of an old man with declining 
physical powers. The symbols refer to the futility of using aphrodisiacs; 
`voice of the bird becomes faint' refers to lost sexual potency. Referring to 
11: 3 Zimmerman (1973: 27) says, "When his gonads fill up, inevitably he 
experiences an emission ... And yet when the tree, a 
familiar symbol of 
erection ... once 
falls it lies there prone and inert, and Qoheleth's potency is 
not aroused even by proximity to a woman. " Qoheleth's hostility to women 
revealed in 7: 26 could, according to Zimmerman, only stem from a hostile 
relationship with his mother. "The hatred which was directed against women 
(at first his mother, then his wife) enlarges, and then is levelled against all 
womankind. " (Zimmerman, 1973: 29) "The first feminine relationship in his 
life with his mother/sister, on the other hand, fixated a love which he 
yearned to find again but could not under society's rule of morality and 
law. " (1973: 36) 
60See for example Lohfink (1979), Baltzer (1987), Loretz (1991), Farmer (1991). Phyllis Trible (1989) has 
written on Ecclesiastes, but her introduction to Ecclesiastes contains no feminist critique. 
610n psychoanalytic literary criticism see Elizabeth Wright (1986). 
48 
Crenshaw (1985: 382) is surely justified to say of Zimmerman's reading: 
"Such flights of fantasy possess more entertainment value than truth. "62 
Zimmerman's reading presents us with an appropriate point to end our 
overview of readings of Ecclesiastes63. It certainly alerts us to the diversity 
of readings of Ecclesiastes that have been proposed in the 2300 years of this 
text's existence. 
IV CONCLUSION 
Up until the Reformation pre-critical interpretation of Ecclesiastes tended to 
be allegorical; either way Ecclesiastes was always read as Scripture and with 
the epilogue as determinative. The Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment 
period marks the watershed in the interpretation of Ecclesiastes. Its effect 
was to reinforce literal interpretation and to bracket out the constitutive role 
of faith in the interpretation process. The application of historical method to 
the OT in the nineteenth century lead eventually to source critical analysis of 
Ecclesiastes, and then to form critical and traditional critical analyses. 
Although the second half of the twentieth century has seen a recovery of a 
sense of the unity of Ecclesiastes, the Epilogue still tends to be regarded as 
secondary. Newer reading strategies are gradually starting to have an impact 
on the reading of Ecclesiastes. 
Clearly there is a close relationship between the history of the interpretation 
of Ecclesiastes and that of hermeneutics. Modernity and its hermeneutical 
legacy has shaped contemporary readings of Ecclesiastes particularly 
powerfully. However scholars are as disagreed as ever about the message of 
Ecclesiastes. Crenshaw (see quote at outset of chapter) suggests that this 
diversity is related to the different worldviews readers bring to the text. If 
this is at least part of the reason, rather than the `fault' being that of the text 
alone, then it becomes apparent just how important it is for us to explore in 
detail the way in which different worldviews or hermeneutics have shaped 
the interpretation of Ecclesiastes if we are ever to move towards a correct 
interpretation of this perplexing book. 
62Cf. also Michel's (1988: 89,90) response to Zimmerman. 
63We have not considered the widespread cultural use of Ecclesiastes. Kreitzer (1994) explores the 
relationship between Hemingways's Farewell to Arms and Ecclesiastes. Bono of U2 asserts that 
Ecclesiastes is the key to understanding U2's album, `Achtung Baby. ' The cultural use (and abuse) of 
Ecclesiastes has yet to be thoroughly investigated. 
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Because of the importance of modernity in the interpretation of Ecclesiastes, 
we will focus our attention there. Chapters three to six will examine the link 
between hermeneutics and the interpretation of Ecclesiastes in modernity 
and late/post modernity64. 




HISTORICAL CRITICISM AND ECCLESIASTES: READING 
ECCLESIASTES IN MODERNITY 
"The historical critique of Scripture that emerges fully in the eighteenth century 
has its dogmatic base, as our brief look at Spinoza has shown, in the 
Enlightenment's faith in reason. " (Gadamer, 1989: 182) 
"Enlightenment critique is primarily directed against the religious tradition of 
Christianity - i. e., the Bible. ... This is the real radicality of the modern Enlightenment compared to all other movements of enlightenment: it must assert 
itself against the Bible and dogmatic interpretations of it. " (Gadamer, 1989: 272) 
I INTRODUCTION 
The historical critical method of biblical interpretation remains the dominant 
mode of academic biblical study, although its hegemony is no longer as 
secure as it once was. This method is a product of the Enlightenment and 
post-Enlightenment era (i. e. of modernity) and can only be understood 
against this background. Examination of readings of Ecclesiastes in 
modernity requires therefore, that we explore the origins of the historical 
critical method in the Enlightenment and attend to its prejudices. ' 
Our approach in this chapter will be as follows. We will first examine 
modernity as the context in which the historical critical hermeneutic 
developed. We will then trace the development of the historical critical 
hermeneutic itself and examine Krentz' articulation of it in particular, before 
going on to consider the types of readings of Ecclesiastes that it has 
produced. Finally we will evaluate it as a biblical hermeneutic. 
II THE NARRATIVE[S] OF MODERNITY 
Scholder (1990) and Reventlow (1984) have stressed the importance of 
examining the development of the historical critical method in its historical 
and cultural context. The main figures of the development are well known 
but "up until now it has not been described in context. " (Scholder, 1990: 1; 
Cf. Reventlow, 1984: 2,3) Exploring this context will involve examining its 
1Like Gadamer (1989: 265-285), I am not using prejudice here in a pejorative sense, but to indicate that pre- 
judgements are universal and unavoidable. Uncommitted neutrality and objectivity are a myth. 
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philosophical hermeneutical elements closely, as Scholder (1990: 5,6) 
recognises in his assertion that investigation of this area will result in the 
theologian finding "himself or herself transported into the largely uncharted 
area which lies between philosophy and theology. " Examination of this 
context is no simple matter. A legacy of modernity is the standard account of 
its origins, an account which tends to be assumed in OT studies. However, 
this account has been steadily undermined in recent decades and especially 
in the context of postmodernism a variety of narratives of modernity have 
arisen. 
We will enter the discussion of modernity through Toulmin's (1990) 
reassessment of the standard account2. This will give us an understanding of 
the standard account plus a contemporary alternative account, which will 
assist us in asking critical questions in the following section when we 
examine the rise of the historical critical method in modernity. 
Toulmin (1990: 3) clearly regards modernity as in a crisis: 
"[i]f an historical era is ending, it is the era of Modernity itself. ... What looked in the 19th century like an irresistible river has disappeared in the sand, and we seem 
to have run aground. ... we are now stranded and uncertain of our location. The 
very project of Modernity thus seems to have lost momentum, and we need to 
fashion a successor program. " 
According to Toulmin for most of the twentieth century Western Europeans 
and North Americans were generally agreed that modernity began in the 
seventeenth century and that the transition from the Middle Ages to 
modernity was achieved through the application of rational methods in all 
areas of intellectual study; by Galileo in physics, Descartes in epistemology 
and Hobbes in political theory. This understanding represents in a nut shell 
what Toulmin calls the standard account of modernity. In its view modernity 
was unquestionably a good thing. The seventeenth century recovery of the 
power of rationality plus the rejection of superstition reshaped Europe. The 
fragmentation of Christendom freed European nations to embrace their 
autonomy. 
2One could, of course, enter the debate about modernity from a variety of directions. I have chosen 
Toulmin because of his long standing concern with modernity and academic theory and the incisive nature 
of Cosmopolis. Brueggemann (1993: 3) describes Cosmopolis as one of two texts that have particularly 
shaped his understanding of the postmodern shift. 
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Since the 1950's this standard account of modernity has however been 
increasingly undermined (Toulmin, 1990: 17-21), and Toulmin proposes a 
revised narrative of modernity which recognises two distinct origins for the 
modern world, one in the humanism of the Renaissance and a second in the 
seventeenth century Enlightenment, which lost many of the humanist 
insights. Humanism emerged within a European culture that was still 
predominantly Christian and struck a balance between theoretical and 
practical concerns, all the time aware of its epistemological limitations. 
However in the 1600's "[t]here is a shift from a style of philosophy that 
keeps equally in view issues of local, time bound practice, and universal, 
timeless theory to one that accepts matters of universal, timeless theory as 
being entitled to an exclusive place on the agenda of `philosophy'. " 
(Toulmin, 1990: 24) 
This shift from `Montaigne to Descartes' is closely related to changes in the 
historical and social context. The religious wars seemed to demonstrate that 
religion was not an adequate base for stable and peaceful existence. With the 
assassination of Henry of Navarre in 1610 the search for a solid foundation 
to life became critical and "[t]he only other place to look for `certain 
foundations of belief' ay in the epistemological proofs that Montaigne had 
ruled out. " (Toulmin, 1990: 55,56) 
Descartes' development is regularly presented in an acontextual, rational 
way, but it was the context of deep uncertainty in the seventeenth century 
that shaped and provided a receptive audience for his ideas. "Descartes was 
convinced that we can build a secure body of human knowledge, if we scrap 
our inherited systems of concepts and start again from scratch - with a clean 
slate - using `rationally validated' methods. " (Toulmin, 1990: 81) This 
approach spread through all branches of knowledge: law, medicine, political 
theory and theology, thereby creating an estrangement between philosophy 
and the humanities. (Toulmin, 1990: 77-83) 
In Toulmin's opinion a worldview developed out of this Cartesian source of 
modernity which dominated the West for some 200 years. 
"After 1660, there developed an overall framework of ideas about humanity and 
nature, rational mind and causal matter, that gained the standing of `common 
sense': for the next 100,150 or 200 years, the main timbers of this framework of 
ideas and beliefs were rarely called in question. They were spoken of as `allowed 
by men' or `standing to reason', and they were seen as needing no further 
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justification than that. ... Between them, they defined a system of ideas that we may refer to as the Modern world view, or the `framework of modernity'. " (Toulmin, 1990: 107,108) 
Central to this worldview is the Cartesian dichotomy between humanity and 
nature. The principal elements of the modem worldview3 divide into two 
groups, reflecting this dichotomy. (Toulmin, 1990: 109-117) On the nature 
side of the divide Toulmin finds the following principles: 
1. nature is governed by fixed laws set up at creation. 
2. the structure of nature was established a few thousand years ago. 
3. the material substance of physical nature is essentially inert. 
4. Physical objects and processes cannot think or reason. 
5. At the creation, God combined natural objects into stable systems. 
6. Higher and lower things are linked so that motion in nature, and action in 
society, flow from `higher' to `lower' creatures. 
On the humanity side Toulmin discerns the following assumptions: 
1. The essence of humanity is the capacity for rational thought and action. 
2. There can be no science of psychology. 
3. Human beings also have collective power to establish social systems. 
4. Humans are mixed beings - in part rational, in part causal. 
5. Reason is mental, emotion is bodily. 
6. The emotions frustrate or distort reason. 
These presuppositions were like an intellectual scaffolding within which 
theorists worked. Toulmin (1990: 145) refers to 1750-1914 as the time of 
dismantling the scaffolding of the modem worldview. The denial that nature 
has a history was first to be questioned. The belief in inert matter took a long 
time to undermine. It had already been strongly criticised at the end of the 
eighteenth century but lingered long into the twentieth century. Cartesian 
dualism has been perhaps the most intractable element of the scaffolding. 
Even reactions to it like romanticism do not transcend its inherent dualism 
but assume its categories in their reaction. Romanticism, according to 
Toulmin (1990: 148), "was rationalism's mirror-image. " However, by the 
mid-nineteenth century the sciences were no longer in practice coldly value 
3Venter (1991: 33) discerns five main characteristics of the Enlightenment. 1. Faith in the development of 
mankind. 2. A nature-culture tension. 3. A problematising of the idea of evil. 4. Neo-classicism. 5. Practical 
and scientific rationality. 
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free and from the 1860's in Germany Helmholtz and his colleagues 
redefined the body-mind relationship to escape Cartesian dualism. "By 1914, 
then, all the material was ready to hand to justify dismantling the last timbers 
of the intellectual scaffolding that had, since the late 17th century, 
established the parameters of acceptable thought. " (Toulmin, 1990: 150) 
Western Europe was close to recovering the world of tolerance and 
moderation aspired to by de Navarre and Montaigne. 
In 1920-1960, however, this re-Renaissance was deferred (see Toulmin, 
1990: 152-160), and in fact in this period of uncertainty the tide went into 
reverse. This reversal is epitomised in logical positivism and Mies' 
architectural theory. "The ideas of strict `rationality' modelled on formal 
logic, and of a universal `method' for developing new ideas in any field of 
natural science, were adopted in the 1920s and 1930s with even greater 
enthusiasm, and in an even more extreme form, than had been the case in the 
mid-17th century. " (Toulmin, 1990: 159) 
World War II represented the culmination of modernity4. It was the last time, 
according to Toulmin (1990: 160), that the ideals of Modernity could be 
enacted unselfconsciously. The counter-culture of the 60's represents the 
deferred reaction to modernity. Within twenty years commitment to the 
ecosystem, emotional therapy and postmodern architecture were 
mainstream. The sciences became a confederation of enterprises with 
methods appropriate to their own field of study. 
For Toulmin it is naive to categorise modernity as either a failure or success. 
Epistemologically foundationalism has proved an illusion but since the 
eighteenth century there has been a growing concern for human interests. 
The way ahead is to humanise modernity. Philosophy and science have to be 
redeemed by reconnecting them with the humanist side of modernity. 
Practical philosophy must be recovered. 
Toulmin's revised narrative of modernity is not the new standard accounts, 
for there is no new standard account but a plurality of accounts. How to 
4See Bauman's (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust for a penetrating study of the connection between the 
holocaust and modernity. 17he truth is that every 'ingredient' of the Holocaust ... was normal ... in the 
sense of being fully in keeping with everything we know about our civilization, its guiding spirit, its 
priorities, its immanent vision of the world. " (Bauman, 1989: 8) 
5Cf. Carroll, 1993: 117, for example. Carroll argues, contra Toulmin, that the Enlightenment was the 
fulfilment of humanism. 
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interpret modernity is at the heart of the postmodern debate, and there is no 
consensus here6. We shall not evaluate Toulmin's account in detail. For our 
purposes the significance of his narrative lies in its demonstration that the 
standard account is but one account among many, and that it has its own 
prejudices. Toulmin (1990: 81) maintains that "[b]oth the received view of 
Modernity, and the standard narrative of its origins, were thus rationalist 
constructions. " Especially in the light of the plurality of accounts of 
modernity, the rationalist prejudices of the standard account can no longer be 
assumed; if they -are to be presupposed then a case has to be made for 
adopting them rather than alternatives. 
As we examine the emergence of the historical critical method in modernity 
it is thus vital that we not only recontextualise it but that we critically 
evaluate the context within which it emerged and interrogate its prejudices in 
this way. 
III THE DEVELOPMENT AND NATURE OF THE HISTORICAL 
CRITICAL METHOD 
"Historical" and "critical" both identify key elements of the historical critical 
method of biblical interpretation. Critical signifies the subjection of the 
biblical tradition to examination on the basis of the modem worldview. As 
Scholder (1990: 2,3) points out, this was clearly understood by F. C. Baur, 
who in a discussion with a colleague at Jena, Karl Hase, asserts that "in the 
end only that view can prevail which brings unity, connection and rational 
consistency to our world-view, our understanding of the history of the 
Gospel, our whole consciousness. " Scholder comments: "`Unity, connection 
and rational consistency' : that means, quite simply, honest exegesis - honest 
to the degree that in principle it must be carried on with a concern for the 
understanding of reality `which has been gained by the spirit in modern 
times'. " Historical indicates that it is particularly Enlightenment historical 
method which is applied to the Bible by the historical critical method, 
especially as it came to maturity in the nineteenth century7. (Cf. Nicholson, 
1981) 
6See the discussion of postmodernity in chapter six. 
7Krentz (1975: 1) comments that "historical criticism ... introduced 
into biblical interpretation a new method 
based on a secular understanding of history. " 
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Our approach in this section will be as follows. Firstly we will briefly outline 
the development of the historical critical method. Secondly we will examine 
Krentz's explication of the method as an example of a proponent of 
historical criticism. 
1. THE ORIGINS OF THE HISTORICAL CRITICAL METHOD 
Rogerson (1984: ix) describes Germany as the home of the historical critical 
method, and indeed, it was in nineteenth century Germany that the historical 
critical method reached maturity. However, prior to the second half of the 
eighteenth century Germany had hardly been touched by critical theology, 
whereas a century earlier orthodoxy was forced onto the defensive in all 
other Western European countries (Scholder, 1990: 4,5). Thus, if the mature 
adulthood of the historical critical method is to be found in Germany, this is 
not true of its early and adolescent years; generally they are found 
elsewhere. 
Exactly how far back one goes to discover the roots of the historical critical 
method is debatable. In one sense the roots of the historical critical method 
go back further than the start of modernity since the Enlightenment has its 
roots in early Greek philosophy. However, the emergence of the modern 
worldview and the rejection of a synthesis of nature with grace8 was 
something new and unprecedented in its scale. Consequently, it seems wise 
to follow Krentz and Scholder in focusing analysis of the rise of the 
historical critical method on the seventeenth century and following9. 
Renaissance rediscovery of antiquity and the development of the printing 
press were crucial ingredients in the recipe of modernity. But, as Toulmin's 
distinction between the two origins of the modern world indicates, it was a 
particular approach to and use of antiquity which produced the modern 
worldview, and not just its rediscovery. 
And this particular approach emerged through the emancipation of reason 
from all constraints in philosophy and its penetration of science and history. 
The scientific and historical revolutions of the Enlightenment gave birth to 
the historical critical method. It was Descartes who emancipated reason, and 
"like a young stallion locked up in stables for winter set free in spring 
8See Windelband, 1901: 310-351. 
9Reventlow (1984: 3) locates the starting point of historical critical theology in late mediaeval spiritualism. 
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pasture, it galloped far and wide with a wild and virile exuberance. The main 
shackle to be cast off was that of religion. ... Out of the scientific explosion 
the decisive blow against religion was struck by history, which now replaced 
myth. " (Carroll, 1993: 120) The changes that came about in the seventeenth 
century and became focused on the Bible in the historical critical method 
began with philosophy (Descartes), exploded in the ongoing scientific 
revolution (Newton) and developed in history from where they were focused 
hermeneutically on the Bible. Richardson (1963: 295) expresses this most 
clearly: 
"The thought of our own times has been shaped by the two great intellectual 
revolutions of the modern period - the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, and the revolution in historical method which was the great 
achievement of the nineteenth century. The two revolutions are not indeed 
separate and distinct things; perhaps we should think rather of one great 
reorientation of the human mind, which began with the Renaissance and is still 
continuing. It began with the rise of what we today call the natural sciences; and 
by the nineteenth century it had embraced the sphere of history and what are now 
called the human sciences. " 
Shifts in historiography are harder to identify than scientific ones, with the 
result that the changes in historiography are regularly subordinated to the 
scientific revolution. "That is certainly a mistake; for which insight in the 
end changed our understanding of reality more deeply is a completely open 
question. " (Scholder, 1990: 65) As early as the mid-seventeenth century de la 
Peyrere in his Pre-Adamites raised the question of how the nations and their 
religion could be reconciled with the Bible. "There is no more impressive 
evidence than this remarkable book of what a profound problem the old view 
of history had already become by the middle of the seventeenth century. 
With it - almost a century before Voltaire - the development of the new 
universal-historical conception of world history begins. " (Scholder, 1990: 67) 
The mediaeval view of history did not collapse overnight; historical 
consciousness was slowly restructured between 1550 and 1650. Jean Bodin's 
Methodus adfacilem historiarum cognitionem produced the first criticism of 
Melanchton's picture of history'°. Bodin criticises the scheme of the four 
monarchies of Daniel, pleads for the notion of human progress, makes 
chronology the presupposition of all historical understanding, and maintains 
that the question of whether time is eternal or not must be decided not by 
tradition but by compelling arguments. "The more marked consideration of 
10No fewer than 12 editions of this text were published up to 1650. 
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political realities, the extension of perspective beyond the limits of the West, 
the demands for compelling arguments even where tradition has long 
decided - all this points to the beginning of an emancipation from a purely 
biblical-theological understanding of the world and the history of nations. " 
(Scholder, 1990: 75) The result was a shift similar to that in philosophy and 
science. History gradually became autonomous from theology. The 
Scriptures were treated more and more as ordinary historical documents. 
"The process of objectification had begun. " (Krentz, 1975: 16) 
The eighteenth century was the heyday of the Enlightenment. The critical 
approach towards the Bible was consolidated in Deism (Krentz, 1975: 16,17; 
cf. Reventlow, 1984: 289ff. ), but the triumph of abstract reason restrained the 
move towards a fully historical approach to the Bible. However, already in 
the seventeenth century Spinoza had argued for an historical approach to the 
Bible". Now through the labours of scholars like Turretinus, Wettstein, 
Ernesti, Astruc, Semler, Eichhorn, Gabler and Michaelis there was a slow 
but steady move towards a more historical interpretation of the Bible. A 
particularly significant figure in the latter half of the century was Semler. He 
was the first German Protestant theologian to approach the Bible through the 
history of religion and to insist upon a critical rather than a dogmatic reading 
of it. The interpreter must seek to discover what the original author meant by 
the text (Jeanrond, 1994: 39). Keil likewise stressed that an interpreter must 
think the author's thoughts after him without judging them. The exegete 
should only establish the facts. "The standard for subsequent commentaries 
was formulated. " (Krentz, 1975: 19) 
By the end of the eighteenth century in Germany, most Old Testament 
professors were either Neologists or Rationalists. Semler and Michaelis were 
the founders of Neologism. Brought up as Pietists they abandoned Pietism 
through the influence of Spinoza and Deism. As the eighteenth century 
moved into the nineteenth, Neologism was increasingly replaced by 
Rationalism and Supranaturalism, both responses to the Kantianism which 
penetrated most of the theological faculties in the 1790's (Rogerson, 
1984: 16-18). Source criticism of the Pentateuch was advanced through the 
labours of Eichhorn in particular, but there was no radical reconstruction of 
the history of Israel (Rogerson, 1984: 19-27). 
11See our discussion of Spinoza in chapter one and especially Preus (1995). 
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The historical thought of the Enlightenment, as we explained above, was 
more philosophical than historical. The eighteenth century fostered an 
understanding of history dominated by the idea of progress (Bebbington, 
1979: 68-91). This philosophy of history continued on into the nineteenth 
century, but was displaced by German historicism and Hegelian philosophy. 
Historicism refers to that sort of historical thought which dominated 
Germany from the rise of romanticism at the end of the eighteenth century 
down to the mid-twentieth century. It represents a reaction to the idea of 
progress and is characterised by a belief that all cultures are moulded by 
history, a privileging of intuition as the means whereby we understand 
groups other than our own, and a denial of history as linear (Bebbington, 
1979: 92-94). It was bound up with Kantian and romantic reactions to the 
Enlightenment. 
Niebuhr's Römische Geschichte (1811-1812) was a major early historicist 
work. Krentz (1975: 22) assesses it as follows: Two questions dominated his 
method: what is the evidence? and what is the value of the evidence? In this 
way Niebuhr sought to separate poetry from truth in his sources and to 
reconstruct what happened in a more believable narrative. As Collingwood 
(1946: 130) points out, the classic example of this is Niebuhr's treatment of 
Livy. Niebuhr argues that much of what was taken for early Roman history 
is patriotic fiction of a later period, and that even the earliest stratum is not 
sober fact but a national epic of the ancient Roman people. Niebuhr detects 
the historical reality of early Rome, a society of peasant farmers, behind the 
epic. 12 As Bebbington (1979: 106) makes clear, Niebuhr's approach was 
more nuanced than Krentz suggests. 
"Niebuhr blended the fragmentary sources for early Roman history ... into a coherent story of a perennial struggle for power between patricians and plebians, 
an interpretation that was to enjoy a remarkable longevity and that has not yet 
been exorcized from the text books. It was, for its day, a tour de force, replacing 
the traditional accounts of brief phases of republican history based on the ancient 
historians with a unitary and vivid narrative. Niebuhr could not have achieved his 
feat without making the typical historicist assumption that poetry and myth 
express the inner spirit of a nation, and so treating as sound evidence what would 
now be approached with great caution. " 
Von Ranke, another historicist, concentrated on collecting the facts of 
history - commitment to detail being a characteristic of this school - but also 
12Collingwood (1946: 130) notes that this method goes back via Herder to Vico, and that by the mid- 
nineteenth century it was the common property of all competent historians, at least in Germany. 
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sought the unity of history. The historian must penetrate to the inwardness of 
events. Every moment in history is equidistant from God. This approach 
assumed some sensible idea or divine presence moving through all history, 
whether it was Hegel's spirit, von Ranke's governing God, Droysen's ethical 
progress or Humboldt's pantheistic truth. After 1850 historical enquiry 
became more immanentist, a turn well represented by Eduard Meyer 
(Krentz, 1975: 24), for whom the historian should describe happenings and 
not seek laws and general ideas. 
It was during the early nineteenth century that the turning point for critical 
study of the OT occurred (Rogerson, 1984: 28-49). De Wette was the first 
scholar to rewrite the history of Israelite religion radically. His approach to 
the OT was deeply influenced by Kantian thought, which was mediated inter 
alia through Fries13. Just how influential Kant was upon de Wette is apparent 
from de Wette's semi-autobiographical novel Theodore, in which he 
describes Kant's influence upon him as follows14: 
"Theodore heard at the same time some lectures on morals from a Kantian 
philosopher, through which a completely new world was opened up to him. The 
notions of the self-sufficiency of reason in its law-giving, of the freedom of the 
will through which he was elevated above nature and fate, ... all these notions 
gripped him powerfully, and filled him with a high self-awareness. Those 
shadowy ideas about the love of God and Christ, about the new birth, about the 
rule of God's grace in the human mind ... these he translated now into this new 
philosophical language, and so they appeared to him clearer and more certain. " 
(quoted by Rogerson, 1984: 37) 
Fries' notion of the intuition of eternal ideas through myth caught de Wette's 
imagination as a means of positively approaching the OT as a religious 
book. A critical approach to the OT demonstrated that it has little to offer in 
terms of authentic history. In this de Wette was deeply influenced by Fries: 
"it was the unwillingness of the Friesian system to allow that history is a 
purposive process that enabled de Wette to make such radical proposals 
about the history of Israel; to suggest that there was a radical divergence 
between the Old Testament story and what could be known about the actual 
facts. " (Rogerson, 1984: 49) Through his exposure to Fries De Wette arrived 
at an articulate view of religion, and in his study of the Old Testament he 
brought this to bear on it comprehensively. 
13Cf. Rogerson's (1992: 19-26 & 65-85) more recent position on the chronology of Fries' influence upon de 
Wette, compared with his earlier views (1984: 28-49). 
14Cf. Rogerson, 1992: 27-30 for a description of the content of a lecture given at the University of Jena by 
Kant the year before de Wette arrived there. This lecture gives one an insight into the view of religion Kant 
was expounding at this time. 
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Gesenius, Gramberg and George developed de Wette's reconstruction of the 
history of Israel (Rogerson, 1984: 50-68)15. Vatke published his Biblical 
Theology in 1835. In the critical interpretation of the OT he was mainly 
guided by de Wette and Gesenius but his work is deeply influenced by 
Hegel. The first 170 and the last 120 pages of his text are devoted to the 
nature of religion. The principle of evolutionary development shapes Vatke's 
thought throughout. 
Under the influence of contemporary philosophical trends and secular 
historical research, biblical criticism refined its techniques. Schleiermacher 
had given historical criticism a positive place in his analysis of 
understanding, and his prestige gave respectability to the use of historical 
method in biblical studies, which now came to be increasingly practised at 
the German universities, where OT was studied on a large scale (Rogerson, 
1984: 138). The Biblia Hebraica soon appeared, and in 1829 Heinrich Meyer 
produced the first volume of his Critical and Exegetical Commentary. For 
Meyer exegesis was to be free of dogmatic and party spirit, not captive to 
any `ism', and the exegete should simply determine what the author said. By 
the end of the century the ICC and the Handkommentar were also in 
production. By this time even the conservative scholars used the historical 
method to determine the facts. They differed only in their attempt to keep 
revelation close to the facts. (Cf. Krentz, 1975: 27,28) 
Probably the most significant OT figure of the nineteenth century was 
Wellhausen. His documentary hypothesis became the virtual consensus, as 
did his understanding of the history of Israel. Above all else he was a 
historian of Israel's religion (Clements, 1976: 8). Wellhausen recognised the 
influence of philosophy upon many of his predecessors but denied such 
influence upon himself: "Philosophy does not precede but follows [biblical 
criticism], in that it seeks to evaluate and systematise that which it has not 
itself discovered. The authors of the two great works of 1835 [Strauss's Life 
of Jesus and Vatke's Biblical Theology] were Hegelian, it is true. But that 
which is of scholarly significance in them does not come from Hegel. " 
(quoted by Rogerson, 1982: 63) With this statement we see a significant shift 
from de Wette and Vatke. Their extensive treatments of the nature of 
15Rogerson mentions but does not explore the philosophical influences upon all three. Thus Gesenius, for 
example, is often called a rationalist but also evidenced Hegelian influence and was indifferent to 
theological issues. 
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religion indicate a strong awareness of the influence of worldviewish 
questions upon their OT work. Wellhausen's decontextualisation of OT 
research is a good example of Toulmin's characterisation of modernity, and 
indicates a direction which became ever stronger in OT studies. Indeed, up 
to the present, it is rare to find an OT scholar who finds it necessary to 
grapple with these broader issues in his/her research. We would be most 
surprised to find a contemporary OT scholar starting a book with a chapter 
on the nature of religion! 
Rogerson (1982) does grapple with the broader philosophical issues, and he 
acknowledges that biblical criticism has been far more influenced by 
philosophy than Wellhausen allows, but he too removes the heart of 
historical criticism from philosophical influence: 
"If biblical criticism is defined as the investigation of the literary processes which 
brought the books of the Bible to their extant form, together with a critical 
evaluation of the history and culture of ancient Israel and Judea so as to interpret 
biblical material in its original historical and cultural setting, it is difficult to see 
how philosophy, even defined very broadly, can affect such investigations. 
Surely, the reconstruction of the history of Israel, or of the apostolic period, 
involves the use of an historical method unaffected by philosophy. Further, the 
conclusion, based upon the alteration of the divine names and other criteria in the 
`Flood' narrative of Genesis 6-9, that this narrative is a combination of two 
originally separate written accounts, is something else that in no way depends 
upon philosophy. ... I am happy to agree that 
in many of its technical procedures, 
biblical criticism is not affected by philosophy. " (Rogerson, 1982: 64; cf. 
Clements, 1976: 3,4. ) 
The problem of the relationship between faith and historical knowledge 
became acute towards the end of the nineteenth century with the emergence 
of the history of religions school, which sought to explain the Bible in terms 
of its surrounding cultures. Gunkel was the key OT figure in the history of 
religions school. "Its basic outlook was positivistic. The Bible, firmly 
anchored in its own world, was interpreted as an amalgam of various 
borrowed motifs, and became a book strange to modem men. " (Krentz, 
1975: 28; Cf. Hahn, 1966: 83-118) 
With Germany at the forefront, historical criticism dominated Protestantism 
on the continent by the end of the nineteenth century. England and America 
embraced the historical critical method much later than Germany, but by the 
end of the nineteenth century its success there was also ensured. As Krentz 
(1975: 30) points out, 
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"It is difficult to overestimate the significance the nineteenth century has for 
biblical interpretation. It made historical criticism the approved method of 
interpretation. The result was a revolution of viewpoint in evaluating the Bible. 
The Scriptures were, so to speak, secularized. ... The Bible was no longer the criterion for the writing of history; rather history had become the criterion for 
understanding the Bible. ... The Bible stood before criticism as defendant before judge. The criticism was largely positivist in orientation, immanentist in its 
explanations, and incapable of appreciating the category of revelation. " 
From one angle the whole of twentieth century theology can be seen as an 
attempt to relate modernity and faith (Cf. Zahrnt, 1969). World War One 
called historicism and evolutionary thought into question, generating inter 
alia a strong reaction to the straitjacket of positivism in biblical 
interpretation. Barth called for theological interpretation while also finding a 
place for historical criticism. Krentz (1975: 32) captures the tension of 
biblical interpretation in Barth and the twentieth century when he points out 
that "[b]y the end of the Second World War historical criticism was firmly 
established, not to be dislodged by any attack. But the dangers of historicism 
to faith were also clear. The central problem of the relation of faith and 
historical method was posed as strongly as ever. " Throughout the twentieth 
century there have been strong reactions to the historical critical method in 
Old Testament studies. These reactions will be our concern in chapter four. 
2. KRENTZ'S ARTICULATION OF THE HISTORICAL CRITICAL 
METHOD 
It is apparent from the above that historical method in modernity is diverse. 
Different historical methods handled the Old Testament differently so that it 
seems impossible to pin down the historical critical method in biblical 
interpretation. Krentz (1975: 33) recognises this ambiguity: "Today historical 
criticism is taken for granted ... Yet 
it is anything but clear just what we 
mean when we use the phrase historical method". The effect of modernity, 
however, has been to decontextualise the method and to promote the 
assumption that there is one historical critical method16. Thus, even Krentz 
(1975: 33), who recognises this problem, does not face it but quotes 
Wilckens with approval and then follows his advice. "The only scientifically 
responsible interpretation of the Bible is that investigation of the biblical 
16This tendency is recognised in a fascinating article by John Mc Intyre (1994: 370-384). His opening 
sentence is as follows: "One circumstance which, more than any others, has controlled the discussion of the 
relation of faith to history, has been the assumption, held by both the theologians and the historical critics 
with whom they have been debating, that historical criticism is a single, and fairly simply identifiable 
entity. " 
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texts that, with a methodologically consistent use of historical understanding 
in the present state of its art, seeks via reconstruction to recognise and 
describe the meaning these texts have had in the context of the tradition and 
history of early Christianity. " (Wilckens quoted by Krentz, 1975: 33. ) 
For Krentz (1975: 34) history is systematic (analytical) knowledge of the 
past. The historical critical method in biblical interpretation "produces 
history in the modern sense, for it consciously and critically investigates 
biblical documents to write a narrative of the history they reveal. " (Krentz, 
1975: 35) The modem historian, like the historical critical biblical scholar 
seeks to explain what happened and why. History involves interpretation and 
the biblical scholar must explain how the diversity of thought arose in Israel. 
His first task is to hear the text on its own terms: "This basic respect for the 
historical integrity of a text is inherent in all criticism. " (Krentz, 1975: 39). 
The text has hermeneutical autonomy and the exegete must go where the text 
leads. Thus "the critical biblical scholar will not only question the texts, but 
himself - his methods, his conclusions, and his presuppositions - and the 
others who share in the same task. " (Krentz, 1975: 53,54) His work is his 
own judgement and yet he submits to the text: "where that text deals with the 
profundities of man, that calls for a submission to the autonomy of the text 
that calls the historian forth for judgement and knowledge of himself. Then 
history performs its humane (or in the case of the biblical texts) its 
theological function. " (Krentz, 1975: 54) 
Krentz (1975: 39) argues that historical criticism is conservative in its 
privileging of the text and refusal to privilege traditional interpretations. The 
historian listens to the text and interrogates it in order to assess it as a 
testimony to history. All the linguistic tools available are used to determine 
the meaning of the text for its original hearers. "Concern for literary figures 
... are used 
by the historian to judge the historical usefulness of material, not 
to achieve a literary appreciation of it per se. " (Krentz, 1975: 44) Historical 
method evaluates its sources to determine what really happened and what the 
significance of those events is. It does not exclude specifically Christian 
goals for the critical interpretation of the Bible because the historian also 
seeks to understand himself through a study of the past (Krentz, 1975: 41). 
However, "The differences between biblical scholarship and secular history 
derive from the major source, the Bible, and not the methods used. Biblical 
scholars use the methods of secular history on the Bible to discover truth and 
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explain what happened. The methods are secular. The procedures may be 
modified to fit the Bible, but are not essentially changed. " (Krentz, 1975: 48) 
Krentz (1975: 49-54) lists the following as the main methods of historical 
critical interpretation of the Bible: textual criticism, philological study, 
literary criticism, form criticism, redaction criticism, historical criticism and 
perhaps Sachkritik. 
With regard to presuppositions Krentz (1975: 61) acknowledges that 
"[h]istorical method is anything but a carefully defined and agreed on set of 
axioms and presuppositions. " Troeltsch's 1898 essay articulated the 
principles of historical criticism and continues to haunt theology. According 
to Troeltsch there are three principles of historical method: firstly that of 
methodological doubt, secondly that of analogy and thirdly that of 
correlation. Troeltsch recognised that the third principle rules out miracle 
and salvation history, but it is inescapable. By the principle of analogy and 
correlation Christianity loses its uniqueness. All current historiography 
affirms Troeltsch's first principle. The second one is generally affirmed 
although "[a] problem arises when this uniformity is raised to a universal 
principle that makes some evidence inadmissible. " (Krentz, 1975: 57) The 
third principle is very complex. Historicism only allowed causation that is 
not transcendental or theological, and although historicistic and positivistic 
philosophies of history are presently in demise this does not mean that a 
theological interpretation of history is being rehabilitated (Krentz, 1975: 58- 
61). 
Despite contemporary disagreements about the nature of historiography, 
theology cannot return to a precritical age - "Christian theologians ... can 
in 
the present only seek to use historical criticism in the service of the Gospel. " 
(Krentz, 1975: 61)17 Historical criticism does not pose a threat to Scripture 
because it is congruent with its object, the Bible. The Bible is an ancient text 
and historical criticism positions the Bible in our history and "makes the 
`full brightness and impact of Christian ideas' shine out. " (Krentz, 1975: 61) 
To refuse to use historical criticism would be docetic and a denial of faith in 
Jesus as the Lord of history. 
17See Krentz (1975: 63-67) for his list of ten positive results of the historical critical method that make it 
worthwhile. 
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How does faith relate to this method of biblical interpretation? For Krentz 
(1975: 68) it is a mistake to think that there is a sacred method of 
interpretation: "A method does not have faith or unbelief; there are only 
believing or unbelieving interpreters. As little as there are sacred engineering 
and architecture used in the construction of a church building, so little is 
there a sacred method of interpreting a text. " However there are real tensions 
between faith and secular historical method. Within the Christian community 
the ideal is biblical interpretation in the service of the gospel. Within 
historical study the aim is verifiable fact in a significant narrative. A number 
of proposals for dealing with this tension have been made (Cf. Krentz, 
1975: 67-72). For Krentz (1975: 72) the tension 
"can be resolved only in the person of the interpreter living in the community of 
faith, who combines dedication to historical truth with the recognition of his own 
humanity and need for forgiveness. Historical research, like all of man's efforts, is 
also perverted by sin. But in the community of scholarship that lives in the 
fellowship of the people of God, the errors that arise from human frailty can be 
corrected and sin forgiven by God's grace. Then biblical criticism will grow 
together with faith into the full measure of the stature of Christ, his Gospel, his 
Word, and his Holy Scripture. " 
IV READINGS OF ECCLESIASTES IN MODERNITY 
During modernity many commentaries on Ecclesiastes have been produced. 
One effect of the historical focus of the historical critical hermeneutic was 
however to marginalise wisdom literature. Wellhausen paid virtually no 
attention to wisdom literature, regarding it as late and secondary (Clements, 
1976: 100). He was particularly concerned with the history of Israel's 
religious institutions and did not see wisdom literature as an integral part of 
this. Consequently the thorough application of the historical critical method 
to `historical' Old Testament literature occurs far earlier than it does to 
wisdom literature, as we observed in chapter two. It was the development of 
form criticism by Gunkel that alerted scholars to the Sitz im Leben of 
wisdom in Israel and its connections with the ANE, thereby leading, at the 
time when Religionsgeschichte was in vogue, to a renewed interest in 
wisdom. It is thus only at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth century that fully historical critical works on Ecclesiastes appear. 
Our approach in this section will be as follows. We will focus our 
exploration of the application of the historical critical method to Ecclesiastes 
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on the commentaries of McNeile'8 and Galling, because these are early 
major examples of the application of source and form criticism to 
Ecclesiastes. We will also note how the core of the historical critical method 
continues to dominate study of Ecclesiastes up to the present by looking 
briefly at several other important commentators on Ecclesiastes. 
As a means of focusing our study exegetically we will repeatedly look at 
how scholars see Ecclesiastes 12: 8ff in relation to the rest of the book. Up 
until the end of the nineteenth century the epilogue was read as an integral 
part of Ecclesiastes19. Source criticism separated it off from the central 
section of `distinctively Qoheleth' material. This has deeply affected the 
reading of Ecclesiastes so that examination of the relationship between the 
epilogue and the body of the text foregrounds important hermeneutical 
issues. 
1. McNEILE ON ECCLESIASTES 
The source/literary critical approach to Ecclesiastes was pioneered by 
Siegfried (1898) in Germany20. As was typical of early literary criticism of 
Ecclesiastes, Siegfried thought in terms of a supplementary hypothesis, 
whereby an original and radically pessimistic text was supplemented with 
material from different perspectives. This supplementary hypothesis differed 
from the sort of documentary hypothesis that Wellhausen formulated for the 
Pentateuch, but the historical methodology was the same. As Gordis 
(1968: 70) says, "The Documentary Hypothesis of the Pentateuch, which 
analysed the Five Books of Moses into diverse and ever more numerous 
sources, influenced the study of Koheleth as well. Siegfried divided the book 
among nine sources (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, R1, R2, E1, E2). " 
In Siegfried's schema Q1 stands for Qoheleth himself, a deeply pessimistic 
philosopher whose book would have disappeared if it hadn't become 
associated with Solomon's name. Q2 was an Epicurean Sadducee who 
recommends eating and drinking as the way to handle life. Q3 is a wise man 
18Barton's (1912) literary critical approach to Ecclesiastes is very similar to McNeile's, and so we have 
selected McNeile's earlier and lesser known commentary as a representative example. 
19According to Gordis (1968: 349) Döderlein was the first to note that the last six verses are not from 
Qoheleth's hand, but see our comments on Rashbam in chapter two. 
20Gordis (1968: 6) notes that "[t]entatively advanced by Haupt, the theory of multiple sources was 
meticulously worked out by Siegfried. " See Harrison, 1969: 1079-1083 for an overview of some of the 
earliest critical approaches to Ecclesiastes. 
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who highly values wisdom; many of the proverbs in Ecclesiastes come form 
this source. Q4 is a Hasid who strongly opposed Qoheleth's view of God's 
government of the world. Q5 stands for several other interpolators who 
propose general moral maxims. The whole writing 1: 2 - 12: 7 was edited by a 
redactor (R1) with a heading 1: 1 and a conclusion 12: 8.12: 9,10; 12: 11,12 
and 12: 13,14 are three further additions. 12: 13,14 betray the hand of a 
Pharisee which Q4 was unaware of. 12: 9,10 and 12: 11,12 come from two 
other epilogists (El, E2). 
Lauer (1900), Jastrow (1919), Podechard (1912) and others followed 
Siegfried's type of literary critical approach to Ecclesiastes, but generally it 
was regarded as too extreme. Kraetzschmar21 was right when, in reviewing 
Siegfried's work, he said "it is questionable whether Siegfried will find 
many followers in his extreme interpolation theory. It is a right idea 
overstrained in the endeavour to explain all the difficulties in the book ... But 
the unravelling is done with energy, and will incite to further investigation 
from this view. " Few would follow Siegfried in such an extreme source 
critical analysis, but his `right idea' continues to influence study of 
Ecclesiastes today. At the heart of Siegfried's approach is the principle that 
in order to understand the text we have to reconstruct the different sources. 
In the latter part of the twentieth century there has been a strong reassertion 
of the basic unity of Ecclesiastes with the significant exception of 12: 8ff. 
Unlike commentaries before Siegfried, there are few critical commentaries 
in the twentieth century which read Ecclesiastes as an integral whole 
including 12: 8ff, so that in this sense at least Siegfried's right idea continues 
to influence research into Ecclesiastes. 
Within English speaking circles (UK and North America) Siegfried's 
approach was mediated in a modified form inter alia through McNeile22 in 
Cambridge and Barton in Pennsylvania. As McNeile (1904: v, vi) says in his 
preface, when he wrote 
"very few students have analysed it [Ecclesiastes] by the critical methods which 
have opened up a new world of study in the Hexateuch, the historical books and 
the prophets. The following pages have been written with two chief aims: firstly, 
to disentangle the strands which go to form the `three-fold' cord of the writing; 
and secondly, to estimate the position which Koheleth occupied with regard to the 
religious and philosophical thought of his day. ... neither of these can 
be 
21 Quoted in McNeile, 1904: 31. 
22McNeile (1904: 31) says of his own analysis of Ecclesiastes that it "is an attempt at further investigation, 
incited by Siegfried's interesting commentary. " 
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accurately studied unless the writing be placed in its historical and literary 
perspective. " 
McNeile is clearly conscious of applying the sort of critical approach that 
had been applied to the Pentateuch to Ecclesiastes. Nearly a third of 
McNeile's text is devoted to introductory issues, in which he deals with the 
name Qoheleth, canonicity, the circumstances of the writer, an outline of his 
thought, the integrity of Ecclesiastes, the style and vocabulary, the relation 
of Qoheleth to Ben Sira and the Book of Wisdom, and finally the 
relationship between Ecclesiastes and Greek language and thought. 
For McNeile (1904: 8) Ecclesiastes has been well described as a "Hebrew 
journal intime. " It is not a thesis, a sermon or a collection of aphorisms but 
the outpouring of the mind of a wealthy Jew who has seen much suffering 
and is serious in his wrestling with the meaning of life. Little can be gleaned 
with any certainty about Qoheleth (McNeile, 1904: 9). Reflection upon 
nature first made Qoheleth question life. He could not find a key to the 
riddle of nature and so turned to luxury and elegance; however this too is 
vanity. His avoidance of Yahweh in his writing alerts us to his attitude 
towards religion: "`The Deity' is to him `Nature', the sum-total of the 
irresistible and inscrutable forces which govern the world. But at the same 
time he has not quite lost his Semitic belief that God is more than Nature. " 
(McNeile, 1904: 15) For Qoheleth Nature involves a mass of misery but he 
should not be called a pessimist because of his strong conviction that 
humankind should be and could be better if the circumstances were different. 
Eschatological expectations are of no help to Qoheleth with the notion of an 
ideal Israel fading day by day. "There are left him only the shreds of the 
religious convictions of his fathers, with a species of `natural religion' which 
has fatalism and altruism among its ingredients. " (McNeile, 1904: 16) 
Qoheleth's conclusion is that since the work of God is inscrutable and allows 
universal injustice and misery, man can come to no conclusion about life. 
One can only make the most of the present. 
Nowhere does McNeile attempt a structural analysis of Ecclesiastes. His 
commentary notes follow chapter divisions. In his (1904: 13-21) discussion 
of Qoheleth's thoughts he divides the text from 2: 13-10: 20 up into a "series 
of pictures illustrating the troubles of men. " This analysis assumes his source 
critical analysis of Ecclesiastes, to which we turn now. 
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In McNeile's view Qoheleth would have been rejected as heretical if it had 
not been edited by an unknown admirer, who emphasised the Solomonic 
authorship. The statement in 1: 12 enabled him to add 1: 1. This editor then 
summed up the burden of the book in 1: 2 and 12: 8, speaking of Qoheleth in 
the third person and using the strengthened expression "Vanity of vanities", 
which does not occur in the body of the text. He finally added 12: 9,10 as a 
postscript in which he elaborates upon the value of Qoheleth's-Solomon's 
teaching. 
Even the edited version would have caused much discussion. Instead of it 
being dismissed as heretical, attempts were made to improve it, first of all by 
one of the wise men. He was attracted by the sections of the book with a 
gnomic and philosophical character and tried to improve the book by adding 
mashalim. Some of these are suggested by Qoheleth's words and either 
correct or develop them. Many, however, seem to be random additions. 
McNeile (1904: 22-24) lists the following as the wise man's additions: 4: 5, 
4: 9-12,6: 7,6: 9a, 7: l a, 7: 4-6,7: 7,7: 8-9,7: 10,7: 11-12,7: 19,8: 1,9: 17-10: 3, 
10: 8-11,10: 12-15,10: 18,10: 19,12: 11,12. 
Although the wise man's proverbs were orthodox, they were not specifically 
religious. Far more was required to make Qoheleth acceptable for the 
orthodox. This was the task of a pious Jew, one of the Hasidim. He is 
responsible for the additions to Ecclesiastes relating to the duty to fear God 
and the certainty of judgement to those who do not fulfil this duty. McNeile 
(1904: 24-27) attributes the following verses to this editor: 2: 26ab, 3: 14b, 
3: 17,4: 17-5: 6,7: 18b, 7: 26b, 7: 29,8: 2b, 3ab, 5,6a; 8: 11-13,11: 9b, 12: 1a, 
12: 13,14. 
McNeile (1904: 27-30) is well aware of the `innumerable' attempts to read 
Ecclesiastes as a unity. Most defenders of the unity of the text understand 
Qoheleth to have gone through different phases of thought, alternating 
between doubt and faith with faith ultimately triumphing. However, for 
McNeile the contrasts are too stark for this to be the case. There is also the 
problem of explaining the miscellaneous proverbs in chapters 4-10 which 
exhibit neither faith nor doubt. 
In relation to Greek language and thought McNeile (1904: 39-55) argues that 
it is very difficult to find any Graecisms in Ecclesiastes. Qoheleth was not 
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directly influenced by any one school of Greek philosophy but "the natural 
development of the two religions, Hebrew and Greek, proceeded (broadly 
speaking) on the same lines, and produced certain affinities between them. 
Before Christ came ... it was inevitable that all religious thought which was 
unrestrained by orthodoxy and ancient tradition should tend towards 
Pantheism- and its necessary corollary Fatalism. " (McNeile, 1904: 52) 
In 12: 8-14 McNeile (1904: 91-94) discerns the editor's closing formula plus 
three postscripts. 12: 8 contains the admiring editor's closing formula with 
the strengthened `vanity of vanities'. In 12: 9,10 this same editor commends 
Qoheleth's teaching. In the second postscript 12: 11,12 the wise man reflects 
upon the value of short, incisive proverbs. In 12: 13,14 the Hasid sums up his 
own teaching. 
McNeile's approach to Ecclesiastes is best described as a literary critical 
one, with `literary critical' understood as source criticism. Barton (1984: 69- 
72) notes that there are also elements of redaction criticism in his approach. 
Barton examines the effect of wisdom redaction in 4: 7-12 and of Hasid 
redaction in 11: 9-12: 14. As he demonstrates, there is potential to move in 
this direction. But in his notes on the text McNeile does not pursue this 
direction; these interpolations are simply omitted and detailed consideration 
is not given to how they reshape the meaning of the text. 
2. GALLING ON ECCLESIASTES 
According to Galling (1969: 74) "Das 222 Verse umfassende Buch ist jetzt in 
12 Kapitel eingeteilt, die jedoch keine Sinneinheiten darstellen. In 
Wirklichkeit handelt es sich um eine Reihe von in sich geschlossenen 
Sentenzen zumeist geringen Umfangs. " Qoheleth recorded the sentences23 
which were edited by one of his disciples (QR1) around 300 B. C. "Die bald 
nach Q. s Tod erfolgte postume editio princeps (mit dem ersten Nachwort) 
wurde gegen Ende des 3. Jh. s von QR2 mit einem zweiten Nachwort (12: 12- 
14) versehen. " (Galling, 1969: 75,76) 
All attempts to discover an overall structure in Ecclesiastes must fail because 
"der Autor nicht ein Buch (einen Traktat de vanitate rerum) geplant hat, 
23Galling (1969: 74) refers to the twenty seven sections he discerns in Ecclesiastes as "Sentenzen" although 
he acknowledges that in most cases "Reflexionen" would be more appropriate. 
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sondern seine jeweilige Erkentniss in einer auf ein bestimmtes Thema 
zugespitzen Sentenz zum Ausdruck bringt. " (Galling, 1969: 76) The 
individual sentence is the primary literary unit and must be interpreted as 
such. However, behind the sentences Qoheleth's thought again and again 
revolves around the happenings of fate and death. "In den Sprüchen Qs ist 
die Einheit der Lebenssicht Q. s unverkennbar wie die Individuation durch 
die Ich-Aussage. " (Galling, 1969: 76) In this respect the sentences are so 
close that no overarching structure is required to discern the separate 
sentences. The relative independence of the sentences does not mean that 
they are randomly mixed up like play cards are shuffled. The order most 
probably stems from QR1; 1: 4-11 and 1: 12-2: 11 were probably deliberately 
placed at the beginning by QR1, and 11: 7-12: 8 at the end. Nevertheless, the 
relatively free ordering of the sentences must be allowed for. Galling rejects 
the attempts by Bickell and Siegfried to discern a strict order by making 
changes and separating out sources. 
QR2 has also made various corrections in the text. These stand contrary to 
the scopus of their respective sentence and are readily recognisable as from 
the same hand as the second epilogue. Examples are 3: 17aß, 8: 5, l2bff, 
11: 9b-12: la. QR2 equated Qoheleth with Solomon by expanding 1: 1-3 
which is originally from the hand of QR1. 
Qoheleth's thought does represent something of a crisis in wisdom but QR1 
exaggerates the negative element of Qoheleth's message by summing it up 
in 1: 2 and 12: 8 as he does. (Galling, 1969: 80) Against the background of a 
static view of creation order that had developed in wisdom circles Qoheleth 
stresses the limitations of wisdom for man. 
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expresses the transience of 
human experience in the context of human seeking for stability and 
endurance. 
Barton (1984: 67,68) uses Galling (1932,1940) as his example of a form 
critical approach to Ecclesiastes. Galling did however think, as Barton 
acknowledges, that Qoheleth was the author of these sayings. A more radical 
form critic might argue that many of these sayings were ancient and 
anonymous proverbs with histories of their own. However, as Whybray (see 
below) points out, this sort of form criticism is methodologically unable to 
deal with the individual genius of a writer. For example, the examination of 
quotations in Ecclesiastes is related to form criticism because these quotes 
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would have had a life in Israel outside of the text of Ecclesiastes. However, 
the actual utilisation of the material in Ecclesiastes is something that form 
criticism cannot account for. But even from Galling's conservative position, 
it is apparent that form criticism has potentially radical implications for the 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes. The criterion of consistency in content would 
be of no use in literary analysis of such an anthology so that Barton (1912) 
and McNeile would be approaching Ecclesiastes quite incorrectly (Cf. 
Barton, 1984: 67). 
3. GORDIS ON ECCLESIASTES 
Gordis' commentary on Ecclesiastes was first published in 1951. In it we get 
a feel for the shift towards a much stronger sense of the basic unity of 
Ecclesiastes that has characterised later twentieth century scholarship on 
Ecclesiastes. Indeed Gordis (1968: 73) notes that the few decades preceding 
his commentary have seen a growing recognition of the unity of 
Ecclesiastes. Whereas in the nineteenth century the unity of the book was 
maintained among critical scholars only by Genung and Cornill, it has now 
been recognised by Levy (1912), Hertzberg (1932), MacDonald (1933), 
Galling (1940) and Weber (1947) (Gordis, 1968: 379). Only the epilogue is 
clearly from another hand24. 
Gordis (1968: 71,72) rejects the notion of Ecclesiastes going through a 
number of redactions in order to make it acceptable. Such an hypothesis is 
contradicted by the history of the Apocrypha and the Pseudepigrapha after 
their composition. Many of these books were less objectionable to orthodoxy 
than Ecclesiastes and yet no attempt was made to rework them in order to fit 
them into the Canon. Chronologically, such an hypothesis is also unlikely 
because the complex process of writing, popularisation and interpolation 
would have to take place in a century or less. Detailed study of individual 
passages confirms that the hypothesis of various editors is unnecessary. 
Gordis (1968: 378) finds that most of the Hasid passages are authentically 
Qoheleth. In others Qoheleth is citing conventional doctrine. Because of 
their mashal form the Hokma passages are generally most congenial to 
Qoheleth's standpoint, or are cited as text for his commentary. "The various 
24Cf. Murphy (1992a: xxxiv): "It is preferable to explain the book as generally of one piece ... with the 
obvious exception of the epilogue. " 
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Hakam glossators and Hasid interpolators are merely figments of the 
scholarly imagination. " (Gordis, 1968: 73) 
Within the canon Gordis (1968: 14-21) stresses that whereas Torah and 
prophecy focused on the group, wisdom focused on the individual. Song and 
wisdom are both expressions of hokmah as technical wisdom so that the 
Ketubim is a unity, the deposit of wisdom. Wisdom in Israel has extensive 
contacts with the ANE but is nevertheless an indigenous development. 
Gordis explores aspects of the intertextuality of the Old Testament in 
relation to Ecclesiastes and argues that Qoheleth makes creative use of 
Genesis and Deuteronomy. Gordis (1968: 51-58) rejects any notion of strong 
Greek influence: "Koheleth has two fundamental themes - the essential 
unknowability of the world and the divine imperative of joy. His unique 
achievement lies in the skill and the sensitiveness with which he presents his 
world-view. He has attained to this plane of vision principally through his 
ancestral Hebrew culture, modified by some general contact with Greek 
ideas. " He is a linguistic pioneer in that he is the first to use Hebrew for 
quasi-philosophical purposes. However, Ecclesiastes is not a debate, a 
dialogue, or a philosophical treatise. For Gordis (1968: 110) it is best 
described as a cahier or notebook, in which the author jotted down his 
reflections during the leisure of old age. There is. no logical progression of 
thought in the book, and efforts to find it result in far-fetched exegesis. Nor 
is the book concerned with a single topic. Its unity is not one of logical 
progression, but of mood and world-view. Like much Jewish literature, it is 
organic, not syllogistic in structure. 
Gordis' commentary is significant in the close attention he plays to 
quotations in Ecclesiastes. Levy and Galling had independently recognised 
the presence of quotations in Ecclesiastes but Gordis (1939/40) was the first 
to tackle the subject systematically. Fox (1980) and Whybray (1981) have 
since developed the discussion further25. For Gordis (1968: 95-108) failure to 
recognise quotations is disastrous for they play a fundamental role in 
wisdom literature, where there is no supernatural revelation but only patient 
observation used as the basis of reasonable conclusions. Gordis (1968: 96) 
defines quotations as "words which do not reflect the present sentiments of 
the author of the literary composition in which they are found, but have been 
25Although there is no agreement concerning the presence of quotations in Ecclesiastes. See Perry 
(1993: 4), for example, who regards Gordis' approach as "[a]nother attempt to palliate K's radical 
condemnation of creation. " 
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introduced by the author to convey the standpoint of another person or 
situation. " He discerns four types of quotation in Ecclesiastes. Firstly there is 
the straightforward use of proverbial quotations (e. g. 10: 18). Secondly there 
is the sort in which Qoheleth buttresses his argument with a proverb, part of 
which is relevant but the proverb is quoted in full for the sake of 
completeness. (e. g. 5: 3) Thirdly there is the use of proverbial quotations as a 
text (as for e. g. in 7: 1-14). Fourthly there is the use of contrasting proverbs 
as a way of contradicting accepted doctrines (e. g. 4: 5,6). 
On the relation of 12: 9ff to the rest of Ecclesiastes Gordis (1968: 349ff) 
follows the tradition that the epilogue is from another hand. The use of the 
third person plus distinctive vocabulary indicate this. It is possible that these 
concluding verses are not a unit but they do not contradict each other, and 
there is a satisfactory progression of thought. "The entire epilogue is best 
regarded as a unit. ... The editor ... has selected those aspects of Koheleth 
which were most congenial to him. While he has not done full justice to the 
temper and world-view of Koheleth, the ideas he stresses ... are part of 
Koheleth's outlook. " (Gordis, 1968: 351) 
4. CRENSHAW ON ECCLESIASTES 
Since the 1950's the worldview of modernity has increasingly come under 
attack and this has affected the historical critical method. In the next two 
chapters we will explore some of the twentieth century reactions to historical 
criticism. Up until the present however the main commentaries on 
Ecclesiastes remain historical critical. The sort of shift in type of 
commentary signalled by Clines' (1989) commentary on Job has not yet 
happened with Ecclesiastes26. We will, therefore, conclude our examination 
of the reading of Ecclesiastes in modernity by briefly examining some of the 
major contemporary commentaries on Ecclesiastes. 
Amidst all his work on wisdom literature, Crenshaw published his 
commentary on Ecclesiastes in 198827. His assessment of the message of 
Ecclesiastes is very negative: "Life is profitless; totally absurd. This 
oppressive message lies at the heart of the Bible's strangest book. ... The 
deity stands distant, abandoning humanity to chance and death. " (Crenshaw, 
26See chapter six for a discussion of Clines' latest approach to OT study. 
27See the bibliography for Crenshaw's publications on wisdom. 
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1988: 23) According to Crenshaw, Qoheleth wrote against a background of a 
religious/intellectual crisis in which it was very difficult to see any 
connection between external circumstances and inner worth, as did Job. 
Qoheleth is more radical than Job; he discerns no moral order at all, although 
he refuses to carry this position through to its logical conclusions. To those 
with the ability to enjoy life Qoheleth recommends pleasure so that "[ljittle 
room exists here for a scrupulous conscience or for anxiety concerning 
religious duty. " (Crenshaw, 1988: 27) 
Ecclesiastes represents no one genre, but reflection arising from personal 
observation dominates the book. As regards the integrity of Ecclesiastes, 
Crenshaw (1988: 34,35) acknowledges that the epilogist in 12: 9-10 believed 
that Qoheleth had stamped his teaching with a recognizable design rather 
than bequeathing a legacy of random thoughts. This seems to be confirmed 
by the unifying refrain that unifies the text. However, scholars have been 
unable to agree on this design or on the main message of the text. Crenshaw 
(1988: 35-49) examines the different attempts to get at the structure of 
Ecclesiastes and concludes that 
"[t]his discussion of Qoheleth's structure has failed to resolve a single issue, but it 
demonstrates the complexity of the problem. In my judgement no one has 
succeeded in delineating the plan of the book, for it certainly has characteristics 
inherent to a collection of sentences. ... Research into the book also shows that it 
reflects the interpreter's world view. That is why, I think, opinions vary so widely 
with regard to such basic matters as Q's optimism or pessimism, his attitude 
towards women (Lohfink 1979), and his advocacy of immoral conduct. " 
(Crenshaw, 1988: 47) 
Crenshaw (1988: 48) analyses Ecclesiastes' structure loosely into 25 
sections. 
For Crenshaw (1988: 49) the tensions of the book are best explained as the 
fruit of a lifetime's research. "Qoheleth bares his soul in all its twistings and 
turnings, ups and downs, and he invites readers to accompany him in pursuit 
of fresh discovery. " He identifies as secondary materials the following: 1: 1; 
12: 9-11,12-14; 2: 26a, 3: 17a, 8: 12-13,11: 9b, perhaps 5: 18 and 7: 26b, and 
perhaps 1: 2 and 12: 8. The first epilogue derives from a close student of 
Qoheleth's and reads almost like an epitaph. The second introduces wholly 
alien categories as it assesses the unorthodox teacher. 
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5. MURPHY ON ECCLESIASTES 
Murphy, like Crenshaw, has published mainly on wisdom literature28. His 
(1992a) commentary on Ecclesiastes is characterised by cautious, sane 
scholarship within the historical critical tradition. Ecclesiastes was probably 
published in Palestine rather than Egypt but there is no compelling evidence 
either way. As regards the integrity of Ecclesiastes "[i]t is preferable to 
explain the book as generally of one piece ... with the obvious exception of 
the epilogue. " (Murphy, 1992a: xxxiv) Murphy follows Wright's (1968) 
analysis of Ecclesiastes fairly closely29. 
Ecclesiastes is intensely Jewish and draws especially on creation theology in 
the Old Testament. Its relationship to the ANE must also be recognised but 
Murphy is reluctant to specify influences. He devotes considerable space to 
the history of the interpretation of Ecclesiastes and concludes that selective 
emphasis is common to all periods, quoting Pedersen with approval: 
"very different types have found their own image in Ecclesiastes, and it is 
remarkable that none of the interpretations mentioned is completely without some 
bias. There are many aspects in our book; different interpreters have highlighted 
what was most fitting for themselves and their age, and they understood it in their 
own way. But for all there was a difficulty, namely that there were also other 
aspects which could hardly be harmonised with their preferred view. " (Murphy, 
1992a: ly) 
Murphy (1992a: lv, lvi) points out that this contextualises historical critical 
research: 
"If we do not accept Solomonic authorship, what is the concept of authorship that 
we are working with today? Is it Q1 and Q2 and Qinf? Will a future generation 
find this position unsatisfactory, and centre its attention on the book instead? How 
many far-fetched theories have been hazarded by modern writers who are locked 
up in their own crippling presuppositions? Even the vagaries and extravagances of 
ancient exegesis can have a sobering effect on current scholarship. We need not 
repeat the mistakes of the past, and we can be made more aware of our own 
presuppositions. " 
For Murphy (1992a: lvi-lxix) the message of Ecclesiastes has suffered from 
excessive summarising and he approaches its message by studying the text's 
major words. Qoheleth is in conflict with traditional wisdom but he should 
not be set in radical opposition with other biblical wisdom by suggesting that 
28See the bibliography in Hoglund (1987) for a list of Murphy's works up until 1985. 
29See chapter four for our discussion of Wright's New Critical approach to Ecclesiastes. 
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he is deeply pessimistic and ultimately nihilistic. Folly is never an option for 
Qoheleth and although he couldn't grasp wisdom he believed it was there. If 
Qoheleth's teaching is sometimes in conflict with traditional wisdom his 
method is not. As regards historical Old Testament literature, Murphy 
argues, we have no evidence of what Qoheleth thought about the salvation 
history, and we should not try to speculate on this. 
The epilogue of 12: 9-14 is an addition to the book, and is probably best 
regarded as a unity, although "it was somehow not fitting that the enigmatic 
book of Ecclesiastes should come to an end without the subtlety and open- 
ended character that the epilogue shows. " (Murphy, 1992a: 130). 12: 13,14 do 
not fit well with Qoheleth. With respect to the fear of God and importance of 
obedience "[t]he epilogue is obviously putting forth an ideal which has been 
developed elsewhere and which is not a concern in Ecclesiastes. " (Murphy, 
1992a: 126) 
6. WHYBRAY ON ECCLESIASTES 
For Whybray (1989a: 6,7) Ecclesiastes is a wisdom text but in order to 
express his ideas Qoheleth had to develop a new style of discourse. His use 
of the first person singular is unique and betrays the influence of the Greek 
cult of the individual. "Q is an `intellectual' in a sense otherwise unknown to 
the OT. In his remorseless determination to probe the nature of things he 
belongs to a new world of thought, though ... his sense of God's 
transcendence ... is a Jewish 
inheritance which distinguishes him quite 
radically from the secular philosopher. " Ecclesiastes was written in the 
Ptolemaic period which was a time of intense economic development; hence 
Qoheleth's preoccupation with financial matters. It is a work of the later 
post-exilic period, when the old values of Israelite society had been 
displaced because of the intellectual influence of Hellenism and the new 
spirit of commercial enterprise. 
Ecclesiastes is not a systematic treatise and there is generally no progression 
of thought from one section to the next, but rather a cyclical tendency. 
Whybray accounts for the tensions as ones existing within Qoheleth's own 
mind: "Qoheleth was attempting to reconcile his own experience of life and 
of the world with the traditional wisdom tradition which he inherited, and ... 
he offers no universal or satisfactory answer to these problems. " 
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(1989a: 18,19) Form critical criteria are insufficient to determine the 
structure, especially as they do not make room for individual genius. As 
regards the structure of Ecclesiastes Whybray argues that there is no 
uniformity in the way the book has been put together. Some sections are 
random collections, others show formal and logical continuity. Section 
divisions between these two types of sections are not clear. Exegetes must be 
content to leave the questions open. The different themes are closely related 
in Ecclesiastes but there is no co-ordinating theme. 1: 2 & 12: 8 are from an 
editor, and not from Qoheleth. Whybray (1992: 169) takes the view that 1: 4- 
12: 7 is the work of Qoheleth, while stressing that complete consistency in a 
work like Ecclesiastes is hardly to be expected. 
Qoheleth is not a systematic philosopher. There are inconsistencies in his 
thought but this is because his problems are insoluble. He is a seeker after 
truth about man and his fate in the world, and is concerned to test the 
wisdom tradition by experience. He is not a teacher but one who presents 
problems to his reader, thereby inviting them to pursue these questions for 
themselves. It is uncertain whether Qoheleth's thought is ultimately 
optimistic or pessimistic, but he is certainly a realist. More recently 
Whybray (1992) has argued for the dominance of the exhortation to joy in 
Ecclesiastes30. 
In 12: 9-14, which is universally acknowledged as not from Qoheleth, 
Whybray (1989a: 169) discerns two different hands. The first praises 
Qoheleth uncritically whereas the second appears to be softening the effect 
of his teaching. We can not determine further editorial hands in the text. 
V9,10 contain the only direct information about Qoheleth and are probably 
from a personal acquaintance who was a former student or admiring 
colleague. 
7. THE FRUIT OF HISTORICAL CRITICAL READINGS OF 
ECCLESIASTES 
On a number of issues a consensus has emerged out of historical critical 
study of Ecclesiastes. There is near universal agreement that Solomon was 
not the author and that the book was written in the third century BC or 
30We will discuss Whybray's (1992) view in detail in chapter seven. It may indicate a stronger structure to 
Ecclesiastes than his earlier work recognises. 
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thereabouts. Throughout the twentieth century there has been a growing 
commitment to the basic unity of Ecclesiastes with the exception of the 
epilogue. Any notion of strong Greek influence on the book tends to be 
rejected although broad connections with Greek thought are recognised. 
Generally Qoheleth is thought to be rooted in Hebraic thought and part of 
the wisdom movement in Israel31. However there is no agreement about the 
structure of Ecclesiastes, nor about its message. There is widespread 
agreement that Qoheleth is distancing himself from certain biblical traditions 
but scholars are not agreed as to whether Ecclesiastes is basically positive or 
extremely pessimistic in its outlook. 
As regards tradition criticism there has been an ongoing debate about 
Ecclesiastes' relationship to the biblical wisdom and other traditions. 
Generally it is assumed that while Ecclesiastes is rooted in the biblical 
wisdom tradition, Qoheleth is subjecting it to a radical critique and 
distancing himself from parts of it. Qoheleth makes no mention of Israel's 
covenant traditions and scholars disagree as to how to interpret this. Some 
take him to be highly critical of these traditions and especially of the 
blessing/curse tradition while others, like Murphy, refuse to make a 
judgement from his silence. Redaction criticism has never come into its own 
in historical critical research into Ecclesiastes. Childs' canonical approach to 
Ecclesiastes is regarded by some as an example of redaction criticism, and 
we will examine this in the next chapter. 
V RE-THINKING HISTORICAL CRITICISM 
1. The Importance of Recontextualising Historical Criticism 
Historical criticism has dominated the interpretation of Ecclesiastes this 
century. As we have shown the historical critical method emerged out of and 
has been deeply shaped by modernity. However, part of the legacy of 
modernity in Old Testament study has been the tendency to decontextualise 
this method of interpretation so that it is simply regarded as normal32. We 
noticed this with Wellhausen, to an extent with Rogerson, and it is clearly 
present in Krentz's account of the historical critical method, which assumes 
31Although, as we noted in chapter two, there are some like Lohfink (1993), who argue for strong Greek influence upon Ecclesiastes. 32Barton (1993a: 8) says of the historical critical method that "[i]t is a particular attitude towards the study 
of the biblical text, which became usual in German biblical study in the nineteenth century, and until 
recently was normal in most university faculties of theology. " (italics mine) 
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the standard account of modernity. Some indications of this are Krentz's 
assumption that there is such a thing as the historical critical method, his 
understanding of history as objective, systematic knowledge of the past, his 
failure to take the role of the reader seriously in interpretation, his reluctance 
to see faith and the historical critical method as in conflict, thereby 
privatising faith, his understanding that the historical critical method will 
allow us to hear the OT ideas and his privileging of the present state of 
historiography, thereby affirming the idea of progress. 
The historical critical method is however always related to an epistemology, 
and if we are to assess its significance it must be assessed in its larger 
philosophical and cultural context. Indeed this tendency to decontextualise 
the historical critical method is itself an indication of how deeply it has been 
shaped by modernity. Toulmin (1990: 21) notes that "one aim of 17th- 
century philosophers was to frame all their questions in terms that rendered 
them independent of context' 'and demonstrates how this aspiration towards 
neutral objectivity permeates Enlightenment thought. A vital part of our 
investigation has, therefore, been to recontextualise the historical critical 
method and to demonstrate that it has been deeply shaped by modernity33. 
2. The Importance of Recognising the Diversity Within Modernity 
Recontextualisation increases our understanding of historical criticism but 
we still have to evaluate this deeper understanding. And in the process of 
evaluation it is important to remember that although there is a common 
underlying paradigm or worldview which informs modernity, the standard 
account tends to suppress the diversity of approaches within the unity. It is 
common, for example, for historical criticism to be referred to as a unitary 
entity. And it does have a certain unity insofar as the philosophies of history 
informing it are all modem. However, the diversity of modem philosophies 
of history informing the historical critical method rarely receive attention. 
McIntyre (1994: 374) is one of the few scholars who recognises this 
diversity: 
"It is such considerations which lie at the back of my opening remarks in this 
essay, for they are the justification for the rejection of what has become accepted 
dogma, not only in history and those disciplines associated with it, but in theology 
33Wright's (1992: 126) distinction between basic and consequential beliefs is relevant here. The 
consequential philosophies of history are shaped by the basic Enlightenment beliefs. Cf. Botha's (1994) 
view that the epistemic paradigm remains constant. 
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itself, namely, that there is a single identifiable entity called historical criticism, 
which operates a simple criterion of historicity, in judging and validating 
historical claims, implicit in those statements which refer to the past. This dogma 
has dominated not only the unsympathetic critic's approach to the historicity of 
events described in the Bible, but even the attempts of theologians to understand 
and express the historical passages of the Christian faith. " 
Even within modernity it is legitimate to ask of a biblical scholar which 
philosophy of history undergirds his historical critical methodology. Thus 
Gabler's rationalistic hermeneutic34 is very different to Herder's historicist 
approach35, even if at a certain level they both work with a modern idea of 
progress. And de Wette's Kantianism is different to Vatke's Hegelianism. 
And in the context of the postmodern turn philosophy of history has become 
more diverse and fragmented so that, one can no longer, like Krentz, simply 
give an account of the current state of historiography with an assumed idea 
of progress. Historiography, like most disciplines nowadays, is pluralistic36 
and one must account for one's particular philosophy of history as opposed 
to others. The main types of philosophy of history in the nineteenth century 
all tend to operate within the modern worldview, but nevertheless they will 
and do produce different results when applied to the OT, and it is important 
to bear this diversity in mind when evaluating historical criticism. Thus even 
if one was to assume the standard account of modernity it would still be 
necessary for an OT scholar to account for his particular approach to history 
and thus to the historical critical method. 
3. The Importance of Evaluating the Context in Which the Historical Critical 
Method Emerged 
However, as we have seen, the standard account of modernity can no longer 
be assumed. Modernity has given birth to the historical critical method, and 
the latter bears all the marks of family resemblance. What are we to make of 
modernity? Our answer to this question will be determinative for the 
direction we propose in OT studies in all sorts of ways. One can approach 
the question of modernity from many directions, and I would not want to 
underestimate its achievements or suggest that reverting to a pre-modem 
position is possible or warranted. In this section we will evaluate only one 
aspect of modernity, namely its attitude to religion. Clearly this is relevant to 
34See Brett, 1991: 82-85. 
350n Herder's view of history see Collingwood, 1946: 88-93. 
36Cf. Jenkins (1991,1995) for an indication of the present state of debate about philosophy of history. 
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the interpretation of the OT and it will give us an idea of the extent to which 
a critical stance is required in relation to modernity. 
Toulmin does not make a lot of the anti-Christian nature of the 
Enlightenment, although he does recognise that humanism emerged within a 
predominantly Christian Europe. Gadamer, however, alerts us to the 
centrality of the religious implications of modernity. He37 argues that the 
Enlightenment critique is directed primarily against Christianity and that 
historical criticism has its roots in the Enlightenment's faith in reason. The 
anti-Christian aspect of modernity is also foregrounded by Gay (1977a) in 
The Rise of Modern Paganism. In his view the Enlightenment philosophers' 
claim to distance themselves from Christianity has not generally been taken 
seriously (Gay, 1977a: 322). He acknowledges some truth in the view that 
modernity is a secularised version of Christianity but rejects the image of the 
two as connected by a bridge: "it fails to evoke the essential hostility 
between eighteenth-century religion and eighteenth-century secularism: the 
philosophes rudely treated the Christian past rather as Voltaire treated the 
plays of Shakespeare - as a dunghill strewn with diamonds, crying out to be 
pillaged and badly needing to be cleaned out. " (Gay, 1977a: 323; Cf. also 
Carroll, 1993: 117,120,121. ) 
The Christian era was regarded by the Enlightenment thinkers as a period of 
darkness and retreat from reason. Christianity was criticised for its contempt 
of antiquity, and even those mediaevals who preserved the classics were 
criticised because, "while they held grimly on to the ramparts of antiquity, 
they surrendered its citadel - the autonomy of critical thought. " (Gay, 
1977a: 226) It was well recognised that belief in revelation undermined the 
autonomy of reason, and that, in reviving antiquity a worldview was being 
espoused poles apart from traditional Christian perspectives. Cassirer 
(1951: 134ff) perceptively alert us to the fact that the Enlightenment does not 
so much reject religion as appropriate a new form of faith; however this is 
faith judged by reason: 
"The relations between the concept of God and the concepts of truth, morality, 
law are by no means abandoned, but their direction changes. An exchange of 
index symbols takes place, as it were. That which formerly had established other 
concepts, now moves into the position of that which is to be established, and that 
which hitherto had justified other concepts, now finds itself in the position of a 
concept which requires justification. " (Cassirer, 1951: 159) 
37See quotes at outset of chapter. 
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A logical extension of this is Religion Within the Bounds of Reason. 
Epistemologically modernity is clearly rooted in views which appear 
incongruent with Christianity38. Toulmin's narrative alerts us to the 
centrality of human autonomy and rational analysis in modernity. This is 
nothing new, but his contextualising of this aspiration helps us to understand 
Enlightenment despair over Christianity and the desperate need for certainty. 
The answer was found in secular reason. For reasons described above, 
Toulmin finds this to be an understandable but wrong move. From a 
Christian perspective Newbigin (1986; 1994) agrees, but for very different 
reasons. 
Newbigin (1994: 61) alerts us to modernity's espousal of secular reason as a 
reaction to appeals to revelation and tradition as sources of authority39. 
Observation of facts and critical reflection upon them are the source of 
reliable knowledge, not faith and revelation. Newbigin contrasts Locke's 
view of faith - "a persuasion of our minds short of knowledge", with 
Augustine's "credo ut intelligam". For Augustine faith is the path to 
knowledge, for Descartes doubt. In Newbigin's (1994: 62-64) view 
Cartesianism is inherently self-destructive40; to privilege doubt 
epistemologically inevitably (and ironically) leads to scepticism and 
nihilism. Furthermore secular reason has not escaped tradition and faith. 
Tradition and faith inevitably affect epistemology: 
"Reason is a faculty with which we try to grasp the different elements in our 
experience in an orderly way, so that as we say `they make sense'. It is not a 
separate source of information about what is the case. It can only function within 
a linguistic and cultural tradition. ... All rationality is socially and culturally conditioned. 
In the `Age of Reason' ... `reason' was used to denote conformity with a set of assumptions derived from the science and philosophy of the time. ... Reason operates within a specific tradition of rational discourse, which is carried by a 
specific human community. No supra-cultural `reason' can stand in judgement 
over all human traditions of rationality. All reason operates within a total 
woridview which is embodied in the language, the concepts and the models which 
are the means by which those who share them can reason together. " (Newbigin, 
1994: 79,80) 
38As an example of how strong this privileging of reason was in opposition to religion cf. Rogerson, 
1992: 27-30 for a description of a lecture given by Kant in Jena in 1798. As Rogerson (1992: 29) notes, 
"There are, not surprisingly, radical implications for biblical interpretation in this position. " 
39Cf. Gunton's (1993) view of modernity as the secularisation of Christianity. 
'Cf. Carroll, 1993: 124,125. 
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Part of the Enlightenment's view of reason is its rejection of tradition as 
formative and belief in rational progress. For Descartes "[t]he task of reason 
begins on terra nullius, to create the world again from the ground up. The 
building blocks themselves} must also be created out of nothing, by the 
power of the mind alone. ... The palace of Reason will be constructed only 
from propositions that are clear and distinct. The rest is rubbish. " (Carroll, 
1993: 119) In fact, in its appropriation of antiquity modernity reveals its 
positioning in a particular tradition. This non-neutrality is widely accepted 
today and once again raises the question of the pedigree of the historical 
critical method and its appropriateness for biblical interpretation. Clearly this 
is a very different approach to faith seeking understanding. 
Modernity is under attack from a variety of directions today. Carroll (1993), 
for example, subtitles his text on humanism, "The Wreck of Western 
Culture" and concludes that 
"[h]umanism failed because man is not the centre of creation, in the sense of 
being creature and creator in one. ... human reason is powerful only on a narrow front within strict limits. ... Our story is told. Its purpose 
has been simple, to shout 
that humanism is dead, has been so since the late nineteenth century, and it is 
about time to quit. Let us bury it with appropriate rites, which means honouring 
the little that was good, and understanding what went wrong and why. " (Carroll, 
1993: 228-232) 
Not all would agree with Carroll41. His position does, however, indicate that 
the assumptions of modernity can no longer be taken for granted. This aside, 
our point in this section is that the historical critical method was shaped 
within an ethos of suspicion towards Christianity. With the modern 
worldview now itself a target of suspicion, the question is again 
foregrounded of the extent of pagan42 influence upon biblical studies and its 
appropriateness. It is not just that a theological, a literary and an historical 
hermeneutic have different aims - if that were the case they could easily be 
seen as complementary. The problem is a deeper one of basic views about 
the world which shape the theological, literary or historical hermeneutic. As 
it has developed the historical critical hermeneutic tends to operate with very 
different basic beliefs to most theological hermeneutics, beliefs which 
occupy the same terrain as religion, viz. questions like who are we, how we 
know in a reliable way etc. And these basic beliefs tend to be antithetical, so 
41Cf. Habermas (1987b), Norris (1991,1994) and Gellner (1992) as examples of philosophers who are very 
positive towards the "project of modernity". 
421 use pagan here in the sense in which Clouser (1992: 36-40) uses it. 
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that it is hard to believe that'a synthesis of views stemming from opposed 
starting points will lead one to the truth about the OT. 
This is particularly relevant with the widespread, renewed recognition of the 
Bible as much more than just an ancient text (Cf. Childs, Newbigin, 
Lindbeck, Frei, etc. ). If the Bible is taken seriously as the story how would 
that reshape the historical critical method? What would a contemporary 
biblical hermeneutic look like developed in an ethos sympathetic to 
Christianity and shaped by the biblical story? Modernity has tended to 
privatise religion and to insist that the Christian narrative not be allowed to 
shape life in its wholeness. The problematising of this privatisation43 
reopens the question of how the Christian narrative would shape a biblical 
hermeneutic in a postliberal context. 
4. The Importance of Showing the Link Between Philosophies of History 
(The Context) and Particular Approaches to the Old Testament 
Clearly there is a link between modern philosophies of history and OT 
interpretation. However, as we seek to evaluate modernity and the historical 
critical method an important part of the evidence is the way in which 
particular philosophies of history give rise to particular approaches to the 
OT. These approaches could then be evaluated to see if they do justice to the 
OT. This is a vast area of investigation, and we will only use one example to 
indicate the direction such research might take. 
We have already noted that in general modem philosophy of history yielded 
inter alia a source critical approach in OT studies. This was firstly applied to 
the Pentateuch and the prophets and then later to Ecclesiastes, as we have 
seen. Within the prophets this approach manifested itself as a concern to 
identify the authentic words of the prophet from later accretions. Brett 
(1991: 89-93) argues persuasively that this approach to the prophets is 
connected with romantic idealism in historiography. Such an approach to 
history focused its investigations on the inner life of great individuals as the 
43Modernity has privatised religion but from a Christian perspective this is inadmissable. Wright 
(1992: 41,42) expresses this very clearly: "The reason why stories come into conflict with each other is that 
worldviews, and the stories which characterise them, are in principle normative: that is, they claim to make 
sense of the whole of reality. ... It 
is ironic that many people in the modern world have regarded 
Christianity as a private worldview, a set of private stories. Some Christians have actually played right into 
this trap. But in principle the whole point of Christianity is that it offers a story which is the story of the 
whole world. It is public truth. Otherwise it collapses into Gnosticism. " 
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key to history. The result of this approach in studies of the prophets is that 
reconstruction of the exact words of the prophet and their interpretation 
becomes the goal of exegesis, with little attention being paid to later 
additions and to the final form of the text. Brett cites Wellhausen and Gunkel 
as examples of this and notes Gunkel went so far as to contrast the artificial, 
written stages of the tradition with the vital original context in the life of the 
nation. 
Below we will note the relationship of this link to readings of Ecclesiastes. 
Suffice it to note here that different philosophies of history shape OT 
interpretation in decisive ways. Contra Rogerson, the results of historical 
criticism cannot be distinguished from philosophy, and the question arises as 
to what type of approach to history would be most appropriate to an OT 
hermeneutic. 
5. The Importance of Developing a Christian View of History and Biblical 
Interpretation 
As we argued above, that type of approach to the OT which focuses 
interpretation upon the person or event behind the text is connected to a 
particular romantic idealist philosophy of history. Thus, if we are to evaluate 
such an OT hermeneutic we will have to ask at some point, is this a right 
understanding of history and is it appropriate for understanding the OT? 
Many OT scholars, like Krentz, when faced with a question like this simply 
refer to the current state of historical scholarship. Clearly this is important 
but the evaluative issue will not go away; one still has to account critically 
for one's philosophy of history and anyway, philosophy of history is 
increasingy pluralistic. And the point we wish to make in this section is that 
such evaluation will inevitably involve one's view of religion. If one is to 
follow Gunkel in locating revelation in the peculiarity of the Hebrew Spirit 
then that is to assume a certain understanding of religion. Our argument is 
that biblical interpretation is best served by a philosophy of history shaped 
by the Christian narrative44. We will argue for this approach in this section 
and then give some indication of the shape of such an approach in the next 
section. 
44Cf. Morgan (1988: 187), who rightly makes the point that religious interpretation requires a theoretical 
framework which integrates religion and human existence. Our argument is that such a framework should 
be shaped by the Christian narrative. 
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Throughout Krentz's account of the historical critical method there is a 
tension between reading Scripture as Scripture and the handling of it by 
historical criticism as another ancient text. Krentz notes this tension but 
seems to hope that somehow faith and the historical method are reconcilable. 
The mistake he makes, in my opinion is to place faith and the historical 
critical method on the same level, whereas they function at different levels. 
The historical method is always tied to some philosophy of history and to 
some epistemology, which in turn is rooted in some worldview45. In its pre- 
theoretical sense faith is akin to this level of worldview. In assessing the 
relationship between historical criticism and faith, the important question is 
how the `worldviewish' and philosophical underpinnings of the particular 
historical critical method being used compare to the Christian story or 
worldview. 
Different worldviews may work with the historical critical method but they 
will shape it in different ways. Hence the serious mistake of assuming one 
type of historical critical method. Thus Christian faith conflicts with the 
modern historical critical method, not in its concern to take history seriously 
but in the way in which it takes history seriously46. Brueggemann (1994: 239) 
states this most clearly: 
"The claim that `God acts in history' is not compatible with our Enlightenment 
notions of control, reason, objectivity, and technique. Indeed, if one begins with 
the assumptions of modernity, history can only be thought of as a bare story of 
power, in which the God of the Bible can never make a significant appearance. 
The claim that `God acts in history', that God's word impinges upon the human 
process, requires a very different beginning point. " 
As Wright (1992: 425,426) says of biblical literature, "The language 
functions as a lens through which historical events can be seen as bearing the 
full meaning that the community believed them to possess. However foreign 
to post-Enlightenment thought it may be to see meaning within history, such 
language grows naturally out of Israel's basic monotheistic and covenant 
theology. " Thus Christian faith and the historical critical method need not be 
antithetical, provided the narrative informing and shaping the particular 
historical critical method is Christian. Even today, however, OT scholars are 
very reluctant to move in this direction. 
45This is of course from my thetical-critical position. 
46McIntyre (1994: 378) expresses a similar point: "there are elements in the Christian faith which are not 
amenable to description in terms that would be admitted by a secular or positivist historian. " 
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"Many have felt the pressure in recent decades to engage in scholarly work, 
including specialist study of the Bible, from within the post-Enlightenment 
modernist perspective, putting specifically Christian perspectives on hold while 
the exercise is going on. This has been helped by the impression that ... matters of 
religious opinion are simply private options which do not engage with the public 
world..... this way of conceiving the problem is based on a mistake. All 
worldviews, including both the modernism of the Enlightenment and Christianity, 
claim to be public and comprehensive. " (Wright, 1992: 137) 
No one has exposed the antithesis between the modern-historical critical 
approach to the Bible and the traditional Christian approach more clearly 
than Levenson (1993). He argues that a modem historical critical reading is 
altogether at odds with a `literary' reading. In the process he exposes the 
synthetic nature of much contemporary Protestant OT scholarship. It claims 
to be purely historical-critical but is in fact constrained by Christian (and 
often anti-Semitic) perspectives in all sorts of ways. Krentz, incidentally, is a 
good example of this. Consider his reference to the Bible as Scripture 
throughout his text. Ironically, Levenson (1993: xiv, xv), even as he exposes 
the tension between these two ways of reading the Bible, himself articulates 
his "own intuition 
... that the two seemingly opposite 
directions in which 
these essays move are each indispensable avenues to the larger and more 
encompassing truth. The dignity both of traditional interpretation and of 
modern criticism depends on a careful separation of the two and a re 
engagement on new terms. " What Levenson does not recognise is that 
different worldviews inform these different readings and these worldviews 
are antithetical. In terms of their starting points there is not going to be a 
larger and more encompassing truth. To suggest there is betrays an 
anachronistic idea of progress. 
Thus, for a number of reasons the time is ripe for a reassessment of the 
epistemological (and historical) foundations of OT study. Firstly historical 
criticism is not a neutral hermeneutic but has been shaped by perspectives 
suspicious of the public nature of Christianity. Secondly, there is no single 
historical critical method but a variety of approaches informed by different 
philosophies of history. And thirdly, as we will discuss below, historical 
ciritical methods tend to overlook the literary and theological aspects of the 
OT texts. Within NT study Wright (1992) is attempting such a 
reconstruction along the lines of critical realism. Suffice it to note at this 
point that such reconstruction does not involve a reversion to pre- 
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modernity47. One of the historical critical approach's great contributions has 
been to focus the historicity of the Old Testament. Some reactions to the 
historical critical method such as Frei and Lindbeck are in danger of 
jettisoning this insight, which is a mistake. In my view historical questions 
are a key element in any biblical hermeneutic, since Scripture is undoubtedly 
a text developed in and embedded in history. Thus source, form, tradition 
and redaction criticism will always be valid parts of the hermeneutic 
enterprise. What will need reconsideration is one's understanding of history 
and how this shapes these disciplines. This is precisely the sort of activity 
Wright (1992) engages in. He defends the historical focus of the historical 
critical method and the legitimacy of form criticism, for example, but 
critiques the assumptions that have informed form criticism of the NT 
through the influence of Bultmann (Cf. Wright, 1992: 418-443). 
Thus it seems to me that what is urgently required in Old Testament study is 
a reassessment of its epistemological (and historical) foundations from a 
Christian perspective and an exploration of how that would shape source, 
form, redaction and tradition criticism differently, as well as how that would 
relate historical to other types of interpretation48. But these are very complex 
questions. In the 60's Stephen Neill recognised the need for biblical 
interpretation to be informed by a theology of history which would not by 
itself solve the historical problems but would "hold the ring within which a 
solution can be found. " (Neill & Wright, 1988: 366) And Thiselton and 
Pannenberg have likewise stressed the need for a philosophy of history that 
is theologically informed (Cf. Thiselton, 1980: 51-84). However, Wright 
notes that there has been little progress in this area over recent decades 
(Neill & Wright, 1988: 366). 
In narrative texts like the Pentateuch the historical aspect of the text is a 
more central issue than in a text like Ecclesiastes, and so we will not pursue 
the question of the referential nature of OT texts. Suffice it to note here that 
some of the philosophies of history that have shaped the historical critical 
method have focused interpretation away from the biblical text. Romantic 
idealism is an example that we have considered. In this way the literary and 
theological dimensions of the text have been obscured. If the aim of 
47Cf. Wright, 1992: 9, "I think, that the heirs of the Enlightenment have been too shrill in their denunciation 
of traditional Christianity, and that Christianity has often been too unshakeably arrogant in resisting new 
questions. " 
48It is important to note that I am recommending this agenda in the context of a genuine pluralism in OT 
studies. In this respect see chapter seven. 
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interpretation is understanding of the text then an understanding of history 
and a hermeneutic is required which will faciliate the bringing into focus of 
the different aspects of biblical texts and their interrelationships. And it 
could be argued that, with its transcendent focus a Christian understanding 
of history is less likely to be reductionistic49 in the way that some historical 
criticism has been. This brings us to the next point. 
6. The Importance of a Comprehensive Biblical Hermeneutic 
In chapter seven we will give further attention to the overall shape that a 
Christian biblical hermeneutic might take. For the moment we note the 
overly historical emphasis of the historical critical hermeneutic, which 
makes one wonder whether an historical hermeneutic is equipped to allow 
Scripture to speak on its own terms? Certainly there is an historical aspect to 
Scripture and this is what the historical critical method identifies so clearly. 
However, before Scripture is a source for history writing it is literature and 
highly ideological literature at that, as our designation of it as Scripture 
indicates. "The theologian, " and we might say `the biblical scholar, ' "has 
more to think about than the application to his subject-matter of the canons 
of historical inquiry. ... The 
historical method is not to be taken as the sole 
component of theological method for the simple reason that theology and the 
Christian faith from which it draws its material includes more than history. " 
(McIntyre, 1994: 379) The historical critical method focuses on the text as 
coming into being at a particular time and place but, at best it relegates to 
second place the text as literature and kerygma. 
A good example of this is the reduction of literary criticism in biblical 
studies to source criticism. As Barton (1984: 20) notes, literary scholars are 
surprised that Old Testament literary criticism should refer to source 
criticism. Barton (1984: 21ff) defends the legitimacy of such `literary' 
criticism against the criticism that it comes looking for sources and finds 
them, by maintaining that source criticism has its roots in `observable 
discrepancies' in the Pentateuch. At this point Barton makes a typically 
modem move by reducing the problem to the facts of the text. What about 
the mode of observation? The origin of Old Testament literary criticism 
cannot be reduced to the text or to observation; it is an interaction between 
49The Dutch Christian philosopher, Dooyeweerd (1953-1958,1960), stressed the non-reductionistic 
attitude of a consistent Christian perspective on reality. The latter should refuse to make any immanent 
aspect of creation, like history, the key to understanding the whole. 
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the two. Observation is, however, far from neutral and was deeply shaped by 
historical research of the day as we have demonstrated50. And this approach, 
as Sternberg51 and Ouweneel (1993 11: 391) recognise, subordinates literary 
criticism (in the true sense of the word) to historical criticism and makes the 
latter depend on whatever historical philosophy is followed, often nineteenth 
century evolutionistic philosophy. Commenting on the documentary 
hypothesis, Ouweneel (1993 II: 391) says that "[i]nstead of the evolutionistic 
approach being the result of careful historical criticism, the latter itself being 
based on literary criticism, in reality things are reversed: literary criticism is 
subordinated to historical criticism, and the latter is made to depend on 
evolutionistic prejudice. " 
If Wright (1992: 6) is correct that "[t]he NT ... must be read so as to be 
understood, read within appropriate contexts, within an acoustic which will 
allow its full overtones to be heard, " then a biblical hermeneutic must 
correlate with the ontology of the Bible and take its literary, ideological and 
historical nature into account, and accurately interrelate these. What Wright 
(1992: 6) says of Shakespeare is true of the Old Testament: 
"A volume of Shakespeare may be used to prop up a table leg, or it may be used 
as a basis for a philosophical theory. It is not difficult, though, to see that using it 
as the foundation for dramatic productions of the plays themselves carries more 
authenticity than either of these ... There is a general appropriateness about using Shakespeare as a basis for staging plays which justifies itself without much more 
argument. " 
VI EVALUATING HISTORICAL CRITICAL READINGS OF 
ECCLESIASTES 
How then are we to evaluate historical critical readings of Ecclesiastes? 
Have they been a success or a failure? Undoubtedly there have been huge 
advances, as the thorough philological, linguistic, structural and intertextual 
elements of the range of contemporary commentaries on Ecclesiastes make 
quite clear. It must also be remembered that more recent historical critical 
study of Ecclesiastes, like that of Murphy (1992), is somewhat different 
from that of Barton and McNeile. Other influences have come to bear on the 
historical critical method which have modified it considerably. Murphy, for 
example, has followed Wright's New Critical analysis of Ecclesiastes as we 
50Cf. Hahn, 1954: 2ff; Ouweneel, 1993 11: 384-427. 
51Cf. Sternberg's (1985: 13-23) very useful discussion on the interrelationship between source and 
discourse. 
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noted above. Recent works on Ecclesiastes such as Ogden (1987) and 
Fredericks (1988,1993) manifest a much greater concern for the literary 
shape of the text. These new directions are still in their early days, but show 
much potential in helping one to understand the text as a whole. And, if this 
is the test of interpretation, then much of the historical critical work of this 
century on Ecclesiastes must, despite all the advances, be judged a failure. 
Different reconstructed texts have tended to be the focus of interpretation 
and these have yielded a confusing variety of views about the message of 
Qoheleth. 
It is with McNeile that it is most apparent that a reconstructed text has 
become the focus of interpretation and not the final form of the text as we 
have it. There has been widespread agreement among scholars this century 
that the text as we have it is basically reliable. Yet, in his "Notes on select 
passages, " McNeile (1904: 56-94) makes no comments about the 
`interpolations' apart from the epilogue so that the reconstructed text has 
become the focus of comment. It was Siegfried who set this type of source 
critical approach to Ecclesiastes in motion. Subsequent return to the 
substantial unity of Ecclesiastes raises the question of whether his idea was a 
`right one' after all. If recent trends are anything to go by, then it would 
certainly seem as if Siegfried pointed study of Ecclesiastes in a wrong 
direction. This source critical approach represents the unhelpful dominance 
of a particular diachronic method which is applied at the expense of the 
complex literary contours of the text. 
Surprisingly McNeile still express hope about the positive value of the 
overall shape of the text. According to McNeile (1904: 27) 
"it may be gladly admitted that, under these successive hands, Koheleth's Journal 
has been not spoilt but enriched. By the annotations of two contemporary thinkers 
its value has been multiplied historically and doctrinally. It became a `three-fold 
cord' whose drawing and attracting power has been `not quickly broken. ' It is in 
this triple form that Jews and Christians alike have counted it inspired. " 
Barton (1912: 50) concludes his section on Qoheleth's thought as follows: "It 
is a teaching which is to a Christian chilling and disappointing, but 
Qoheleth's negative work had, no doubt, a function to perform in clearing 
away outworn conceptions before a new, larger, truer, and more inspiring 
faith could have its birth. " Barton fails to consider the message of the text as 
a whole and assumes that his reconstructed message of Qoheleth is what 
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counts. McNeile is aware of the larger three-fold cord and assumes that this 
contradictory three-fold voice can be heard positively. What he fails to pay 
attention to is the cord itself. If the three strands have been woven into a cord 
it would seem important to attend to the final product! The attempts by 
McNeile and Barton to synthesise a historical critical view with some kind 
of positive approach to Ecclesiastes as a three-fold cord or a negative 
precursor of the positive gospel are not convincing. 
The confident division of Ecclesiastes into sources by Siegfried, Barton, 
McNeile etc., and the almost complete undermining of this approach by later 
historical critical scholarship acutely focuses the question of the validity of 
the source critical method. How did these scholars go so wrong in their 
handling of Ecclesiastes? At one level they seem to have not taken the 
difference between narrative genre and wisdom seriously enough, and to 
have applied what seemed to work with the Pentateuch directly to 
Ecclesiastes. However, source critical analysis of the Pentateuch has come 
under increasing fire this century and it also seems to have been applied 
without any strong sense of the genre of narrative literature. The deeper 
problem with this type of source criticism seems to be its weddedness to a 
historical method which looks for scientific style and precision in literary 
texts and focuses interpretation on the reconstructed actual words of the 
historical Qoheleth behind the text in romantic idealist fashion. It is in the 
way they observed Ecclesiastes that the problem lies, contra Barton's 
(1984: 22) notion of observed discrepancies. Barton (1984: 26) is, I think, 
correct that source criticism begins with an intuition about the text. 
However, intuition is not a neutral category but is informed by one's 
assumptions and one's cultural context. In the grip of a scientistic and 
positivistic mindset, McNeile and Barton observed and intuited the sources 
they discerned. Source criticism remains an important tool for the 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes. However, as we mentioned earlier it will need 
to be shaped very differently and in close interaction with discourse analysis. 
It is important to note that while most of the source critical reconstruction of 
Ecclesiastes has been rejected by contemporary scholars, one glaring 
omission remains: the epilogue. Across the critical board there is agreement 
that Qoheleth and the final editor differ from each other. Paradoxically, 
while no one is quite sure what Qoheleth's message was, all are sure that it 
was not what `the editor' says it was! In this respect the source critical 
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assumptions of Barton and McNeile live on, for contemporary historical 
critical scholars assume as strongly as they did that they can distinguish 
distinctively Qoheleth material from editorial material and assess the 
relationship between the two. This emphasis is also the legacy of the 
romantic idealism that we discussed above. The idea that if we can only 
isolate the historical Qoheleth material then we have the real data for 
interpretation has been most persistent. 
However, while it does seem to me that we can discern editorial comment in 
12: 9-14 and 1: 1, it is impossible to determine with any precision the limits of 
such activity, or to know whether the editor arranged the Qoheleth material 
in any particular way, what he left out and what he included and so on. With 
its repetition structures, Ecclesiastes shows signs of strong overall shaping, 
as Crenshaw acknowledges (see above). One wonders, therefore, on what 
basis one can assume that one can easily distinguish Qoheleth from editorial 
material. One can do this only if one assumes that overt editing is the only 
real editing in the text; an assumption which seems rather naive. 
The near consensus that Qoheleth calls much of the Old Testament tradition 
into question and that the epilogue counteracts this tendency thereby making 
Qoheleth acceptable to orthodoxy seems to me questionable. Intuitively I am 
cautious on this direction, because of my thetical-critical position. On a 
straightforward reading the epilogue appears to contextualise Qoheleth's 
work - he was a wise man who was engaged in the typical work of the wise - 
and to focus its message in terms of the call to fear God and obey his 
commands. The historical critical approach rather naively assumes that most 
Israelites were taken in by this epilogue which is clearly at odds with the 
main body of the text. We now, however, see the contradiction clearly. 
However, as Gordis points out, the canonical process was by no means so 
simplistic. It does seem to me therefore, that a recognition of the wrong path 
that Siegfried initiated in study of Ecclesiastes needs to be followed by a 
recognition of the literary nature of Ecclesiastes which will reopen the 
discussion of the relationship between the epilogue and the main body of the 
text. In the final chapter I present my suggestions in this critical area. It will 
not do to label 12: 9-14 an addendum or epilogue, and then think that one can 
ignore it in interpreting the text, as most historical critical research has done 
this century. 
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The historical critical reading of Ecclesiastes this century has marginalised 
the poetics of wisdom literature. This is only now starting to come into its 
own but has still to be applied in detail to Ecclesiastes52. There is a great deal 
of work to be done on literary characteristics of Ecclesiastes-like repetition 
in a way comparable to Sternberg's (1985: 365-440) work on repetition in 
narrative. Source criticism will need to work with such discourse analysis to 
arrive at a more accurate view of the nature of Ecclesiastes. 
VII CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have seen that historical criticism is a product of 
modernity and more particularly of nineteenth century philosophies of 
history. In particular the undermining of the standard account of modernity 
has alerted us to the need to attend to these philosophical presuppositions of 
historical criticism in our evaluation of it and historical critical readings of 
Ecclesiastes. Especially in early historical critical readings of Ecclesiastes 
there is a strong tendency to reconstruct the original words of Qoheleth and 
to focus upon these in interpreting Ecclesiastes. We have argued that this 
approach is connected with a romantic idealist philosophy of history. The 
legacy of this approach remains in the near universal tendency of modern 
commentators to bracket out the epilogue in their interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes. 
Clearly one's view of history plays an important part in shaping one's 
hermeneutic for reading the OT and in the current context OT scholars will 
need to account for the philosophy of history that they bring to the OT. 
Views of religion will inevitably play a part here, and we have argued that 
Christian scholars ought to seek consciously to allow their philosophy of 
history and their epistemology to be shaped by the Christian narrative or 
worldview. What such shaping would involve for a philosophy of history 
and for a biblical hermeneutic needs much more consideration, but it was 
stressed that such a Christian hermeneutic would resist the historical 
reductionism of historical criticism. In the twentieth century several scholars 
have recognised this reductionism and sought to correct it. It is to these 
reactions that we now turn. 




BETWEEN EARLY AND LATE MODERNITY: 
THE CANONICAL APPROACH, NEW CRITICISM, 
STRUCTURALISM AND THE READING OF ECCLESIASTES 
I INTRODUCTION 
Childs' canonical approach to reading the OT is an important but 
controversial reaction to the historical critical method. Childs (1979: 74) 
denies any particular literary pedigree for his method, claiming only a 
theological motivation, but this has been questioned'. Blenkinsopp (1980: 24) 
says of Childs' Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (IOTS), 
"Much of what he has to say reflects recent and not so recent trends in 
literary criticism to which he makes only passing reference. There is also a 
shading off into hermeneutical and philosophical issues involved in deciding 
what is the `real meaning' of a text. " Barton (1984: 153,154) has more 
specifically noted the close similarity of the canonical method to the New 
Critical school of literary criticism and maintains that "we may expect new 
criticism and canon criticism to stand and fall together. " Barton (1984: 180- 
184) also notes the close relationship between New Criticism (NC) and 
structuralism2, and by implication between canon criticism and 
structuralism3. 
At the end of chapter three we noted historical criticism's failure to account 
for the theological and literary aspects of the OT. Not surprisingly Childs 
and proponents of a literary approach to the OT focus on these neglected 
aspects. As a professed theological reaction to historical criticism which 
nevertheless raises literary questions about final-form readings of the text, 
Childs' canonical approach provides a convenient entry point into an 
exploration of reactions to an overly (and particular) historical emphasis in 
the interpretation of texts. In this chapter we will examine the canonical 
1For the reactions to IOTS see JSOT 16,1980; Horizons in Biblical Theology 2,1980,113-121; Barr 
(1983). 
2Although of course Barton recognises the reaction of structuralists to NC he also notes five resemblances 
between them: i. the focus upon the text itself. ii. emphasis on the non-referential character of literature. iii. 
heightened concern for shape, form and genre. iv. denial of the existence of true synonymity. v. recognition 
of the meaning of texts as determined and publicly accessible. 
3Barr (1980: 20) suggests that those interested in structuralism as an alternative to the historical critical 
method will be disappointed by Childs' IOTS. 
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approach, NC, and structuralism in relation to Old Testament exegesis and 
the reading of Ecclesiastes. Childs has written briefly about a canonical 
approach to Ecclesiastes, and at least indirectly NC and structuralism have 
had a significant impact upon studies of Ecclesiastes. Wright and Loader are 
prominent exegetes who have fruitfully developed New Critical and 
structuralist insights in relation to Ecclesiastes4. Structuralism is also 
significant as a pre-cursor of the post-structuralism of postmodernism. 
Hence the title of this chapter. 
In this chapter we will firstly describe Childs' canonical approach and then 
examine its application to Ecclesiastes. Secondly we will explore NC and the 
ways in which it has been applied to the OT. We will use Wright's work as 
an example of its application to Ecclesiastes. Thirdly we will outline 
structuralism and examine its application in OT studies, using Loader as an 
example of a structuralist reading of Ecclesiastes. Finally we will consider 
the implications of the canonical approach, NC and structuralism for reading 
Ecclesiastes and thus for OT hermeneutics. 
II CHILDS' CANONICAL APPROACH AS A REACTION TO 
HISTORICAL CRITICISM 
Brett (1991: 27-57) has outlined the stages in the development of Childs' 
canonical hermeneutic. He discerns a growing tension in Childs' published 
works between diachronic and synchronic interests in interpretation. The 
tension is there in Childs' 1974 commentary on Exodus, but five years later 
in his IOTS it has erupted into a polemic against diachronic approaches. In 
terms of our focus upon Ecclesiastes, Childs' IOTS will be our main concern 
because it is here that he outlines his canonical approach in most detail and 
applies it to Ecclesiastes. 
In IOTS Childs focuses his problems with historical critical interpretation on 
the modem discipline of OT introduction. He outlines the history of the 
development of modem introduction to the OT and notes that the real point 
of controversy is not the main lines of this history but how one evaluates this 
history (Childs, 1979: 30,39). For Childs (1979: 34) it is important that "[t]he 
rise of the modem historical study of the Old Testament must be seen in 
4Lohfink, who has published a commentary and a number of articles on Ecclesiastes, also describes his 
approach as New Critical. 
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connection with the entire intellectual revolution which occurred during the 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and which issued in a 
radically different understanding of God, man and the world. " In OT studies 
this revolution led to the modern discipline of OT introduction, a 
development which can be traced through Cappellus, Spinoza, Simon and 
Semler. Semler replaced the theological view of the canon as a unified 
corpus with a strictly historical interpretation which deeply influenced the 
father of modem introduction to the OT, Eichhorn, for whom "it would have 
been desirable if one had never used the word canon" (Childs, 1979: 36). 
In Childs' view the modem approach to the OT has brought gains and losses. 
Undeniably the historical critical method has brought great advantages in the 
areas of philology, textual and literary criticism, historical knowledge and 
exegetical precision. Negatively however it has meant that the focus of OT 
interpretation is not the canonical literature of the Hebrews and the church 
but the stages of development of OT literature. Consequently "there always 
remains an enormous hiatus between the description of the critically 
reconstructed literature and the actual canonical text which has been 
received and used as authoritative scripture by the community. " (Childs, 
1979: 40) This predominantly historical concern fails to understand the 
peculiar dynamic of Israel's religious literature and does not relate the nature 
of the OT literature correctly to the community which treasured it as 
scripture. A key issue for Childs is the nature of the historical categories 
applied; if the OT is read with a historical referential approach as the 
dominant method then justice is not done to OT as the literature which 
formed Israel and vice versa. 
In Childs' view the development of this modern introduction and the 
conservative reaction has lead to a number of false dichotomies in the 
discipline of OT studies: liberal versus conservative, scientific versus 
ecclesiastical, objective versus confessional. What underlies this confusion? 
"In my judgement, the crucial issue which produced the confusion is the 
problem of the canon, that is to say, how one understands the nature of the 
OT in relation to its authority for the community of faith and practice which 
shaped and preserved it. " (Childs, 1979: 41) By the nineteenth century in 
critical circles the canon had come to be seen solely in terms of an external 
ecclesiastical validation and without any significance for the shaping or 
interpretation of the biblical literature. Historical critical scholars had no 
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room for the notion of canon in their scholarship; conservatives took `canon' 
very seriously but had no room for the historical critical method. In Childs' 
(1979: 45) opinion "the crucial task is to rethink the problem of Introduction 
in such a way as to overcome this long established tension between the 
canon and criticism. Is it possible to understand the OT as canonical 
scripture and yet to make full and consistent use of historical critical tools? " 
It is this that his canonical approach seeks to do. 
Defining `canon' and understanding the process of its formation is no easy 
task. For Childs it is important that there is a historical and a theological 
aspect to the development of the canon. "The authoritative Word gave the 
community its form and content in obedience to the divine imperative, yet 
conversely the reception of the authoritative tradition by its hearers gave 
shape to the same writings through a historical and theological process of 
selecting, collecting and ordering. " (Childs, 1979: 58,59). For Childs Israel 
did not testify to its own self-understanding, but by means of a canon bore 
witness to God, as is evidenced by the canon's conscious obscuring of its 
editors. The decisive force at work in the formation of the canon emerged in 
the transmission of a divine word in such a form as to lay authoritative claim 
upon successive generations so that adequate interpretation of the biblical 
text depends on taking the canonical shape seriously. 
What is the relationship between the literary and canonical histories of the 
OT? For Childs the two processes are distinct although they do belong 
together. The former involves a much broader history than the latter. With 
regard to both histories caution is required; we lack sufficient historical 
evidence for much certainty about these processes. Clearly the role of the 
canon is fundamentally important to understanding the OT but the history of 
the canonical process does not seem to be an avenue through which one can 
greatly illuminate the present text. Child's canonical approach seeks to 
overcome this methodological impasse by relating the significance of the 
canon to its complex history but in a very different way from the historical 
critical method. 
Childs' proposed approach is that of a canonical analysis of the Hebrew 
Bible. This is a descriptive task: "It seeks to understand the peculiar shape 
and special function of these texts which comprise the Hebrew canon. Such 
an analysis does not assume a particular stance or faith commitment on the 
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part of the reader because the subject of the investigation is the literature of 
Israel's faith, not that of the reader. " (Childs, 1979: 72) This literature has 
had a special history as Israel's religious corpus and thus requires a 
hermeneutic which will do justice to its peculiar features. Canonical analysis 
focuses upon the final form of the text with a view to examining the features 
of this corpus in relation to its usage within ancient Israel. Without making 
any dogmatic claims for the literature this approach seeks to take its 
religious function seriously: "the approach seeks to work within that 
interpretative structure which the biblical text has received from those who 
formed and used it as sacred scripture. " (Childs, 1979: 73) 
Childs distinguishes his method from the newer literary critical methods 
such as NC and structuralism, from the kerygmatic exegesis popularised by 
von Rad and his students and from the traditio-critical approach5. The 
canonical approach is distinguished from the new literary approaches by its 
concern with the theological shape of the text rather than with an original 
literary or aesthetic unity. In Child's view the kerygmatic type of exegesis of 
von Rad is too closely bound to authorial intention. Often the assumption 
that the theological point must be related to an original intention within a 
reconstructed historical context runs directly in the face of the literature's 
explicit statement of its function within the final form of the biblical text. " 
Israel's religious use of her traditions unleashed a force which shaped the 
literature as it was collected, selected and ordered. Particular editors, groups 
and parties were involved but, "basic to the canonical process is that those 
responsible for the actual editing of the text did their best to obscure their 
own identity. " (Childs, 1979: 78) Consequently the process by which texts 
were reworked is very obscure. "But irrespective of intentionality the effect 
of the canonical process was to render the tradition accessible to the future 
generation by means of a `canonical intentionality', which is coextensive 
with the meaning of the biblical text. " (Childs, 1979: 79) Canonical analysis 
also differs from traditio-critical analysis in its evaluation of the history of 
the formation of the text by assuming the normative status of the final form 
of the text. 
5Since the publication of IOTS scholars have regularly tried to expose a link between the canonical 
approach and contemporary literary and theological developments. In the main Childs has continued to 
deny these. In his most recent Biblical Theology he distances himself from narrative theology, from the 
functional approach to the Bible of Kelsey, Lindbeck, Meeks and Ollenburger, and from the literary 
approaches which detract from reading the Bible as sacred scripture pointing to the extra-biblical reality of 
the resurrected Christ. See Childs, 1992: 18-23,719-727. 
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This assumption of the normative status of the final form of the OT text is 
justified, according to Childs, in that it alone witnesses to the full history of 
revelation. Only in the final form in which the normative history has been 
concluded, can the full effect of the revelatory history be seen. Certainly 
earlier stages were regarded as canonical prior to the final form but to take 
the canon seriously means taking its critical handling of the earlier stages 
seriously as well. This is not to become ahistorical but to make a critical, 
theological judgement regarding the process. The ANE historian is justified 
in reading the OT differently but in the interpretation of sacred scripture one 
ought to stay with the final form. This final form is hermeneutically 
significant in setting up a particular profile for a passage and attempts to 
shift this canonical ordering ought to be resisted. Childs (1979: 77) 
recognises that much of his polemic is against forms of historicism which 
make the use of the Bible dependent upon reconstructed historical events 
rather than the text. However he notes that his canonical approach is equally 
incompatible with Ricoeur's philosophical hermeneutics, because Ricoeur 
does not take the canon seriously in its grounding of the biblical metaphors 
in Israel's historical context. 
Childs (1979: 82) dislikes the term `canonical criticism' for his method since 
this puts it alongside source and form criticism etc. as simply another 
historical critical tool. "The issue at stake in relation to the canon turns on 
establishing a stance from which the Bible can be read as sacred scripture. " 
(Childs, 1979: 82) In delineating the scope of exegesis the canonical method 
relativises the claims to priority of the historical critical method by resisting 
the notion that every biblical text has to be filtered through a historical 
critical mesh before interpretation can begin. Positively it challenges the 
exegete to focus on the received form and to discern its function for the 
community of faith: "A canonical Introduction is not the end, but only the 
beginning of exegesis. It prepares the stage for the real performance by 
clearing away unnecessary distractions and directing one's attention to the 
main activity which is about to be initiated. " (Childs, 1979: 83) 
III CHILDS' CANONICAL APPROACH TO ECCLESIASTES 
Childs' (1979: 580-589) brief treatment of Ecclesiastes is divided into three 
sections. Firstly, under the heading "Historical-critical problems" he outlines 
five main issues in the study of Ecclesiastes that have engaged critical 
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scholars. On the issue of authorship there is now a consensus that Solomon 
was not the author. However there is no agreement as to the significance of 
this. Most scholars agree on a date between 300-200 BC for the book. There 
is a growing consensus that the book should be approached as a unified 
composition of one author. There is however no consensus on structure; in 
Childs' view the truth lies between the views that find no structure and those 
that detect a unity of progressive thought. As regards Ecclesiastes' 
theological contribution scholars remain divided as to whether it is primarily 
positive or mainly pessimistic. Childs' detects and strongly disagrees with a 
broad critical consensus that the key to the book's interpretation lies in 
discerning the historical and psychological influences on the writer. In 
Childs' view this fails to deal with the canonical role of the book as sacred 
scripture of a continuing community of faith. 
In his second section Childs deals with the canonical shape of Ecclesiastes. 
The epilogue receives most attention, with about the same amount of space 
devoted to the superscription and the main body of the work. The 
superscription is regarded by many scholars as part of a final redactional 
stage in the process of composition of Ecclesiastes. If Galling6 was right and 
the editorial framework was based on a misunderstanding of the body of the 
work then this would have implications for a canonical reading. His view 
has however received little support and Childs maintains that the 
identification of a redactional stage is of secondary importance in a 
canonical analysis; in the final form the superscription is important. What is 
important is the function of the title; the important hermeneutical question is 
why the author is identified as Qoheleth and yet described in terms 
appropriate to Solomon. Childs rejects the hypothesis that Ecclesiastes is 
pseudepigraphic because Solomon's name is never used, and furthermore, 
the identification of Qoheleth with Solomon is abandoned within the book 
itself. Childs prefers the explanation that the superscription serves to identify 
the book as an official corrective within the wisdom tradition rather than 
some individual aberration. 
For Childs the epilogue betrays the most obvious canonical shaping in 
Ecclesiastes. There has been much debate about the composition of this 
section but the crucial issue is not the number of redactors but the effect of 
6See chapter 3 for a discussion of Galling's approach to Ecclesiastes. Galling thinks that QRl 
overemphasises the negative aspect of Qoheleth's sayings. 
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the epilogue upon the canonical shape of the book. "Few passages in the OT 
reflect a more overt consciousness of the canon than does this epilogue. " 
(Childs, 1974: 585) Like the superscription, the epilogue in its description of 
Qoheleth identifies the book as part of Israel's wisdom. Qoheleth is assigned 
a public and critical role within Israel's wisdom teaching. 12: 13 holds 
wisdom and law closely together under the overarching theological rubric of 
the judgement of God. 
Childs has little to say about the main body of Ecclesiastes. It contains 
collections of sayings in smaller integral units but there is no attempt to 
present a unified reflection on life. Ecclesiastes arose in reaction to a body of 
wisdom literature and so treats almost all the themes common to wisdom. 
Sometimes Qoheleth contradicts this wisdom tradition; at other times he 
modifies it or affirms it. Apparent contradictions arise from his addressing 
different contexts. Amidst the diversity Childs' (1974: 587) does however 
find some "effort on the part of the canonical process to tie these strands 
together. " 
Childs' third section deals with the theological and hermeneutical 
implications of his approach to Ecclesiastes. Canonical analysis alerts us to 
the fact that the authoritative role of Ecclesiastes lies in its function for the 
Israelite community within the larger canonical context. The person of 
Qoheleth and the extent to which his views reflect his own struggles are not 
relevant to canonical analysis. The canonical shaping of Ecclesiastes focuses 
rather upon the book as a normative critical corrective similar to James in 
relation to the Pauline corpus. It might be suggested that the epilogue 
neutralises the biting force of Ecclesiastes and that the canonical approach is 
deficient in relying too much upon the epilogue. Ought not a hermeneutic 
make the reader feel the same shock that Qoheleth's first hearers must have 
experienced? In Childs' view such a theory of actualisation stems from a 
romantic understanding of history derived from Herder. "However, from a 
theological perspective it is far from obvious. Indeed, the purpose of a canon 
of sacred writings is to propose a very different understanding of 
actualization. The authority of the biblical text does not rest on a capacity to 
match original experiences, rather on the claim which the canonical text 
makes on every subsequent generation of hearers. " (Childs, 1974: 589) 
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Childs' canonical approach to Ecclesiastes is most intriguing in the weight it 
accords to the often neglected epilogue. As Ecclesiastes has come to be 
regarded more and more as a unity the epilogue has still tended to be 
regarded as secondary and as an attempt to correct the heterodoxy of 
Qoheleth. Rather than as a secondary addition, Childs privileges the epilogue 
as the major sign of canonical shaping. This reverses the general value 
judgement of the epilogue and foregrounds it as the key to the canonical 
interpretation of the book. 
Childs' attempt to read Ecclesiastes as a unity is attractive. However it is 
questionable whether he is actually reading the final form as a unity. 
Concerning the canonical method Barr (1980: 20,21) maintains that "[i]n 
effect, then, the emphasis does not fall on the final form of the text: it falls 
on the historical joins which in the later stages led from the previous forms 
to the final text. And let us grant the importance of these joins. But - on the 
basis of the final text itself - these joins are less important than the content 
which lies between the joins. " This is certainly true of Childs' treatment of 
Ecclesiastes. He must first identify the signs of canonical shaping, which 
then become the key to interpreting the text. This neglects the crucial issue 
of how the epilogue relates to the main body of the text. Indeed it seems to 
me that Childs subtly builds on historical critical insights in his treatment of 
Ecclesiastes. One can only see the epilogue as pointing towards Ecclesiastes 
as a corrective if one first of all has assumed the radical stance that many 
historical critical scholars discern in the main body of the work. Apart from 
this the epilogue would indicate Qoheleth as another orthodox wisdom 
teacher. 
Childs' canonical method seems to me to be a synthesis between redaction 
criticism and a final form reading7. Murphy (1980: 41,42) suggests that the 
canonical method differs from redaction criticism in two ways: firstly it 
closes the redaction at a point well beyond the usual date that redaction 
critics would ascribe to a text. Secondly "it locks into a normative broad 
exegetical understanding that was regnant at the time of the stabilization of 
the text. " Childs (1979: 68) himself articulates the difference as follows: 
"Canonical analysis focuses its attention on the effect which the different 
layers have had on the final form of the text, rather than using the text as a 
source for other information obtained by means of an oblique reading, such 
70n this point see also Barr, 1983: 146. 
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as the editor's self-understanding. " However, what distinguishes Childs' 
reading from an intrinsic final form one is his concern to see how different 
layers have affected the final form. Childs is very cautious on getting behind 
the text and yet discernment of the effects of layers requires just that and in a 
fairly precise manner. Hence Barr (1980: 15) is right in his assessment that 
"Childs' actual operation, however, is far more dependent on historical 
criticism than his account of the latter would suggest. The operation is 
bipolar: if one pole is the new canonical reading, the other is the situation 
reached by traditional criticism. He displays, not what' a canonical reading, 
untouched by historical criticism, would be, but the path by which, starting 
from current positions, one can find one's way to the new canonical 
reading. " 
In some ways at least Childs' canonical hermeneutic is thus different to an 
intrinsic approach like NC (see below). However there is a similarity. Childs 
locates the crucial development in the history of introduction to the OT in 
the revised approach to canon in modernity and thus insists that his approach 
is a theological one. However as we saw in chapter three the shifts that came 
about in relation to canon are a small part of deeper philosophical changes. 
One of the effects of these philosophical changes has been an overly 
historical emphasis in OT interpretation which has led to a neglect of the 
literary and theological aspects of OT texts. These neglected aspects are 
closely linked so that Childs concern to recover the theological function of 
the texts inevitably involves focusing on the final (literary) form of the text. 
Thus while it is wrong to lump Childs' approach too closely with NC, it does 
share the latter's reaction to an overly (and particular) historical emphasis in 
the humanities. The canonical approach, NC, and structuralism are all 
attempts to recover neglected dimensions of texts. 
III NEW CRITICISM AND ITS APPLICATION TO OLD 
TESTAMENT STUDIES 
1. INTRODUCTION: CHRONOLOGY AND ORIGINS 
NC "almost certainly constitutes the English-speaking world's major literary 
contribution to literary theory. " (Robey, 1986: 73) It originated in the USA in 
the 1920's, was a fully developed theory by 1950, and continued to exert a 
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powerful influence until the 1960's8. NC however, continues to exert its 
influence in many different ways9. 
NC began in America with the work of a group of theorists at Vanderbilt 
University in Tennessee, most notably Ransom, Tate, Pen and Warren. The 
method they developed was close reading or practical criticism. In 1941 
Ransom published a book The New Criticism from which title the movement 
got its name. NC became a national and then international movement 
through the additional labours of Wellek, Warren, Brooks, Wimsatt and 
Beardsley'°. 
2. NEW CRITICISM AS A REACTION TO `POSITIVISM' 
The development of NC is part of an early twentieth century "revolt against 
positivism in .... literary scholarship. " (Wellek, 1963: 256) This revolt was 
predominantly European and with respect to NC was mediated to America 
through Richards and Eliot. Since this reaction is important for our research 
we will first explore the nature of positivism in its broader philosophical 
sense, then look at how this manifested itself in literary studies before 
investigating the reaction to `positivism' within literary studies. 
i. Positivism in the broader philosophical sense. 
Comte used the expression "positive philosophy" and its abbreviated form 
`positivism' has remained with us ever since". Positivism has come to 
designate a philosophical movement that was influential in all countries of 
the Western world in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first 
half of the twentieth century. However, there are varieties within this 
movement. Kolakowski (1968), for example, traces positivism from 
Berkeley and Hume through Comte, Bernard, Mill and Spencer and via 
conventionalism and pragmatism to the logical positivists of the twentieth 
8Lentricchia (1980: 3) argues that 1957 marks the demise of NC. 
9For example, Jefferson and Robey (1986: 22), in the process of commenting on the most recent literary 
theories, make the point that the borrowing and adaptation characteristic of these theories "have the effect 
of taking one back to a reconsideration of Formalism and New Criticism, and demonstrate by implication 
that despite their apparent bracketing out of the reader, they do contain embryonic theories of reading that 
could be developed and further elaborated. " For a suggested link between NC and postmodern literary 
theory see Norris, 1990b. 
imFor a more detailed survey of the development of NC see Rylance, 1990: 721-735. 
11 According to Abbagnano (1967: 414) the term `positivism' was first used by Henri, comte de Saint 
Simon, to refer to scientific method and its extension to philosophy. Comte appropriated it from Saint 
Simon. 
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century. This diversity alerts one to the dangers of generalisations about 
positivism as a whole. Kolakowski nevertheless suggests that the following 
are more or less true of the tradition of positivism. It is a type of 
epistemology seeking to clarify rules and criteria for human knowledge and 
Kolakowski (1972: 9-18) discerns four main characteristics of positivism. 
Firstly phenomenalism, which opposes any distinction between substance 
and essence. Secondly nominalism whereby "we may not assume that any 
insight formulated in general terms can have any real referents other than 
individual concrete objects. " (Kolakowski, 1972: 13) Thirdly positivism 
refuses to call value judgements and normative statements knowledge. And 
finally positivism upholds the unity of the scientific method. The methods 
for acquiring valid knowledge and the stages of theoretical reflection are 
essentially the same in all spheres of experience. Positivism sought to apply 
its epistemology to all disciplines12. This meant that methods derived from 
the natural sciences were extended to other disciplines so that a science of 
literature analogous to the natural sciences emerged. 
ii. `Positivism' in literary studies. 
Positivism is used here to refer to the sort of literary scholarship against 
which the reaction since the twenties has been directed and which was 
generally shaped by positivism in philosophy. Philosophical positivism, 
especially with its concern to extend scientific method to all areas of life, 
played an important role in developing these traits but the complexities and 
diversities of these developments in literary studies must not be 
overlooked. 13 
In the latter nineteenth century it was common for literature to be studied in 
terms of "the genesis of the art-work in terms of `influences' and `sources'; 
to search for similar or analogous motifs and themes in earlier literature; to 
probe the origins of the political, cultural and social background of the 
period or the biographical background of the author - all in order to give a 
causal explanation of how the work came into being. " (Weiss, 1984: 2) 
Scientific causality was used to explain literary phenomena in relation to 
economic, social and political conditions, and Brunetiere and Symonds, for 
1201, positivism and Protestant thought in Britain and America see Cashdollar (1989). On the relationship 
between positivism and philosophy of history see Collingwood, 1946: 126-133. 
13Note, for example, Wellek's (1963: 257,258) references to the interrelationship between historicism and 
positivism, and to the effect of different views of the methods of the natural sciences. 
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example, argued for an understanding of the evolution of genres on the basis 
of the analogy of biological sciences. `Positivism' in literary studies is 
summed up in an exaggerated form in Taine's introduction to his 1863 
history of English literature. In his view a literary text is an expression of 
the psychology of an individual which in turn is an expression of his/her 
milieu and race, captured in the phrase `la race, le milieu, et le moment'. 
Literary scholarship must therefore take as its object the causal explanation 
of texts in relation to these three factors. By so doing it will become a form 
of scientific history comparable in status and method to the natural sciences. 
In an exaggerated way Taine expressed assumptions which guided European 
and American scholarship in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Jefferson 
and Robey (1986: 9) sum these up as follows: 
"In its pure form positivistic scholarship studied literature almost exclusively in 
relation to its factual causes or genesis: the author's life, his recorded intentions in 
writing, his immediate social and cultural environment, his sources.... It was not 
interested in the features of the literary text itself except from a philological and 
historical viewpoint. ... it disregarded questions concerning the value or the distinctive properties of literature, since these could not be dealt with in a factual 
and historical manner. Or more exactly, while it took for granted that literary texts 
possessed a special value, in practice it treated them as if they were 
indistinguishable from other sorts of historical document. " 
iii. Reaction to positivism. 
In his essay, "The revolt against positivism in recent literary scholarship", 
Wellek (1963) outlines the reaction to positivism in literary studies across 
Europe in the early twentieth century. It was widespread and part of a 
broader philosophical reaction to positivism. Philosophically there was a 
shift from positivism to a wide variety of idealisms as exemplified in the 
work of Bergson in France, Croce in Italy and Alexander and Whitehead in 
England. Whereas in positivism the natural science paradigm was imposed 
on other disciplines, in philosophy of history this imposition was now 
questioned and rejected. Several philosophers now offered a defence of the 
methods of the historical sciences which they sharply distinguished from the 
natural sciences. In literary studies too it was stressed that literary 
scholarship is a system of knowledge with its own aims and methods. This 
called for a methodologically precise criticism that deals with the distinctive 
properties of literature. Wellek explores the diverse ways in which this 
common reaction manifested itself across Europe, ranging from Croce in 
Italy to Richards, Eliot, Empson and Lewis in England to Russian 
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Formalism. NC's roots lie in the English reaction of Richards and Eliot. We 
will therefore briefly explore aspects of Richard's and Eliot's approaches 
before making some comments about NC as a manifestation of this reaction. 
For Richards the key to establishing the autonomy of the literary field lies in 
emphasising the reader's response. He stresses the need for a theory of 
communication and valuation in literary studies. Towards this end he 
distinguishes between referential and emotive functions of language. The 
value of literature lies in its use of the emotive function of language, that is, 
in its effect upon the reader. In its effect good literature is disconcerting and 
thereby carries the reconciliation of conflicting values to an exceptionally 
high level. "They renovate and enhance our reactions to life by disrupting 
established habits of response, and creating in us a state of equilibrium of a 
kind that other sorts of experience can rarely achieve. " (Robey, 1986: 76). 
Richards' influence in literary theory is seen above all in the close reading of 
texts. This approach was developed by his pupil William Empson, who, 
according to Wellek (1963: 266) did in his Seven Types of Ambiguity "more 
than anybody else to inaugurate the subtle and sometimes even over 
ingenious analyses of poetic diction and its implications which are 
flourishing today both in England and in the United States. "la 
If NC derives its emphasis on close reading from Richards it derives its anti- 
affectivity and stress on the objective reality of the poem from Eliot. In his 
celebrated essay "Tradition and Individual Talent", published in 1919, Eliot 
(1972: 71) attacks that approach to poetry which seeks its significance in the 
marks of individual talent which set it off from its immediate predecessors. 
He stresses that a literary work positions itself within the literary tradition, 
within which it must be understood and that this context depersonalises it 
and objectifies it. Thus "the poet has, not a `personality' to express, but a 
particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which 
impressions and expressions combine in peculiar and unexpected ways. " 
(Eliot, 1972: 75) Poetry becomes thus, not an expression of emotion and 
personality but an escape from both of these'5. 
The New Critics shared Richards' and Eliot's reaction to positivism. Allen 
Tate epitomises this New Critical reaction. A scholar and a critic he was 
"Intriguingly, I am told by Christopher Norris that Empson developed an interest in Ecclesiastes late in his 
life. I have not been able to track down any references to this. 
150n the influence of Eliot on NC see Selden and Widdowson, 1993: 11,12. 
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fiercely critical of the "cloistered historical scholarship of the graduate 
school", with its positivistic assumption that the literary text "expresses its 
place and time, or the author's personality" and nothing more. (Tate, 
1959: 7,54) The New Critics also shared with Richards a stress on the need 
for a theory of literature and his emphasis on close reading of texts. 
However, in common with Eliot, the New Critics rejected Richards' focus 
on the reader and the emotive effect of the text as the way into a properly 
theoretical approach to literary studies. It is to their distinctive understanding 
of literary theory that we now turn. 
3. PRINCIPLES OF NEW CRITICISM 
i. The nature of literariness. 
The shift from an extrinsic to an intrinsic approach to literature raises the 
question of the nature of literature and the difference between it and other 
types of writing. NC focuses on the distinctive properties of literature and 
attempts to deal with these theoretically. Thus Wimsatt (1954) and Brooks 
(1975) start with Richards' view of literature as characterised by 
reconciliation of opposites but contra Richards maintain that this 
characteristic is not an event in the mind of the author or reader but in the 
text. Complexity and coherence constitute the key considerations in the 
analysis of literary texts. A literary work is a system of tensions which may 
operate without ultimate solution; indeed the presence of these tensions is 
the sign of a truly valuable work of art. Mature works resist easy 
satisfactions. However the various elements are integrated into a whole. 
Ransom, for example, separates the structure of a poem into two features: 
structure (logic or argument) and local texture (density or particularity). 
Critical interpretation of a poem consists of integrating the two, of 
discerning how they balance and enable one another. 
The New Critical understanding of literature, and especially poetry, as a 
distinct type of writing needs to be taken seriously because, unlike many 
postmodern literary theorists, they restrict their methodology to literary 
texts. Thus, for example, on the whole notion of intentionality, Wimsatt and 
Beardsley (1972: 335) draw a clear distinction between poetry and practical 
messages: "In this respect poetry differs from practical messages, which are 
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successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention. They are more 
abstract than poetry. " (Cf. Weiss, 1984: 21-24. ) 1 
ii. The focus of literary study should be literary texts themselves. 
NC shifts the focus of literary study to the literary text itself: 
"The natural and sensible starting-point for work in literary scholarship is the 
interpretation and analysis of the works of literature themselves. After all, only the 
works themselves justify all our interest in the life of an author, in his social 
environment and the whole process of literature. But, curiously enough, literary 
history has been so preoccupied with the setting of a work of literature that its 
attempts at an analysis of the works themselves have been light in comparison 
with the enormous efforts expended on the study of the environment. " (Wellek 
and Warren, 1954: 139) 
Criticism should focus on the poem/literary work itself, not the 
reader/author. The objective features of the medium thus become the focus 
of study; criticism is the study of the form and structure of a text. "Only one 
who will explain without looking to the right or left, above all without 
inquiring what is before and what is after, only he will fulfil his obligations 
to the creation, and only he will refrain from undermining the sovereignty of 
literary study. " (Staiger as quoted by Weiss, 1984: 6) 
iii. Literary study should not focus upon authorial intention or emotive 
affect. 
Two of the best known products of NC theory are Wimsatt's and 
Beardsley's (1972: 334-358) "The intentional fallacy" and "The affective 
fallacy". These two essays are central to NC's attempt to construct a 
theoretical base which is an alternative to positivism. Although they 
acknowledge that "[t]he words of a poem ... come out of a head, 
not out of a 
hat" they nevertheless reject design or intention as a standard by a which to 
judge a poem; the intentional fallacy is a romantic error. (Wimsatt and 
Beardsley, 1972: 334,336) We do not have access to a poet's intention16 and 
furthermore, a literary work is an object in the public domain and not the 
private creation of an individual. The author's experience etc. are only of 
16Weiss (1984: 13-17) points out that since the time of Socrates the importance of intention for 
interpretation has been disputed. From time to time poets themselves have admitted that they did not fully 
understand their intentions in producing a poem. In the nineteenth century it was suggested that the creative 
activity of the poet flowed from the unconscious like a prophet who does not know what he is prophesying. 
Weiss also suggests that intentionality is intellectually focused whereas poetry touches on areas neglected 
by intellect and memory. 
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historical interest and do not determine the meaning or effect of his creation. 
What counts is what is embodied in the text and that is wholly accessible to 
anyone with a knowledge of the language and culture to which the text 
belongs. In this way the significance of authorial intention for literary 
interpretation is severely curtailed. This is not an ahistorical approach but 
one which severely restricts the role of history in literary study, "relegating 
questions about `how the poem came to be' to a different, and by 
implication, inferior, branch of enquiry. " (Robey, 1986: 82) The `affective 
fallacy' refers to the type of approach which Richards represents, judging 
literature by its effect. This too is rejected. 
Weiss (1984: 8-12) recognises that the way in which NC understands a 
literary work to relate to its historical context of origin is distinctive of NC. 
All New Critics refuse to allow causal factors to dominate the interpretation 
of a literary text. However, Weiss does point out that new critics are divided 
as to the role of background information in interpretation. Some reject it per 
se, whereas others oppose it as the sole method. The latter group recognise 
the indispensability of a historical base for interpretation. Wellek and 
Warren's (1954) Theory of Literature is a fine example of the balance that 
this second group of new critics represents. A good one sixth of their text is 
devoted to the extrinsic approach to literature compared with two thirds 
devoted to the intrinsic approach. This makes clear which approach they 
wish to privilege, but it also shows that they do not reject the extrinsic 
approach out of hand. Even on the more specific issue of intentionality their 
position is more refined than is sometimes suggested. They are reacting 
against a Romantic and intellectual understanding of intention, but are not 
opposed to what Sternberg (1985: 9) calls embodied intentionality. As 
Wellek and Warren (1954: 149) say, "There can be no objections against the 
study of `intention', if we mean by it merely a study of the integral work of 
art directed towards the total meaning. " 
iv. Literature cannot be paraphrased. 
The reduction of literature to a paraphrase is just that, a reduction and it can 
never be equivalent to the work itself. Hence Brooks' (1975: 192-214) essay 
The Heresy of Paraphrase. The structural properties which draw literature 
into a unity are of a dramatic and not a logical nature and the form/content 
distinction that is often applied to literature as though the poetic form is only 
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the vehicle for the message is invalid. This understanding of the integrality 
of the literary work affects the New Critics' view of the relationship of the 
art work to its historical context of origin. Source criticism is, for example, 
severely curtailed. "That ancient text which gave the push to the artist was at 
the most some raw material in the hands of the creator but in no sense the 
source of his creation. This new creation ... springs completely from the 
poet's mind and soul. Therefore Knight asserts that the expression `source' 
is only a misleading metaphor. " (Weiss, 1984: 24) NC stresses that the 
literary work, even if entirely constructed from other texts, is in its present 
form an integral whole and must be understood as such. The literary creation 
is much more than the sum of its sources. Tate (1955: 333) observes how 
difficult critics find it to focus on the literary work itself: "For some reason 
critics have a hard time fixing their minds directly under their noses, and 
before they see the object that is there they use a telescope to scan upon the 
whole horizon to see where it came from. They are wood cutters who do 
their job by finding out where the ore came from in the iron of the steel of 
the blade of the axe that Jack built. " 
New Critics do seek objectivity in their interpretation of literary works. "The 
true interpretation is the outcome of that fortunate occasion when the 
interpreter does not subjugate the creation but is subjugated by it. " (Weiss, 
1984: 19) The method best suited to such interpretation is close reading; 
close, attentive reading of the text is regarded as the best key for unlocking 
the secrets of the literary text. 
4. NEW CRITICISM AND OLD TESTAMENT STUDIES 
The reaction to positivism within literary studies has a parallel in biblical 
studies. Weiss' (1984) The Bible From Within, published in Hebrew in 1962, 
presents a New Critical approach to Biblical literature as the key to resolving 
the distorting influence of what he calls `historicism' upon biblical studies'7. 
Another early advocate of NC as the method for biblical study is Alonso- 
Schökeli8, who used NC in studies on prophetic poetry and poetic imagery. 
17What Weiss calls 'historicism' is equivalent to what Wellek calls positivism. Historicism, even more than 
positivism, is a notoriously slippery word. See Mandelbaum (1967) for a useful discussion of the diverse 
ways in which it has been used. The general definition that Mandelbaum (1967: 24) proposes fits with 
Weiss' use: "Historicism is the belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of anything and an 
adequate assessment of its value are to be gained by considering it in terms of the place it occupied and the 
role it played within a process of development. " 
18See Alonso-Schökel, 1988: 205,206 for a list of his works. 
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Since the 50's and 60's there has been an explosion of literary approaches to 
the Bible, with the production of a huge amount of literature applying the 
developing smorgasbord of literary approaches to biblical literature. This 
explosion occurred at the time when NC was starting to lose its dominance 
in literary theory, and so it is not surprising that biblical study done along 
specifically New Critical lines is limited. In many ways the influence of NC 
remains, but, as it was superseded in literary theory, so too it has been 
superseded in biblical studies. 
It is thus not easy to find a body of biblical study which is specifically New 
Critical. Longman (1987: 25-27) refers to Weiss, the "Sheffield School" and 
Adele Berlin as examples of biblical work which has adopted many of NC's 
insights. As an example of the Sheffield School he refers to Gunn's work on 
David and Saul. Clearly Gunn and Berlin's work is influenced by NC, but 
only in a general way. Berlin herself appeals to other influences as well and 
Gunn is clearly not New Critical in any strong sense19. Weiss and Schökel 
are however, two examples of Old Testament scholars working with a strong 
commitment to New Critical principles. Weiss' work is particularly 
interesting since the Hebrew version of his The Bible From Within was 
published in 1962 and the revised, enlarged and fully-updated English 
edition in 1984. He has had twenty-two years in which to reassess his 
commitment to NC but has not shifted his position. We shall therefore focus 
this section on Weiss' New Critical approach to biblical scholarship. 
Weiss (1984: 27) coined the expression "Total Interpretation" to describe his 
method of interpretation for the poetic parts of the Bible. This method is 
"total" because it seeks to grasp the literary creation in its totality by an 
explanation based on all the formal elements which work together to create 
the literary work. Weiss welcomes the reaction to historicism that NC 
represents since this allowed the literary work itself to become the focus of 
literary study. Weiss is well aware that nowadays NC tends to be regarded as 
out of date. However he defends it against structuralism and continues to 
argue that "Total Interpretation" is the best method for reading biblical 
19Berlin (1983) is aware of structuralism and refers to Polzin, Todorov and Genette. Her methodology is 
however not structuralist and does come very close to NC. So, for example, commenting on Genesis 37 she 
says "we must begin our reading without prior commitment to any theory. The text must speak for itself. " 
(1983: 117) Berlin's work is more New Critical than Gunn's (1982). Gunn (1982: 14,16) stresses that his 
reading of the David narrative as story rests on a reconstructed text and not the final form. As he (1982: 16) 
says, "How the narrative relates to its present context and how this location might affect its meaning are 
questions of importance, but not questions I have chosen to deal with here. " Gunn's work on the David 
narrative represents something of a synthesis of historical critical and narrative methodologies. 
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poetry. NC does have a lot in common with structuralism, but it is focused 
on the individual text whereas structuralism tends to be concerned with 
underlying and general structures20. Criticisms of NC are often either a result 
of the abuse of the method or stem from a lack of understanding. Indeed, 
Weiss' The Bible From Within is an exemplary example of just how 
sophisticated a methodology NC can be. 
Weiss regards form criticism as wedded to historicist presuppositions and 
rejects it as an external approach utilising an outmoded notion of form. (Cf. 
Weiss, 1984: 47-64 for a thorough critique of Gunkel's form critical 
approach in relation to Psalm 23: 1. ) A good scientific method must be 
appropriate to its object and Weiss regards the internal method of `Total 
Interpretation' as the most appropriate method for interpreting Biblical 
poetry. 
Weiss' carefully nuanced understanding of the relationship between 
historical context and poetic interpretation is worth noting. In observing that 
NC is opposed to historicism he distinguishes between two shades of 
opposition, as we saw above. As an opponent of historical background as the 
sole method, Weiss is concerned to restore the methodological imbalance 
resulting from historicism21 but has no desire to deny the legitimate role of 
historical concerns in literary studies. This role is however restricted. 
Biographical and philological data can confirm one's interpretation but 
cannot replace it. The limitations and problems of historical criticism have to 
be faced; however good its intentions "[t]his method seems now to have 
come to the point where its deficiencies are becoming more obvious than its 
merit. The keys which have been cut and shaped with such care certainly 
opened a door; but the door only seems to lead into another room with a 
door which is locked, and the lock on that door the keys do not fit. And the 
room we have got into is plainly not the heart of the building, but only 
another antechamber. " (Gardner as quoted by Weiss, 1984: 64) Indeed, 
historical criticism as practised is not truly historical because of its 
unbalanced idea of the relationship between literature and history. NC seeks 
20To support this statement Weiss (1984: 8) quotes the structuralist Holenstein: "We cannot understand and 
elucidate something until its appropriate place in its polymorphous and polyvalent universal code has been 
found, until it is clear which partial system of this general code is to be actualized for its constitution and 
comprehension". 
21Weiss (1984: 9) quotes Brooks: "the danger now, it seems to me, is not that we will forget the differences 
between poems of different historical periods, but that we may forget those qualities which they have in 
common ... those qualities that make them poems. " 
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to redress this balance and in so doing argues for a different understanding 
of literary texts in history; it opposes their reduction to historical documents 
and recognises their resistance to historical reconstruction. Weiss argues that 
literature will only yield what it has to give if it is approached as literature. 
The strength of Weiss' work is that he is at pains to show how his `Total 
Interpretation' bears fruit in actual exegesis. This, in his view, is the ultimate 
test of a method: "it can only be tested and proved in practice. If the results it 
produces appear to be eisegesis instead of exegesis, then a thorough 
philological-critical examination of the text should point up the inadequacy 
and illuminate the source of the error. " (Weiss, 1984: 73) The major part of 
Weiss' (1984) work is devoted to showing the difference that his method 
makes in exegesis. 
IV WRIGHT ON ECCLESIASTES 
Wright has been selected as an example of the application of NC to 
Ecclesiastes because he specifically appeals to it as providing a 
methodological key for breaking the deadlock in studies of Ecclesiastes22. 
Plumptre (1881: 7) referred to Ecclesiastes as "the sphinx of Hebrew 
literature, with its unsolved riddles of history and life"; Wright (1968) 
argues that NC provides a method for getting at the structure of Ecclesiastes, 
and thereby breaking this riddle. "The structure that the author intended to 
give to this book has finally been recovered. " (Wright, 1990: 489) 
Ecclesiastes, according to Wright, is like a maze. However, there is order to 
it, and the principles underlying this maze need to be discovered. By 
"principles" Wright means underlying structure. In his view we have access 
to this through the patterns of verbal repetition in Ecclesiastes. These 
provide an objective base for getting at the underlying structure. "When 
these patterns are taken as indicating the framework of the book and when 
that framework is brought to the material as an overlay as it were, there 
emerges out of the apparent disorder a straightforward presentation of a very 
22Lohfink is also an important representative of a New Critical approach to Ecclesiastes. Lohfink's 
(1993: 10) indebtedness to NC manifests itself mainly in his commitment to close reading: "Das ganze Buch 
durchzieht eine Leitworttechnik, die ihresgleichen im alten Orient sucht. Sie bewirkt, das alles mit allem in 
einem geheimnisvollen Netz verknüpft ist und alle Ausleger, die einen einlinigen Gedankenfortschritt 
suchen, sich in dieser subtilieren Sprachwelt rettungslos verheddern! ' However, at least as regards 
structure, he is less consistently New Critical than Wright. Lohfink (1993: 10,11) arrives at his structure of 
Ecclesiastes through Greek and Jewish genre comparisons. Wright's analysis of Ecclesiastes has also been 
more influential than Lohfink's. 
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simple theme, albeit somewhat reduced in content from what had previously 
been seen as the message of the book. " (Wright, 1968: 314) 
Previous scholarship, in Wright's view, has lacked a scientific approach to 
solving the riddle of Ecclesiastes. Historically Wright discerns two major 
approaches to the structure of Ecclesiastes; those who find no plan in it and 
those who find some unity or progression of thought. The entire debate is, 
however, plagued by subjectivity. Phrases like "This is how I read 
Ecclesiastes 
... " dog the footsteps of the history of interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes. In this history of research into Ecclesiastes "[t]he results have 
been quite disparate, and this lack of agreement has been viewed by many as 
the final and conclusive evidence if more were needed that there is indeed no 
plan in the book to begin with. " (Wright, 1968: 316) 
Wright reopens the search for objective criteria for the structure of 
Ecclesiastes and, as mentioned above, finds the impulse in NC. It is the 
commitment to close reading of NC that Wright finds most attractive. He 
(1968: 317) describes this close reading as "a careful and verbal structural 
analysis. " He refers to Wellek and Warren's Theory of Literature but does 
not carefully distinguish NC from structuralism and other contemporary 
theories. Indeed Wright sees NC's commitment to close reading as an 
expression of contemporary structural concerns in the sciences of his day. As 
examples in biblical criticism of work in the same new critical spirit as his 
he includes the rhetorical criticism of Muilenberg. He is also cautious about 
the reactionary nature of NC and particularly of its shift away from authorial 
intention. Thus it would be wrong to see Wright as a dogmatic New Critic. 
However it is in NC that he finds the key for an objective close reading 
which can lift one out of the subjective morass that pervades scholarship on 
Ecclesiastes. 
NC, he maintains, discerns two ways in which one can get at the plan of a 
work. One can proceed immediately to the content of a work and try and 
follow the sequence of ideas and thereby construct an outline. This approach 
is, however, plagued by subjectivity. The second alternative is an objective 
method: 
"essentially it is to put attention, first of all, not on the thought but on the form. 
The critic looks for repetitions of vocabulary and of grammatical forms and thus 
seeks to uncover whatever literary devices the author may have used, such as 
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inclusions, mots crochets, anaphora, chiasm, symmetry, refrains, announcement 
of topic and subsequent resumption, recapitulation, etc. " (Wright, 1968: 318) 
Changes in genre, mood etc. and numerical patterns may also provide clues 
to the author's plan. Patterns thereby discerned are then related to the 
content of the book and, where development in thought coincides with these 
patterns, an outline emerges. The subjective element is not purged but is 
considerably constrained. Where changes in thought regularly converge with 
multiple patterns relative certainty can be obtained. 
Loretz and Castellino have applied this approach to Ecclesiastes. However, 
according to Wright (1968: 319,320), the former concentrated on 
microanalysis rather than macroanalysis, and the latter's plan does not match 
the thought of Ecclesiastes, and the objective data for his analysis is meagre. 
This sets the stage for Wright to redo a close reading of Ecclesiastes. 
In 1: 12-18 Wright finds a double introduction followed in 2: 1-17 by two 
paragraphs which expand on this double introduction. The double 
introduction is marked out by its form. Each introductory section contains an 
introductory statement and ends with "all is vanity and a chase after wind" 
plus a proverb. Wright justifies starting with 1: 12 because of a general 
acknowledgement that this is where the book starts. 2: 1-11 and 12-17 are 
also marked off by the phrase "all was vanity and a chase after wind". In this 
way Wright discerns 4 sections in 1: 12 - 2: 17. These sections are generally 
recognised but in Wright's view, no one has pursued this type of analysis 
further. This he seeks to do by letting subsequent occurrences of the "vanity" 
phrase indicate the ends of other units. In this way, he (1968: 321) arrives at 
four additional sections in a short-long-short-long arrangement: 2: 18-26, 
3: 1-4: 6,4: 7-16,4: 17-6: 9. The "vanity" phrase ends in 6: 9 and is not repeated 
in the remaining six chapters. These four sections are all concerned with 
evaluating man's toil and would seem to be meaningful units. The main 
subject of 2: 18-6: 9 is "toil". 
Thus, in 1: 12-6: 9, Wright finds a continuity of thought. Qoheleth seeks to 
report the results of his investigation of life. He starts with a double 
introduction (1: 12-15; 1: 16-18), and then evaluates pleasure seeking (2: 1- 
11), wisdom (2: 12-17) and the results of toil (2: 18-6: 9). These eight units are 
tied together not only by the repetition of the evaluation, but also by an 
interlocking arrangement whereby, once the series begins, each section picks 
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up a motif mentioned two units earlier. For example, in 2: 12-17 "wisdom, 
madness and folly" picks up from 1: 17. The four sections on toil are also 
connected by the idea of there being nothing better to do than to eat and 
drink and enjoy one's labour. There is development in this idea in that it is 
heavily qualified in the last section. 
6: 6-9 contains a number of phrases that recall earlier remarks. This, plus the 
cessation of the "vanity" phrase, suggests that 6: 9 marks a major break. 
Wright scrutinises 6: 10-12 and finds two new ideas introduced: man does 
not know what is good to do nor does he know what comes after him. In 7 
and 8a pattern occurs with the verbal expressions "not find/who can find", 
and in 9 and 10 "do not know" and "no knowledge" occur with great 
regularity. Wright (1968: 323) uses these phrases to mark off sections and 
thereby ends up with the development of man not knowing what is good in 
four sections in 7: 1-8: 17, and with the development of man not knowing 
what is to come in six sections in 9: 1-11: 6. This brings us to the generally 
recognised final poem on youth and old age at the end of the book. 1: 2 and 
12: 8, as is generally recognised, is an overall inclusion. The question in 1: 3 
provides the context in which 1: 4-11 is to be read. The epilogue is from the 
hand of the editor. 
In this way Wright arrives at the following outline of Ecclesiastes. 
TITLE 1: 1 
POEM ON TOIL 1: 2-11 
I. QOHELETH'S INVESTIGATION OF LIFE 1: 12-6: 9 
Double Introduction 1: 12-15 
1: 16-18 
Study of pleasure seeking 2: 1-11 
Study of wisdom and folly 2: 12-17 
Study of the fruits of toil 
one has to leave them to another 2: 18-26 
one cannot hit on the right time to act 3: 1-4: 6 
the problem of a `second one' 4: 7-16 
one can lose all that one accumulates 4: 17-6: 9 
II. QOHELETH'S CONCLUSIONS 6: 10-11: 6 
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Introduction 6: 10-12: man does not know what God has done, for man cannot 
find out what is good to do, and he cannot find out what comes after. 
A. Man cannot find out what is good for him to do 
Critique of traditional wisdom 
on the day of prosperity and 
adversity 7: 1-14 
on justice and wickedness 7: 15-24 
on women and folly 7: 25-29 
on the wise man and the king 8: 1-17 
B. Man does not know what will come after him 
he knows he will die; the 
dead know nothing 9: 1-6 
there is no knowledge in 
Sheol 9: 7-10 
man does not know his time 9: 11,12 
man does not know what 
will be 9: 13-10: 15 
he does not know what evil 
will come 10: 16-11: 2 
he does not know what 
good will come 11: 3-6 
POEM ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE 11: 7-12: 8 
EPILOGUE 12: 9-14 
Wright (1968: 324) is sure this is objective: "it seems almost certain that the 
patterns uncovered are a deliberate device utilized by the author to provide 
the main structure of the book. ... 
it is a case of verbal repetitions marking 
out and exactly coinciding with the repetitions of ideas. " The theme of 
Ecclesiastes is thus the impossibility of understanding what God has done. 
Qoheleth's only advice is to enjoy life while one can. 
Up until this point we have focused our discussion on Wright's 1968 article 
since this is the one in which he develops his close reading of Ecclesiastes. It 
should be noted that Wright has buttressed this early analysis with two later 
articles (1980,1983) in which he argues that there are intricate numerical 
patterns in Ecclesiastes which support his proposed structure. His 1968 
article received mixed reactions (Wright, 1980: 39). He examines the direct 
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criticisms made by Braun, Glaser, Lys and Loader against his reading of 
Ecclesiastes and concludes that "the proposal has suffered nothing from the 
direct scrutiny it has received to date. " (Wright, 1980: 42) However he does 
acknowledge the difficulty in objectively discerning the sorts of pattern he 
found in Ecclesiastes: 
"A repetition which one interpreter sees as an ending formula another sees as part 
of a chiasm leading in a different direction and another sees as a Leitmotiv. While 
one critic is impressed by repetitions as indicators of structure in this particular 
book and allows for irregularities in other stylistic features, another gives primary 
value to introductory formulae or to discontinuities (change of person, topic, 
genre) and allows for irregularities in other areas. " (Wright, 1980: 41) 
To escape the impasse of this subjectivity further evidence is required from 
the text of Ecclesiastes. "What is really needed at this time is additional data 
from the book itself which would be of such a nature that it would aid in 
evaluating the data already in the discussion and aid in weighing in favour of 
one or other interpretation of that data. " (Wright, 1980: 42,43) Such 
additional data Wright (1980,1983) found in intricate numerical patterns. In 
his 1983 article Wright extended the analysis of numerical patterns in 
Ecclesiastes to the subsections. Since our concern with Wright is as an 
example of a New Critical reading of Ecclesiastes we shall not describe and 
evaluate his numerical analysis in any detail23. He justifies it not only in 
terms of its success, but also in terms of similar numerical relations in 
Proverbs, the fascination of ancients with numbers, numerical patterns in the 
Book of Wisdom and the practice of the Sopherim of counting letters, words 
and verses (Wright, 1983: 39,40). The numerical preoccupation we find in 
the book is not bizarre by the standards of the ancients and we have to look 
at their books on their own terms. For our purposes it suffices to note that 
these patterns confirm Wright's' earlier analysis of Ecclesiastes. 
Wright's interpretation of Ecclesiastes is firmly New Critical. He is hesitant 
about NC's denial of authorial intentionality but in practice works very 
much with an embodied intentionality stance, which approximates the 
refined view of NC (see above). Wright's approach to the structure of 
Ecclesiastes is intrinsic, working with the final form of the text and 
concentrating his attention on a close reading of the text. Verbal repetitions 
in particular are the key for Wright to the objective structure of the book. 
23For a summary cf. Murphy, 1992a: xxxviii, xxxix. 
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V STRUCTURALISM AND ITS APPLICATION TO OLD 
TESTAMENT STUDIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The literature related to the development and application of structuralism is 
vast and multi-disciplinary24. We will firstly outline the development of 
structuralism, concentrating on Jakobson's and Greimas's views in particular 
since they are key figures in relating structuralism to literature. Then we will 
survey the application of structuralism to Old Testament interpretation and 
in particular to wisdom literature. This will provide the backdrop for an 
examination of Loader's work on Ecclesiastes with a view to considering the 
positive insight that a structuralist approach to Ecclesiastes might provide. 
Terence Hawkes (1977) begins his study of structuralism with Vico in the 
eighteenth century. Vico attempted to develop a science of human society by 
applying the principles of natural science to the world of nations. Primitive 
man possessed sapienza poetica whereby he cast his responses to his context 
in a metaphysics of metaphor, symbol and myth. Early accounts of creation 
were not intended to be taken literally but were ways of encoding and 
shaping reality. Consequently that which man recognises as true and that 
which he constructs are the same. "When man perceives the world, he 
perceives without knowing it the superimposed shape of his own mind. " 
(Hawkes, 1977: 13) This works both ways; humans construct society and 
society shapes humanity. "That is, man constructs the myths, the social 
institutions, virtually the whole world as he perceives it, and in so doing he 
constructs himself. This making process involves the continual creation of 
recognizable and repeated forms which we can now term a process of 
structuring. " (Hawkes, 1977: 14) Vico's work is one of the first modem 
attempts to deny a permanent structuring to reality. With the exception of 
poetic wisdom there is no givenness to human nature or reality. 
From a structuralist perspective the world does not consist of independently 
existing objects which can be perceived. "In fact, every perceiver's method 
of perceiving can be shown to contain an inherent bias which affects what is 
perceived to a significant degree. ... any observer is bound to create 
something of what he observes. Accordingly, the relationship ... becomes 
24See for example Hawkes' (1977) bibliography. 
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the only thing that can be observed. " (Hawkes, 1977: 17) The true nature of 
things lies in the relationships which we construct and then perceive between 
them. The common ground with Vico is clear. Structuralists aim to 
conceptualise these structures constructed by humans. 
2. STRUCTURALISM AND LINGUISTICS: SAUSSURE 
In linguistics structuralism involves the search for linguistic structure. The 
Swiss linguist Saussure is the originator of structuralist linguistics. He 
inherited a worldview in which the world consisted of independently 
existing objects and in which language was thought to have a 
correspondence relationship with this world. Saussure rejected this and the 
notion of language that resulted from it in favour of a more relational view. 
His views are set out in his Course in General Linguistics. The extent to 
which structure is central to his understanding of linguistics is evident from 
the second of his three main points about the scope of linguistics: "to 
determine the forces that are permanently and universally at work in all 
languages, and to deduce the general laws to which all specific historical 
phenomena can be reduced. " (Saussure, 1959: 6) 
Order within the field of linguistics becomes manifest when one approaches 
linguistics in the following way: "from the very outset we must put both feet 
on the ground of language and use language as the norm of all other 
manifestations of speech. " (Saussure, 1959: 9). Once Langue (language) is 
given priority over langage (speech), then order results. This principle is 
developed into Saussure's distinction between langue and parole, whereby 
he distinguishes between the language system and concrete acts of speech. 
Language for Saussure is a system of signs that express ideas and his 
linguistics explores the way in which these signs operate. The linguistic unit 
is a slice of sound which, to the exclusion of everything that precedes and 
follows it in the spoken chain, is the signifier of a certain concept. The bond 
between the two is wholly arbitrary so that in language there are only 
differences and no positive terms. "Whether we take the signified or the 
signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the 
linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have 
issued from the system. " (Saussure, 1959: 120). Saussure rejects the use of 
symbol as a synonym for sign because the symbol is never wholly arbitrary, 
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whereas the sign is. Meaning is thus generated not by a correspondence 
relationship with reality but by differences within the system. 
3. AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN STRUCTURALISM 
The English translation of Saussure's Cours only appeared in 1959 and it 
was mainly in the 1960's that it experienced the height of its influence, being 
taken up and developed in a variety of disciplines. Levi-Strauss extended 
semiotics to the whole of culture on the basis of his understanding that 
language constitutes the prototype of cultural phenomena. Thus phenomena 
like kinship and myth were studied along structuralist lines. And this work 
on myth was soon extended to include the Old Testament. 
In Europe and America three major schools of structuralist linguistic 
analysis developed (Hawkes, 1977: 73-76). In the USA descriptive linguistics 
developed, originating in the work of Peirce and taken up by Morris. In 
Prague a functional type developed focusing on the functions language 
fulfils in society as a distinct structure. Key figures were Troubetskoi and 
Jakobson. In Copenhagen a glossematic school developed which emphasised 
the formal nature of all language so that for every process there is a system. 
These three varieties are the major structuralist modes of linguistic analysis 
in the twentieth century. 
Jakobson focused on the poetic function of language and sought to give an 
account of this within the context of linguistics. 25 To this end he invokes the 
linguistic notions of polarities and equivalence in order to account for the 
peculiar nature of poetic language. Jakobson's notion of polarities is derived 
from Saussure's syntagmatic-associative distinction which is developed in 
poetry in terms of metonymy and metaphor. The former is associative in 
character, the latter is syntagmatic. They are binarily opposed and underpin 
the process of selection and combination by which signs are formed. The 
distinction between the two modes is fundamental to language. 
The poetic function of language draws on both the selective and the 
combinative modes as a means for the promotion of equivalence. "The 
poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of 
selection into the axis of combination. " (Jakobson, 1960: 358) Poeticalness 
25For a useful summary of Jakobson's view see Hawkes, 1977: 76-87. 
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is an aspect of all uses of language; poetry arises when `poeticalness' is 
raised to a higher degree than other competing functions. Hence, when 
dealing with poetic function, linguistics cannot limit itself to the field of 
poetry. (Jakobson, 1960: 377) We therefore need a poetics of poetry and 
prose which attends to metonymy and metaphor at all levels and this is what 
Jakobson seeks to provide. To this end he draws attention to six constituent 
factors that make up any speech event. All communication entails a message 
initiated by an addresser and directed towards an addressee. The message 
requires a contact between the two (e. g. oral, visual, electronic) and must be 
formulated in terms of a code (speech, writing, numbers) and refer to a 
context understood by both addresser and addressee. This can be 
diagramatically represented as follows. 
context 
message 
addresser -------------------------------- addressee 
contact 
code 
It is important to note that the message cannot be the sole carrier of meaning 
in this act; rather meaning resides in the total act of communication. All 
meaning is context-sensitive and thus is not a stable entity which passes 
untrammelled from sender to receiver. The six constitutive elements are 
never in perfect balance. One is always dominant so that, if, for example, the 
act is directed towards the context, then the referential function of the act 
dominates. If towards the addresser the emotive and so on. 
Jakobson's work was most strongly directed towards poetic texts. In terms of 
structuralist analysis of prose Vladimir Propp was most probably the linking 
figure between the Russian Formalists, of which Jakobson was a member, 
and structuralists, especially French ones (Cf. Hawkes, 1977: 87). Propp's 
work was refashioned and developed by Greimas. 
Greimas' primary concern is semantics. He focuses on narrative structure in 
particular and describes it in terms of a Saussurean linguistic model of an 
underlying langue generating a parole. Binary oppositions underlie the 
elementary structure of signification. We perceive differences and thus the 
127 
world takes shape in front of us. These oppositions form the basis of a deep- 
lying actantial model from whose structures the surface structures of 
individual stories derive. Stories spring from a common grammar or 
enunciation-spectacle so that, although stories differ considerably at a 
surface level, at a structural level they derive from a common grammar. At a 
surface level the structure of the enunciation spectacle is manifested through 
the actants who embody it and these actants operate at a 
functional/phonemic level rather than in terms of content. An actant may be 
embodied in a single character or reside in the function of more than one 
character. "The content of the actions changes all the time, the actors vary, 
but the enunciation-spectacle remains always the same, for its permanence is 
guaranteed by the fixed distribution of the roles" (Greimas quoted by 
Hawkes, 1977: 89) 
Like Propp, Greimas argues for a grammar of narrative in which a finite 
number of elements, organised in a finite number of ways, generate stories. 
Greimas reorganises Propp's seven spheres of action into the following three 
relationships: 
i. subject versus object 
ii. sender versus receiver 
iii. helper versus opponent 
If these three relationships form a type of phonemic analysis, then a 
syntactic analysis is required at the surface level which will show how these 
elements can be joined to form a narrative. Greimas reduces and modifies 
Propp's thirty-one functions to twenty. Greimas' work on narrative 
constitutes a refinement of Propp's with the same basic aim; to establish the 
plot models and to explore their combinatory potential. 
It is not easy to generalise about structuralism but we can sum up its 
approach to literary texts in the following three ways. Firstly, structuralism 
looks at a text as a manifestation of a deep, underlying structure. This has led 
to the well known distinction between surface and deep structure. Because of 
structuralism's fascination with deep structure some have concluded that it is 
not interested in the final form of the text and therefore in interpretation26. 
26Greenwood (1985: 8,9) notes that structuralists are not primarily concerned with the meaning of a text. 
Barton (1984: 121) stresses that structuralists are more concerned with analysis than exegesis. They are not 
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This has led some to characterise structuralism in terms of `absence' as 
opposed to present meaning in texts. One such is Ricoeur, who said to Levi- 
Strauss in a public discussion of June 1953: 
"there is no `message', not in the cybernetic sense, but in the `kerygmatic' sense; 
you give up meaning in despair; but you save yourself by the notion that if human 
beings have nothing to say, at least they say it so well that one can subject their 
discourse to a structural analysis. You save meaning, but it is the meaning of 
meaninglessness, the admirable syntactic arrangement of a discourse which says 
nothing. I see you at that point of conjunction of agnosticism and an acute 
understanding of syntaxes. " (Ricoeur, 1963: 652,653) 
Certainly the focus of structuralism is deep, underlying structure but it would 
be wrong to conclude therefore, that it has no concern with interpretation. 
Polzin's work on Job (see below) is a fine example of how concern with 
deep structure may illumine the surface structure and overall interpretation 
of the message of the text. Polzin (1977: 102) correctly comments that 
"[f]ormulas, methodologies, formal analyses may all have their place in such 
an enterprise. But they are valuable only insofar as they help to make what 
one studies a little more intelligible to whoever employs them. " 
Secondly the model that structuralism constructs is a hypothetical-deductive 
and not an inductive one (Greenwood, 1985: 112,113; Polzin, 1977: 19ff). 
Thirdly, structuralism is conscious of the reader of the text; it emphasises 
deep-subjectivity. "Structural analysis as sign can be viewed in its dual role 
as the meaning (=content) of an object but the expression of a subject. It is 
the crucial awareness and self-consciousness of the latter role of analysis 
that most often signals the study of an object as truly structural. " (Polzin, 
1977: 38) 
4. APPLICATION OF STRUCTURALISM TO OLD TESTAMENT 
TEXTS 
The application of structuralism to biblical studies began in the early 1960's 
with the work of Leach, who, using methods deeply influenced by Levi- 
Strauss, attempted a structural analysis of the creation stories in Genesis. 
(Cf. Greenwood, 1985: 16-22). By September 1969 close to two hundred 
biblical scholars, including Roland Barthes, gathered at Chantilly to discuss 
so much concerned with providing new interpretations as explaining how an interpretation comes to be 
appropriate. 
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the relationship between structuralism and biblical interpretation. In 1970 
Güttgemans founded the journal Linguistica Biblica to promote structuralist 
approaches to the Bible. 
Structuralist interpretation of the Old Testament has produced a sizeable 
body of literature, although the latter is concentrated on Old Testament 
narrative texts. Greenwood (1985) maintains that the methodologies of Levi 
Strauss, Barthes, Greimas and Güttgemans are the most established 
structural procedures for biblical interpretation27. Very little structuralist 
work has been done on Old Testament wisdom literature. Polzin's (1974, 
1977) outstanding work on Job is a notable exception. Although Job has a 
much stronger narrative aspect to it than Ecclesiastes, there are many 
parallels between them, and we shall therefore focus our discussion in this 
section upon Polzin's work on structuralism and Job. 
Polzin finds discrepancy and contradiction at the heart of Job. He identifies 
three major contradictions: firstly there is that between what a person is 
taught to believe about divine justice and what he experiences in his life. 
Secondly Job's friends affirm divine retribution for ten chapters but 
following the words of God in 42: 7ff they sacrifice to God for "not speaking 
of Him what is right. " Thirdly some of God's words seem to contradict his 
actions. His statement in 42: 7 that Job spoke right of him seems to contradict 
Yahweh's speeches in 38-41 and the reaffirmation of the principle of 
retribution in the epilogue. 
For Polzin, confrontation of these inconsistencies is part of the book's 
structure and message. "Attempts to remove these inconsistencies can be 
characterised as academic `failure of nerve' just as the platitudes of Job's 
friends are a `failure of nerve' in the face of Job's problems. By removing 
the book's inconsistencies, some scholars have succeeded in removing its 
message. " (Polzin, 1974: 183) Polzin rejects the usual source-critical and 
form-critical approaches to Job and works with Job as a unified work. Of the 
usual form-critical approaches to Job he says that "[s]uch attempts at 
analysis seem to me ultimately to destroy the message(s) of the book and 
moreover make impossible the first step towards understanding how, in its 
27See Polzin (1977) as well for useful bibliographies relating to the application of structuralism in Old 
Testament studies. 
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present form, it has affected men so profoundly down through the ages. " 
(Polzin, 1974: 186) 
This of course, raises the question of genre at a macro rather than micro 
level. Polzin (1974: 187) is cautious with respect to form-critical analyses of 
genre. He (1974: 189) does, however, recognise the need for a "full-fledged 
science of discourse" which would include a typology of discourse. Such an 
approach would examine Job as a whole in relation to different types of 
discourse. Polzin recognises that although the science of discourse is still an 
infant we may nevertheless discern three main types of discourse, viz. 
metonymy (e. g. story, narrative, novel), metaphor (e. g.. lyric poetry) and 
enthymeme (e. g. philosophical treatises). Since Job tells a story and falls into 
the first category Polzin investigates it as a sequence of sentences 
constituting a narrative. Polzin proposes three stages in a structural analysis 
of Job. Firstly analysis of the "framework" of the book, secondly 
consideration of its "code", and thirdly analysis of the "message". This tri- 
partite distinction is derived from Greimas (Polzin, 1974: 187). "Code" and 
"message" are concepts from communication theory and correspond to the 
Saussurean distinction between langue and parole. "Framework" refers to 
the first step of analysis whereby the discourse is divided up into its basic 
units that are fundamental to the next two stages. 
Analysis of the framework seeks to determine the largest units essential to 
the story. "Its basic unities are `cardinal functions', veritable hinges of a 
story in that they are nucleatic actions or events without which the story 
would be essentially different. " (Polzin, 1974: 189) Every story can be 
described as a series of sequences which can be united into larger 
`movements'. Polzin (1974: 190) designates the functional role of each 
movement the main sequential function of the movement. In a way 
analogous to Levi-Strauss' work on myth, Polzin proposes that the main 
sequential function in Job is set up to mediate contradictions. 
Polzin discerns four movements in Job which involve a dialectical working 
out of a series of contradictions by means of four major sequential functions. 
In the first movement (Job 1-37) the sequential function is that of God 
afflicting Job. This sets up a conflict between the sphere of belief and 
experience. The friends side with belief, Job with experience. In the second 
movement (Job 38-42: 6) the first contradiction is resolved by the theophany 
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but a new one is set up: by assenting to the vision Job has to deny the 
validity of his previous experience. The third movement (Job 42: 7-8) 
resolves the second contradiction (Job spoke what is right) but sets up 
another: how does God's speech in 38-41 relate to 42: 7ff? The fourth 
movement (42: 10-17) resolves the last conflict and restores equilibrium. By 
restoring Job's fortunes God confirms his word of 42: 7-9 and the affirmation 
of his power in 38-41. "Far from being a gratuitous `hollywood ending', the 
final verses in chapter 42 dialectically resolve the subsidiary conflicts which 
the central event of the entire book, the theophany of God, had engendered. " 
(Polzin, 1974: 198) 
For Polzin (1974: 200) the framework of Job is the work of a genius. "The 
genius of this journey is that insight is conferred not by the avoidance of 
contradiction and inconsistency but precisely by the courageous integration 
of contradiction and resolution. In other words the story is a paradigm. What 
is on the surface a diachronic linear treatment of a problem reveals itself as 
containing an underlying or latent synchronic structure. " This pattern 
provides the material for analysis of the code of Job. 
The second stage in Polzin's structural analysis of Job is determination of 
the code of the text. Interdisciplinary co-operation is vital at this level and 
Polzin (1977: 89ff), in an attempt to analyse the code (that which is left of the 
structure once all the semantic content is removed), makes use of 
mathematical concepts of group structure. Polzin argues that the framework 
of Job is made up of a set of transformations which can be thought of as a 
representation of a Klein group, or more precisely as an Abelian group 
having four members. 
Within each movement in Job there is a before and after element, and a 
sphere of belief and one of experience. If X and Y symbolise belief and 
experience then the four movements can be seen in the following way. 
Initial situation: +X +y 
First movement: +X +y -- -X +y 
Second movement: -X +Y - - +X -Y 
Third movement: +X -Y - - -X +y 
Fourth movement: -X +Y - - +X +Y 
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This analysis alerts us to the fact that only four states are possible but that 
one of these four never occurs. -X-Y is avoided. "The one state avoided 
throughout the framework is that state representing somehow a negation 
both of the sphere of belief and the sphere of experience! It seems to me that 
this one observation is worth the entire (and tiring) trip. " (Polzin, 1977: 100) 
Polzin (1977: 100) plausibly argues that it is the one state that Job fervently 
requested. The conflict between Job and God is ultimately one in which God 
represents +X +Y whereas Job keeps begging for -X -Y, that is to be taken 
down to Sheol. "The message of the book centres around the courageous 
affirmation of apparently irreconcilable spheres instead of the insane 
negation of those spheres to avoid conflict and contradiction. " (Polzin, 
1977: 101) 
The third stage in Polzin's structural analysis of Job is the explication of the 
message. Polzin (1977: 102) recognises that if structural analysis is relevant 
to biblical exegesis then it has to make a difference at this stage. All the 
characters in the book take up positions which are then challenged. This 
pushes one to inquire concerning the "situation of discourse" out of which 
and for which Job was written. The key to the situation of discourse is what 
Polzin calls "contextualised situation"; textual indexes that would point at 
aspects of the situation of discourse. Analysis of the situation of discourse 
particularly through the role of the speeches indicates that ambiguity is 
avoided in the message of the book by what God is reported to have done 
and said. These two aspects validate or invalidate everything else in the 
story. 
"The figures of the story, far from being arbitrary, capricious, and mutually 
contradictory, interrelate with one another to help form a coherent message. There 
is no absolute answer to the problem of innocent suffering, no stance that is valid 
for all times and situations of one's life. At certain moments, suffering is so 
horrendous that any attempt to justify and explain it is 'obscene' .... This is the 
situation with which Job was confronted ... it was `obscene' for his friends to 
explain away the `Holocaust' his life had become. But at another moment in his 
life, after the vision of God out of the whirlwind, faith in redemption of some sort 
was once again possible for Job and he could now see his way to a belief he had 
once lost. " (Polzin, 1977: 120,121) 
VI LOADER'S READING OF ECCLESIASTES 
Structure is central to Loader's (1979,1986) interpretation of Ecclesiastes. 
Barton (1984: 130) invokes Loader's approach as a possible candidate for a 
structuralist approach to Ecclesiastes, although he does find it wanting in 
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terms of any precise definition of structuralism. For Loader (1979: 1,2) 
synchronic analysis must precede diachronic analysis of a text. The form and 
content of Ecclesiastes must first be analysed in their own right before the 
history of the development of the text is considered. Loader thus suggests 
five steps to be followed in the analysis of Ecclesiastes. Firstly, the 
individual pericopes need to be demarcated. Secondly the form of these 
pericopes should be assessed. Thirdly typical forms or Gattungen are to be 
identified. Fourthly the contents of each pericope are to be interpreted and 
finally, the composition of the whole book is to be accounted for. 
Loader (1979: 9-16) finds the following figures of style in Ecclesiastes: 
parallelism (over a hundred instances), chiasmus (particularly suited to the 
polar tensions in Qoheleth), paranomasia, anaphora, hyperbole and rhyme. 
He (1979: 16-19) argues that, apart from 1: 1 "the book as a whole is a work 
of poetry. " He thus rejects the view that the whole book is prose (Masoretes, 
Podechard) and the view that it is part prose, part poetry. The Masoretes did 
not apply the accentuation system of the poetical books to Ecclesiastes and 
thus saw it as prose. The LXX, however, places Ecclesiastes with the poetic 
books, in Loader's view, correctly. It is poetry with an unusual metre and 
form. 
By Gattungen Loader understands typical forms, and not form as the unique 
structure of a specific literary unit. He (1979: 18-28) identifies the following 
Gattungen in Ecclesiastes: the royal fiction, the Wahrspruch and maxim, the 
=%D saying, the comparison, the metaphor, the parable, the allegory, the 
observation, the self-discourse, the woe-saying and benediction, the 
antilogion, the rhetorical question, and the admonition. Many of the typical 
literary forms of wisdom literature are used by Qoheleth, but they often 
become parts of new structural units. Series of literary units may be regarded 
as a Gattung when they have several characteristics in common and this is 
the case with some of Ecclesiastes' units containing many of the wisdom 
forms. Pericopes in Ecclesiastes often contain questioning and reflections; 
we may therefore speak of an additional Gattung, which Loader (1979: 28) 
refers to as the reflection. 
Polar structures occur in virtually every literary unit of Ecclesiastes, 
according to Loader. Polar structures are "patterns of tension created by the 
counterposition of two elements to one another" (Loader, 1979: 1). Thus in 
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3: 1-9 for example, which Loader (1979: 29) identifies as a pericope, he 
discerns the underlying polar structure life, conservation (pole), 
abandonment, death (contra-pole), no security, surrender of helpless man to 
the eventualities of life (tension). Loader (1979: 29-111) finds this type of 
polar structure throughout Ecclesiastes. 
The style of Ecclesiastes is so uniform and the basic theme so consistently 
pursued that there can be no question of identifying different sources in 
terms of Ecclesiastes' composition. There are also, however, so many 
repetitions in the book that we cannot speak of a progressive development of 
a theme either. As a volume of poetry Ecclesiastes is neither a random 
collection nor a scientific treatise. The poems each constitute a unit by 
themselves but are also held together by more than a common theme. The 
inclusion (1: 2 and 12: 8) and the nature of the first poem as a prologue to the 
entire volume confirm this. The hebel declaration is found throughout the 
book, and even in chapter ten where the word is not mentioned the idea is 
present. Thus "[i]t is obvious and certain that this one conviction of 
emptiness and senselessness is the dominant motif in the book. " (Loader, 
1979: 9) The several separate units function as illustrations, motivations and 
discussions of this basic hebel idea, and the polar structures express this 
relationship. 
The polar tensions indicate the tension between Qoheleth's views and that of 
general wisdom (Loader, 1979: 116). This raises the question of the 
interpretation and explanation of the polarity. The development of ANE 
wisdom is one aspect of the background needed for an understanding of 
Ecclesiastes. Israelite wisdom developed through the same stages as 
Egyptian and Mesopotamian wisdom so that a comparison of Israel's 
wisdom with these other two cultures allows Ecclesiastes to fall exactly into 
place (Loader, 1986: 9). Once wisdom precepts are encoded a crisis of 
wisdom follows, and Ecclesiastes represents part of such a crisis. Loader 
discerns three phases in the development of wisdom: firstly there is a strong 
appreciation of the relationship between action and the opportune time for 
action. Secondly there is a loss of the sense of temporal relevance so that a 
dogmatic system originates. Thirdly there is protest against this petrification. 
For the first see Prov 10-29. Job's three friends are an example of the second 
and of course, Qoheleth is an example of the third. Qoheleth never comes to 
a happy ending; the tension and protest continue to the end. 
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Another important aspect of the background is the religious history of the 
time. Loader dates Ecclesiastes to the mid third century BC. After the exile 
of the sixth century BC profound changes in religious outlook took place in 
Israel. The God-concept became less personal, a development which was 
often compensated for by the personification of circumlocutions to fill the 
gap; this is how Judaism resolved the tension between the growing 
remoteness of God and the desire to hold onto God. Ecclesiastes is a striking 
exception to this; God is the distant one with whom Qoheleth cannot speak 
and he refuses to fill this vacuum. Qoheleth's thinking is rooted in two 
traditions: on the one hand he wishes to make room for human participation 
but on the other he wishes to be the dispassionate onlooker. "Involvement 
and detachment are polar opposites and hence stand in a relationship of 
tension to each other. " (Loader, 1986: 13) He therefore strongly criticises 
mainstream wisdom and yet appropriates all the typical forms of expression 
that characterise it. "He accepts God, but God is far - this is the ground for 
the polarity in his thought. " (Loader, 1979: 129) 
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Barton (1984: 130,131) is correct in arguing that Loader's interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes can only be called structuralist in a very limited sense. He 
certainly is not working with a structuralist methodology. One clear 
indication of this is his conclusion that there is one contradiction in the book, 
namely that between the epilogue and the rest of the book. This presupposes 
some understanding of the redaction of the text and a refusal to work with 
the final form of the text as a unified whole. He also works with a stronger 
sense of the historical setting of the text than is normally the case with 
structuralists. Even Polzin in his discussion of the situation of discourse 
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argues his case intrinsically rather than by trying to relate Job to external 
developments. His structural concern is also very much a surface structural 
one, although his polar structural analysis points in the direction of the 
possibility of a developed structural analysis of Ecclesiastes. Such an 
analysis remains to be done. 
VII THE IMPLICATIONS OF CANONICAL CRITICISM, NEW 
CRITICISM AND STRUCTURALISM FOR READING 
ECCLESIASTES AND FOR OLD TESTAMENT HERMENEUTICS 
Just how successful Childs', Wright's and Loader's analyses of Ecclesiastes 
are is debatable. However the questions they bring to the text are crucial. All 
three raise questions about the literary unity of the text in the light of its 
neglect. NC, structuralism and the canonical approach can in this respect all 
be seen as reactions to `positivism' as it became obvious that positivism 
prevented literature from being itself and being studied in a way that is true 
to its character28. 
The recovery of reading which the New Critics sought inevitably recentres 
the question of genre, since reading method must always be appropriate to 
its genre. Hence the large amount of discussion in NC concerning the nature 
of literariness. Whatever we may think of their conclusions in this area, their 
recognition of macrogenre and the necessity of developing methods of 
interpretation appropriate to the object remains crucial. The danger for OT 
studies is that NC was developed in relation to literary and particularly 
poetic texts. Poetic texts are often highly allusive and non-didactic in a way 
that contrasts with much of the OT where a didactic, kerygmatic focus is 
much more evident. Even within literary studies the New Critical 
understanding of `poeticalness' as essentially paradoxical and incapable of 
paraphrase has come under strong criticism (Cf. Norris, 1990b). Norris 
argues that we need an approach which does justice to the literary nature of 
literature without sacrificing the question of truth. It seems to me that such 
an approach would be more appropriate to OT texts in comparison with the 
New Critical stress on poetic texts as `being' rather than meaning. As we 
have seen much of the New Critical polemic against intentionality is related 
28See Collingwood (1946: 126-133) for a discussion of the effect of positivism upon philosophies of 
history, and thus upon the historical critical method. Collingwood discerns two negative effects of 
positivism upon history; firstly it led to "unprecedented mastery over small-scale problems with 
unprecedented weakness in dealing with large-scale problems" and secondly it prevented scholars from 
judging the facts with the result that history could only be the record of external events. 
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specifically to poetic (paradoxical and ambiguous) as opposed to practical 
texts. OT texts regularly fall more into the practical category than the poetic 
one, and even from a New Critical perspective this would change the method 
of interpretation. 
This raises the question of the nature of Old Testament texts and of 
Ecclesiastes in particular. Can we, without further ado, categorise them as 
literary texts and apply literary methods of interpretation? At very least NC 
and structuralism rightly alert us to the literary aspect of the OT as text. In 
this respect the recovery of synchronic reading of a text by NC and 
structuralism seems to me to be particularly valuable. Weiss captures this in 
his description of his method as Total interpretation, and de Man (1983: 3 1) 
refers to the same thing as the "circular intent at totality. " The final form of 
the text is the only form in which we have a text like Ecclesiastes and it 
makes sense to devote one's energies to this form. Certainly this is what any 
reading of Ecclesiastes ought to do. As NC stresses, no text is simply the 
sum of its sources. A text is a new creation and a reading of it must "be 
judged at the moment of creative art ... by the art of the poem itself. " 
(Wellek and Warren, 1954: 294) Even if we could recover all the sources of 
an Old Testament text that is still something very different from 
understanding the text itself. Source criticism is certainly a legitimate and 
important enterprise but it should not be equated with the reading of a text. 
Childs' approach reminds us that OT texts are also highly theological. 
Synchronic readings of OT texts will need to account for the relationship 
between the theological and literary aspects of these texts. Indeed Childs' 
emphasis on the final form of the text alerts us to the fact that seeking the 
message of the text will inevitably involve analysis of it as a literary text. 
And in this respect NC and structuralism do therefore point one in a host of 
fruitful directions for reading Ecclesiastes. Wright's and Loader's analyses 
are a real advance in the quest to understand Ecclesiastes. Wright's work is 
particularly important in its focus upon the function of repetition in 
Ecclesiastes. Sternberg (1985: 432-435) has explored this in detail in relation 
to Old Testament narrative texts. Such work remains to be done in relation to 
a wisdom text like Ecclesiastes, but Wright's analysis is an important step in 
the right direction. His analysis of the repetition of the hebel sayings has 
been fruitful in allaying scholarly despair over discerning the structure of 
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Ecclesiastes, as evidenced by the positive reception of Wright's analysis by 
Perdue (1994b), Murphy (1992a) etc. In my opinion his analysis often 
incorrectly privileges form at the expense of content29, and, as I argue in 
chapter seven, the hebel repetitions are closely connected with the carpe 
diem repetitions, and these need to be analysed closely together. Form and 
content need to be held more closely together in the analysis of Ecclesiastes. 
Fox (1989: 156) says, for example, about Wright's use of inclusios, "we can 
know that a repeated expression is an inclusio only after we find it occurring 
at the beginning and end of a unit demarcated by other means. " This is an 
overstatement but it serves as a reminder that one cannot escape the 
hermeneutical circle in analysis of the poetics of Ecclesiastes. 
Loader's thesis about the polar opposites in Ecclesiastes is also an important 
advance in Ecclesiastes' research. Structuralism alerts us to the role of 
contradictions in literature and taking this seriously prevents one from 
reconstructing Ecclesiastes because of its contradictions. Personally I think 
the polar tensions operate somewhat differently in Ecclesiastes and that these 
tensions are better approached as juxtapositions which create gaps (see 
chapter seven). However, concern for the literary nature of Ecclesiastes has 
led Loader to analyse its literary structure and it is this kind of analysis that 
is crucial if we are to advance in our understanding of the text as a whole. 
Loader's tentative probing of the underlying structure also suggests that a 
structural analysis of Ecclesiastes comparable to Polzin's work on Job may 
be a fruitful area in which to work. A weakness of biblical structuralism has 
been its focus on deep structure at the expense of exegesis and message. 
However, as we have seen from Polzin's work on Job, this need not be the 
case. Structuralism can be a powerful accompaniment to exegesis and I 
suggest that it could work this way with Ecclesiastes. 
NC and structuralism are, however, reminders that such readings would need 
to take the epilogue seriously as an integral part of the form of Ecclesiastes, 
an approach which Childs helpfully foregrounded. However Childs did not 
explore the relationship of the epilogue to the main body of the work; this 
remains to be done. Wright's and Loaders' analyses of Ecclesiastes move 
towards a synchronic reading of Ecclesiastes, but even they fail to explore 
the literary relationship of the epilogue to the text as a whole. Loader, as we 
29Cf. for example Ogden's (1979: 347,348) criticism as to whether 6: 7-9 does divide the book, and see in 
particular Fox, 1989: 156ff and Schoors 1982: 97ff. 
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saw, regards the epilogue as the one genuine contradiction in Ecclesiastes. 
Wright regards the epilogue as theologically very close to the main body of 
the text: 
"Qoheleth himself recommended the fear of God (5: 6) and expressed belief in 
judgement (11: 9). He does not speak of the commandments of God but he surely 
promoted them because he never recommends folly. It would seem that the ideas 
of fear, commandments, and judgement are really presuppositions for Qoheleth as 
he discusses the concrete problem of how specifically one is to conduct one's life 
within that religious context; hence, those ideas are not prominent in the book. 
What the editor does is to give those presuppositions a greater prominence lest 
anyone misunderstand. From the concluding sentence one might surmise that 
God's judgement is less mysterious for the editor than it was for Qoheleth. " 
(Wright, 1990: 495) 
One would have thought that Wright's mathematical analysis of Ecclesiastes 
would result in a closer consideration of how the epilogue fits into its literary 
structure. However, despite Wright's different understanding of the epilogue 
to Loader's, at this point both scholars have assumed a diachronic analysis 
of the development of the book and have failed to pursue New Criticism's 
circular intent at totality. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
As reactions to `positivism' Childs' canonical approach, NC and 
structuralism rightly alert us to the literary (and theological) dimensions of 
the OT texts, aspects which historical criticism tends to neglect. The 
applications of NC and structuralism to Ecclesiastes have been particularly 
fruitful in their foregrounding of the poetics of the text. Clearly if we are to 
advance in our understanding of Ecclesiastes then sustained attention will 
need to be given to the literary shape of Ecclesiastes. Childs' canonical 
approach is a reminder that the literary and the theological aspects of OT 
texts are inseparable; access to the message is gained via the literary shape 
of the text. Thus a hermeneutic is required which accounts for the historical, 
literary and theological aspects of the OT texts. 
In the context of his narrative poetics Sternberg has given sustained attention 
to the development of a hermeneutic which integrates the historical, 
theological and literary elements of texts. Fox has given sustained attention 
to the genre of Ecclesiastes along narrative lines. In the following chapter we 





NARRATIVE AND THE READING OF ECCLESIASTES 
I INTRODUCTION 
Biblical narratology is a relatively recent addition to the smorgasbord of 
biblical hermeneutical approaches, having emerged in the seventies and 
matured in the eighties. Gunn (1987: 65-68) traces its emergence from the 
growing awareness of the limitations of the historical critical method 
through canon criticism and NC (including Muilenberg's rhetorical criticism) 
to the narratology of Alter and Berlin. Exegetical narrative approaches to the 
OT are thus part of the reaction to historical criticism and part of the literary 
turn in biblical hermeneutics. Indeed, as we saw in chapter four, 
structuralism has devoted considerable energy to laying bare the depth 
structure of narrative. 
In this chapter our concern is with two scholars who articulate narrative 
approaches concerned more with surface analysis of narrative texts. 
Sternberg has developed a sophisticated poetics of biblical narrative in 
which he seeks to integrate the historical, ideological and aesthetic aspects of 
the text. Fox has argued for the application of a narrative approach to 
Ecclesiastes. We will begin by outlining Sternberg's poetics of biblical 
narrative and then examine Fox's argument for a narrative approach to 
Ecclesiastes. This focuses the question of the genre of Ecclesiastes, and the 
remainder of this chapter will be devoted to this issue. 
II STERNBERG'S POETICS OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVE 
In 1981 Alter (1981: 15) was able to write that "[o]ver the last few years, 
there has been growing interest in literary approaches among the younger 
generation of biblical scholars ... but, while useful explications of particular 
texts have begun to appear, there have been as yet no major works of 
criticism, and certainly no satisfying overview of the poetics of the Hebrew 
Bible. " Alter's The Art of Biblical Narrative is an overview but Sternberg's 
Poetics is the major work. Gunn, by no means a fan of Sternberg,, 
nevertheless comments when speaking about biblical narratology that 
I See Gunn, 1990: 53-64 where he critiques Sternberg for being ideological in an 'absolutist' sense. 
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"Sternberg's recent book on poetics moves such a narratology into a whole 
new dimension of discrimination and sophistication and will be fundamental 
to the emerging generation of narrative critics. " (Gunn, 1987: 68). 
The substance of Sternberg's theory of biblical narratology is found in the 
first three chapters of his Poetics. The remaining chapters flesh out this 
theory in exegetical examples. Since our main concern in this section is with 
the theory of biblical narratology and its relationship to Ecclesiastes - 
Sternberg does not deal with wisdom literature - our focus will be 
particularly upon chapters one to three. 
Sternberg (1985: 2) defines poetics as "the systematic working or study of 
literature as such. " It is important to Sternberg that biblical narrative is a 
work of literature so that in a poetics such as his, the discipline and its object 
come together. He stresses this in opposition to biblical scholars who see 
"literary approaches" to the Bible as the conscious imposition of alien 
categories upon the OT text. For Sternberg the authors of the biblical 
narratives have used narrative techniques to convey their message, and 
poetics is a study of these techniques. Consequently at the very outset of his 
Poetics he indicates his understanding of narrative as functional discourse 
and sees poetics as research into how this discourse functions2. Sternberg's 
(1985: 1) opening paragraph is a ringing affirmation of communication as the 
context within which narrative interpretation takes place. "Biblical narrative 
is oriented to an addressee and regulated by a purpose or set of purposes 
involving the addressee. Hence our primary business as readers is to make 
purposive sense of it". Recognition of the genre of the text alone is 
insufficient: "Unless firmly anchored in the relations between narrator and 
audience, therefore, formalism degenerates into a new mode of atomism. " 
(Sternberg, 1985: 2). 
Sternberg is critical of literary approaches to the Bible which view the text 
as autonomous. He detects the influence of NC in these approaches. NC was 
in reaction to the historicism of the historical critical method and this 
accounts for its being so anti-historical: "their dismissal of historicism makes 
an ideological rather than methodological reorientation: polemics may at 
best clear the ground but not substitute for a scholarly alternative. " 
2Sternberg's poetics represents in this sense a sort of textual realism far removed from the pluralism and 
indeterminacy of postmodernism. For a discussion of the latter see chapter six. 
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(Sternberg, 1985: 8) For Sternberg seeing narrative technique as part of the 
text itself means taking the historical construction of the text seriously if one 
is going to come to grips with the functional purpose of biblical narrative. 
Sternberg discusses Wimsatt and Beardsley's intentional fallacy and 
concludes that their attack focused not so much on authorial intention as on 
speculative reliance on external intention. We know virtually nothing about 
external intention as regards biblical authors so that our concern with 
authorial intention has to be focused on textual indicators, which Wimsatt 
and Beardsley were not against. This discernment of objectified or embodied 
intention Sternberg (1985: 9) regards as crucial: "such intention fulfils a 
crucial role, for communication presupposes a speaker who resorts to certain 
linguistic and structural tools in order to produce certain effects on the 
addressee; the discourse accordingly supplies a network of clues to the 
speaker's intention. " 
Taking authorial intention seriously means that source criticism and 
narratology should not be set against each other. This is especially so 
considering the gap in sociocultural context between our time and that of the 
origin of the biblical narratives. Of course we can never fully bridge this gap 
but this does not mean we cannot try. In fact this is the only alternative: 
"Once the choice turns out to lie between reconstructing the author's 
intention and licensing the reader's invention, there is no doubt where most 
of us stand. " (Sternberg, 1985: 10) The historicity of the text cannot be 
avoided; at the very least all scholars acknowledge that the language and its 
meaning require historical reconstruction. Of course the nature of the source 
criticism we engage in needs careful attention and Sternberg is very critical 
of much that has been called source criticism. There is an inevitable tension 
between source and discourse but Sternberg appeals for a closer partnership 
between the two; indeed he maintains that the two cannot but work together 
and neither has the primacy over the other. 
Frequently it is falsely assumed that the Bible as a religious text is in 
antithesis to the Bible as literature. For Sternberg this is a false antithesis. In 
the ancient world highly poetic and literary material was regularly highly 
ideological and attended to for instruction. "The question is how rather than 
whether the literary coexists with the social, the doctrinal, the 
philosophical. " (Sternberg, 1985: 35) Representation is never to be set 
against evaluation, although the extent to which these aspects dominate in 
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any piece of literature will vary. Only if the Bible were ideological in an 
extreme form of didactic would taking it seriously as literature be 
inadmissible. However, "if biblical narrative is didactic, then it has chosen 
the strangest way to go about its business. For the narrator breaks every law 
in the didacticist's decalogue. Anything like preaching from the narrative 
pulpit is conspicuous for its absence. " (Sternberg, 1985: 37,38) Narrative is 
the means whereby the Bible presents its message and the two, narrative 
technique and message are not to be set against each other. 
In this respect it is time we stopped seeing the techniques of narrative as 
literary techniques. Those in the literary field have often been in the 
forefront of examining these techniques but that does not mean that they are 
confined to literary texts where art may be high and content and message 
low. "What determines literariness is not the mere presence but the 
dominance of the poetic function, the control it exerts over all the rest. " 
(Sternberg, 1985: 40) Narrative techniques are as much the prerogative of the 
historical biblical narratives as of fictional texts, and the presence of these 
techniques must not be seen as compromising the texts ideological nature. 
So how does the aesthetic aspect relate to the ideological in biblical 
narrative? "Biblical narrative emerges as a complex, because 
multifunctional, discourse. Functionally speaking, it is regulated by a set of 
three principles: ideological, historiographic, and aesthetic. " (Sternberg, 
1985: 41) The ideological is particularly prominent in the law sections of the 
Pentateuch and in prophetic moralising for example. The historiographic is 
prominent in the names of places, people and etiologies. The aesthetic is in 
high profile in the narratives. The relation of these three principles is one of 
co-ordination and tense complementarity. Sternberg sums up the point at 
which the three merge as "the drama of reading. " "They join forces to 
originate a strategy of telling that casts reading as a drama, interpretation as 
an ordeal that enacts and distinguishes the human predicament. " (Sternberg, 
1985: 46) The ideological principle is seen in the foolproof aspect of the 
narratives; the aesthetic is seen in the exposition of biblical doctrine in a 
narrative which has built into it the cognitive antithesis between God and 
humanity. 
Sternberg (1985: 56,57) stresses the need not to impose a poetics upon the 
biblical narratives but to work so as to allow the biblical poetics to emerge: 
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"In practice as well as in methodology, the gravest danger to the literary 
approaches lurks in their imposition of models that do not fit the Bible, nor indeed 
... literature in general. ... In most of the theoretical work I have done, on narrative and other subjects, the Bible has proved a corrective to widely held doctrines 
about literary structure and analysis, often a pointer to the formation of 
alternatives. " 
Sternberg's work is in a class of its own and it will be in the centre of 
discussion of biblical narrative for a long time to come. No one who has read 
Sternberg can deny the validity of taking the biblical narratives seriously as 
narratives. A question which Sternberg does not address is the extent to 
which his poetics of biblical narrative would apply to biblical wisdom 
literature, and for our purposes, Ecclesiastes in particular. Fox has, however, 
recently suggested that Ecclesiastes has a narrative frame structure and that 
narrative analysis is the key to accessing its message. 
III FOX: FRAME-NARRATIVE IN QOHELETH 
Fox's (1972) doctorate is entitled The Book of Qoheleth and its Relation to 
the Wisdom School3. This early work contains none of Fox's subsequent 
theories about Ecclesiastes as narrative or about Qoheleth's methodology as 
empirical where wisdom's methodology was not. Indeed Fox (1972: i) argues 
that "[t]he book of Qoheleth is an attack on wisdom starting from wisdom 
premises and conducted by wisdom methods. " Wisdom's epistemology, 
according to Fox at this point, is empiricism, although it frequently 
abandoned its empiricism when it did not fit with the doctrines of wisdom. 
Qoheleth differs from traditional wisdom only in using empiricism more 
consistently. 
By 1977 Fox had begun to focus upon the literary shape of Ecclesiastes. He 
now maintains that Ecclesiastes is wisdom literature and narration. 
"It tells something that happened to someone. I would like to take some first steps 
in the investigation of the literary characteristics of Qoheleth as narrative: Who is 
speaking (the question of voice), how do the voices speak, and how do they relate 
to each other? I will argue that the Book of Qoheleth is to be taken as a whole, as a 
single, well-integrated composition, the product not of editorship but of 
authorship, which uses interplay of voice as a deliberate literary device for 
rhetorical and artistic purposes. " (Fox, 1977: 83) 
3Note that Fox's doctorate is written in modern Hebrew. These comments are dependent upon the extended 
abstract in English. 
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Fox argues that while modern scholarship correctly recognises more than 
one voice in Ecclesiastes, its presuppositions prevent the voice other than 
Qoheleth's from being listened to carefully. This other voice is the one we 
hear speaking in 1: 2,7: 27 and 12: 8 for example. This third person voice is 
not that of Qoheleth, as is made particularly clear by the way the voices 
interact in 7: 27. It is unlikely, according to Fox (1977: 84), that Qoheleth 
would speak of himself in the third person in the midst of a first person 
sentence, while a writer quoting someone else can put a verbum dicendi 
wherever he wishes within the quotation. 
But if it is not Qoheleth, who is this other voice? Generally scholars speak of 
an editor/editors. But, says Fox, what signs are there of editing in 
Ecclesiastes? Fox suggests that the notion of editorship needs closer 
examination. The other voice could be that of a passive editor who receives a 
finished book and only adds glosses. Barton (1912) is an example of this 
view. However 1: 2 (the addition of a title), 7: 27 and the epilogue make this 
impossible; whoever is responsible for these `insertions' is far more active 
than a mere phrase inserter. Neither could the other voice be that of an 
editor-rearranger as Loretz suggests. The way the voice appears in 1: 2,12: 8 
and especially 7: 27 betrays activity at the level of sentence formation. Fox 
wonders by what criteria one could distinguish editorial rearrangement of a 
previously completed book. Loretz uses the criterion of logical order but, as 
Fox demonstrates illogical order is not evidence for editorship and in the 
absence of a strong structure it is difficult to say what violates original 
structure. 
A third possibility is that the other voice is that of the editor as compiler and 
arranger, as Ellermeier proposes. Ellermeier alone has investigated precisely 
what this editor did and concludes that Ecclesiastes was compiled by a 
redactor (QohRi) who wrote 1: 1a; 1: 2-3; 12: 8,9-12. Qohiti had before him 56 
small independent meshalim which he joined on the basis of "thematische 
Begriffe" and "Stichwörter". A second editor QohR2 was responsible for 
12: 13ff and some glossing. Fox (1977: 88-90) finds Ellermeier's view 
wanting on three accounts. Firstly it is not at all clear whether we can 
distinguish originally independent units. Secondly it is often not clear 
whether Ellermeier's `Begriffe' and `Stichwörte' join or are internal to units. 
Thirdly to the extent that there are connections how does one know that 
these are editorial rather than from the author. "While I agree with 
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Ellermeier that in 1: 2 and elsewhere we can hear another voice speaking 
besides Qoheleth's, I see no evidence that that voice belongs to an editor 
who arranged numerous units he received from Qoheleth. " (Fox, 1977: 89) 
Fourthly, Qoheleth's words are presented to us as the single search by one 
man. The language of search and observation are found throughout the book 
and "provide a matrix that unites the disparate observations that Qoheleth 
reports. " (Fox, 1977: 90) 
How then should we understand this other voice speaking in the third person 
about Qoheleth in 1: 2; 7: 27; 12: 8 and in the epilogue? 
"Here we should not ask what Qoheleth or an editor could have written, but rather 
- what are the literary implications of the words? What are we meant to hear in the 
third-person sections? ... I believe the questions raised can best be answered by the following understanding of that voice and its relation to Qoheleth. That certain 
words are in a different voice does not mean that they are by a different hand. ... I suggest that all of 1: 2-12: 14 is by the same hand4 - not that the epilogue is by Qoheleth, but that Qoheleth is `by' the epilogist. In other words, the speaker we 
hear from time to time in the background saying 'Qoheleth said' ... this speaker is the teller of the tale, the external narrator of the story of Qoheleth. That is to say, 
the epic situation of the third-person voice in the epilogue and elsewhere is that of 
a man looking back and telling his son the story of the ancient wise-man 
Qoheleth, passing on to him words he knew Qoheleth to have said, appreciatively 
but cautiously evaluating his work in retrospect. Virtually all the `story' he tells is 
a quotation of the words of the wise-man he is telling about. The speaker, whom I 
will call the frame-narrator, keeps himself well in the background, but he does 
not make himself disappear. He presents himself not as the creator of Qoheleth's 
words but as their transmitter. " (Fox, 1977: 90,91) 
Fox thus understands Ecclesiastes as operating on three levels: the first is 
that of the frame-narrator who tells about the second (2a), Qoheleth-the- 
reporter, the narrating "I", who looks back from old age and speaks about 
the third level (2b), Qoheleth-the-seeker, the younger Qoheleth who made 
the investigation in 1: 12ff. Level one is a different person from levels two 
and three; levels two and three are different perspectives of the same person. 
Fox's approach leads him to explore in detail the meaning of the epilogue in 
terms of its relationship to the main body of Ecclesiastes (Fox, 1977: 96- 
106). The didactic tone of the father-son instruction situation would have 
been easily recognised by the early readers of Ecclesiastes. In this way the 
epilogist identifies himself as a wisdom teacher. The frame narrator's first 
4To an extent Fox (1972) had already recognised this in his doctoral thesis. On p xii he argues that the 
editor and Qoheleth are the same person. 
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function in the epilogue is to testify to the reality of Qoheleth so that we 
react to him as having lived. 
"The reader's acceptance of the reality of literary figures is important to certain 
authors even when writing the most outlandish tales. ... What the author seeks is 
not necessarily genuine belief in the character's existence (though that may be the 
intention in the case of Qoheleth) but suspension of disbelief for the purposes of 
the fiction.... The epilogist of Qoheleth succeeded in convincing many readers 
that he had an intimate familiarity with Qoheleth, and it is clear that this is one of 
the epilogue's purposes. " (Fox, 1977: 18) 
The second function of the frame-narrator in the epilogue is to convey a 
certain stance towards Qoheleth and his teaching. Qoheleth is acknowledged 
as a wise man and his goals are praised but the frame-narrator is subtly non- 
committal about the truth of Qoheleth's words. In v10 Qoheleth is said to 
have sought fine words and truth but it is not said that he succeeded. This 
caution becomes more pronounced in v12 with the warning against 
excessive writing and speaking, the very activities Qoheleth is engaged in. 
Fox takes the comparison of the words of the wise with goads/nails to 
indicate not positive stability but their dangerous nature; they both prick and 
hurt. And of course the dogmatic certitude with which the overall duty of 
humans is stated contrasts with Qoheleth's insistence on the uncertainty of 
everything. In a sense the epilogue can be seen as a call to allow expression 
of unorthodox opinion as long as the right conclusion is arrived at. But, 
"it is not only in offering a proper conclusion that the frame-narrative makes the 
book more easily tolerated. The use of a frame-narrative in itself puts a certain 
protective distance between the author and the views expressed in his work. This 
distance may be important even when the author is anonymous, because it may 
prevent the book as a whole from being violently rejected. The author blunts 
objections to the book as a whole by implying through use of a frame-narrator that 
he is just reporting what Qoheleth said, without actually rejecting the latter's 
ideas. " (Fox, 1977: 103) 
Finally, Fox (1977: 104) considers the relationship between the frame- 
narrator and the implied author, "the voice behind the voices". In a footnote 
Fox refers, in this respect, to the work of Wayne Booth, who has argued that 
every work of literature has an implied author which "includes, in short, the 
intuitive apprehension of a completed artistic whole; the chief value to 
which this implied author is committed, regardless of what party his creator 
belongs to in real life, is that which is expressed by the total form. " (Booth, 
1983: 73) This is important because the view of the frame-narrator may not 
be the same as the implied author, particularly in a book like Ecclesiastes 
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where the conventional view of the frame-narrator does not cancel out 
Qoheleth's scepticism unless the reader allows it to. In fact, by ending such 
an unorthodox book with an orthodox epilogue, the author creates an 
ambiguity which gives the reader freedom to choose which position she will 
align herself with. 
Fox's understanding of the frame-narrator - implied author relationship is 
questionable. However he has certainly demonstrated the value of a literary 
approach to Ecclesiastes, and in my opinion, raised one of the most 
important questions in the interpretation of Ecclesiastes, namely how, in a 
final form approach, one understands the epilogue to relate to the main body 
of the text. Fox is the only recent commentator on Ecclesiastes who has 
focused intensively on this problem. But how does his kind of literary 
analysis relate to typical, historical studies of the genre of Ecclesiastes? This 
is the question that will occupy us in the following section, before we go on 
to evaluate in detail Fox's reading of the epilogue in the context of his 
narrative approach to Ecclesiastes. 
IV THE GENRE OF ECCLESIASTES 
The conjunction of autobiography and fiction in actual writing practice is still apt 
to be felt as something of a scandal. (Jefferson, 1990: 108) 
Part of the problem with Ecclesiastes is that there is no consensus about its 
genre. Scholars are, for example, disagreed about how unified a book 
Ecclesiastes is. Galling (1969: 76) represents one extreme (see chapter three), 
Lohfink (1990: 628) another. He acknowledges that "I consciously go against 
current majority opinion that the book of Qoheleth is no more than a loose 
agglomeration of single proverbs, sentences, and `mashals'.... In my opinion 
the book of Qoheleth is a very organised text. " Fox, as we have seen, has 
argued that Ecclesiastes is best approached as narrative, wisdom literature; 
an approach which also sees a stronger unity in the book. 
Emic analysis of genre in a comparative sense might be expected to produce 
a stronger consensus, but here again there has been considerable 
disagreement. Von Rad (1972: 226) considered Ecclesiastes a royal 
testament. Braun (1973: 36) argues that it has the genre of a Hellenistic 
diatribe and more recently Lohfink (1993: 10,14) suggests that the genre is 
that of a "Zugleich von Diatribe und Palindromie; ein Buch aus dem Bereich 
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der Bildungsarbeit. " Longman (1990) maintains that Ecclesiastes is fictional 
royal autobiography. Not surprisingly Murphy (1992a: xxxi) maintains that 
there is no satisfactory solution to the problem of the literary form of 
Ecclesiastes. However, in my opinion, comparative genre analysis may 
provide more insight than the above differences suggest, if, as we will argue 
below, it works with literary analysis of the text. 
The more valuable genre analyses have come from comparisons with ANE 
texts5, one of the most recent of which is that by Perdue (1994b: 194-205). 
We will use his thorough analysis as an entry point into the detailed 
discussion of the genre of Ecclesiastes. Perdue points out that scholars 
usually place Qoheleth in one of two form critical categories; either it is a 
sayings collection, or a first person narrative. Compared with Proverbs, Ben 
Sira and Pirke Aboth Ecclesiastes does look like a sayings collection, 
according to Perdue, with a loose rhetorical structure. However, first person 
narration is Ecclesiastes' most distinguishing characteristic among the 
Israelite and Jewish wisdom corpus. Thus Perdue explores the following 
ANE forms which are all characterised by first person usage, in order to 
determine the genre of Ecclesiastes. 
i. Righteous Sufferer poems: These are modelled on the style of the 
individual lament in which a righteous sufferer narrates his trials and 
calamities, including his questioning of traditional wisdom and cultus. 
Finally he is redeemed by his personal god. The Sumerian "Man and his 
God" (ANET 589-5916) and the Akkadian "I will praise the Lord of 
Wisdom" (ANET 596-600) fit into this category. For Perdue these poems 
differ from Qoheleth in that he experiences a radical gulf between God and 
the world, a gulf which they do not manifest. 
ii. The Dialogue of Pessimism (ANET 600-601) 
Qoheleth has in common the use of the first person voice and structures that 
support opposite decisions. However Qoheleth never advocates suicide. 
In Perdue's opinion the smell of death surrounds Qoheleth, and he suggests 
that the following three categories of Egyptian literature which are all set in 
5It is unlikely that Ecclesiastes is modelled directly on the Greek diatribe as Lohfink suggests, since it lacks 
its strong dialogical character with opponents who are clearly identified. 
6The numbers following ANET are the relevant page numbers in Pritchard (1969). 
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situations involving death provide the closest form-critical parallels to 
Qoheleth. 
iii. The Songs of the Harper 
Egyptian banquet songs were sometimes used in funerary contexts. Although 
in a funerary context they tended not to question the afterlife and not to 
emphasise the present, as did their secular counterparts, "A Song of the 
Harper" (ANET 467) represents an intriguing difference. Composed at a 
time of social and political disintegration, this song is sceptical about the 
afterlife and encourages the reader to: 
"Fulfil thy needs upon earth, after the command of thy heart, 
Until there come for thee that day of mourning. " 
In common with Qoheleth this song shares the context of death, first person 
narration and scepticism about the future life, as well as celebration of 
present life. 
iv. Grave biographies 
These were placed in the mouth of the deceased; they are first person 
posthumous speeches addressed to tomb visitors, and contain an 
autobiographical narrative, ethical maxims and instructions to visitors7. In 
the later inscriptions the gods act without the constraint of retributive justice; 
this pessimistic element reveals a remarkable parallel with Qoheleth, 
according to Perdue, as does the fictional narrator's voice, the above literary 
features and the pervasive autobiographical style. 
v. Royal instructions (ANET 412-414; 421-425) 
The longer form of Egyptian royal instruction inserts an introductory 
narrative between the title and admonitions. In this way the biography 
provides the occasion for the instruction. Within the OT royal instructions 
are found in 1 Kings 12: 1-12 and Proverbs 31: 1-9. The longer form of royal 
instruction parallels Qoheleth in terms of the royal voice of the narrator, the 
list of royal achievements and the giving of instruction. 
Perdue (1994: 202) concludes that "the book of Qoheleth is best seen as the 
fictional testament of Israel's most famous king, who is presented as 
7See Perdue (1994b: 365) for bibliographical details. 
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speaking to his audience either in his old age, shortly before death, or 
perhaps from the tomb. " "In Qoheleth we have the fiction of Israel's greatest 
and wisest king, presumably the one best able to master life and to know by 
wisdom the meaning of existence, undertaking the quest to determine the 
`good' in human living. " (Perdue, 1994: 205) In Perdue's view Ecclesiastes 
is thus imaginative wisdom literature with a narrative structure in a form that 
is close to that of grave biographies and royal testaments - Qoheleth is 
presented as a dead person who undertakes to instruct from the tomb! 
The fictional autobiographical nature of Ecclesiastes has also been argued 
for recently by Tremper Longman (1991), but by means of a comparison 
with Akkadian fictional autobiography8. Longman argues persuasively that 
there is a genre of Akkadian literature which is fictional autobiography. He 
discerns three sub-groups within this genre; fictional autobiography with a 
blessing and/or curse ending, fictional autobiography with a didactic ending 
and fictional autobiography with a prophetic ending. As regards the 
comparison with Ecclesiastes, Longman (1991: 120) maintains that "[w]hat 
has not been examined before, however, is the close similarity that exists 
between Qoheleth and the Akkadian genre of autobiography, particularly 
fictional autobiography with a didactic ending. " 
Longman argues that 1: 1-11 and 12: 9-14 are the frame of Ecclesiastes which 
were provided by a second wisdom figure who is using Qoheleth's sayings 
to instruct his son. If one removes these, Ecclesiastes may be divided into 
three sections: 
1: 12-18 a first person introduction 
2: 1-6: 9 an extended first person narrative in which Qoheleth 
describes his search for meaning in life 
6: 10-12: 8 first person instruction from Qoheleth 
Analysed in this way, Ecclesiastes exhibits the same three-fold structure as 
the Akkadian Cuthaean legend, the best preserved Akkadian didactic 
autobiography. There is also a similarity at the level of form. Qoheleth 
shares the forms of royal fiction and self-discourse with the Cuthaean 
8Longman's book is a development of his 1984 article. Surprisingly Perdue (1994b) does not mention 
Longman, and he does not consider the genre similarities between Ecclesiastes and Akkadian fictional 
autobiography. Longman (1991: 118ff) notes the similarity between Akkadian fictional autobiography with 
a didactic ending and Egyptian Instruction texts, but does not suggest a comparison with the Songs of the 
Harper or with Egyptian Grave Biographies. 
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legend. Longman concludes that Ecclesiastes has an obvious Akkadian 
background in terms of genre. "Thus the literary structure and the use of 
royal fiction and self-discourse in the book of Qoheleth and in the Cuthaean 
Legend demonstrate a generic relationship between the two. " (Longman, 
1991: 122) 
Longman is well aware that this analysis of Ecclesiastes does not provide a 
detailed analysis of the structure of Ecclesiastes. Without elaborating on it he 
argues that the frame is a crucial part of the book since it provides a 
hermeneutical guide by instructing the reader how to understand the text. 
Longman (1991: 121,122) also suggests that understanding Ecclesiastes as 
autobiography may help to explain its `contradictions': "Perhaps ... if there is 
a development within the structure of Qoheleth, it is that of a temporal 
thought progression. In other words, the book traces Qoheleth's thoughts on 
subjects at different periods in his life. The so-called `contradictions' in the 
book may thus be explained as being different conclusions reached at 
different times in his life. " 
Longman's and Perdue's analyses of the genre of Ecclesiastes are 
stimulating and helpful in confirming the autobiographical and didactic 
wisdom nature of Ecclesiastes. Some questions about the detailed 
comparisons remain. As is widely acknowledged, for example, the royal 
fiction in Ecclesiastes is soon dropped and this militates to some extent 
against it being a royal instruction or the testament of Israel's most famous 
king9. The similarity to grave biographies is also dependent upon Perdue's 
pessimistic reading of Ecclesiastes, something which is far from firmly 
established. As will become apparent in chapter seven, this is not our reading 
of Ecclesiastes. Furthermore Ecclesiastes may be closer to righteous sufferer 
poems than Perdue suggests depending upon how one understands the total 
message of the booklo. However Qoheleth does not speak of his own 
9Murphy (1992a: xxxi) says that the proposal of royal testament for the genre of Ecclesiastes is 
unacceptable because the king fiction disappears after chapter two. See Perdue, 1994b: 201,202 for an 
attempt to defend the royal fiction of Ecclesiastes. Longman refers to all Akkadian autobiography as royal. 
He acknowledges that while the royal fiction is adopted throughout the Cuthaean legend, some think it is 
only present in part of Ecclesiastes. According to Longman (1991: 122), "This question is not important to 
adjudicate; it is clear that royal fiction is employed in both Qoheleth and the Cuthaean Legend. " However, 
if the author adopts the fiction and then drops it, this deviation from the form may be significant since the 
norms of a genre provide a basis for conformity and divergence. As a heading to the entire book 1: 1 does 
however confirm the royal fiction. 
1OPerdue's main reason for distinguishing Ecclesiastes from righteous sufferer poems is that in the latter the 
sufferer is rescued by his personal god, whereas Qoheleth experiences a great gulf between god and the 
world. In my view the difference is more at the level of the type of problem the sufferer is experiencing 
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suffering but of his observations and this brings a more philosophical, 
perhaps Hellenistic element into his discussion which none of the proposed 
parallels accounts for. Longman (1991: 199) points out that all the Akkadian 
fictional autobiographies are written in prose, and he regards this as an 
important element of their genre. Very few Akkadian texts were written in 
prose and fictional autobiography takes this characteristic from non-fictional 
autobiography which used prose rather than poetry as a means of stressing 
its authenticity. What Longman does not comment on is the fact that 
Ecclesiastes is highly poetic, although admittedly scholars are still not 
agreed as to whether its style is that of poetry or prose (Cf. Murphy, 1992a: 
xxviii, xxix). 
Isakkson's (1987) "Studies in the Language of Qoheleth" confirms the 
autobiographical and reflective nature of Ecclesiastes. Isakkson argues that 
the autobiographical feature of Ecclesiastes is one of its central 
characteristics. Syntactically this trait is manifested through a chain of Suffix 
Conjugation forms in the first person singular, sometimes preceded by waw. 
Waw + Prefix Conjugation forms of the verb are very infrequent in 
Ecclesiastes. 
"My conclusion is that the choice of conjunctive SC and wSC forms in the 
autobiographical thread is due to the special kind of narrative that constitutes this 
thread. The narrative of the thread is of the resume type, in which, with the words 
of F. Rundgren `the events are not given according to the historical process of the 
(usual) narrative, but are picked out as important single events and then 
juxtaposed'. There are many examples of this kind of resume narration from all 
genres of the Old Testament, which means that this special feature of the book is 
not a valid proof of lateness. ... The infrequent usage of waPC forms is noted.... My conclusion is that the low frequency of this verbal usage is a matter of literary 
genre: the philosophical approach of the book and the absence of straightforward 
historical narration. " (Isakkson, 1987: 190) 
Thus the comparison of the form of Ecclesiastes with that of AND 1 texts 
helpfully focuses its autobiographical and instructional nature, but do Perdue 
and Longman successfully explain how Ecclesiastes as a whole fits 
together? As we saw in chapter 3a crucial test in this respect is explaining 
how the epilogue relates to the rest of the book. For Longman the form of 
the material within the frame of Ecclesiastes is that of a fictional 
rather than the view of God. But see Fisch (1988: 158,159) who distinguishes the subjective, personal `Tof 
the Psalms from the autobiographical "I" in Qoheleth. 
I lWhat we have not explored here in detail are comparisons with Greek genres. Lohfink (1993: 10) argues 
that the form of this Lehrbuch results from the confluence of two forms; Greek philosophical diatribe and 
Hebrew chiasm. For a brief evaluation of Lohfink's view of a close relationship between Ecclesiastes and 
Hellenistic thought see Murphy, 1992: xliii - xlv. 
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autobiography. In his 1984 article, Longman argues that the frame provides 
an orthodox warning against the sceptical pessimism of Qoheleth. Qoheleth 
is throughout pessimistic; the carpe diem passages represent resignation and 
not hope. Qoheleth is a sceptic because he has not allowed God to enter into 
his thinking. In his 1991 text Longman does not explain how he understands 
the frame as providing a hermeneutical guide to Ecclesiastes, but the 
introduction to Ecclesiastes in Dillard and Longman (1994: 247-253) makes 
it clear that Longman still upholds his 1984 view. `He' quotes Fox's 
translation12 of 12: 10-12 with approval; it fits with Longman's view that the 
narrator distances himself strongly from the pessimistic Qoheleth. 
"Qoheleth's speech (1: 12-12: 7) is a foil, a teaching device, used by the 
second wise man in order to instruct his son (vs. 12) concerning the dangers 
of speculative, doubting wisdom in Israel. " (Dillard and Longman, 
1994: 254) 
Perdue (1994b) recognises the need to analyse the literary structure of 
Ecclesiastes in terms of narrator etc., but he ends up with an uneven mixture 
of a source-critical and narrative analysis. Nowhere is this more evident than 
on p237 where he mentions in one paragraph that 12: 9-14 consists of three 
parts attached by an editor, and then goes on in the next paragraph to say 
that, "The narrator then turns to his or her own understanding ... " This type 
of diachronic analysis cannot simply be juxtaposed with a narrative, 
synchronic reading in this way! 
A weakness of both Longman and Perdue's comparative approaches is thus 
that neither explains in any detailed or satisfactory way how the epilogue 
relates to the rest of the book13. Indeed their comparative approach rests on a 
diachronic analysis of Ecclesiastes, which identifies the first person narration 
as the main element in Ecclesiastes. Perdue, for example, argues that first 
person narration is Ecclesiastes' most distinguishing characteristic, and he 
then looks for parallels to this among ANE literature. For Longman as well 
self-discourse is utterly central to the parallel with Akkadian autobiography. 
12See below. 
13Longman (and Dillard, 1994) has most recently seconded Fox in support of his view as explained above. 
His frame, however, includes 1: 1-11 and he would need, even if one accepted Fox's translation of the 
epilogue, to explain how the opening poem is part of the orthodox hermeneutical guide that Longman takes 
it to be. It seems to me that Longman's approach fails in terms of that circular intent at totality of NC. The 
parallel to Akkadian autobiography is not strong enough to warrant taking 1: 12-12: 7 as an enclosed, unified 
section. The carpe diem sayings should not just be read as representative of resignation. And, as I will 
argue below, Fox's interpretation of the epilogue is not convincing. Which all points towards the limits of 
the comparative approach; the nature of Ecclesiastes has to be argued primarily from the text itself. 
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Thus for both Longman and Perdue comparative genre analysis is done after 
diachronic analysis of Ecclesiastes in which the first person narration is 
identified as the main characteristic of the book. Diachronic analysis can 
thus be said to shape their comparative analysis. 
One suspects that these underlying diachronic assumptions are an 
unconscious legacy of historical critical interpretation of Ecclesiastes which 
ensures that the conjunction of fiction and autobiography in Ecclesiastes 
remain a scandal for many OT scholars14. Diachronic analysis of 
Ecclesiastes often works on the historical assumption that "[e]ven though in 
the first part of the book he [Qoheleth] uses the device of pretending to be 
King Solomon ... there is no doubt that throughout the book this `I' is a real 
and not a fictitious `I'. " (Whybray, 1980: 6) In the light of this assumption 
every effort is often made to locate the historical Qoheleth and the text is 
interpreted on this basis. OT scholars have become increasingly sceptical 
about source critical analyses of Qoheleth, but the method of finding the real 
Qoheleth and then reading the book on this basis remains in place and 
shapes comparative genre analysis. 
I am not suggesting that Perdue or Longman would necessarily argue that 
the "I" of Ecclesiastes is historical in the sense that Whybray does. Indeed, 
the comparison of Ecclesiastes with fictional autobiography confirms what 
literary studies of autobiography alert us to; the `I' of autobiography can be 
very elusive15. Perdue's and Longman's analyses indicate that the "I" of 
Ecclesiastes is fictional. But what they fail to pursue are the implications of 
the "I" being fictional, for the presentation of a fictional Qoheleth in the 
context of a frame narrative raises in an acute way the question of the 
relationship between the first person narration and the frame narrator. As 
Fox has argued, Ecclesiastes 7: 27 in particular indicates that the frame 
cannot just be regarded as a frame put on a complete first person narration. 
The evidence points to deliberate shaping. 
There is an important methodological issue at stake here. Comparative genre 
analysis must be based upon analyses of texts that are, initially at least, 
performed independently of studies of comparative genre16. The 
14Note the quote from Jefferson at the outset of this section. 
15For contemporary studies of autobiography see Marcus, 1994. 
16A similar example of the importance of correct methodology is that of the comparison between 
Deuteronomy and ANE treaties. See Bartholomew, 1992: 203-220. 
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hermeneutical spiral operates here as well, but the effort has to be made to 
compare Ecclesiastes with other genres without reading comparative genres 
into Ecclesiastes at the outset, as part of that continual move between source 
and discourse that Sternberg describes so well'7. That Perdue and Longman 
are in danger of privileging diachronic at the expense of synchronic analysis 
become apparent when one examines Fox's proposals for ANE texts with a 
similar genre to Ecclesiastes. 
Fox (1977: 83-92) begins with a literary analysis of Ecclesiastes as `frame- 
narrative' and then looks for ANE texts comparable to "[t]he use of an 
anonymous third-person retrospective frame-narrative encompassing a first 
person narrative or monologue". Fox finds examples of this style particularly 
in Egypt but also in Israel. It occurs in various genres, including wisdom 
literature. Fox (1977: 92-96; 1989: 312-315) lists the following examples 18. 
i. The Instruction for Kagemeni. 
Only the final portion of this text is preserved but the overall design is clear. 
In the body of the text the old vizier who is the father of Kagemeni instructs 
his children and records his instruction. The epilogue speaks about the vizier 
in retrospect and explains how his son benefited from his instruction and 
became vizier himself. The narrative frame which surrounds and presents the 
instruction of the old vizier looks back on the life of the old vizier and 
evaluates his work. 
ii. The Prophecy of Neferti. 
Although written in the reign of Amenemhet I in the twelfth dynasty, this 
text begins with a frame-narrative presenting itself in the reign of Snefru in 
the fourth dynasty looking back on the life of the ancient sage Neferti, whose 
words are respectfully introduced. The work is fictional, presenting a 
prophecy ex eventu of the triumph of Amenemhet I. 
iii. The Complaint of Ipuwer. 
The introduction has been lost but, according to Fox, it must have explained 
the setting that is implied in the ending of the work, i. e. how Ipuwer was 
called to address the king. The body of the work consists of Ipuwer's lament 
17See chapter seven, III, 3. 
18Fox's 1989 list is longer than the 1977 one. The former adds Duachety, Shuruppak and Ahiqar. These 
additions do not add much to the overall argument and we have ommitted them from our consideration of 
Fox's examples. 
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about the breakdown of the social order. His "I" occurs only occasionally. 
Thus the speech of Ipuwer, which forms the body of the text, is presented 
within a framework by an anonymous narrator who looks back on the sage, 
quoting and evaluating him. 
iv. Onchsheshongy. 
Onchsheshonqy consists of an anonymous frame-narrator relating the story 
of Onchsheshonqy. It opens by explaining how he came to write his 
Instruction on ostraca while in prison. The body of the book consists of a 
long quotation of Onchsheshonqy's words. It is uncertain whether 
Onchsheshonqy ever existed. Fox says that the introductory story is probably 
fictional and notes that the Instruction contains references to the introduction 
and is probably contemporaneous with it. 
v. Deuteronomy. 
Fox argues that in its present state, but excluding the additions in 4: 41-43, 
32: 48-52,34: 1-12, Deuteronomy is a first-person monologue by Moses set 
in a third-person framework. Thus we have a narrator telling about Moses, 
looking back on him while remaining in the background. In a footnote Fox 
(1977: 93) acknowledges that Haran suggested the parallel between 
Ecclesiastes and Deuteronomy to him, arguing that the narrative form might 
be another'9 sign of wisdom influence upon Deuteronomy. 
vi. Tobit. 
According to Fox the title and brief identification are not part of the frame 
narrative. Immediately after this Tobit begins speaking in a reflective 
manner similar to Qoheleth. The book as a whole is a third-person narrative, 
as, for example, 3: 7ff indicate, in which the author speaks about Tobit. The 
essential narrative design is the same as Qoheleth. Fox notes with interest 
that the first person speaker in Tobit can appear immediately after the title 
without an introduction by the frame-narrator, contrary to the expectations of 
modem readers who would anticipate that the frame-narrator would be more 
prominent at the outset. Fox (1977: 94) finds this a helpful parallel to 
Ecclesiastes: "The frame-narrator's voice in Qoheleth as in Tobit is scarcely 
heard at the beginning of the work - only `Qoheleth said' in 1: 2. The author 
19Weinfeld (1992: 244ff) discusses the relationship between deuteronomic literature and wisdom literature 
at length. 
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allows the first-person speaker to introduce himself in order to establish him 
immediately as the focal point. " 
vii. Uncle Remus20. 
Fox also employs an analogy from modem literature to help elucidate the 
function of the narrative framework. He notes the difference between 
Qoheleth and `Uncle Remus' and explains that he is concerned only to 
compare the rhetorical function of the narrative framework as a literary 
technique. Fox does however note that models from far afield can be helpful 
in drawing our attention to phenomena we might be unaware of and in 
helping us to break out of unjustified assumptions that arise from working 
with a restricted body of texts. 
Like Qoheleth, Uncle Remus' words are surrounded by a frame narrative. 
The words "said Uncle Remus", interrupting a first-person sentence, are 
equivalent to r *711D MIMM in Ecclesiastes 7: 27. As with Ecclesiastes the 
frame-narrator presents himself not as the creator of the story but merely as 
the transmitter, "a relatively passive agent between their creator (Uncle 
Remus) and the reader. " (Fox, 1977: 95) The narrator stays well in the 
background, and indeed the author Harris once referred to this narrator as a 
"dull reporter. " Fox (1977: 95) notes that the narrator is not to be identified 
with the author himself; "Harris was far more than simply a collector and 
transmitter of Negro folklore. He utilised old slave tales but altered and 
polished and sharpened them until the products were far from pure folk tales. 
He once showed a friend sixteen introductions he had written for a single 
story. " 
Why does Harris employ a frame-narrator? According to Fox this is in order 
to cause the reader to treat Uncle Remus seriously - without the frame it 
would be too easy to laugh him off - and to create some distance from Uncle 
Remus. The frame-narrator embodies an attitude of respect at a distance to 
Uncle Remus. The frame-narrative also attests to the reality of Uncle Remus, 
thus calling for a suspension of disbelief in the reader since he is a fictional 
character. "In other words, a bizarre character, one whose voice we are not 
used to encountering in literature, needs a plausible, normal voice to mediate 
20A series of novels by Joel Chandler Harris. Fox (1977: 94) argues that the various volumes really form a 
single work. 
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him to us and to show us how to relate to him. Qoheleth too receives this 
type of mediation from his frame-narrator. " (Fox, 1977: 96) 
Remarkably there is no overlap between the ANE texts that Fox invokes and 
those that Perdue and Longman call upon. This powerfully indicates the 
extent to which one's initial decisions about Ecclesiastes shape comparative 
investigations of the genre. What are we to make of these different 
approaches? If one was forced to choose between them then Fox's approach 
would be preferable because it seeks to do justice to the genre of 
Ecclesiastes as a whole. However, I suggest that in accordance with their 
starting points Fox and Perdue-Longman recognise real but partial aspects of 
Ecclesiastes, aspects which in my view need not be antithetical. Perdue and 
Longman are alert to the royal fiction, the dominant first person narrative 
and Perdue is sensitive to the pessimism and ethos of death that surrounds 
Qoheleth. And indeed the fictional testament or royal autobiography closely 
parallels these. Fox is above all concerned with the frame-narrative aspect of 
Ecclesiastes and he correctly finds that this is a style that extends across 
particular genres. Fox's comparisons do not however account for the royal 
fiction and the scepticism in Ecclesiastes. For example, not one of the main 
characters in his examples is the king. 
In my view Fox, Longman and Perdue pick up correctly on different aspects 
of Ecclesiastes: 
first person narration is a dominant characteristic 
there is a royal fiction and 1: 1 relates that to the entire book 
there is a pessimistic element in Ecclesiastes 
death is a dominant feature of Ecclesiastes 
frame-narrative is integral to the book and cannot simply be read as a late 
addition to a complete text 
Any understanding of the genre of Ecclesiastes must do justice to all these 
features. My suggestion is that we have in Ecclesiastes a developed wisdom 
form of the royal testament or fictional autobiography cast in a frame 
narrative. The explosive material in Qoheleth requires careful presentation, 
and the frame-narrative technique which was common in the ANE would 
lend itself to such caution and is developed accordingly in Ecclesiastes. 
Contra Longman and Perdue, however, the fictional autobiographical aspect 
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of Ecclesiastes undermines diachronic analysis which quickly isolates the 
first person narrative as the `real Qoheleth. ' The recognition of this 
fictionality should have led Longman and Perdue to see that the way in 
which Qoheleth is presented and the relevance of the framework to this are 
integral parts of interpreting Ecclesiastes. 
Fox is thus right that it is the literary implications of the third person 
sections, i. e. of the `editing' in Ecclesiastes that should be focused upon in 
our interpretation of the book. Further development of our understanding of 
Ecclesiastes requires that we move beyond comparative genre analysis, but 
certainly not without the important insights it has brought, to the sort of 
narrative literary analysis pursued by Fox21, as Longman recognises. 
Comparative genre analysis helpfully alerts us to many of the characteristics 
of Ecclesiastes, but these must lead us to deepened close analysis of the text 
itself. This enables the whole text of Ecclesiastes to be taken seriously, and 
the voice of Qoheleth to be treated as one voice in the text, and not 
necessarily that of the implied author. In the following section we will 
examine Fox's literary approach in more detail, especially as it relates to the 
epilogue. 
V FOX'S READING OF THE EPILOGUE 
The implication of Fox's approach is that we ought to read Ecclesiastes as a 
narrative unity. The way to discover the message/theology of Ecclesiastes 
then, is decidedly not by reconstructing original versions of the text but by 
inquiring after the implied author of Ecclesiastes. In other words the way to 
arrive at the message of Ecclesiastes is by exploring the following 
diagrammatically expressed relationships in Ecclesiastes. (E = Ecclesiastes. ) 
21Note that while I am using narrative theory to develop a methodology for discerning the message of 
Ecclesiastes, I am aware that Ecclesiastes' genre is composite in the sense that it is not 'pure' narrative. 
The autobiographical and wisdom elements are also important parts of the total genre. Autobiography has 
however a strong narrative element to it and it does seem to me that a narrative structure constitutes 
Ecclesiastes, so that a narrative approach provides a useful way into the text. 
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According to this approach the way to discover the message of Ecclesiastes 
is to inquire after the Implied Author (IA). One inquires after the IA by 
firstly exploring the characters in the text and their interrelationship; namely 
the narrator and Qoheleth. Qoheleth himself is represented in a number of 
ways; as king in Jerusalem (the Solomonic fiction), as a younger man and as 
the older man who reflects upon all that he has experienced. The 
relationships between these different representations also need to be 
explored22. Secondly, to discern the message of the text it is important to 
also ask how the implied author relates to the narrator and to Qoheleth. 
Sternberg (1985: 74,75) maintains that in biblical narrative the implied author 
and the narrator are the same. Fox and Lohfink23 suggest that in Ecclesiastes 
they are not. Fox's case hinges on his reading of the epilogue, to which we 
now turn. 
Fox (1977: 96) translates the epilogue as follows: 
221t remains a moot point as to what extent it is possible to discern the relationship between these different 
representations. I have not pursued this issue further here. In his discussion of the aspectual value of the SC 
verbs in the autobiographical thread, Isakkson (1987: 44ft) suggests that while in 2-4 the SC thread may 
have an historical aspect to it, in later chapters the aspect tends to be neutralised by placing the verb in a 
subordinate clause. "The neutralized aspect in such passages depicts the author as speaking out of his 
present state of thought, not about conclusions specifically made in the past. " (Isakkson, 1987: 45) This 
kind of data supports the existence of different representations and might help to discern the relationship 
between them. 
231 learnt this in a discussion with Lokfink. 
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8. "Utterly absurd, " said Qoheleth, "Everything is absurd. " 
9. Now furthermore, Qoheleth was a wise-man. He constantly taught the 
people knowledge, and weighing and investigating he composed many 
sayings. 
10. Qoheleth sought to find fine words and to write the most honest words of 
truth. 
11. The words of the wise are like goads, and the (words of) masters of 
collections are like implanted nails that are given by a shepherd. 
12. And furthermore, my son, beware of these things. It is pointless to make 
a lot of books, and much talking wearies the flesh. 
13. Finally, when everything has been heard: Fear God and keep his 
commandments, for that is the whole man. 
14. For God will bring every deed into judgement, (judging) even every 
hidden matter, whether it is good or bad. 
Below we identify the crucial aspects of Fox's translation and outline his 
arguments supporting his translation. 
i. v 10 `sought to find fine words and to write'. 
For Fox this expression is subtly non-committal, the implication being that 
Qoheleth sought to find and to write fine and honest words of truth, but 
perhaps did not! Essential to this interpretation is the pointing of =1=1 as 
an infinitive absolute, translated "to write", which Fox understands as the 
direct object of tZI7=. The NRSV translation by comparison (reading either 
the infinitive absolute form or the alternative reading =1=1 1 the NRSV 
translates this phrase "and he wrote words of truth plainly") would clearly 
undermine Fox's interpretation. In support of this non-committal reading of 
v10 Fox also points out that R&7 and m7= are two of Qoheleth's theme 
words which here remind us that seeking does not necessarily mean finding. 
Fox alerts us to Ecclesiastes 8: 17 in this respect, arguing that this verse 
teaches that God made man unable to comprehend the world and he implies 
that this teaching underlies M =t7 and t2 7= in the epilogue. Just as the 
human person cannot understand the world no matter how much he searches, 
so Qoheleth was unable to write truth. 
ii. vl la `The words of the wise are like goads, and the (words of) masters of 
collections are like implanted nails' 
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According to Fox the words of the wise are like goads and nails not because 
they goad into right action and provide a stable point of anchorage but 
because they prick and hurt; they are painful and dangerous and one needs to 
be cautious of them. Fox maintains that vii is unclear and perhaps 
deliberately ambiguous. However he argues that if there is parallelism in this 
verse we would not expect the comparison to refer to completely different 
things like encouraging better behaviour and being permanent. Fox suggests 
that the nails like the goads are dangerous. 
iii. vl lb `that are given by a shepherd. ' 
According to Fox the shepherd is not God, because in the OT God is called 
`shepherd' in his capacity as keeper and saviour and these attributes are not 
relevant here. Furthermore "shepherd' is never used by itself to refer to God. 
In Israelite, and Egyptian and Babylonian didactic wisdom literature God is 
never called `shepherd. ' Indeed he is hardly ever given any metaphorical 
qualities in wisdom literature. The words of the wise are also never 
considered as given by God. 
IMM which qualifies MD'l cannot be read as indicating that there is only one 
i. e. divine shepherd, since the weight of the verse would then rest there and 
not on the similes of v1la, and the verse would be a theological declaration 
totally divorced from its context. Thus Fox argues that 1 is simply a 
shepherd, any shepherd, and `1 i1 s functions simply as an indefinite article, 
as in 1 Samuel 24: 15,26: 20,1 Kings 19: 4,5 and Ezekiel 17: 7. "In all these 
cases numerical qualification is not the point, i. e., there is no need to show 
unity as opposed to plurality. The modifier could be removed with little 
effect on the sense of the sentence. " (Fox, 1977: 103) 
iv. vl2a `And furthermore, my son, beware of these things. ' 
1n'1 should, according to Fox, not be translated as "besides. " Whereas in v9 
Fox (1977: 98) followed the accents, here he proposes going against them, 
arguing that we ought to pause after `i11'1 as in v9 but here against the 
accents. In v12 the reserve in the epilogist's account becomes pronounced 
and Qoheleth's words are included in the warning: "And furthermore, my 
son, beware of these things. " 
v. v12ba `It is pointless to make a lot of books'. 
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Fox rejects the translation of this phrase as "Of making many books there is 
no end" because "of' would require beth or lamed before fl fVD. 
According to Fox r7 indicates purpose and with 1'M should be translated as 
`pointless. ' He argues that 71=171 i is banal in vl2bca if r7 means `end'. Fox 
compares the use of rj`P' 71lß here with Ecclesiastes 4: 8 and points out that 
the lonely man's work had an end-point, death, but that what it lacked was 
purpose. Fox also argues that syntactically 1"N cannot negate the predicate 
nexus in a nominal sentence. r7 1'M is a noun phrase meaning literally "a 
nothingness of purpose" or "a lack of purpose". 
vi. v 12bß `and much talking wearies the flesh. ' 
N* is a hapax legomena. Fox rejects the explanation by comparison with 
the Arabic lahija meaning "apply oneself assiduously", noting that it is a 
root which does not appear elsewhere in Hebrew. Fox proposes that we read 
M *, which root means "meditate or study" but which could also mean 
"utter, speak" as in Psalm 37: 30. The advantage of this interpretation is that 
in ba and bp the activities of the wise men are referred to rather than there 
being a shift to the pupil's activities in bß. 
vii. In v13,14 the epilogist sets law against wisdom, thereby contrasting 
dogmatic certainty with Qoheleth's uncertainty of all knowledge. For Fox 
this relegates the words of the wise to a place of secondary importance. 
Evaluation of Fox's reading 
i. How strong is Fox's case that the narrator is subtly non-committal in v10? 
With respect to =T: )1 there are a number of possibilities: 
a. The passive form could be retained as it is in the Septuagint (Kai. 
y¬ypcgtp vov ¬uen'rE'ros) and in Lohfink's (1993: 10) recent translation of 
this verse as "und hier sind diese wahren Worte sorgfältig aufgeschrieben. " 
Delitzsch (1970: 432) retains the passive form but translates, "Koheleth 
strove to find words of pleasantness, and written in sincerity, words of 
truth. " The latter translation has the same meaning as Fox's translation. The 
difficulty with the passive is that the form is singular whereas "words" are 
plural, although that in itself is not conclusive since the "true words" may be 
here viewed as a single totality. 
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b. =1i1D1 as an infinitive absolute is certainly possible as a proposal for 
revocalising the text, and this could legitimately be understood as the direct 
object of =111D1 could also be revocalised as an infinite absolute but 
be understood as a continuation of the preceding finite verb in the sense of 
"He sought ... and he wrote ... "24. 
c. Five Hebrew manuscripts and certain versions (Aquila, Symmachus, 
Peshitta, and Vulgate) understand the verb actively as ==. Such a reading 
would count strongly against Fox's position, especially if i'1? N is understood 
as "in the profound sense of capturing reality. " (Murphy, 1992a: 125) 
There is little difference of meaning between Lohfink's translation, which 
takes =1i1D1 as an infinitive absolute which continues the preceding il»=, 
and that which reads Tl D 1. All these translations count against Fox. 
However whether the passive form is retained or revocalised to an infinite 
absolute, both can be translated to support Fox's position. Context alone will 
determine a decision in this area, but it does seem to me that the 
tentativeness of Fox's translation at this point makes it less likely. A more 
positive reading of v10 can embrace either translation, but Fox's depends 
upon translating this verse as "He sought .... to write. " Remarkably, although 
without discussion, even Fox in his 1989 paraphrase of Ecclesiastes 
`translates' v10b as "and he wrote words that were completely true and 
honest. " (Fox, 1989: 348) Of course, if this is the correct translation, it 
deconstructs Fox's position! 
Fox finds further support for reading v10 as subtly non-committal in its use 
of the theme words Vj7= and M2l]. = certainly is one of Ecclesiastes key 
words; it occurs seventeen times and its wide semantic range is exploited by 
the author in the rhetorical form of antanaclasis especially in those passages 
in which it is repeated25. Fox may be correct in seeing a link between the use 
of these words here and in the main body of Ecclesiastes, especially 7: 25-29 
and 8: 16-17, but his understanding of the link is inadequate in my view. In 
7: 25-29 and 8: 16-17 these two verbs are linked with the limitations of 
24See GK 113z. Murphy (1992a: 123) argues for such revocalisation. On the infinite absolute as object see 
GK 113d. 
250n the semantic range of NSJ] see Ceresko (1982), who argues that the wisdom poets in particular 
exploited the ambiguity inherent in MYT] as a form of antanaclasis. The semantic range of IA312 extends to 
such activities as arrive, reach, overtake, seize, grasp, understand, find and acquire. 
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Qoheleth's project but the words themselves do not suggest `not finding'. 
The negative element in these passages is stressed by negating ml"= and 
Man, and the search to find is not always unsuccessful in these passages. 
See for example 7: 27-29 for the ironic play on "finding" and "not finding". 
8: 16,17 has a stronger stress on "not finding. " It should also be noted that 
where M= is used without repetition as in 9: 10,15 and 11: 1 it has the 
meaning of "to find. " 
The use of t7= and M3M in 12: 10 resonates with the previous use of this 
vocabulary in Ecclesiastes by reminding us that they are connected with 
Qoheleth's encounter with the limitations of human knowledge but this by 
no means makes vlO subtly non-committal. Whenever Qoheleth has wanted 
the reader to know that his search leads to "not finding" he has clearly said 
so, and in the absence of such negating the context alone could suggest, and 
would need to do so very clearly, that this is how these words are to be read 
in v10. The context however points clearly in the reverse direction, and this 
on two accounts. 
Firstly it should be noted that Fox suggests that the narrator is subtly non- 
committal in v10 because he wants to create some distance between 
Qoheleth's radical views and his own. In other words it is the `truth' of 
Qoheleth's presentation that the narrator wants to distance himself from to 
some extent26. But v10 is about more than the truth of Qoheleth's sayings, it 
is also about their aesthetic form, as r.! Dil '121 indicates. As Crenshaw 
(1988: 191) comments, "Qoheleth devoted time and energy both to the 
aesthetic of his composition and to the reliability of what he said. " Like 
Crenshaw Fox translates rMli as "pleasing" but he never claims that the 
narrator is distancing himself subtly from the truth and the aesthetic form of 
Qoheleth's sayings. But v9 is clear that Qoheleth, like other wisdom 
teachers, was a master of form27. However if the narrator is subtly non- 
committal he would have to be suspicious of both. 
Secondly, to read v10 as Fox does is to set it against v9a, where Qoheleth is 
described as `wise. ' Contextually it makes far more sense to read v10 as 
Qoheleth achieving what he set out to do, thereby demonstrating his 
26Fox understands i17 "121 721' as a superlative, which he translates "the most honest words of truth. " 
It is this strong statement of truth that Fox maintains the narrator wants to distance himself from. 
27Cf. Fishbane's (1985: 29-32) understanding of the three verbs in v9 as technical terms describing 
Qoheleth's activity in terms of conventional scribal tasks. 
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wisdom. That there is a contradiction between the positive affirmation of v9a 
and Fox's reading of v10 is confirmed by Fox's discerning a very negative 
comment about wisdom in general in vl l and Qoheleth in particular in v12. 
This takes us on to a second question. 
ii. Is the point of the comparison of the words of the wise with goads and 
implanted nails that they are painful and dangerous? 
For two reasons I suggest that Fox is on weak ground here. Firstly what is 
being described is not just the words of Qoheleth but the MIMDM I1Mi28, 
and it seems quite extraordinary that the narrator would create distance 
between himself and Qoheleth by describing the whole corpus of the words 
of the wise as dangerous, especially in the light of his positive statement in 
v9 about Qoheleth being one of the wise! Surely a much more plausible 
strategy would be to distinguish Qoheleth from other wisdom literature, a 
strategy which most biblical scholars follow even today! 
Secondly, Fox's argument about parallelism in v12 as being better accounted 
for by having both similes referring to the danger and pain of the WM DM 
''V1 is unconvincing. The traditional interpretation also has both similes 
referring to one thing, namely the value of the words of the wise, with the 
two similes developing slightly different aspects of that value, goading in the 
right direction on the one hand, and providing stability on the other. Indeed, 
one could argue that the traditional understanding fits better with the 
dynamic nature of biblical parallelism in which there is invariably movement 
from one line to the next. As Alter (1985: 10) puts it, "Literature thrives on 
parallelism ... But 
it is equally important to recognize that literary expression 
abhors complete parallelism, just as language resists true synonymity, usage 
always introducing small wedges of difference between closely akin 
terms. "29 If in this verse we have in the parallelism the characteristic 
heightening or intensification which Alter (1985: 19) proposes, then the 
heightening is probably to be located in the D'3 1U] qualifying "nails. " Thus 
the direction in which the sayings of the wise goad one is a direction which 
is firm, solid and trustworthy. 
28This expression recalls the titles in Proverbs 22: 17,24: 23,30: 1 and 31: 1. Galling suggests that v11a is a 
quote. 
29See chapter one of Alter (1985). Fox is in danger of understanding parallelism in biblical verse as "a 
system for the deployment of synonyms. " (Alter, 1985: 9) 
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iii. Is Fox right in understanding v11b as not referring to God as the one 
shepherd who is the source of the words of the wise? 
Fox's reading is certainly possible but for a number of reasons it is not as 
strong as it might appear. Firstly, Fox insists that ` MM functions simply as 
an indefinite article, and he refers the reader to a number of verses where 
1r1M apparently functions this way. Remarkably not one of these verses 
strongly support Fox's view. We cannot examine each of the relevant verses 
in detail here but careful examination of the relevant verses bears out the 
following points. In Ezekiel 17: 7 `iris is best translated as "another" and is 
not redundant. In 1 Samuel 24: 15 `1 rM is emphatic and should be translated 
"a single flea". The expression is deliberately repeated in 26: 20. In 1 Kings 
19: 4 the NRSV correctly translates ` MM as `solitary' and the expression is 
repeated in v5, although the NRSV does not repeat it. Thus, remarkably in 
not one of Fox's examples does 'Z MN function simply as an indefinite 
article. 
Does this mean then that `1rM never functions as the indefinite article? No, 
but it does alert us to the danger of too quickly assuming that we are dealing 
with the indefinite article when we encounter `1f1N. GK (190: 401), to whom 
Fox refers, notes that "[o]nly in a few passages is a noun made expressly 
indeterminate by the addition of `1M in the sense of our indefinite article", 
and BDB lists the indefinite article as one of eight possible meanings of 
I MN. It should be noted, incidentally, that Fox appears to have taken his 
examples of the use of ails as the indefinite article straight out of BDB, for 
BDB lists all Fox's examples plus one other, 1 Samuel 16: 7. The latter verse, 
however, also seems to me a bad example of 'IM M as the indefinite article. 
NRSV simply translates it as "`a' new cart", but it seems to me that the 
numerical sense of `one' is present, being compared to the two milch-cows. 
This means, if correct, that all BDB's examples of it as the indefinite 
article fail! 
There are uses of `i nX equivalent to the indefinite article in the OT. Daniel 
8: 3 seems to me a particularly strong case, and Exodus 16: 33, Judges 9: 53, 
13: 2,1 Samuel 7: 9,12,22: 9 as highly likely cases. It is therefore possible 
that ails is the indefinite article in vl lb, but one ought to be cautious about 
coming to that conclusion and it seems unlikely that the word is redundant in 
the compact epilogue of 12: 9-14. The idea of "one shepherd" would make 
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sense as indicating the unified source of the diverse words of the wise if it is 
understood as referring to God as the ultimate source of such wisdom. 
Secondly Fox is wrong that God cannot be metaphorically referred to by 
`IMM MV"I n because the ideas of him as keeper and saviour are irrelevant 
here. Quite the contrary. God as the unified source of the diverse words of 
the wise would explain their value. Furthermore r1=11 were used by 
shepherds to goad cattle along the right route, and thus shepherd imagery is 
already strongly present in this verse30, which can be seen to progress 
naturally to God the shepherd as the one source of wisdom31. 
iv. Is Fox's reading of v12 as a warning against Qoheleth and his type of 
activities convincing? 
For a number of reasons, the answer must be `No. ' Firstly in v9 Fox uses the 
accents to argue for translating 'Ii1' as `furthermore. ' Here he argues against 
the accents in order to retain the same translation. This reflects a lack of 
consistency but makes it possible for Fox to read i inli] as the object of 
IMTm. The accents however make Murphy's translation more likely: "As for 
more than these, my son, beware"32. 
However, even if Fox is right in understanding `lil' as `furthermore, ' I TIT in 
v 12a need not imply a negative warning as Fox reads it. Ogden translates 
vl2a as, "PS. From these things my Son be instructed, "33 and as Görg 
(1980: 43) says, "A similar semantic neutralization obtains in the case of the 
... 
imperative in Eccl. 12: 12: the son should `be advised. ' That ultimately a 
30Murphy (1992a: 125) maintains that the precise meaning of the metaphor of nails is not clear. Fox 
(1989: 348) strengthens our argument that shepherd imagery dominates vii by paraphrasing vl lb, "and the 
words of proverb-collectors may smart like the nails a shepherd uses to prod his sheep. " It should be noted 
that this paraphrase makes the reference to the nails more positive than in his 1977 (p. 96) translation that 
we are examining. 
31In my work on Ecclesiastes I have been struck by the similarities to Deuteronomy. Eating and drinking is 
a dominant motif in Ecclesiastes and Deuteronomy (Cf. McConville, 1984 on this theme in Deuteronomy), 
Ecclesiastes 4: 17ff is akin to the name theology of Deuteronomy, Ecclesiastes 5: 3-4 restates the law of 
Deuteronomy 23: 22-24, the exhortation to beware of anything more than these in 12: 12 and that nothing 
can be taken away from God's work in 3: 14 is similar to Deuteronomy's exhortation not to add or take 
anything away from the law (Cf. Weinfeld, 1972: 261,362), the exhortation to keep the commandments in 
Ecclesiastes 12: 13 is a characteristic deuteronomistic phrase (Weinfeld, 1972: 336), the remembrance motif 
is common to both Deuteronomy and Ecclesiastes, and so on. If the author of Ecclesiastes is keenly aware 
of Deuteronomy or its theology then it is possible that `Il1N in Ecclesiastes 12: 11 may be related to TIN 
71r' in Deuteronomy 6: 4. Mayes (1979: 177) also notes that some of the exhortations following 
Deuteronomy 6: 4 have wisdom parallels. 
32Murphy (1992a: 124) acknowledges the difficulty with this phrase but comments, "Here the two words 
are to be joined in accordance with the Masoretic punctuation". 
33Italics mine. 
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`warning' is involved becomes apparent only from the content of the 
admonition that follows. " `l1? is often used in the OT to refer to giving 
instruction (Cf. BDB 2094)34. The context alone can determine whether or 
not this instruction is a warning. 
The context militates strongly against vl2a being a warning against 
Qoheleth; such an interpretation would contradict v9 in particular. However, 
it should also be noted that if this is a warning then 711271n most likely 
relates to Q'? ?1 '1=1 as a whole. This focuses the contradiction with v9 
even more strongly, and makes Fox's reading even less likely. 
In terms of context it should be noted that Fox's understanding of v12 and 
the epilogue in general as warning against Qoheleth is closely related to his 
translation of 
5=1 throughout Ecclesiastes as "absurd". We do not have 
time to explore the great variety of proposals for translating 
ý=M but suffice 
it to note that this negative and in my opinion anachronistic translation has 
not won broad approval among biblical scholars and by itself fails to do 
justice to the positive strand within Ecclesiastes35. If the positive strand in 
Ecclesiastes is better accounted for, and if it is the stronger strand or the one 
that triumphs, then contextually it is much harder to argue that the narrator 
distances himself from Qoheleth in the epilogue. 
It is thus better to take `I 71T as referring to instruction (Ogden) or in the more 
traditional way as a warning against adding to the wisdom writings (Cf. 
Murphy, 1992a: 125). 
As regards 12ba Fox's translation is possible but not as compelling as he 
makes out. It is not essential for t11i= to be prefaced with a= or 
5 in order 
for it to be translated "of'. As Whybray (1989: 173) points out the rest of v12 
from i11 223. onwards has the form of a wisdom saying. This form is pithy 
and compressed and regularly lacks the sort of prepositions we might 
34The form 1, ITM in 12: 12 is Niphal imperative m. s. The Niphal infinitive construct form occurs in 4: 13, 
appropriately translated as "take advice" by the NRSV. Cf. also Psalm 19: 12. BDB does suggest that in 
12: 12 711i 1 means only 'warn' as in Ezekiel but that of course must be argued from the context. 
35Ogden translates 5=M as 'enigmatic', which seems to me a better grasp of the metaphorical focus of this 
word. Fox's translation seems to be influenced by modern existentialism and hence in danger of being 
anachronistic. Qoheleth is not declaring life to be absurd in an existentialist way but shows it to be 
empirically impossible to grasp. If this empirical epistemology is pushed all the way it would lead to 
absurdity but Qoheleth always juxtaposes his statements about the enigma of life with confessional 
affirmations of life. 
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anticipate in narrative. Apart from this, in a compound sentence formed by 
the juxtaposition of a subject and an independent noun clause, as we have 
here, it is legitimate to translate, "(And) as for ... "36 "No end" would thus be 
a legitimate translation of r7 JIM37. It is unconvincing to argue that 71=1711 
is banal in v 12bct if r7 means `end'; the authors point would simply be that 
the production of books just goes on and on. However, even if one were to 
translate r7 JIM as a noun phrase, "pointless" is only one option. Ogden, for 
example, proposes "endless". 
Nor is Fox's translation of a 715 as "talking" particularly persuasive. Even 
on his terms it could mean "study" and indeed in his 1989 paraphrase he 
(1989: 348) translates this phrase "and too much study just tires one out. " 
Fox's argument that "speaking" is preferable because then in ba and bß the 
activities of the wise men are referred to rather than there being a shift to the 
pupil's activities in bß is reminiscent of his argument about parallelism in 
vii, and just as unconvincing. V12 starts by addressing X12 and in this 
respect the weariness would be rhetorically apt. Even if one opts for 
"talking" it could refer to the response that students make to books just as 
much as to the activities of scribes. 
v. Fox finds a strong opposition between wisdom and law in the epilogue. 
This is a common view. For many commentators, the language about fearing 
God and keeping his commandments is so alien to Qoheleth, that 12-14 must 
be read as a critique of Qoheleth38. The relationship between these two types 
of OT material continues to be a matter of discussion among OT 
theologians39. However, this type of `strong opposition' reading may be in 
danger of reading a modern antithesis back into Ecclesiastes. Murphy 
(1992a: 126) for example, rightly says about v 12, "Lauha and many others 
36 GK, 143a. 
371t is unusual to have 1'M as part of the predicate nexus in a nominal sentence. I can find no parallel in the 
OT, but there is no reason why 119 cannot negate the predicate in a nominal sentence. Murphy, Whybray, 
Lofhink and Crenshaw all translate it this way. Fox simply states that 1'N cannot negate the predicate in a 
nominal sentence but presents no evidence or reference to sustain this comment. 
38Cf. for example Lauha, 1978: 221-223. The content of v12-14 is decisive for Lauha's understanding of 
v12-14 as an independent second afterword. Lauha comments, "Bisweilen ist versucht worden, die beiden 
Nachworte miteinander zu verbinden ..., aber nicht nur 
die Form, sondern vor allem auch der Inhalt und die 
Intention sind ganz verschieden, ja sogar entgegensetzt! ' 
39See Reventlow, 1985: 168-186. Recent decades have seen a re-awakening of interest in OT wisdom 
literature (Clements, 1992: 13-39), but, as Reventlow (1985: 181) says, "It is at this point, i. e. over the 
question of the relationship between the various areas of OT thought, that the discussion will have to be 
continued: in other words, between the conception of order which is characteristic of wisdom (and not just 
wisdom) and the areas governed by the tradition of salvation history. " See Goldingay, 1987: 200-239 for a 
discussion of the wisdom-salvation history relationship. 
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regard it as a criticism of Qoheleth. In this view, one can do without books 
such as Ecclesiastes that are so troublesome and confusing. ... Thus the 
reader is protected against the upsetting doctrine offered in the book. 
However, this inference is not at all necessary. It seems to reflect more the 
problem of modems who see the presence of the book in the canon as an 
exceptional thing that must somehow be `explained. ' Were the ancients as 
easily scandalized as the modems? " 
Murphy does note that the conjunction of the fear of God and obedience to 
the commandments in, v 13 is not found elsewhere in Ecclesiastes; "The 
epilogue is obviously putting forth an ideal which has been developed 
elsewhere and which is not a concern in Ecclesiastes. " (Murphy 1992a: 126) 
Below (chapter seven) I argue that Murphy's latter statement overstates the 
case, and that there are indications that Qoheleth is aware of law and that the 
conjunction of law and the fear of God is not so surprising. This issue is 
closely connected with one's view of OT theology and the development and 
relationship between the OT legal and wisdom traditions. Clearly if one sees 
wisdom and law as radically distinct and opposing traditions then this will 
lend weight to Fox's view. 
vi. Finally in our evaluation of Fox's reading of the epilogue it should be 
noted that it undermines his notion of foolproof composition in Ecclesiastes. 
Sternberg (1985: 41-57) says that biblical narrative is characterised by 
foolproof composition so that the central developments are clear to all 
readers. Fox (1989: 9,10) says that this is also true of Ecclesiastes; in its 
canonical form it presents a reasonably clear message along the following 
lines: Everything in life is vanity and there is no point in striving too hard for 
anything. It is best to enjoy what you have when you have it and to fear God. 
The essentials, according to Fox, are clear to all readers. 
In a footnote to this section Fox (1989: 10) modifies his position slightly: 
"This is so, Sternberg says, because the biblical narrator is completely 
reliable and does not deal in the esoteric. In the case of this text, the speaker 
(Qoheleth) is almost entirely reliable, notwithstanding the slight distance that 
the epilogist, who is probably the author of the book, sets between himself 
and Qoheleth, his persona. " However Fox seems to me to overstate the 
reliability of his narrator here. In his view the narrator affirms an orthodox 
perspective but the implied author wishes to create room for Qoheleth's type 
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of view to be heard. One is thus left uncertain as to precisely where the 
implied author stands, the implications being, especially when one considers 
the large amount of space given to Qoheleth, that he is sympathetic to 
Qoheleth's affirmations of life as absurd! This makes Fox's position very 
similar to the major historical critical readings in which an orthodox editor 
has added an appendix to a radical text in order to make it more acceptable, 
and certainly undermines the notion of foolproof composition in 
Ecclesiastes. 
How then is Fox's reading of the epilogue to be evaluated in its totality? As 
we have seen in most cases his translation is possible, but not persuasive. 
Part of the difficulty in evaluating Fox's reading of the epilogue is that most 
of his arguments are possible. A more sophisticated means is required of 
evaluating their relative strength as arguments. This need in much OT 
scholarship has been recognised by Wenham (1991) who follows Sanders 
(1985: 326-327) in proposing that the strength of different arguments with 
which scholars propose positions need evaluation. Wenham's six categories 
are helpful in assessing the overall strength of Fox's reading of the epilogue. 
This evaluation can be diagrammatically expressed as follows: 










3. comparison - 
goads & nails 
* 
4.111 =IM * 
5. -inn (vl2) 
6. 'It * 
7.117 * 
8. law versus 
wisdom 
Barclay (1987) and Sanders (1985) have suggested that a consequence of 
this type of evaluation should be the setting aside of the weaker arguments 
and focusing upon the stronger ones. It is clear from the diagram above that 
such an approach makes Fox's reading of the epilogue less than convincing. 
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It is refreshing though, to find a commentator exploring in detail the 
relationship between 12: 9-14 and the main body of the text in the way that 
Fox does. Debate about the details of 12: 9-14 will no doubt continue40. In 
my view v9 must be read positively, as most commentators including Fox, 
agree. V 10 should be read with the implication that the teacher sought and 
found pleasing words, as I argued above. If v9 is taken seriously as a 
positive statement about the wise, then Fox's reading of v11 as a negative 
generalisation about the wise is ruled out and a positive interpretation of this 
verse becomes much more likely41. The goads may be painful, but it is their 
capacity to push in the right direction rather than the negative pain that is in 
mind here. Likewise the nails or pegs should be read positively as points of 
stability and anchorage. (Cf. Crenshaw, 1988: 190) 71M1n in vl2a refers 
back to the writings of the wise, and thus, "Iil'1 is best understood as "In 
addition to" (Murphy and Crenshaw) and v12 as a warning against being 
instructed by books other than the words of the wise like Qoheleth42. V13 
and v14 conclude the epilogue and the book. V13b is in the second person 
and sums up the message of Qoheleth in the OT terms of fearing God and 
keeping his commandments. 
Thus in terms of my reading of the epilogue the narrator reads Qoheleth 
positively and at least as arriving at a point in agreement with fearing God 
and keeping his commandments, contrary to Fox and Longman's 
suggestions. In terms of our diagram at the outset of section V above, this 
means that the narrator and the implied author occupy the same stance. The 
critical question is whether or not Qoheleth and the narrator can be shown to 
be as close to each other as this suggests. I suggest that a careful analysis of 
40Cf. Baumgärtel (1969), Dohmen (1992), Wilson (1984) and Sheppard (1980). 
41The context has to determine what aspect of the image of goads is in mind here, and in my view it can 
only be the positive aspect of giving direction, especially when one realises that the author is talking about 
the words of the wise as a whole and not just Qoheleth's words. 
42Ogden takes v12 to be an exhortation to be instructed by these things (including Qoheleth); and the 'no 
end' and `much study' to refer positively to the huge amount of effort such wisdom analysis requires. "He 
is advising the student that what Q has done is the same endeavour that any who would be wise must 
undertake for themselves. " (Ogden, 1987: 211) V12 is "a solemn counsel to any who would follow the sage 
that such a decision calls for a sincere commitment to an endless and all-consuming task. There can be no 
turning back. " (Ogden, 1987: 212) Ogden's interpretation differs in content from Fox, but both connect 
i1n I7 with 71111. However, as Delitzsch (1970: 436) and Murphy (1992a: 123,124) point out, the 
Massoretic punctuation holds ' "I and T1=f] together and the word order makes it more likely that they 
belong together. Murphy is right I think, in suggesting that 7I1'1 means more than "furthermore" (Fox) in 
v12. In v9 '111' is separated from the rest of the sentence by Massoretic punctuation marks, whereas in v12 
j= IM '1I1'1 are held together. 
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Ecclesiastes' literary artistry may provide an answer to this question (see 
below in chapter seven). 
VI CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have examined Sternberg's narrative poetics as an 
example of literary reactions to historical criticism. Sternberg's poetics is an 
important attempt to integrate the historical, ideological and aesthetic aspects 
of narrative texts into a hermeneutic. Fox has argued that analysis of the 
literary (aesthetic) aspect of Ecclesiastes along narrative lines is vital to its 
correct interpretation. A detailed comparison of his narrative analysis of 
Ecclesiastes with historical analyses of the genre of Ecclesiastes provided a 
test case for exploring the relationship between historical and literary 
analysis of Ecclesiastes. Our research confirms Sternberg's insistence that 
diachronic and synchronic analysis need to work in close partnership with 
each other. We shall elaborate more on this relationship in chapter seven. 
These reactions to historical criticism that we have examined in this chapter 
and the previous one all more or less operate within the classical humanist 
paradigm of textuality43. Postmodernism has however raised a variety of 
questions about this sort of approach. Thus, before we outline a hermeneutic 
and apply it to Ecclesiastes we will examine the postmodern turn and its 
implications for OT studies and the reading of Ecclesiastes in the next 
chapter. 




POSTMODERNITY AND THE READING OF ECCLESIASTES 
"The liberal consensus has so successfully established itself as the ideology of Western intellectual culture, that it has become almost invisible as the 
presupposition of every postmodern debate. " (Hesse, 1994: 457) 
"Creative antirealism is presently popular among philosophers; this is the view 
that it is human behaviour - in particular, human thought and language - that is somehow responsible for the fundamental structure of the world and for the fundamental kinds of entities there are. From a theistic point of view, however, 
universal creative anti-realism is at best a piece of laughable bravado. For God, of 
course, owes neither his existence nor his properties to us and our ways of 
thinking; the truth is just the reverse. And so far as the created universe is 
concerned, while it indeed owes its existence and character to activity on the part 
of a person, that person is certainly not a human person. " (Plantinga, 1984: 269) 
I INTRODUCTION 
Postmodernism constitutes a radical challenge to traditional notions of 
textual interpretation in which hermeneutics is concerned with the attempt to 
discern the true meaning of texts. In this sense both historical critical and 
literary biblical interpretation have been traditional. Postmodernism in 
certain forms, by contrast, challenges the very possibility of determinate 
meaning, declares the author dead, and makes textual meaning dependent on 
the reader. 
We have already made some initial comments about postmodernity in 
chapter one. In this chapter we will supplement these by firstly analysing the 
philosophical crisis that is central to postmodernism, and then we will 
examine the manifestation of postmodernism in OT studies and its 
implication for OT hermeneutics and the reading of Ecclesiastes. 
II THEORIES OF THE POSTMODERN 
Postmodernity is an unusually slippery word, used nowadays in a 
bewildering variety of ways. The contemporary debate about 
postmodernism begins in the 1950's and 60's as a reaction to modernism in 
the arts'. This reaction was soon extended to a critique of modem culture as 
'See Bertens, 1995: 20 and Rose, 1993: 3-20 on the earliest uses of the term `postmodern'. Bertens points 
out that after the 1870's "`Postmodern' resurfaced in 1934, in 1939, and in the 1940's. From then on 
sightings began to multiply. There is, however, very little continuity between these early uses and the debate on postmodernism as it gets underway in the course of the 1960s. " 
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a whole through theorists like Hassan, Spanos and Jencks. This does not of 
course mean that the postmodern debate has no earlier roots. A cursory 
reading of Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard makes their 
dependence upon earlier theorists like Nietzsche and Heidegger clear. In his 
brief summary of the progenitors of contemporary theorising of the 
postmodern Lyon (1994: 7-11) singles out Nietzsche, Marx, Heidegger, 
Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard and Simmel as "streams feeding into the 
postmodern river. " Little in theories of the postmodern is new, but it is the 
widespread disillusionment with modernity and the widespread embrace of 
previously minority anti-modern positions that makes the present different. 
Up until the 80's the debate on postmodernism was generally confined to the 
arts and architecture. In 1981-1984 this all changed, when philosophers 
began to address the postmodern debate in all seriousness. Habermas set the 
ball rolling as it were, with his 1980 Adorno lecture entitled "Modernity 
versus Postmodernity". As we saw in chapter one, Habermas has reacted 
strongly to the post-modern notion of the end of modernity, proposing 
instead that we think of modernity as an unfinished project. Modernity is in 
crisis but the answer is to get it back on track, not to abandon it. 
At the end of the 80's and beginning of the 90's the postmodern debate was 
increasingly bounded on the one side by Habermas and on the other by 
Lyotard2. (Bertens, 1995: 122) Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition is a 
study of "the condition of knowledge in the most highly developed 
societies. " (Lyotard, 1984: xxiii) Knowledge has been profoundly affected by 
the replacement of the production of material goods as the central concern in 
advanced societies with information. Society has become computerised and 
performativity dominates others forms of reason. The resulting postmodern 
condition is characterised by 
"incredulity towards metanarratives. ... To the obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the crisis of metaphysical 
philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied on it. The 
narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great 
voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language 
elements - narrative, but also denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on. 
2Inevitably it is not easy to talk of boundaries with postmodernity. Contra Hutcheon, Lyotard may not be 
the opposite boundary to Habermas. Norris (1990a: 165) argues that no one is as extreme as Baudrillard in 
his opposition towards truth claims. He acknowledges that Lyotard has made similar claims but, "In 
Lyotard's case there has been a marked shift of emphasis, from a work like The Postmodern Condition 
where enlightenment values are seen as the source of manifold errors and evils, to those recent texts where 
a certain (albeit heterodox) reading of Kant is applied to questions of history, politics and interpretation. " 
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Conveyed within each cloud are pragmatic valencies specific to its kind. Each of 
us lives at the intersection of many of these. However, we do not necessarily 
establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do 
establish are not necessarily communicable. " (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv) 
Thus Lyotard strikes at the heart of the possibility of transcendent, objective 
legitimation. Language games have replaced metanarratives and these 
always have only local and limited validity. In his opposition to 
metanarratives Lyotard has modem science particularly in mind. However 
science too has to operate within narratives and the postmodern condition is 
about immanent legitimation. "Narrative is thus for Lyotard the inevitable 
source of all legitimation, and therefore of all value and truth. " (Bertens, 
1995: 126) 
Baudrillard's grim analysis is deeply pessimistic about Western society. In 
his view consumerism has come to dominate our social order, and, 
especially through electronic media, this shift has been accompanied in what 
he calls the third simulacra by the hyperreal replacing and being 
indistinguishable from the real. Disneyland is, for example, there to conceal 
the. fact that the real Disneyland is America. Baudrillard sees everything in 
terms of cybernetic control so that we are helpless victims of technological 
control. Even the masses are the product of information, and the only 
response is to `join the objects'3, since thinking and action have become 
impossible from. the perspective of the subject. This is a bleak picture 
indeed: 
"We are left with a hyperreal that has escaped our control and that is beyond 
conceptualization in spite of the `obscene' visibility of every single detail.... 
Baudrillard, however, leaves all other theorists far behind in the nightmarish 
character of his conclusions. ... for Baudrillard that [electronic] revolution has 
effectively made us the helpless victims of a technological determinism that 
through its unassailable code serves the interests of a hyperreal, meaningless 
capitalist order. " (Bertens, 1995: 156) 
In his understanding of consumerism as central to our social order and in his 
notion of the hyperreal Baudrillard has made a contribution to the debate 
about postmodernity4. However this "apostle of unreason" shows scant 
regard for facts and paints with a large brush. His analysis of the decay of so 
much contemporary culture may well be correct, as Norris (1990a: 164-193) 
3For a discussion of this see Baudrillard (1983) and Bertens, 1995: 155. 
4The link between capitalist consumerism and postmodernity is also analysed by Jameson. See Bertens, 
1995: 160-184. 
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recognises, but whether this diagnosis pushes truth forever out of reach, as 
Baudrillard would have it, remains an open question. Norris for one thinks 
that criteria of truth and falsehood remain, and it is surely true that the more 
hyperreal the situation the more important such criteria become. 
Derrida is synonymous with deconstructive postmodernism. Certainly 
Derrida has been an important figure in promoting the priority of language, 
rejection of metaphysics and textual instability; themes which have become 
central to much postmodernism. The genre of Derrida's writings is not easy 
to classify and this is related to his radical understanding of the relationship 
between philosophy and literature. Derrida refuses to privilege philosophy as 
the dispenser of reason and focuses on language with all its disruptiveness as 
the basis of both philosophy and literature. Philosophy cannot dispense with 
language and is thus subject to modes of rhetorical analysis as is any 
discourse. In the history of Western philosophy thinkers have been able to 
impose their concepts on other disciplines only by ignoring the disruptive 
effects of language. By undermining/deconstructing this boundary between 
philosophy and other modes of discourse Derrida "provided a whole new set 
of powerful strategies which placed the literary critic, not simply on a 
footing with the philosopher, but in a complex relationship (or rivalry) with 
him, whereby philosophic claims were open to rhetorical questioning or 
deconstruction. " (Norris, 1991a: 21) Indeed in so far as literary texts are in 
touch with their rhetorical nature they are less deluded than philosophers 
who deny their embeddedness in language. 
Derrida's deconstructive approach rests therefore on his philosophy of 
language. Language as `writing' is the bottom line of reality and is Derrida's 
means of opposing logocentrism. It is important to note that he is using 
writing to mean something different from mere inscription. In Of 
Grammatology he (1976: 9) says, "We say `writing' for all that gives rise to 
inscription 
... cinematography, choreography,... pictorial, musical, sculptural 
`writing'. " Norris (1991a: 28,29) explains Derrida's notion of writing as 
follows: 
"the term is closely related to that element of signifying difference which 
Saussure thought essential to the workings of language. Writing for Derrida is the 
`free play' or element of undecidability within every system of communication. 
Its operations are precisely those which escape the self-consciousness of speech 
and its deluded sense of the mastery of concept over language. Writing is the 
endless displacement of meaning which both governs language and places it for 
ever beyond the reach of a stable, self-authenticating knowledge. " 
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If this is difficult to understand that is part of Derrida's intention; he does not 
want the meaning to be pinned down. As the elusiveness of his use of 
differance indicates, its meaning remaining suspended between `difference' 
and `deferral' (Norris, 1991a: 31). Derrida applies his understanding of 
writing to Rousseau's "Essay on the Origin of Languages" and Levi- 
Strauss's nature-culture distinction in order to show how their texts suppress 
writing which nevertheless remains present, and once foregrounded 
deconstructs their texts. (Cf. Norris, 1991a: 32-41) In terms of deconstructive 
method Norris (1991a: 39) comments on this work of Derrida that "[o]nce 
again it is a matter of taking a repressed or subjugated theme (that of 
writing), pursuing its various textual ramifications and showing how these 
subvert the very order that strives to hold them in check. " Such self- 
engendered paradoxes in texts Derrida calls `aporia'. (Cf. Norris, 1991a: 49) 
Language as the bottom line of reality has no underlying ground to support 
it, or meaning beyond itself. Consequently Derrida resists any attempt to 
recentre philosophy. The Western tradition has identified a number of 
different possible centres which provide a foundation for language. However 
for Derrida all these centres take their place within the universe of signs and 
they cannot escape the endless chain of signifier and signified. Centres are 
functionally indispensable but they are always only provisional; Derrida 
calls this approach decentering, and the refusal to acknowledge the 
provisionality of our centres logocentrism . Here we encounter a major 
theme of postmodern thinking, what Lyotard refers to as the rejection of 
metanarratives. Fragmentation and transience characterise postmodernity, 
accompanied by thorough going pluralism. For Derrida there is no 
grounding of language; language has no ground external to itself that is not 
illusory. Here he follows Heidegger in absolutising language and refers to 
language as "the bottomless chessboard" to indicate the lack of any 
foundation and that play has no meaning outside of itself. 
Habermas (1987b: 161-210) and Norris (1991a: 139-158; 1990a: 49-76) 
disagree strongly about how to evaluate Derrida and how to position him 
among postmodern theorists. For Habermas (1987b: 187) "Derrida is 
particularly interested in standing the primacy of logic over rhetoric, 
canonized since Aristotle, on its head. " Norris argues that Habermas 
misreads Derrida, who retains a concern for rigorous analytical work and 
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careful philosophical argumentation. This is true but it does seem that there 
are tensions in Derrida's work between this emphasis and that of language 
as "the bottomless chessboard. " 
Our survey of key theories of the postmodern has been all too brief. 
Theorists of the importance of Foucault and Bauman have not received 
attention. However the purpose of the survey is simply to put our discussion 
of postmodernity and OT hermeneutics in this broader philosophical context. 
These broader issues impinge on OT hermeneutics continually but are often 
unknown. Before we progress to the implications of `the postmodern 
condition' for OT hermeneutics, it is worth pausing to identify central 
characteristics of postmodernity. 
1. Postmodernity has raised all sorts of questions about our capacity to know 
and how we know and whether we can accurately represent reality i. e. about 
epistemology. The possibility of universal objective knowledge is 
considered by many to be impossible. Much postmodern theory is strongly 
anti-realist and considers all knowledge to be local, communal and a human 
construct. Such epistemological scepticism is captured very clearly in 
Lyotard's notion of "incredulity towards metanarratives. " The corollary of 
this scepticism has been a profound suspicion of the hidden agendas of 
`neutral' modem knowledge; what claimed to be objective and value free 
has come to be seen by many as a mask for powerful ideologies. The 
consequence of this scepticism is an awareness of inevitable pluralism in 
knowledge and consequent fragmentation. Certainty and truth are regarded 
by many with great suspicion - paradoxically the one thing that radical 
postmodern thinkers seem quite sure of is that there are no metanarratives! 
There is widespread disagreement about the role of rationality and whether 
or not knowledge can be grounded. Some, like Norris, Habermas and 
Gellner seek to reconstruct the project of modernity. Others would seek a 
genuinely post-modern position in which rationality is always perspectival. 
Others like Maclntyre (1988) seek to do justice to the perspectival nature of 
rationality while holding on to more universal perspectives. 
2. Epistemology is closely related to ontology and here too postmodernity 
has undermined the broad consensus of modernity. One would expect that 
incredulity towards metanarratives would leave little room for much 
ontological reflection but of course this is unavoidable. All philosophical 
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analysis inevitably carries with it ontological presuppositions whether 
conscious or not. A common ontological presupposition in postmodern 
theory is that language is the most fundamental aspect of reality. Derrida is a 
good example of this view. Lyotard's view of reason as inextricably bound 
up in power games and needing to be subverted by desire which will get the 
flow of the libidinal economy going again reflects strong ontological 
presuppositions5. Much postmodern theory has little room for any notion of 
an order in reality existing apart from human construction. Scepticism about 
human knowing goes hand in hand with a high view of the human 
community as constructing the worlds in which we live. This too reflects a 
particular ontology. 
3. Epistemology and ontology are inseparable from anthropology in the 
sense of the nature of humankind. The rationalistic autonomous view of the 
human which was so dominant in modernity has been undermined and a 
plurality of alternatives proposed. Rorty (1983: 585,586), for example, 
suggests that we should think of the moral self as "a network of beliefs, 
desires, and emotions with nothing behind it - no substrate behind the 
attributes. For purposes of moral and political deliberation and conversation, 
a person just is that network. " For Foucault (1973: xxiii) the human person is 
"no more than a kind of rift in the order of things, or, in any case, a 
configuration whose outlines are determined by the new position he has so 
recently taken up in the field of knowledge ... man 
is only a recent invention, 
a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, ... that 
will disappear as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form. " In 
several postmodern thinkers Freud's anthropology has been revised and 
renewed6. If thinkers like Baudrillard play down the possibility of the human 
subject acting in any significant way others stress the possibility of human 
self-creation. 
Epistemology, ontology, anthropology. That so much postmodern theorising 
is related to these areas indicates the extent to which the philosophical 
foundations of modernity are in crisis. In many respects postmodernity is the 
name we give to this foundational crisis, which Neil Smith captures 
poignantly when he writes, "The Enlightenment is dead, Marxism is dead, 
the working class movement is dead... and the author does not feel so well 
5See Bertens, 1995: 134-137. 
6For example Baudrillard, Deleuze and Gittari, Lacan. See Selden and Widdowson (1993: 136-144) for a 
brief discussion of psychoanalytic theories in literary studies. 
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either. "7 Postmodernity is characterised by pluralism, uncertainty, instability 
and fragmentation. The old certainties seem to have gone with no unified 
vision to replace them even as capitalism hurtles on into a revolutionary 
information phase. 
Personally it seems to me better to refer to what is being called 
postmodernity, as late or high modernity8. Harvey (1989) suggests that 
modernity is characterised by a rejection of tradition and embrace of change 
as well as a confidence in reason to lead to new certain truths. The capacity 
of reason to do this has been undermined so that we are left with change, 
flux and instability. The roots of modernity have been called into question 
but not abandoned9. Human autonomy tends to remain as firmly entrenched 
as ever, the difference being that we now simply have to learn to live with 
the uncertainties. It should also not be forgotten that the nihilistic and 
relativistic side of postmodern theory is only one aspect of the contemporary 
situation. Norris (1994) already detects something of a reaction to the 
extremes of postmodernism among some of its proponents, namely Said and 
Kristeva. Certainly if modernity is a reaction to and immanentising of a 
Christian worldview, then postmodernity shows little sign of openness to 
recovering Christian perspectives on reality. Lyon (1994: 86) does say that 
"[t]oday, the human is being displaced, decentred, and the grip on the future 
seems once more up for grabs. While this opens the door for everything from 
Foucault's play of power to the Age of Aquarius, it also renders more possible the 
possibility that Providence was not such a bad idea after all. Perhaps postmodern 
apocalyptics will have to make space for a vision of a (re)new(ed) earth, that 
antique agent of social change, and the original partner of final judgement. " 
And Milbank (1990) has argued that only Christian theology provides an 
alternative route to contemporary nihilism. However, these voices are in the 
minority. The fact is that important shifts are taking place and as Lyon 
(1994: 84,85) says the concept of postmodernity is a valuable `problematic' 
that alerts us to key questions concerning our age: "the question of 
postmodernity offers an opportunity to reappraise modernity, to read the 
signs of the times as indicators that modernity itself is unstable, 
unpredictable, and to forsake the foreclosed future that it once seemed to 
promise. " (Lyon, 1994: 70) Postmodernity problematises the foundations of 
modernity and thus of OT studies, and in this way it invites us to debate the 
7Quoted in Harvey, 1989: 325. 
8'High modernity' is Anthony Gidden's (1991: 4,27-32) expression. 
9As the quote from Hesse at the outset of this chapter indicates. 
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nature and direction of present day OT studies, and in particular the 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes. 
III THE POSTMODERN TURN AND OLD TESTAMENT 
HERMENEUTICS 
In virtually every discipline there is a growing body of "postmodernity and 
.... " literature. Theology is no exception, nor is biblical studieslo. That 
developments in theology are significant for biblical studies and vice versa is 
receiving new recognition amidst the fluidity of the present (Cf. Watson, 
1994: 1-14; Perdue, 1994a: 305,30611). Within modernity it has become 
commonplace in the university to assume that biblical exegesis should take 
place in isolation from theology and that it should not be related to Scriptural 
proclamation. Watson (1994: 6) refers to C. F. Evans' (1977: 82) proposal that 
we should strive "to ensure as far as possible that exegesis is studied in such 
a way that it does not issue in proclamation. " This rigid drawing of 
boundaries between exegesis, theology and proclamation is now open to 
question in ways that it was not some twenty years ago. However, for the 
sake of focusing what could become a very wide-ranging discussion we will 
confine our investigation to postmodernity and Old Testament 
hermeneutics12. 
If postmodernity is characterised by instability and crisis then according to 
Rendtorff this is also true of contemporary Old Testament hermeneutics. In 
an article appropriately entitled "The Paradigm is Changing: Hopes- and 
Fears" Rendtorff (1993: 44) maintains that 
"Old Testament scholarship at present is `in crisis'. The Wellhausen paradigm no 
longer functions as commonly accepted presupposition for Old Testament 
exegesis. And at present, no other concept is visible that could replace such a 
100n postmodernity and theology see Loughlin (1993) and Griffin, Beardslee and Holland (1989). On 
postmodernity and the Bible see McKnight (1988). 
1lperdue (1994a: 305,306) stresses that "biblical theologians must begin to make the effort to become more 
theologically literate. As biblical scholars who possess some sense of the importance of public discourse, 
we must learn to read texts that are not simply behind but also beyond the Bible. This means that we must 
attempt to become theologically literate in order to become familiar with the horizons of meaning that 
historical and modern cultures produce. Otherwise, the questions we bring to the text are highly subjective 
and unavoidably individualistic. ... This does not mean that we should replace contemporary theology with 
a constructive biblical theology, but it is obvious that serious dialogue between the two groups would 
enrich them both. " 
12In this chapter I have focused on philosophical and 'OT' approaches to postmodernity. I see great value 
in exploring theological approaches to postmodernity but regard philosophy as more fundamental. 
Postmodern developments in theology and in OT studies echo philosophical views of postmodernity. With 
all Perdue's helpful stress on theology he misses the more fundamental importance of philosophy. 
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widely accepted position. ... the shaking of this paradigm is part of a far-reaching shaking of the centuries-old fundamentals of Old Testament scholarship.... 
Almost half a thousand years have faded away. " 
Rendtorff (1993: 36) follows Kuhn (1970) in using `paradigm' to refer to a 
methodological model that has secured consensus in a discipline. According 
to Rendtorff this is precisely what has happened in OT study this century. 
Wellhausen's documentary hypothesis has been the paradigm within which 
OT scholarship has operated. However, Rendtorff uses the notion of 
paradigm in a somewhat contradictory way. On the one hand he argues that 
the Wellhausen paradigm dominates OT scholarship during this century, but 
simultaneously sees Gunkel, Von Rad and Noth as introducing a different 
paradigm. For Rendtorff the significant difference between Wellhausen and 
these other scholars is the latter's concern with the oral history of the 
material underlying the text. Although Gunkel, Von Rad and Noth 
maintained Wellhausen's sources (this indicates for Rendtorff the existence 
and strength of the Wellhausenian paradigm), their research actually led in a 
different direction and Rendtorff implies that this direction heads towards 
the contemporary focus on the final form of the text. 
There is a link between some of Von Rad's creative OT exegesis (for 
example on Genesis) and final form readings of the text13. However 
Rendtorff's narrative of Gunkel's work leading on to final form readings 
today is too simplistic. Form criticism has far more in common with source 
criticism in its concern with reconstructing earlier stages of texts and treating 
these as the focus of OT study than with final form readings, and beneath 
both these methods pulsates nineteenth century historicism. Rendtorff is 
greatly concerned to establish continuity between historical criticism and 
contemporary readings of the OT and consequently this narrative of 
continuity fits his purposes well. It fails however to do justice to the strong 
reaction to modernity that is at the heart of postmodernity. To understand the 
present crisis in OT studies it is vital to penetrate behind Wellhausen's 
source criticism and Gunkel's form criticism to discern the common matrix 
out of which both scholars worked. Indeed if Gunkel could so easily 
introduce a different paradigm then it is difficult to see how one could 
continue to call Wellhausen's documentary hypothesis a paradigm at all; it is 
much better seen as a dominant manifestation of a paradigm. Rendtorff's 
13Von Rad, for example, was involved in the formation of Interpretation, a journal which is committed to 
hearing the message of the OT texts as redactional wholes. 
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mistake is not to see that the worldview of modernity underlies both 
approaches. Rendtorff (1993: 35) recognises that Wellhausen was deeply 
influenced by romanticism but does not pursue the issue of philosophical 
shaping in discerning the paradigm operative in twentieth century OT 
scholarship. 
Now however Rendtorff (1993: 44) is sure that this dominant Wellhausen 
paradigm has ended: "I do not see any new arguments that could turn back 
the wheel. " What has changed is not the object of study: "the sources are the 
same as they have always been. What has changed is the scholarly attitude to 
the sources, in particular to the main core of sources, namely the texts of the 
Old Testament itself. " (Rendtorff, 1993: 46) Rendtorff s use of "sources" to 
describe the OT indicates the extent to which he still thinks of the OT as 
source-material for historical study and thus the extent to which he still 
thinks within the historical critical paradigm. Indeed much of his 1993 
article is concerned with historical questions; theological questions do not 
feature at all! His articulation of the paradigm shift in terms of what readers 
bring to the text is perceptive - this is where the change is taking place - but 
he then goes on to look at changed attitudes mainly in terms of history and 
the OT. 
In looking at changing attitudes towards the OT and history Rendtorff notes 
the tendency to try and write histories of Israel without the OT. He dislikes 
this tendency and even more the tendency by those engaged in such ventures 
to declare their method the only right one and those who pursue more 
traditional approaches biblicists or fundamentalists. 
"There are many scholarly approaches and methods, in Bible studies as well as in 
history writing. Nobody will forbid any scholar or group or school to believe their 
own method to be the best one. Many will be interested in seeing the results and 
checking their validity and usefulness. But in scholarship there is by definition no 
heresy. We should rather practice and accept methodological pluralism. " 
(Rendtorff, 1993: 47) 
Again one senses that for Rendtorff such pluralism is a way of establishing 
continuity between historical criticism and contemporary methods of reading 
the OT. What he does not consider is the ideological exclusivism that 
permeated historical criticism; now that the boot is on the other foot as it 
were historical critical scholars make a powerful plea for methodological 
pluralism. Such a plea is not confined to Rendtorff; Barton (1984) and Brett 
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(1991) makes similar proposals for pluralism provided no exclusivist 
methodology becomes part of this pluralism! 
The great advantage in the newer literary methods is, according to Rendtorff, 
their concern with the text as it is. For too long and too intentionally OT 
scholarship has neglected the final form of texts. "Scholars still seem to be 
proud of knowing things better than the final redactors or compilers. This is 
a kind of nineteenth-century hubris we should have left behind us. " 
(Rendtorff, 1993: 52) Rendtorff's (1993: 52,53) conclusion is that, "The 
paradigm is changing. I believe it has changed already. But the field is open. 
Many new and fruitful approaches are visible that will lead Old Testament 
scholarship into the twenty-first century. At the moment there is no new 
model that could be expected to achieve common acceptance as a paradigm, 
and there will probably be none in the near future. " 
Rendtorff correctly recognises that Old Testament studies is increasingly 
characterised by fragmentation and pluralism; common postmodern themes. 
But it is not just that the Wellhausen paradigm has lost its power, as 
Rendtorff correctly asserts, but that the underpinnings of the dominant mode 
of OT interpretation in modernity seem to many no longer valid. The 
postmodern turn has called modernity into question and with the dominant 
method of OT interpretation in modernity, historical criticism, being deeply 
rooted in the modem world view, it is inevitable that historical criticism 
should also partake of the crisis of modernity. It is this link that Rendtorff 
has not explored in his analysis of the contemporary crisis in OT studies, and 
consequently he too easily speaks of continuity between the historical 
critical era and the `postmodern era' in OT interpretation. 
In this section we will examine the views of three OT scholars who 
consciously reflect on the foundations of OT study and seek to articulate 
ways ahead amidst postmodernity, namely Brueggemann, Clines and 
Perdue. 
1. CLINES: OLD TESTAMENT CONSUMERISM 
Clines is one of the most capable and creative OT scholars in the UK today. 
His writings range across the OT (Pentateuch; Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther; Job) 
and extend from detailed Semitic study (Hebrew dictionary) to avant garde 
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methods for reading the Old Testament. One gets the impression that he is 
constantly rethinking his positions and on the move. Currently he is a strong 
proponent of a `postmodern' approach to the OT and we shall focus on him 
in this capacity. In order to put his present moves in context we will briefly 
outline the development of his OT scholarship. 
In his early years of OT scholarship Clines was a conservative proponent of 
the historical critical method. As he (1993a: 71) says, "in the olden days I 
thought we were all doing the same thing, historical-critical scholarship with 
the goal of arriving at some objectively determinable meaning of the text. " 
However, early on in his career Clines manifested a capacity to go against 
the dominant currents of OT scholarship, as evidenced by his The Theme of 
the Pentateuch. In this highly creative piece of work Clines criticises the 
excessive atomism and geneticism in pentateuchal studies and commits 
himself to ignoring the sources and focusing on the final form of the 
Pentateuch as a literary work. In the process he identifies his allies as the 
structuralists, Childs, Alonso Schökel, Walter Wink and the late Von Rad 
(Clines, 1978: 10,11). This is not to say that he denies the need for atomistic 
work; biblical studies requires both atomistic and holistic work but the ratio 
has been terribly unbalanced (Clines, 1978: 6). 
The Pentateuch, in Cline's view, is a literary work and requires therefore a 
method shaped by the humanities and not the sciences. The scientific, 
pyramid view of knowledge whereby each scholar makes his little 
contribution which he hopes will contribute to the macrostructure of OT 
scholarship is inadequate. 
"For our discipline belongs firmly in the tradition of humanistic studies, and 
inasmuch as it occupies itself with the interpretation of data that are already given, 
has more in common with the criticism of a body of well known literature than 
with the discovery, accumulation and evaluation of new data. In the sphere of 
literary criticism knowledge does not accumulate steadily through the industry of 
objectively distanced scholars, but by means of repeated engagement with the 
text. When one learns from others, it is as much from the shaft of light the critic 
has brought to bear on the text, a setting of the text in a new context, that one 
learns, as from the details of the commentator's explications. The model is that of 
the guide in a darkened museum who holds up his torch to reveal an unfamiliar 
object, or a familiar object from a fresh angle, in a new light. " (Clines, 1978: 8) 
Clines' approach is to seek the `theme' of the Pentateuch which he defines 
along literary lines. His conclusion is well known: the theme of the 
Pentateuch is the partial fulfilment of the promise to the patriarchs (Cf. 
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Clines, 1978: 29). Although Clines is aware of structuralism his approach is 
clearly not structuralist in any strong sense, but an approach to the 
Pentateuch as a literary-work-of-art14. Nor is it redaction critical, at least not 
in the way in which Clines defines redaction criticism. For Clines (1983: 31- 
33), although redaction criticism is concerned with the shape of the work as 
a whole, such concern is closely linked with authorial/editorial intention, 
which Cline's thematic approach is not. Clines is critical of Hirsch's 
insistence that meaning is inseparably allied with authorial intentionality; 
the theme need not have been in the mind of the author (Clines, 1978: 121). 
However Clines does regard the theme as objectively in the text; there can 
ultimately be only one theme in a literary work like the Pentateuch (Clines, 
1978: 20). 
In 1983 Clines (1983: 26-43) contributed the chapter on method in OT study 
to the text Beginning Old Testament Study. This gives a clear indication of 
where Clines was in terms of methodology at this time. Method, he 
maintains, is a means to an end and the end is determined by the goals we 
have in mind in studying the OT. Clines acknowledges that most people 
have religious goals in mind in their study of the OT. However, 
"[t]he academic study of the Bible has been, and must be, one in which people of 
any religious faith, or of none, can engage, and can co-operate. The immediate 
goal of biblical study must be one that allows but does not require religious 
preconceptions; for many, the immediate goal may only be a stage on the way to 
an ultimate (religious) goal, but for others it may be a sufficient goal in itself. " 
(Clines, 1983: 26) 
Thus Clines proposes that in academic study of the Bible our primary goal 
should be understanding. 
"Given that there is an Old Testament (or, Hebrew Bible), what else can be done 
about it in an institution of higher education? It cannot be preached, and it cannot 
be `taught' - as doctrine, that is, as what one ought to believe; for a university or 
college is not the place for that. But neither can it be used simply as a textbook for 
ancient history or as a source for illustrating social customs in the ancient Near 
East; for it was self-evidently not for these purposes that the Hebrew Bible was 
brought together in the form that it has and it does not as a whole have the 
character of a history or a manual of social customs. Only some description like 
`the Scriptures of the Hebrew people', or `the sacred writings of the Jews which 
now form part of the Christian Bible', can do justice to its essence. It is a religious 
document, and the most appropriate way of handling a religious document in an 
academic setting is to attempt to understand it. " (Clines, 1983: 27) 
"See Clines, 1983: 33-37. 
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With the primary goal of OT study as understanding the OT Clines reshapes 
traditional historical criticism into first and second order methods'5. The 
former have understanding as their chief aim whereas the latter are not 
principally aimed at interpretation but have valuable contributions to make 
to it. First order methods are divided into two categories: traditional methods 
(historical-grammatical exegesis, textual criticism, redaction criticism) and 
methods in literary criticism (close reading, the idea of the literary work of 
art, engagement). Second order methods are historical criticism, source 
criticism and form criticism. These second order methods may help 
interpretation but they are not aimed at it. 
Clines is still working with the concepts of a stable text, objective 
interpretation and the modern university but his reshaping of OT methods is 
noteworthy and represents an advance upon his 1978 position. In The Theme 
of the Pentateuch equal validity for atomistic and holistic criticism was 
allowed. Here priority is given to the text in its final form with 
understanding of that form as the goal. Clines' reshaping is similar to the 
reaction to positivism which we observed in NC and in Childs. His notion of 
understanding remains a modern one. 
A good example of Clines' 1983 method in action is his (1984) The Esther 
Scroll. The Story of the Story. This book contains thoroughgoing textual, 
source and redaction criticism but pride of place is given to the literary shape 
of Esther, as indicated by the `inclusion' of chapters 1 and 10 which deal 
with the literary shape. However this privileging of literary shape operates in 
chapter 10 not just with `the final form' but with the form of the narrative at 
five different stages that Clines has identified. This combination of source 
criticism with literary criticism makes Clines one of those rare few about 
which he speaks in relation to the documentary hypothesis: "very few 
scholars have used this reconstruction of the sources as a means for 
interpreting the text that now stands. " (Clines, 1983: 41) 
Recently Clines has shifted considerably from his 1978-1984 approach 
towards a postmodern position which embraces textual indeterminacy and 
methodological plurality. A clear indication of this is his (1993: 72) 
statement that he does "not really want to talk with most redaction critics - 
about their work, that is - because I do not think what they are doing is very 
15This reshaping is conscious and deliberate. Cf. Clines, 1983: 42. 
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plausible, " and his acknowledgement that he could no longer write a book 
like The Theme of the Pentateuch. In 1984 in The Esther Scroll two chapters 
were devoted to redaction criticism; by 1993 Clines was no longer interested 
in redaction criticism. The first volume of his commentary on Job further 
evidences a waning of interest in historical criticism; he (1989: xxix) simply 
states that he has not and will not devote much time to the history of the text. 
He does, however, include a vegetarian, feminist, materialist and Christian 
reading of Job. 
Cline's current position is clearly articulated in his 1993 article, 
"Possibilities and Priorities of Biblical Interpretation in an International 
Perspective. " In respect of his current methodological position he also gave a 
public lecture in Cheltenham on 7 December 1994 called "Shopping for 
Methods in the Old Testament Supermarket", and we will use these sources 
plus some of his most recent publications to outline his contemporary 
position. His current position is in my opinion best described as OT 
Consumerism. 
Clines stresses the actual and, in his opinion, desirable pluralism in OT 
studies nowadays. He used to think that OT scholars were all doing the same 
thing in their OT scholarship but now he realises that different scholars have 
different goals (Clines, 1993: 71). The Bible furthermore, is a common 
cultural object and biblical interpretation must make room for the religious 
and ideological plurality of our societies. It is important for Clines to be able 
to affirm that the Bible is not just an ecclesiastical object but a cultural one: 
"my academic context has no connections whatsoever with the church. ... It 
is not, therefore, surprising that what I want to affirm is that the Bible is a 
cultural artefact in our society, and not just an ecclesiastical object. " (Clines, 
1993: 76) A tension thus exists between the church and biblical studies in the 
academy and Clines considers this healthy. Although in today's economic 
climate biblical scholars are having to produce products that will sell, 
"academic freedom has to mean - not a freedom to research their subject in 
isolation from the impact their work has on anyone except their fellow academics, 
but - freedom to choose their own priorities and goals, freedom to resist the 
magisterium of anyone - church leaders, politicians, and also the senior scholars 
who distribute research grants - freedom to resist the imposition of the agenda of 
anyone at all. " (Clines, 1993: 77) 
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It is good for the church to be challenged by the less powerful academy: 
"The church does not really know, I think, how much it needs to be liberated 
from the shackles of fundamentalism, or how much it needs to abandon the 
use of the Bible as a tool for social control. ... The academy's biblical 
criticism inevitably relativizes the authority of the Bible, and the church can 
only benefit from such a humanizing of the Bible. " (Clines, 1993: 77,78) 
The pluralism in OT studies is related to the recognition nowadays that all 
interpretation is contextual and cultural. In Clines' view one constructs one's 
identity out of one's prejudices and presuppositions and it would be a 
mistake to suppress these in interpretation. This, combined with the 
postmodern break with Cartesian categories makes for a deeply pluralist 
situation, but in Anglo-American biblical studies, 
"the full impact of the contemporary break with the Cartesian categories has still 
to register ... most active scholars still write as if they were engaged in a quest for objectively determinable meanings and objectively verifiable history. The shifting 
of the ground brought about by the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer or the 
deconstructive philosophy of Derrida is bound to bring questions of method to the 
forefront in biblical and theological studies. " (Clines, 1993: 75) 
a. a consumer product. 
In response to our changed context Clines (1993) proposes an end-user 
theory of interpretation. Clines (1993: 78,79,80) says: 
"I want to propose a model for biblical interpretation that accepts the realities of 
our pluralist context. I call it by various names: a goal-oriented hermeneutic, an 
end-user theory of interpretation, a market philosophy of interpretation, or a 
discipline of 'comparative interpretation'. ... First comes the recognition that texts do not have determinate meanings. ... The second axis for my framework is 
provided by the idea of interpretative communities. ... There is no objective 
standard by which we can know whether one interpretation or other is right; we 
can only tell whether it has been accepted. ... There are no determinate meanings 
and there are no universally agreed upon legitimate interpretations. 
What are biblical scholars then to be doing with themselves? To whom shall 
they appeal for their authorisation, from where shall they gain approval for their 
activities, and above all, who will pay them? ... If there are no 'right' interpretations, and no validity in interpretation beyond the assent of various 
interest groups, biblical interpreters have to give up the goal of determinate and 
universally acceptable interpretations, and devote themselves to interpretations 
they can sell - in whatever mode is called for by the communities they choose to 
serve. I call this 'customised' interpretation. " 
Such an end-user approach could entail recycling old waste interpretations 
which were thought to have been superseded by the progress model of 
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modernity. These discarded interpretations could be revived in a post-critical 
form to stock afresh the shelves of the interpretational supermarket. 
b. consumer hermeneutics. 
Clines goes on to say that he regards the literary turn in OT studies as the 
most important trend since the middle of this century, with its focus upon the 
text in its final form as a literary artefact, upon the reader and her role in the 
construction of meaning and upon hermeneutics and the nature of language 
and texts. Clines particularly commends feminist and ideology criticism. 
Feminist criticism more than any other form relativises the authority of the 
Bible because it takes its starting point in an ideological position very 
different from the patriarchal biblical text. Reading from `left to right' is 
Clines' slogan for reading the text against its grain and insisting on 
addressing one's own questions to the text. 
In his recent lecture in Cheltenham Clines advocated a pragmatic, pluralist 
approach to OT hermeneutics in which a range of interpretive methods are 
available and OT scholars select those they enjoy and find useful. This 
represents a marked shift from his 1983 position where understanding as the 
goal of interpretation governed one's methodology. He acknowledges that 
"It is the question whether feminist criticism and ideological criticism are, 
properly speaking, interpretational at all. Perhaps we should be sharply 
distinguishing between acts of interpretation, which seek only to represent the 
text, to exegete and explicate it, to rehearse it in words other than its own, to 
understand it - but not to critique or evaluate it - and, on the other hand, acts of 
criticism, which judge the text by a norm outside itself. If a feminist or some other 
ideological point of criticism takes its point of departure from an ethical or 
ideological position that lies outside the text, one which may indeed be deeply 
hostile to the text, its goal cannot be mere understanding, mere interpretation.... 
Perhaps the almost unchallenged assumption that the task of biblical scholars is 
essentially to interpret the text represent a systematic repression of our ethical 
instincts. 
... Will not the most 
interesting prospects for biblical studies lie 
precisely in reading against the grain of the texts, in bringing to bear on our texts 
our own cultural and historical and personal positions, and in evaluating the texts 
against the hundred and one yardsticks that the pluralist world of international 
biblical scholarship will inevitably suggest? " (Clines, 1993: 86,87) 
An example of this pluralist style in action and its contrast with Clines' 
previous work is his (1990b) Reading Esther from Left to Right in which he 
performs a formalist, structuralist, feminist, materialist and deconstructionist 
reading on Esther and concludes, "I have been impressed in this study by the 
value of as many strategies as possible for reading a text. As a critic of the 
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text, I should hate to be restricted by a methodological purism. What I have 
noticed is that different strategies confirm, complement or comment on other 
strategies, and so help develop an integrated but polychromatic reading. " 
(Clines, 1990b: 51) 
It is apparent from the above just how far Clines has shifted between 1983 
and 1993. Then he argued for a unified hermeneutic, now the stress is on 
hermeneutic pluralism. Then he worked with a notion of objective textual 
meaning, now he insists on textual indeterminacy and the role of readers in 
creating meaning along the lines of Stanley Fish's `interpretive' 
communities' 16. Then he stressed understanding as the overarching goal of 
interpretation, now his great concern is ideological critique. Then he stressed 
literary reading of texts, now a whole new range of methods are 
foregrounded and historical criticism is hardly mentioned17. Clines continues 
to be wary of allowing religious presuppositions too much control in biblical 
studies and insists on the freedom of the academy. Now, however, he has a 
much greater sense of pluralism. 
Although his close exegetical work has remained very traditional (Cf. the 
first volume on Job) Clines has shown a refreshing tendency to go against 
the flow of historical critical OT scholarship. However his ready espousal of 
hermeneutic pluralism, textual indeterminacy and consumerism raise all 
sorts of questions which we will address below. 
2. BRUEGGEMANN: FUNDING POSTMODERN IMAGINATION 
Brueggemann has long been an advocate of the role of imagination in 
biblical interpretation 18. However, only recently has he related imagination 
to the postmodern situation in his (1993) The Bible and Postmodern 
Imagination. Texts Under Negotiation. He uses postmodern theorising to 
validate and develop his previous work on imagination and OT theology. 
16Clines (1989: xxix) says in his introduction to Job that "meanings are not properties of books, 
but are 
understandings created in the minds of readers who are intent upon reading books. " 
17Clines (1989: xxix) says of his commentary on Job, "I must confess to having spent almost all my time on 
the book as it now is, without thinking very much about how it came to be in its present form. " He 
does 
acknowledge the traditional questions of date, source etc. as "interesting" but wishes to focus on the 
meaning or interpretation of Job and these questions are extrinsic to that purpose. 
18Cf. his (1978) The Prophetic Imagination and (1987) Hopeful Imagination. See Perdue, 1994a: 285-298 
for a description of Brueggemann's work prior to his book on postmodern imagination. 
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Brueggemann is emphatic about the change in our epistemological context 
signified by the postmodern turn and its implications for OT hermeneutics. 
We are in "a wholly new interpretive situation" (1993: vii)19; "the end of 
modernity requires a critique of method in scripture study. It is clear to me 
that conventional historical criticism is, in scripture study, our particular 
practice of modernity, whereby the text was made to fit our modes of 
knowledge and control. As we stand before the text, no longer as its master 
but as its advocate, we will have to find new methods of reading. " (1993: 11) 
"What is now required and permitted is a mode of scripture interpretation 
quite unlike most of what we have practised heretofore. " (1993: 64) 
Brueggemann proposes an epistemology which privileges imagination, 
which he (1993: 62) defines as "my quintessential locus where I receive, 
process, and order all kinds of input, input that heals and assaults, that 
subverts and transforms, and I take into it and handle what I am able as I am 
able. ... It 
is that operation of receiving, processing, and ordering that 
transpires when my mind wonders in listening to a text, a reading, in 
praying, or in any other time. " For Brueggemann (1993: 13) imagination 
refers to "the human capacity to picture, portray, receive, and practice the 
world in ways other than it appears to be at first glance when seen through a 
dominant, habitual, unexamined lens. More succinctly, imagination as the 
quintessential human act is a valid way of knowing. Imagination as a human 
act does not yield the kind of certitude required by Cartesian anxiety, but it 
does yield a possible `home' when we accept a participating role as `home- 
maker'. " 
We thus need a mode of reading the Bible, according to Brueggemann, 
which funds postmodern imagination. This does not involve constructing a 
full new metanarrative but interpreting the OT in such a way as to provide 
the pieces out of which a new world can be imagined. Brueggemann 
(1993: 20) sees the main context for this as the church community and 
envisions "a place where people come to receive new materials, or old 
materials freshly voiced, that will fund, feed, nurture, nourish, legitimate, 
and authorize a counter imagination of the world. " 
It is important for Brueggemann (1993: 17,18) that in our postmodern 
context all worldviews are under negotiation so that 
19A11 the quotes in the following paragraphs are from Brueggemann (1993). 
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"[r]eality ... is no longer a fixed arrangement inhospitable to theological categories, but is an ongoing, creative, constitutive task in which imagination of a 
quite specific kind has a crucial role to play. The core of our new awareness is 
that the world we have taken for granted ... is an imaginative construal. And if it is 
a construal, then from any other perspective, the world can yet be construed 
differently. It is the claim of our faith, and the warrant of our ministry, to insist 
that our peculiar memory in faith provides the materials out of which an 
alternatively construed world can be properly imagined. " 
Faith thus plays a central role in Brueggemann's hermeneutic of postmodern 
imagination, and the Christian community is privileged as the context of 
interpretation. Although he is very wary of imposing systematic categories 
upon texts he does want to take the Bible seriously as the Word of God in 
biblical interpretation and proposes an evangelical infrastructure of memory, 
covenant and hope to shape interpretation. Furthermore he includes liturgy, 
preaching and teaching in the enterprise of biblical interpretation 
(Brueggemann, 1993: 68). 
Brueggemann proposes a dramatic model of biblical interpretation in which 
reality is taken as a drama and the biblical text as a script for the drama. This 
model evokes playful open-endedness which is appropriate to our present 
liminality, and avoids the modern dangers of conservative retreat into 
propositional absolutes on the one hand, and liberal developmentalism on 
the other. Such an approach will be strongly text centred, applying itself to 
one text at a time. Creation, fall, redemption does seem to be the core drama 
of the Bible but Brueggemann (1993: 69,70), although very sympathetic to 
the work of Lindbeck and Frei, is wary of privileging this drama at the 
expense of the small stories of the Bible. The individual text must be 
allowed to speak in all its hoary roughness so that it can do its task of 
subverting our assumed world. In this way the Bible will function as the 
"compost pile that provides material for new life. " (1993: 61) There is little 
room for historical criticism in this method of interpretation (1993: 90) and 
the aesthetisising of the new literary criticism also needs to be guarded 
against (1993: 105). The Bible is treated as an "army of metaphors" with 
which the listener is called to actively engage (1993: 90). 
3. PERDUE: THE COLLAPSE OF HISTORY AND THE PROMISE OF 
IMAGINATION 
Perdue is particularly interesting on a number of accounts. He is aware of the 
postmodern shift and explores its implications for OT theology (Perdue, 
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1994a: 3-15). He follows Brueggemann in privileging imagination as a way 
ahead for OT theology in the postmodern context (Perdue, 1994a: 263-307). 
He has published extensively on wisdom literature, and finally he (1994b) 
has brought his interests in postmodernity and imagination to bear on 
wisdom literature. Perdue (1994a) refers to the postmodern turn in OT 
studies as "the collapse of history". 
"Traditional paradigms and their theological worlds, centred in and constructed by 
history and historical method, have come under serious assault ... I have chosen to call this destabilization of the dominant paradigm of historical criticism `the 
collapse of history. ' By `the collapse of history' I do not mean to argue or even 
imply that history and historical method are now passe ... But I do mean that for at least a generation now active revolt against the domination of history and 
historical method for Old Testament study in general and Old Testament theology 
in particular has been under way and in large measure has seceded from the 
epistemological rule of this once unchallenged strategy of interpretation. " 
(Perdue, 1994a: 4) 
Perdue (1994a: 7-11) gives the following four reasons for this collapse. 
Firstly newer paradigms have challenged history as the dominant paradigm 
for Old Testament scholarship and it is often argued that these newer 
paradigms make theological meaning of the OT more accessible. Secondly 
the current diversity in theology ("the shattered spectrum") has contributed 
to the diversity in Old Testament theology. Thirdly loss of confidence in 
Enlightenment epistemology has undermined the dominance of the historical 
critical method. Fourthly an increasing number of biblical theologians have 
rejected the descriptive approach in favour of "reflective, critical, 
constructive, or systematic strategy. " (Perdue, 1994a: 9) All these reasons, 
according to Perdue, can be subsumed under `postmodernity. ' As with 
postmodernism in general pluralism characterises contemporary biblical 
studies as different paradigms compete for attention. I'D 
However Perdue is adamant that we must hold on to objective criteria that 
can weigh the merits "of any theological presentation ... In any intellectual 
inquiry, no theology, or, for that matter, no ideology, should be exempted 
from the close examination of rational investigation and judicious criticism. 
Here I speak as an unrepentant rationalist. " (Perdue, 1994a: 11; italics mine) 
There is a contradiction in his thinking here. On the one hand he 
acknowledges and welcomes the pluralism and sees no quickly emerging 
consensus and yet he insists on common legitimating criteria201 At the heart 
of much postmodern theorising is specifically the denial of such common 
20See section II above. 
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legitimation. Perdue's insistence on common legitimation positions him 
close to Habermas whereas his ready acknowledgement of the demise of 
Enlightenment epistemology and of pluralism takes him in a rather different 
direction. One does wonder if Perdue has fully understood the implications 
of postmodern pluralism - if he had it would be difficult for him to describe 
himself as an unrepentant rationalist while welcoming pluralism. 
Perdue (1994a: 306,307) proposes the following four stages in a paradigm for 
OT theology. The first stage involves explicating the meaning of OT texts in 
their historical and cultural context. The second stage is "conceptualization 
of the multiple images, ideas, and themes that leads to the systematic 
rendering of the multiple theologies of Old Testament texts within the 
dynamic matrix of creation and history. " (Perdue, 1994a: 306) The third 
stage is to examine how OT texts have been understood within the history of 
interpretation. Finally the theology of the OT and past interpretations must 
be correlated with contemporary discourse. 
In this process' Perdue sees a central place for imagination. He deals very 
positively with Brueggemann's theology of the imagination (Perdue, 
1994a: 285-298), and says that "[a] comprehensive Old Testament theology 
of imagination would be most welcome. ... Especially important is the 
inclusion of historical criticism, social-scientific analysis, and newer literary 
methodologies. " (Perdue, 1994a: 298; Cf. also 302) Perdue does not 
elaborate in detail how imagination would relate to the four stages in his 
proposed paradigm for OT theology. In his treatment of Brueggemann he 
particularly stresses the role of imagination in making the fourth step 
possible, and presumably this is where it would make most difference in his 
own paradigm. 
If Perdue is not explicit about the centrality of imagination in his paradigm 
for OT theology he is so in his theology of wisdom. He (1994b: 20) says of 
Wisdom and Creation, "this book undertakes the task of rendering the 
theology of the sages by interpreting through a paradigm of metaphor and 
imagination the five major wisdom books. " Imagination is, according to 
Perdue (1994a: 263-272; 1994b: 50-52), the capacity of the human mind to 
create images; "Imagination is the bridge between perception and thought or 
sensation and conception. " (Perdue, 1994a: 264) He distinguishes between 
common imagination (which completes the fragmentary data of the senses or 
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projects objects that are not perceived directly), creative imagination (which 
represents or redescribes reality) and religious imagination (which imagines 
God). Perdue (1994b: 51) says of theological imagination that it 
"attempts to create and then interpret divine character and the world of the holy 
through skilful presentation. The substance and mode of theological discourse is 
not rational discourse that presents through discursive language a systematic 
rendering of God, humanity and the world. Rather, through images available 
indirectly through sense experiences, views of God are presented that are 
intelligible, that make some sense to human reason and emotions. To move into 
rational and systematic presentation is a second order of theological discourse. " 
In Perdue's view the sages used their imaginations in shaping a worldview 
for wise living (Perdue, 1994b: 59-62) . This sapiential 
imagination has six 
components: tradition and memory, engagement and reformulation of 
images of faith and the moral life, redescribing reality, imagining God at the 
centre of reality, recognition of the historicality and linguisticality of human 
experience and thereby imagining the nature and destiny of humans, 
recognising the mystery of human experience. In the cosmological wisdom 
tradition Perdue (1994b: 330-333) discerns the root metaphors of fertility, 
artistry, word and battle. In the anthropological tradition he finds the 
metaphors of birth and nurture, artistry, the breath of God, king and slave 
(Perdue, 1994b: 333-336). The metaphors of reality are kingdom, household, 
city and garden (Perdue, 1994b: 336-338). 
Previous theologies of wisdom have conceptualised the theology of wisdom 
in rational, discursive language. In the process the imagistic and aesthetic 
aspects of sapiential language have been neglected. The better procedure 
would be to attend first to the imagistic qualities of sapiential language and 
especially the organising metaphors, and then to go on systematically and 
rationally to set out the sage's conceptions. In Wisdom and Creation 
Perdue's concern is with the first of these approaches. 
What does Perdue's imaginative approach yield in terms of Ecclesiastes? 
Chapter 5 of Wisdom and Creation is devoted to Qoheleth. Ecclesiastes, 
according to Perdue, was probably written by a Hebrew sage in Jerusalem 
around the end of the fourth century BC. Qoheleth's crisis is one of 
imagination: the cosmology of traditional wisdom with its root metaphors is 
not sufficient for his questions about discovering the good in human 
existence. "What was called for was a new world view shaped by Qoheleth's 
imagination. To find the resources for this human-centred reality, Qoheleth 
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turns to the anthropological tradition. This tradition is reconceived in this 
sage's imagination, and central to this reconception is his metaphor of hebet 
("breath"). " (Perdue, 1994b: 194) 
The question of genre, according to Perdue (1994b: 194), is vital for 
understanding Qoheleth's imaginative construction of creation theology. 
Perdue (1994b: 194-202) conducts a thorough investigation of possible genre 
parallels to Qoheleth and concludes that the closest form-critical parallels are 
grave biographies and royal testaments, both of which create the fiction of a 
dead person who undertakes to instruct the living from the tomb. "The book 
of Qoheleth is best seen as the fictional testament of Israel's most famous 
king, who is presented as speaking to his audience either in his old age, 
shortly before death, or perhaps from the tomb. " (Perdue, 1994b: 202)21. 
Drawing in particular upon the work of Wright and Rousseau (1981), Perdue 
(1994b: 204) discerns the following structure in Ecclesiastes. 
Frame 1: 1-11 and 11: 9-12: 14 
Introduction 
1: 1 Title 
1: 2 Theme 
1: 3 Central question 
1: 4-11 Two stanza poem 
Cosmology v4-7 
Anthropology v8-11 
Internal Structure: 1: 12-11: 8 
Conclusion 
12: 9-14 Epilogue 
12: 8 Theme 
11: 9-12: 7 Two stanza poem 
Anthropology 11: 9,10 
Cosmology and Death 
12: 1-8 
I. 1: 12-5: 19 Cosmology, Anthropology and the Moral Order: Human Action 
1: 12-18 Two-fold introduction to Sections I and II 
A. 2: 1-2: 26 Solomon's accomplishments 
Carpe Diem: Conclusion 2: 24-26 
B. 3: 1-13 Time: Human Toil and Divine Action 
Carpe Diem: Interlude 3: 12-13 
C. 3: 14-22 Judgement and Human Nature 
Carpe Diem: Conclusion 3: 22 
21See chapter five, N for a more detailed discussion of Perdue's view of the genre of Ecclesiastes. 
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D. 4: 1-5: 19 Royal Rule and the Cult 
Carpe Diem: Conclusion 5: 17-19 
6: 1-9 Interlude: Joy, Appetite and Desire 
II. 6: 10-11: 8 The Sovereignty of God and the Moral Order: Human Knowing 
E. 6: 10-8: 15 Divine Sovereignty and Human Wisdom (A) 
Carpe Diem: Conclusion 8: 14-15 
F. 8: 16-9: 10 Divine Sovereignty and Human Wisdom (B) 
Carpe Diem: Conclusion 9: 7-10 
G. 9: 11-11: 8 Divine Sovereignty and Human Wisdom (C) 
The two poems on cosmology and anthropology (1: 4-11; 11: 9-12: 7) and the 
repetition of "breath of breath" provide the literary structure of Ecclesiastes. 
Wright has correctly recognised that the book is divided into two parts 
("doing" and "knowing") and Rousseau has correctly recognised that the 
internal part of the book is divided into seven main sections marked off by 
the carpe diem. There is some progression in the book since the quest for the 
good proceeds from doing to knowing. 
Ecclesiastes contains the imaginative fiction of Solomon, Israel's wisest and 
greatest king, seeking to determine the "good" in life. The opening and 
closing poems are an inclusio setting up their two elements, cosmology and 
anthropology as the context for reality. Within the inclusio we have the quest 
of the king to find the "good" through doing and knowing. The only good 
that Qoheleth discovers is carpe diem, which may provide joy. "In 
Solomon's quest to determine this good, the teacher composes a narrative 
testament embodying moral instruction that constructs a world offered for 
human habitation. It is not a comforting world, but nevertheless is a new 
world view that calls for the transformation of the way that sages had 
conceived of God, reality, and the place and role of humanity. " (Perdue, 
1994b: 238,239) 
The dominating metaphor of Qoheleth for life is 
ý= i 1. Perdue (1994b: 207) 
maintains that the root meaning underlying 
ýW 1 is ephemerality and 
proposes that we translate the key statement in 1: 14c: "all is ephemeral and a 
desire for life's vital spirit. " The paradox of human life is its ephemeral 
nature combined with the human desire for the spirit that animates life. Thus 
it is the ephemeral nature of life that Qoheleth laments and not its 
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meaninglessness or absurdity; Qoheleth is obsessed with finding something 
that endures. In connection with this Perdue (1994b: 208) proposes that 
71`1Il' should be understood as that which remains. 
Perdue is emphatic about Qoheleth's opposition to traditional Israelite 
wisdom. As is particularly evident in the opening poem Qoheleth, according 
to Perdue, understands creation as enduring but there is no description of 
God as creating or sustaining the world; "traditional creation theology is 
absent. " (Perdue, 1994b: 210) The cosmos is beautiful but it is not a just 
order reflecting God's righteousness. Qoheleth does not believe in the 
providence of God. In traditional creation theology "Remember your 
creator" evokes a positive image of divine response to suffering. However, 
"For Qoheleth, God is indeed the powerful tyrant whose power directs the 
world and determines the fate of human beings, but he is not the redeemer 
who enters into life to save the human creature. Thus, while students are 
instructed to remember God, they should not expect God to remember 
them. " (Perdue, 1994b: 234) Qoheleth does not believe that the universe is 
made for the well being of humans and ultimately history has no value. 
"Under the sun" expresses the distance between God and human beings. 
Jerusalem is no longer the location of God's presence among his people. 
God is a tyrannical ruler who secretly determines the course of history; his 
sovereignty is grounded in power alone and not in justice. Humans cannot 
affect reality in any important way or know God's purposes. "The inability 
to discern divine activity undercuts both the theologies of salvation history 
and cultic ritual, which represented and reactualized in sacred drama deeds 
of divine redemption. " (Perdue, 1994b: 217) 
All in all Perdue's view of Qoheleth approximates the pessimistic portrait of 
Crenshaw, to which the view of the narrator forms a stark contrast. 12: 9-14 
are from an editor and of 11-14 Perdue (1994b: 237) says, "The narrator then 
turns to his or her own understanding ... The narrator concludes with his 
admonition that summarizes his or her own understanding of wisdom. " 
IV ORIENTATION AMIDST THE FLUX 
The relativisation of historical criticism, the hermeneutical pluralism and 
lack of consensus about the way ahead make it clear that the postmodern 
turn is being felt in OT studies. OT studies are manifesting signs of the crisis 
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that is central to postmodernity. However, for all their talk of pluralism and 
rejection of metanarratives, proponents of pluralism and indeterminacy 
cannot and do not avoid positioning themselves philosophically22. It is easier 
to talk about rejecting metanarratives than to practice such rejection! To say, 
for example, that all knowledge is contextual and local, as Brueggemann 
(1993: 8-12) does, is to position oneself where one can see the whole and 
thus make such a comprehensive statement. In other words Brueggemann's 
position conceals a powerful, autonomous metanarrative. 
This confirms what we argued in section II, namely that postmodernism is 
not as radically new as it is often presented. Indeed postmodernity is better 
described as late or high modernity because it represents the outworking of 
the tensions within modernity. Postmodernism has challenged some of the 
key assumptions of modernity but as Hesse (see quote at outset of chapter) 
reminds us it remains deeply rooted in modernity. The belief in human 
autonomy, for example, remains as entrenched as ever. 
Some form of a metanarrative (philosophical positioning) is inescapable and 
postmodernity has not suddenly produced radically new options. Thus in 
order to orient ourselves amidst the growing pluralism in OT studies it is 
important to identify the presuppositions and inconsistencies in the 
perspectives underlying the views we examined in section III. This will then 
put us in a position to critique their views more insightfully. 
Perdue welcomes the postmodern shift while trying to hold on to universal 
criteria for legitimating readings, thereby also manifesting a superficial 
understanding of the extent to which consistent postmodern pluralism 
undermines rationalism. Clines and Brueggemann are the more perceptive 
analysts of postmodernity in that they see the implications of the shift that 
the turn implies in OT studies. Clines embraces methodological pluralism, 
indeterminacy and the impossibility of validating readings. Brueggemann 
rejects the possibility of large truth. 
What is interesting though is the very different ways in which Clines and 
Brueggemann have embraced postmodernity. It is broadly recognised now 
that one aspect of late modernity is the encroachment of capitalist 
22See in this respect the useful article by Botha (1995) on pluralism. 
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consumerism upon all areas of life23. Clines, as we have seen, embraces this 
aspect of late modernity and allows it to reshape the practice and theory of 
OT hermeneutics. The methods and the product of OT interpretation are to 
be determined by consumer desire. By contrast, Brueggemann is repeatedly 
at pains to distance himself from consumerism (Cf. Brueggemann, 
1993: 27,29,40,57). In his section on the development of an evangelical 
infrastructure that will shape interpretation he (1993: 27) says that "if this 
evangelical infrastructure is not carefully constructed, the Christian 
congregation will rely on the dominant infrastructure of consumerism, and 
will not even discern until very late (too late) that the infrastructure of 
consumerism contains little good news. " 
It is I think a mistake to reconstruct OT hermeneutics along consumer lines. 
Clines' espousal of indeterminacy, which opens the door for his consumer 
move, sounds very radical, but, as Norris and Bertens have noted, is 
politically close to the right wing pragmatism of scholars like Rorty. The 
debate about the death of the author seems to have come full circle since 
Barthes' (1988) provocative essay and Bertens (1995: 7) notes that 
"Deriddean postmodernism largely limited itself to texts and intertexts. In its firm 
belief that the attack on representation was itself an important political act, it was 
content to celebrate the so-called death of the subject ... without realizing that the 
end of representation had paradoxically made questions of subjectivity and 
authorship ... all the more relevant. ... 
In the absence of transcendent truth it 
matters, more than ever, who is speaking (or writing), and why, and to whom. " 
Clines' ready espousal of consumerism and indeterminacy is vulnerable to 
Norris's (1990a: 3,4) critique of 
"`theory' as practised by post-structuralists, post-modernists and other fashionable 
figures on the current intellectual scene. ... their `radicalism' has now passed over into a species of disguised apologetics for the socio-political status quo, a 
persuasion that `reality' is constituted through and through by the meanings, 
values or discourses that presently compose it, so that nothing could count as 
effective counter-argument, much less a critique of existing institutions on valid 
theoretical grounds. " 
Both Brueggemann and Clines accept postmodern epistemological pluralism 
but do so in different ways. Clines' is a pragmatic pluralism in which a 
smorgasbord of methodologies are available and interpreters use what works 
for them. Brueggemann acknowledges the plurality of hermeneutics but 
23See Lyon, 1994: 54-69 and Baudrillard in section II above. 
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argues for a hermeneutic which is shaped by faith and privileges imagination 
as the key to knowledge in the local context. Brueggemann's privileging of 
imagination and the powers he assigns to it contradict his espousal of 
pluralism. Like Perdue his understanding of the imagination is more 
Kantian-Romantic than postmodern24. And this productive understanding of 
the imagination has taken a beating in postmodernity25. As Kearney 
(1988: 251) says, 
"In our Civilization of the Image might we not expect to find imagination 
accorded a privileged place by contemporary philosophers? The very opposite is 
the case. Right across the spectrum of structuralist, post-structuralist and deconstructionist thinking, one notes a common concern to dismantle the very 
notion of imagination. ... The philosophical category of imagination, like that of `man' himself, appears to be dissolving into an anonymous play of language. " 
Thus, for Brueggemann to sustain his proposed hermeneutic, he would need 
to take a far more critical stance in relation to postmodern thinking. 
On the surface Clines' pluralism would appear to be more democratic but 
this is not entirely so. In his recent Cheltenham lecture on the supermarket of 
methods he dealt with NC, rhetorical criticism, structuralism, feminist 
criticism, materialist or political criticism, psychoanalytical criticism, reader 
response criticism and deconstruction. Conspicuous by its absence was any 
type of religious (Christian or Jewish) reading of the OT, which may suggest 
a certain imperialism in his pluralism26. Such imperialism manifests itself in 
much contemporary OT hermeneutic pluralism. Brett (1991), in his work on 
Childs' canonical approach, argues for a pluralistic understanding of OT 
hermeneutics and acknowledges the validity of the canonical approach 
provided it be one of the smorgasbord of methodologies, precisely what 
Childs denies. Similarly Barton (1984) argues for a pluralism of approaches 
to OT texts provided one does not think that there is a correct way to read 
such texts. 
240n the modem imagination see Kearney, 1988: 155-195. Roger Lundin (1993: 104-136) relates the sort of 
privileging of the creative imagination that we see in Brueggemann and Perdue historically to Emerson's 
understanding of the romantic imagination. He (1993: 131) comments that, "Admittedly, there are distinct 
differences between an Enlightenment conception of reason and Emerson's romantic stress upon intuition. 
The one emphasizes law and pattern, while the other stresses spontaneity and freedom; the one enshrines 
reason, while the other exalts the imagination. Yet in spite of their differences, Cartesian rationalism and 
Emersonian romanticism share a deep trust in the power of self to unveil the truth and a deep distrust of 
tradition. " 
250n postmodern imagination see Kearney, 1988: 251-358. 
26Clines (1989) does include a Christian reading of Job in his commentary and he has written the 
commentary on Job for the overtly Christian New Bible Commentary. 21st Century Edition. However his 
recent writings fail to mention such readings as a priority. 
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Imperialistic pluralism reminds us once again that it is hard and perhaps 
impossible to escape some type of metanarrative and thus some type of 
unified OT hermeneutic, even if its unity consists in an insistence upon 
diversity. What is called hermeneutic pluralism often amounts to a 
consideration of different aspects of the hermeneutic process. Thus feminist 
readings are often not `readings' but critiques of patriarchal ideology in texts 
which first have to be read before the feminist critique can take place. 
Lategan (1992) points out that what is called historical criticism focuses on 
part of the communication act involved in interpreting a text, namely the 
relationship between the sender and the text. The new literary criticism by 
comparison focuses on the text itself and reader response on the role of the 
reader in interpretation. Clearly historical criticism, `textual' criticism and 
reader criticism are not necessarily antithetical but could form part of a 
hermeneutic seeking to interpret texts as part of a communicative act. 
However, hermeneutic pluralism also refers to the interpretation of the OT 
from conflicting ideological/philosophical perspectives. As our examination 
has shown these are not absent from proponents of pluralism and 
indeterminacy, and in their respective appropriations of consumerism and a 
Kantian view of the imagination Clines and Brueggemann show themselves 
to be more modem than they acknowledge. The question for OT scholars is 
not whether they work with a metanarrative (philosophical presuppositions) 
or not, but which philosophical presuppositions they work with. For OT 
scholarship postmodernity means that all practitioners should reflect and 
give an account of their foundational/philosophical presuppositions. In this 
way the real pluralism in OT studies will become clear. 
Clines and Brueggemann are two examples of different ways of grounding 
OT studies philosophically. Although I am cautious of Brueggemann's too 
ready acceptance of all truth as local and his privileging of imagination, I do 
think that his path is more helpful than Clines'. In the context of postmodern 
pluralism it seeks to formulate an integrated Christian/theological 
hermeneutic which will allow the Bible to speak as God's Word. 
Indeed Clouser (1991) has argued that religious beliefs are universal and the 
deepest type of human belief which shape all of our lives, including our 
theorising. From a Christian perspective the postmodern context provides us 
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with an opportunity to take that religious shaping seriously and the 
hermeneutic proposals of Brueggemann, Lindbeck, Frei, Childs, Newbigin, 
Sternberg and Lategan seem to me to offer fruitful ways forward in the 
development of what Ouweneel (1993) calls a bibliotropic hermeneutic, i. e. 
one shaped by a Christian perspective upon reality which does justice to the 
historical, literary and kerygmatic aspects of OT texts as well as the 
contextual nature of interpretation. Since this will be developed in the 
context of the Christian community, as Brueggemann stresses, it will 
certainly not achieve universal agreement but then the goal of universal 
public knowledge is no longer credible, as I think Maclntyre (1988) has 
demonstrated. Such an approach would seem to me to do justice to the 
perspectival nature of truth claims (following Maclntyre and an important 
insight of postmodernism) while keeping open claims of universal relevance 
within that perspective27. At the outset of chapter seven I will explain my 
position more fully and outline the sort of hermeneutic I envision. Suffice it 
to note here that, as Plantinga points out (see quote at outset of chapter), a 
Christian perspective would be resistant to the sort of creative anti-realism 
that underlies much postmodernism. In this respect a Christian perspective 
would be closer to modernity in its commitment to the existence of truth and 
the possibility of its discovery, although for different reasons. 
V POSTMODERNISM AND ECCLESIASTES 
What hope do the sort of postmodern OT hermeneutics that we have looked 
at hold for reading Ecclesiastes? Very little specifically postmodern work 
has been done on Ecclesiastes. In chapter two we briefly looked at the 
feminist, socio-critical and psychoanalytic readings of Ecclesiastes that have 
been done. None of these have had much of an impact upon the 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes. Perdue announces the collapse of history and 
promises much with his imaginative, metaphorical reading of Ecclesiastes, 
but in practice his work yields little that is new and fails to deal with the text 
in its final form. He never deals seriously with the question of how the 
narrator's views in 12: 9-14 relate to Qoheleth's unorthodox views, and the 
position he arrives at is virtually the same as that of mainline historical 
critical. 
271t should be noted that while I agree with Maclntyre in principle about the location of rationality within 
traditions, he proposes a recovery of the Aristotelian tradition. 
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But this lack of postmodern readings of Ecclesiastes should not be taken to 
mean that postmodernism makes no difference to the interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes. Clines' supermarket could offer us a smorgasbord of different 
readings of Ecclesiastes -a deconstructionist reading, a feminist reading, a 
psychoanalytic reading, a materialist reading - without ever privileging one 
as the correct reading. A postmodern hermeneutic could insist that we ignore 
the author and his intentions in interpreting Ecclesiastes, that we regard the 
text as inherently indeterminate and that we read Ecclesiastes in whatever 
ways appeal to us and in whatever ways people will pay us to read it. 
In practice, however, it is impossible to operate consistently in this way. 
Most feminists and liberationists, for example, would be reluctant to see 
their readings as simply theirs and as legitimate as say a patriarchal reading. 
Even Clines (1989), after presenting a variety of readings in his introduction 
to Job, exegetes the text as though it has a single meaning. Furthermore, with 
many of these `readings', one first has to read Ecclesiastes determinatively 
along the grain before one can deconstruct it, or perform a feminist or 
materialist critique. This is not to deny the validity of the important 
questions these `readings' raise, but it is to insist that if one is going to 
suspect something, one first needs a good idea of what it is one is suspicious 
of. Thus, for example, if Ecclesiastes 7: 23ff are to be critiqued as patriarchal, 
one first needs to be sure of what they are asserting, and this is where the 
debate is being conducted at present along traditional lines of the meaning of 
the text28. 
The real contribution of postmodernism to biblical interpretation, in my 
opinion, is its insistence that what we bring to the text influences what we 
get out of the text. This recovery of insight into the historicity of all 
interpretation derives, as we have seen in chapter one, from Gadamer. Of 
course the logical implication of this insight could be the radical pluralism of 
postmodernism but it will depend on one's view of history. The attraction of 
Gadamer's hermeneutic is its radical undermining of Cartesian objectivity, 
its recovery of the role of prejudice and tradition in interpretation, its 
dialogical model of understanding and its notion of being addressed by the 
text. It seems to me that the insistence that hermeneutics involves two 
horizons is very helpful; it enables much that shapes biblical interpretation to 
be brought into the light. 
28See chapter one, HI. 
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Gadamer's hermeneutic has however been consistently criticised for its 
inability to discern distorted communication or to be able to distinguish a 
correct from an incorrect understanding. In Klapwijk's (1985: 127,123) 
words, "How can anyone, after the Holocaust, still unreservedly maintain: 
`In understanding we are drawn into an event of truth. '? " The underlying 
issue is, I think, Gadamer's immanentist perspective on reality (history). The 
transcendent cannot be taken into account hermeneutically so that it is only 
through the dialectic of a great diversity of interpretations that the 
universally valid emerges and the thing itself manifests itself. Klapwijk 
suggests that only the notion of the God who has revealed himself in Christ 
is adequate to enable us to hold on to a strong notion of truth in language. 
Thiselton (1992: 602-619) similarly points out that socio-critical theory raises 
in an acute form the issue of hermeneutical pluralism because, once it is 
allowed that `the world' can/should absorb the text, and a plurality of worlds 
is acknowledged, a plurality of diverse interpretations will inevitably be 
generated. Thiselton argues that while hermeneutical pluralism is inevitable, 
since we cannot assess one reading model in terms of another, this is "not 
the same as the belief that each life-world is self-contained, and incapable of 
metacritical ranking in terms of trans-contextual theory". "Would it be the 
same, " asks Thiselton (1992: 606), "in principle, to de-centre the present 
situation as a criterion of theological relevance and truth as to de-centre the 
biblical texts and their witness to Christ and to the cross as a criterion of 
relevance and truth? " 
The answer, from a Christian perspective, is of course `No! ', and Thiselton 
concurs at this point with those scholars who appeal for the Bible to absorb 
the world. Certainly when it comes to biblical interpretation one would want 
to ask which are the appropriate prejudices to bring to Scriptural 
interpretation, what is a healthy tradition to inhabit which is most likely to 
promote a fusion of horizons? As Heidegger asks, is there a right way to 
enter the unavoidable hermeneutical circle? At the outset of the next chapter 
we will address this issue. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have argued that `postmodernity' is better understood as a 
crisis of foundations in late modernity. This crisis is becoming evident in OT 
studies in terms of hermeneutic pluralism and fragmentation. Although little 
postmodern work has been done on Ecclesiastes we observed that consistent 
postmodernism would have radical implications for its interpretation. 
However, as we have seen, postmodernism is not as radically new as it is 
often presented and the hermeneutical positions its proponents advocate in 
OT studies still presuppose metanarratives and epistemologies. The value of 
postmodernism is its recognition that we have to position ourselves 
somewhere from which we do our analysis. The problem of postmodernism 
is its tendency to view all positionings as of equal value or of there being no 
way of deciding where one should position oneself. Gadamer has shown us 
that prejudices are inevitable in interpretation. The crucial question for 
biblical scholars is whether or not there are appropriate prejudices for OT 




CONCLUSION: READING ECCLESIASTES 
I INTRODUCTION 
Historical criticism is a product of modernity. Postmodernism problematises 
this philosophical shaping of historical criticism. Some philosophical 
shaping is inevitable, but we have seen that at many points the modem 
worldview is in conflict with a Christian perspective. In this context we have 
suggested that OT interpretation requires a hermeneutic shaped by a 
Christian perspective. This is a controversial position to argue for', and so in 
this chapter we will set out the case for such an approach and then attempt to 
outline the parameters of such a hermeneutic. Finally we will apply this 
hermeneutic to Ecclesiastes. 
II THE CASE FOR A CHRISTIAN HERMENEUTIC 
"The Christian god cannot have a more fundamental witness than Jesus Christ, 
even antecedent to the commitments of faith; Christian theology cannot abstract 
from Christology in order to shift the challenge for this foundational warrant onto 
philosophy. Within the context of a Christology and a Pneumatology of both 
communal and personal religious experience, one can locate and give its own 
philosophical integrity to metaphysics, but Christology and Pneumatology are 
fundamental. If one abrogates this evidence, one abrogates this god. " 
(Buckley, 1987: 361) 
As we have seen modernity sought to bracket out theological 
presuppositions in the knowledge enterprise and as Ingraffia (1995) shows 
there is a strong anti-theological tendency in postmodern theory. This is a 
prejudice of modernity and one which, as Gadamer so clearly points out, 
conflicts with Christianity. In the context of modernity many Christians have 
sought a synthesis of a Christian with a modernistic perspective in most 
areas including hermeneutics. Krentz, for example, seeks somehow to hold 
faith and modernistic historical criticism together. As a Jew Levenson 
(1993) clearly demonstrates the antithetical relationship between a 
modernistic historical approach to the Hebrew Bible and a literary 
(theological) approach. However, even he still hopes that somehow these 
1Barton (1993a) acknowledges that the argument for a religious hermeneutic is becoming more common 
but he is very cautious of this direction in biblical studies. A sense of the difference in opinion among 
scholars at this point becomes apparent by comparing Barton (1993a, 1993b) with Braaten and Jenson 
(1995). 
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antithetical approaches will lead to a larger truth. The problem with this 
synthesising approach is that it fails to recognise that 
"the reason why stories come into conflict with each other is that worldviews, and 
the stories which characterize them, are in principle nonnative: that is, they claim 
to make sense of the whole of reality. ... in principle the whole point of Christianity is that it offers a story which is the story of the whole world. It is 
public truth. Otherwise it collapses into some form of Gnosticism. " (Wright, 
1992: 41,42) 
Indeed, although many still insist on keeping OT studies distinct from 
philosophy and theology, there is a growing recognition by a variety of 
Christian academics that the public nature of the gospel and Christian faith 
necessarily involves actively allowing one's faith to shape one's 
scholarship2. Indeed, within OT studies, I would argue that this is implied in 
the very name Old Testament studies. At the heart of Christianity is the 
claim to public truth and this claim ought to be given full weight in OT 
studies, in my view. This is of course, not for a moment to deny the insights 
that alternative hermeneutics will arrive at or the right of the latter to be 
practised, but it is to insist that even these insights are not neutral but shaped 
by their `storied' roots. This conscious appropriation of my prejudices 
should not be seen as necessarily inhibiting the critical nature of this work. 
Maclntyre (1988) has, persuasively in my opinion, argued that all 
rationalities are traditioned and Gadamer (1989) has shown the constructive 
role of prejudices in understanding. The aim of being conscious and up front 
about our prejudices is that the otherness of the object of study might be 
focused more, and not less, clearly. 
Thus my proposal is that the way ahead philosophically in OT studies is to 
allow the philosophical scaffolding of OT studies to be shaped by a Christian 
perspective upon reality, what one might call a Christian worldview3. While 
I think this is the right way to proceed it is very important that this is not 
misunderstood to mean that I wish to exclude other approaches from the 
academy4. The sort of religiously shaped approach that I am arguing for is 
2Some examples of this tendency are, in philosophy: Dooyeweerd, Wolterstorff and Plantinga. In theology: 
Newbigin, Frei, Lindbeck (postliberal theology), McGrath. In literary studies: Etchells and Edwards. In 
aesthetics: Seerveld. See bibliography for titles. 
3A powerful historical case for this type of approach is made by Buckley (1987). Buckley argues 
persuasively that the origins of modern atheism in the West resulted to a large extent from the self- 
alienation of religion in which religion looked to philosophy to establish the existence of God. "In an effort 
to secure its basis, religion unknowingly fathered its own estrangement. " (Buckley, 1987: 359) 
4While I obviously side with those who argue for a religious hermeneutic, it should be noted that I am 
critical of advocates of both 'secular' and religious OT hermeneutics for their common lack of attention to 
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sometimes perceived in this way. What I am arguing for is a genuine 
pluralism in OT studies in which different starting points are allowed to 
shape OT scholarship so that the real differences can manifest themselves 
and real dialogue emerge. I do think that my type of approach is the right 
one but would want to defend the legitimacy of alternative approaches and 
would want to be in earnest discussion with those approaches in our 
common quest for the truth. This common quest defeats its object, however, 
if any of the partners insist that others share their starting point. Real 
academic freedom must mean allowing scholars to work from different 
starting points in different traditions. Too often modernistic scholars insist 
on a rationalist type of starting point, and `religious' scholars insists on a 
religious starting point. A genuine pluralism will make room for both5. 
It is, of course, no easy matter to decide how to give full and critical weight 
to the public nature of Christianity in scholarship. As Niebuhr (1975) points 
out, there is not one Christian understanding of the Christ-culture 
relationship but several6. Within this thesis there is no room for a detailed 
evaluation of the different perspectives upon the Christ-culture relationship 
which underlies any view of what Christian scholarship entails7. I must 
therefore simply declare my view that Niebuhr's transformative paradigm is 
the most biblical. It is close to the Reformed perspective upon reality (or 
worldview) which is clearly articulated by Wolters (1985) and in general 
forms the basis from which philosophers like Wolterstorffs and Plantinga 
work. The kind of philosophical direction I am proposing is the sort 
advocated by Wolterstorff (1984), Plantinga (1984), Clouser (1991), and 
Ingraffia (1995)9. 
philosophy. Especially appeals for a church hermeneutic seem to me in danger of short-circuiting the 
philosophical scaffolding of a hermeneutic. 
SThe debate about hermeneutics in OT studies too easily becomes acrimonious with labels like 'liberal' and 
'fundamentalist' being slung about, with both sides being reluctant to make room for the other. In my 
opinion this reflects an inadequate theory of academic pluralism. For a useful analysis of public pluralism 
see Mouw and Griffloen (1993). 
6Niebuhr (1975: 39-44) identifies five approaches to the Christ-culture relationship: Christ against culture; 
the Christ of culture; Christ above culture; Christ and culture in paradox; Christ the transformer of culture. 
7For such an evaluation see Strauss, 1990: 13-35. Scriven (1988) represents a recent upgrading of Niebuhr's 
analysis. 
8Wolterstorff (1983: 3-22) describes this type of Calvinistic paradigm as "world-formative Christianity. " 
91ngraffia explores the postmodern opposition to theology, arguing that a continuation of Nietzsche's 
project of vanquishing God's shadow is central to postmodern theory. Ingraffia examines Nietzsche's, 
Heidegger's and Derrida's opposition to theology and argues that they all critique the ontotheology that 
resulted from the Hellenization of biblical theology. Their deconstruction of this is helpful, but they fail to 
distinguish this ontotheology from biblical theology. The logos of the latter is radically different from the 
logos of the former and resists the deconstruction that the latter is subjected to by Derrida. Thus Christian 
thinkers ought not to follow postmodern theory but should reverse the ontotheological route by recovering a 
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Within current biblical hermeneutical discussions a number of voices have 
called for the sort of project I have in mind'0. Ouweneel proposes what he 
calls a Bibliotropic hermeneutic. In his view the worldview and the 
theoretical framework through which the Bible is approached and studied 
should be consistently Christian and in accord with the worldview of the 
Bible itself". Ouweneel (1993) has recently done significant work in re- 
evaluating the foundations of theology and he has expressed the need for this 
type of worldview to fund theology by coining a new expression viz. 
bibliotropic. A bibliotropic theology is one which "not only is faithful to the 
Bible's own Selbstverständnis but which also can critically account for this 
faithfulness on the basis of meta-theological or philosophical 
presuppositions which themselves are of a bibliotropic nature. Spiritual 
apostasy may manifest itself not only in liberal but also in conservative 
theology in so far as the latter is an open fortress, without much theoretical 
resistance to secular philosophy. " (Ouweneel, 1993: 1: 5) 
Amidst all his work on philosophical hermeneutics and biblical 
interpretation, Thiselton (1992: 604-619) finds it important to call for a 
"critique of the cross" in biblical hermeneutics. In a comparable way Watson 
(1994) argues for a theological hermeneutic in biblical interpretation. He 
(1994: 1) is quite clear on this: 
"The text in question is the biblical text; for the goal is a theological hermeneutic 
within which an exegesis oriented primarily towards theological issues can come 
into being. This is therefore not an exercise in general hermeneutics. ... the hermeneutic or interpretative paradigm towards which the following chapters 
move is a theological rather than a literary one, and the idea that a literary 
perspective is, as such, already 'theological' seems to me to be without 
foundation. " 
Watson's entire text is directed towards the "attempt to formulate in more 
systematic fashion some of the elements of a theological hermeneutic, 
theology of the cross, and developing Christian critical theory which is built on revelation and guided by a 
hermeneutics of faith. 
101 do not necessarily agree in all details with the examples that follow. For a critique of Watson and 
Thiselton see Bartholomew 1995c, 1996a. 
I lThe assumption here is that the Bible does express a consistent perspective upon reality or what we might 
call a worldview, and that Wolters (1991: 237) is correct in maintaining that "[b]iblical faith in fact 
involves a worldview, at least implicitly and in principle. The central notion of creation (a given order of 
reality), fall (human mutiny at the root of all perversion of the given order) and redemption (unearned 
restoration of the order in Christ) are cosmic and transformational in their implications. Together with other 
basic elements .... these central 
ideas ... give believers the fundamental outline of a completely anti-pagan Weltanschauung, a worldview which provides the interpretive framework for history, society, culture, 
politics, and everything else that enters human experience. " 
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intended as a framework within which exegesis may proceed. " (Watson, 
1994: 221)12 
One of the implications of such approaches to hermeneutics is surely the 
possibility, in principal at least, of an integrated hermeneutic in OT studies. 
A transformational13 Christian -perspective in OT hermeneutics is 
incompatible with the antithetical philosophical pluralism present in the 
academy. It should be noted that the argument for an integrated hermeneutic 
is not a position easily arrived at in today's pluralistic context. Contra 
Barthes anti-theological move14 which is endorsed by many postmoderns, 
we insist that the reality of God and the existence of humans, texts and 
history as part of his creation makes determinate meaning principially 
possible. There is such a thing as the true meaning of a biblical text and this 
meaning ought to be the goal of interpretation, even if as finite humans we 
can never be sure we have discovered it in its fullness. We share this 
commitment to objective truth with historical critics, but our understanding 
of objectivity is different from theirs, as we will explain below. Thus in the 
following section we will attempt to outline an integrated hermeneutic model 
for OT interpretation. 
III TOWARDS A HERMENEUTICAL MODEL FOR ACADEMIC15 
OLD TESTAMENT INTERPRETATION 
If we, as theists, believe that the universe is fundamentally personal in character, it 
follows that our ultimate understanding will not be in terms of things, which 
12For a comparison of Wright, Thiselton, Vanhoozer and Watson see Bartholomew, 1995c. Watson (1994) 
does not attend to the theology-philosophy relationship; indeed 'philosophy' does not occur in his index of 
subjects. However he (1990) has written the article on "Philosophy" in the "Dictionary of Biblical 
Interpretation. " In this article he surveys key thinkers in the history of Christianity and concludes that "[t]he 
influence of philosophy on biblical interpretation has tended to be tangential, and resources for 
interpretation have generally been drawn from within the Christian tradition or (since the Enlightenment) 
from the methods of secular historiography and textual scholarship. The present situation is marked by 
widespread scepticism about the ability of historical-critical scholarship to do full justice to the biblical 
texts, and increased awareness of the insights provided by the philosophical tradition might help to clarify 
this issue. " 
13In the sense of Niebuhr's paradigm of Christ as the transformer of culture. 
14See Barthes (1988) who connects textual indeterminacy with an anti-theological move. 
15This section is deliberately headed "for academic OT interpretation". Any study of the Old Testament i. e. 
of the OT as Scripture, has to take into account the fact that most of those who 'use' it as Scripture are non- 
academics. In this sense the study of the OT as Scripture is secondary to its pre-theoretical use as Scripture, 
a hermeneutical principle which has recently been recognised by liberation theologians. The critical 
question then is, how does theoretical reflection relate to pre-theoretical believing reading of Scripture? 
Vander Goot's (1984) explication of this relationship is the one which I feel most comfortable with. He 
argues for the priority of the 'direct' reading of Scripture and insists that biblical studies should be funded 
by the same world view as that of the text. "Only under such circumstances is the Bible's total claim 
properly acknowledged. " (Vander Goot, 1984: 83) Biblical theology should deepen insight into and 
elaborate on the apprehensions of faith that result from the direct use of the Bible in the community of faith. 
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occupy space and may or may not possess certain properties, but of persons, who 
characteristically do things. Action, not substance, will be our most important 
category of thought. It is a truth too long neglected by philosophers. 
(Lucas, 1976: 111)16 
The god who is so personal must have the personal as the foundation of his human 
assertion, and all other reflection that bears upon the existence of this god must 
have the personal as its critical context. (Buckley, 1987: 361) 
1. A COMMUNICATION MODEL OF OLD TESTAMENT 
INTERPRETATION 
In the light of the above two quotes language and texts are best approached 
as types of human communication or discourse'7, so that contra much 
postmodernism personhood is more basic to reality than language. Ricoeur's 
approach, which insists that we bring experience to language is of this sort, 
and is an alternative to deconstruction which makes language fundamental to 
reality. (Cf. Valdes, 1991: 5,6. ) Such a communication approach to texts 
positions a text in the hermeneutical framework: 
SENDER - MESSAGE - RECEIVER18. 
2. THE PRIORITY OF THE TEXT IN OT EXEGESIS. 
The contention of this model of exegesis is that the OT texts in the form that 
we have them should be the focus of interpretation, since it is through this 
text that we get at the message19. Lategan (1992: 152) is correct when he says 
that 
"the text represents the solidification of a preceding communication event. It is 
the deposit of a prior encounter between sender (e. g. Moses or Jesus) and receiver 
(e. g. Israel or the disciples). In the process of becoming a written text, the 
16This statement is quoted by Wolterstorff (1980) at the outset of his Art in Action. It was here that the 
statement attracted my attention. 
17For a philosophical defence of this position see Ricoeur, 1976. From a linguistic position the most well 
known proponents of this type of model are Jakobson (1960) and Austin (1975). Although Ricoeur defends 
a communication model of interpretation, he is critical of authorial discourse interpretation of texts. See 
below for a discussion of this. 
18Within Biblical Studies Lategan (1992) has applied this model in developing a biblical hermeneutic. 
Similarly Thiselton (1992) argues for the validity of speech-act theory in biblical hermeneutics and 
Wolterstorff (1995) has applied speech act theory to a philosophical understanding of the Bible as divine 
discourse. According to Lategan, the value of a communication model is that "[w]hen the full scope of the 
problem ... is taken as the point of departure, 
it becomes possible to classify methods in terms of the 
specific aspect they address and to select the most suitable method in each case. " 
191n some cases the form of the text is unclear. In this case the different possible 'final forms' will need to 
be explored. Cf. Clines (1984a) on Esther. Watson (1994: 16) helpfully refers to "the relative stabilization of 
the text. " 
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message may pass through various stages ... but the text represents also the first 
stage in the process of reinterpretation. The latter has as its aim a new 
communication event, this time between text and contemporary receiver. "20 
A communication approach directs us to this new communication event as 
the focus of interpretation, and clearly the text in its present form mediates 
the message that is at the heart of the new communication event. 
The expression commonly used to refer to this object of interpretation is 
`final form'. I am hesitant about this nomenclature for it may imply that we 
have access to the earlier forms of this text but that we choose to make the 
final form the object of our exegesis. In this case `final form' falsely implies 
that this same text existed in a number of different forms. In fact this is never 
so. We only have the OT texts that we have, and any reconstructed earlier 
`forms' are generally speculative and based on readings of the `final form'. 
This is particularly problematic when one bears in mind the cultural and time 
gap between these ANE texts and our era. Furthermore a reconstructed 
earlier version is a different text; for example the `Qoheleth' that many 
scholars reconstruct from the `final form' of Ecclesiastes is not the same text 
as Ecclesiastes. `Final form' also tends to carry with it the synchronic- 
diachronic tension between historical critical and canonical readings of the 
OT that is evident in Childs' canonical approach. A text may of course have 
a very complex pre-history but in its literary form it is far more than the sum 
of its component parts. 
Does such a view of the text as communicative address take sufficient 
account of the difference between a written and a spoken communication 
act? According to Ricoeur (1976: 25) "no interpretation theory is possible 
that does not come to grips with the problem of writing. " In Ricoeur's 
(1976: 25-37) view writing differs from an oral speech act in that it fixes the 
`said' of speaking, alters the connection of the message to the speaker so that 
the text becomes semantically autonomous, potentially universalises the 
message, makes the relation between message and code more complex, and 
shatters the grounding of reference in the dialogical situation. Nevertheless, 
in Ricoeur's view, the semantic autonomy of the text is still governed by the 
dialectic of event and meaning (Cf. Vald6s, 1991: 6). This is a complex issue 
but Wolterstorff (1995: 152) is correct in my opinion, when he argues that 
"Ricoeur was right to look for a practice of interpretation located in the 
20The italics are mine. 
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space between Romanticism and structuralism. But what occupies that space 
is not the practice of textual sense interpretation but the practice of authorial- 
discourse interpretation -a specific version of this being the practice of 
reading sacred texts to discern divine discourse. "2' 
To privilege the text as the focus of interpretation is not to deny the 
possibility of a text being so incoherent that it becomes necessary to posit a 
number of texts rather than a single text22. At the end of the day the proof of 
the pudding of any hermeneutic will be in the eating. As we have seen, 
though, historical criticism has often been too quick to move in this 
direction. In this respect NC, as we observed in chapter four, is a helpful 
reaction to such disintegration by insisting that the focus of literary study 
should be texts themselves, and that the literary unity of texts is often 
complex and full of tensions. In OT studies the literary nature of OT texts 
has been repeatedly confirmed through the application of literary methods to 
OT texts, thereby showing that what have often been assumed to be 
contradictions and reduplications are literary features of the text. The history 
of `contradictions' in Ecclesiastes is a good example of this. 
3. THE SENDER-MESSAGE RELATIONSHIP: GENETIC CRITICISM. 
Although in a communication model the text is the focus as the means to the 
message, such a model is always aware that the directedness of the text is a 
result of the activity of the sender/s. All texts, and especially OT ones are 
historically and culturally embedded so that explication of their message will 
always need to take the sender-message relationship seriously. In reaction to 
positivism NC often went too far in denying the need to take the historical 
aspect seriously in interpretation. The type of legacy of this focus on the 
literary at the expense of the historical in criticism is the tension that many 
biblical scholars feel today between synchronic and diachronic readings of 
biblical texts. The weakness of Frei's and Lindbeck's narrative hermeneutic, 
for example, is its failure to do justice to the referential/historical aspect of 
biblical texts23. The model of OT hermeneutics that I am proposing, while it 
21See Wolterstorff (1995: 130-152) for a thorough discussion of this aspect of Ricoeur's proposal, and cf. 
Thiselton (1992: 361ff) on Ricoeur's rejection of a dialogue model with respect to texts, and the resulting 
failure to take 'implicature' seriously. See also Thiselton (1992: 68-75) for theological arguments for 
reading Scripture as communicative address rather than as disembodied texts. Thiselton prefers the term 
"address" to "communication", since the latter is often linked in people's minds with an unproblematic 
transfer of information. 
22See our comments below on text structure. 
23As Watson (1994: 19-29) and Vanhoozer (1990) argue. 
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insists on privileging the OT texts as we have them as the focus of 
interpretation, refuses to drive a wedge between the synchronic and 
diachronic aspects of biblical texts. The text as the instantiation of a 
communication event comes into existence at a certain historical point - in 
all its synchroneity it is embedded in history, and it is crucial that this 
historical aspect of the text be taken seriously in interpretation. 
The assumption of a tension between synchronic and diachronic readings of 
texts is common in OT studies today. Levenson (1993) is a good example of 
such a view. He exposes the radical tension between a historical critical as 
opposed to a literary reading of the OT. In the preface (xiv, xv) he expresses 
his "own intuition ... that the two seemingly opposite 
directions in which 
these essays move are each indispensable avenues to the larger and more 
encompassing truth. The dignity both of traditional interpretation and of 
modern criticism depends on a careful separation of the two and a 
reengagement on new terms. " How these two antithetical approaches might 
lead to this larger truth is never explained; indeed Levenson has driven a 
wedge in between the historical and the traditional contexts and what 
Thiselton (1990: 341) says of Morgan should be said of Levenson at this 
point: "Rather than aim for a shift of emphasis between two paradigms, 
might not a more constructive task be the welding together of a more 
comprehensive hermeneutical model which seeks to draw on the strength of 
each approach while avoiding its distinctive weaknesses? " Sternberg too 
points in a similar direction in his strong denial that a literary interpretation 
can avoid historical questions. 
However'welding together' will not be enough if the underlying assumptions 
of Levenson are not also exposed. In chapter 5 Levenson (1993: 106-126) 
exposes the Enlightenment underpinnings of the historical method but still 
tends to affirm its neutral validity in this chapter and the rest of the book. In 
my opinion this retaining of an area of study as neutral is a legacy of 
`positivism' which itself needs to be undermined. 
A communication model of textuality alerts us to the need to explore the 
questions of authorship and readership and their respective worlds in a way 
that refuses to set the diachronic and the synchronic at odds with each other. 
With most OT texts, we have no external information in these respects so 
that we are inevitably pushed back to the text itself for information. The 
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critical question is how to take the historical aspect seriously in OT exegesis. 
Watson (intratextual realism), Wright (critical realism), Vanhoozer (speech 
act theory) and Thiselton (pastoral hermeneutic) all argue, albeit in different 
ways, for a `final form' approach which still takes the historical aspect of 
biblical texts seriously. Much of Watson's, Wright's and Vanhoozer's 
concern is with historical narrative texts in which the referential question 
surfaces in a way that it does not in Ecclesiastes. Historical critical 
interpretation does however affect the interpretation of Ecclesiastes in 
relation to source, form, redaction and tradition criticism in which earlier 
forms of the text are reconstructed and become the focus of interpretation. 
Within OT poetics Sternberg (1985: 7-23) has made what I regard as the 
most helpful proposals about reconstructing the relationship between source 
criticism and literary readings of the text. Sternberg regards NC as an 
unbalanced reaction to the excesses of historical scholarship in that it sought 
to bracket out historical questions in textual interpretation. This is just 
impossible according to Sternberg; even to understand Biblical Hebrew 
requires historical study and "[a]s with linguistic code, so with artistic code. " 
(Sternberg, 1985: 12) "But is the language any more or less of a historical 
datum to be reconstructed than the artistic conventions, the reality-model, 
the value system? " (Sternberg, 1985: 10) The text has no meaning outside of 
an historical context: "The appropriate coordinates are historical, and the 
main trouble with the historical approaches to the Bible is their antihistorical 
performance. " (Sternberg, 1985: 11) 
This antihistorical tendency is clearly seen, according to Sternberg, in the 
faulty application of source criticism that has been so dominant in OT 
studies. "Rarely has there been such a futile expense of spirit in a noble 
cause; rarely have such grandiose theories of origination been built and 
revised and pitted against one another on the evidential equivalent of the 
head of a pin; rarely have so many worked so long and so hard with so little 
to show for their trouble. " (Sternberg, 1985: 13) This is not to deride the 
question of genesis; "the only point at issue between them is where and how 
the appeal to the genetic option serves a purpose. " (Sternberg, 1985: 14) 
Sternberg (1985: 14,15) maintains that broadly speaking approaches to the 
Bible are of two sorts: source- and discourse-oriented inquiries. These 
approaches are distinguished by the object of inquiry. Source criticism is 
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dealt with by the theologian, historian, linguist and geneticist. It focuses on 
the biblical world (usually part of it) as it really was. The historian, for 
example, tries to determine what happened in Israelite history. The geneticist 
focuses on the processes that shaped the biblical text, the passage from oral 
to written transmission etc. Discourse analysis focuses on the text itself as a 
pattern of meaning and effect; to pursue this line of questioning is to make 
sense of the discourse in terms of communication. Discourse-oriented 
analysis seeks to understand the text as a 
"pattern of meaning and effect. What does this piece of language ... signify in 
context? What are the rules governing the transaction between storyteller or poet 
and reader? Are the operative rules, for instance, those of prose or verse, parable 
or chronicle, omniscience or realistic limitation, historical or fictional writing? ... To pursue this line of questioning is to make sense of the discourse in terms of 
communication, always goal-directed on the speaker's part and always requiring 
interpretive activity on the addressee's. " (Sternberg, 1985: 15) 
Sternberg argues strongly for a community of labour; the better we 
understand the context the better we will understand the text and vice versa. 
Source analysis is particularly dependent on understanding of the text 
because apart from the biblical texts we know very little of the context. 
Thus, "[t]he movement from text to reality cannot but pass through 
interpretation. If the Bible is a work of literature, therefore, nobody can 
evade the consequences. As reader, for example, the historian must take into 
account that every item of reality given in the text may have been stylized by 
conventions and for purposes alien to historical science. " (Sternberg, 
1985: 16) 
Discourse and source analysis do not even enjoy temporal priority over each 
other. "Both the interpreter and the historian must perforce combine the two 
viewpoints throughout, incessantly moving between given discourse and 
source in an endeavour to work out the best fit, until they reach some firm 
conclusion. " (Sternberg, 1985: 19) What varies is the object of study. Where 
the object is to make sense of the discourse, conjecture about the source 
operates as an aid to interpretation and discovery of its artful rules. 
Discourse and genetic analysis only become rivals when they cross their 
boundaries and, for example, the source critic imposes her reconstruction of 
the sources and process of composition on the text's structure. 
In biblical interpretation, we maintain that the primary object of study is the 
text as discourse so that source analysis will always be secondary to 
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interpretation of the text. Form, source, redaction and tradition criticism all 
have their place in the study of the sender-message relationship but 
understanding of the text as a whole must remain the goal towards which 
interpretative energies are directed. Clearly the type of model for 
understanding genetic criticism that Sternberg has proposed has radical 
implications for traditional genetic criticism as historical critics have 
practised it. Historical critics have tended to focus on the genetic pole of the 
genetic-discourse dialectic with often disastrous consequences for discourse 
analysis. While maintaining the validity of the genetic aspect of biblical 
interpretation it is vital that the dialectic between source and discourse 
analysis be recognised. 
4. THE TYPE OF MESSAGE : TEXTUAL TYPE OR GENRE. 
Genre is inseparable from the communicative nature of texts, as some of the 
metaphors used by scholars to describe genre indicate. Wellek and Warren 
(1963: 226) refer to genre as an `institution. ' 
"One can work through, express oneself through, existing institutions, create new 
ones, or get on, so far as possible, without sharing in polities or rituals; one can 
also join, but then reshape, institutions. Theory of genres is a principle of order.... 
Any critical and evaluative - as distinct from historical - study involves, in some 
form, the appeal to such structures. " 
Other metaphors used of genre are contracts, codes, games, deep and surface 
structure and patterns of expression (Longman, 1991: 8,9). These metaphors 
point to the character of genres as general, publicly known means of 
expressing a type of message. Ricoeur (1976: 32,33) helpfully points out that 
"genres are generative devices to produce discourse as ... Before being 
classificatory devices used by literary critics to orient themselves in the profusion 
of literary works, therefore being artefacts of criticism, they are to discourse what 
generative grammar is to the grammaticality of individual sentences. ... The function of these generative devices is to produce new entities of language longer 
than the sentence, organic wholes irreducible to a mere addition of sentences.... 
Language is submitted to the rules of a kind of craftsmanship, which allows us to 
speak of production and works of art, and, by extension of works of discourse. 
Poems, narratives, and essays are such works of discourse. The generative 
devices, which we call literary genres, are the technical rules presiding over their 
production. " 
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Consequently, at the macro level one of the major constraints of the way we 
read texts is the textual type or genre of the text24. Morgan (1988: 7) argues 
that 
"[t]exts, like dead men and women have no rights, no aims, no interests. They can 
be used in whatever way readers or interpreters choose ... in all cases it is the interests or aims of the interpreter that are decisive, not the claims of the text as 
such. Any suggestion that the text has rights is a deception concealing someone 
else's interests. "25 
A communicative model, however, refuses to make the aims of the 
interpreter decisive in this way but insists that the primary responsibility of 
the interpreter is to read the text along the grain, as it were, in order to 
discern the message of the text26. Texts in this view do have rights, aims and 
interests, and these need to be taken seriously if the text is to be read and 
criticised objectively. Text are an expression of interpersonal 
communication, and just as we cannot do as we like with people so there are 
ethics of reading. A communicative model reminds us of the need to respect 
the otherness of the text and to allow its voice to be heard. 
This stress on reading biblical texts objectively should not be seen as a 
reassertion of historical criticism in its classic modern mode. A distinction 
should, I suggest, be made between thick and thin notions of objectivity. The 
thin27 rationalist understanding of objectivity which reduces the truth of 
biblical texts to rational propositions and the thin historical-critical approach 
which generally fails to recognise the literary and kerygmatic nature of 
biblical texts because of its overwhelming interest in history should be 
rejected as distorting the biblical texts28. However it would be quite wrong to 
relinquish any notion of objectivity or realism, as some postmodems do. The 
24Cf Norris, 1991b: 206,207. Speaking of Spinoza as not belonging to those who regard interpretation as 
the normal mode of literary-critical activity, Norris points out that "[t]his alternative tradition goes right 
back to Aristotle, with his stress on the virtues of an orderly, disciplined method of approach that starts out 
from observed regularities of structure in various types of text, and then proceeds inductively to specify the 
rules or conventions governing that genre. The most obvious heirs of Aristotelian thinking are those 
modern formalist or structuralist movements which likewise see no virtue in producing ever more 
sophisticated interpretations of individual texts, but concentrate rather on the various poetic devices ... that 
characterize literary discourse in general. " In this way genre functions as an important part of the resistance 
of a text to being read in any way. 
25Morgan's view is more nuanced than this quote taken by itself may suggest. See chapter one of his 
Biblical Interpretation. 
26However important it may be to read texts against the grain, before this can be done they first have to be 
read along the grain. 
271 am using thin here as a metaphor for reductionistic. 
28Note that both fundamentalist hermeneutics (propositional ism) and liberal hermeneutics have been 
deeply influenced by modernity, albeit in quite different directions. 
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point is that a reductionistic Enlightenment understanding of objectivity 
should be rejected because it fails to take into account a variety of factors 
that influence the acquisition of knowledge29, and it yields a narrow view of 
biblical textuality. A thicker notion of method and of biblical textuality is 
required, since interpretation involves both of these elements. But this means 
broadening rather than abandoning the quest for objectivity entirely, as some 
postmodern thinkers are prone to do. 
A thicker notion of biblical texts is required which takes into account their 
historical, literary and ideological/theological aspects30. Such a notion of 
textuality needs to be matched by a thicker notion of readers which takes 
into account religion, gender, culture, historical period and so on. In our 
history-dominated context, careful consideration of the genre of texts can be 
particularly helpful in resisting imposition of thin methodologies upon texts 
since it forces one to take the different aspects of the biblical texts 
seriously31. 
In discourse analysis of the tagmemic sort some highly creative work is 
starting to be done on textual types, particularly as these relate to narrative 
biblical texts32. Unfortunately very little of this sort of work has yet been 
done on wisdom texts. Textual type/genre shapes the entire work so that it is 
crucial to correct interpretation that the interpreter picks up on the type and 
is aware of the rules for that genre. As we saw in chapter five, and as we 
stressed in the section on genetic discourse above, genre determination will 
be a joint historical-literary venture. The concept of genre also needs to be a 
flexible one, which refuses to squeeze texts into preconceived patterns and 
recognises the individual structure of a text33. Genre remains however a 
crucial factor in objective interpretation. 
29Feminist epistemology, for example, has alerted us to the role of gender and subjectivity in the knowing 
process. Harding (1987: 9) helpfully points out that "the beliefs and behaviors of the researcher ... must be 
open to critical scrutiny no less than what is traditionally defined as relevant evidence. Introducing this 
'subjective' element into the analysis in fact increases the objectivity of the research and decreases the 
`objectivism' which hides this kind of evidence from the public. " Clouser (1991) argues for taking religious 
presuppositions seriously in accounts of theory. In my opinion a thick objectivity or what one might call a 
critical realism needs to take all these factors into account. 
301n NT studies Wright (1992) has attempted to develop such a thick notion of biblical texts, and in OT 
studies Sternberg (1985) has argued along similar lines. 
31As we saw in chapter five. 
32See Dawson, 1994. 
33Croce's denial of the existence of genre is an extreme position, but it is understandable as a reaction 
against the `genre tranchd' of classicism (Wellek and Warren, 1963: 233,234). This over reaction correctly 
recognises the individuality of each text and the importance of an inductive, historical approach to the 
question of genre. 
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5. THE INDIVIDUALITY OF THE MESSAGE: TEXT STRUCTURE. 
A communication model of interpretation alerts us to the particularity of 
each text, and, whereas genre is something that a text shares with other texts, 
structure is more specific to a text. All texts have some structure. The idea of 
a text or work carries with it notions of developing unity and coherence. 
Where these break down completely one would conclude that one is not 
dealing with a work or unified text. Bradbury (1987: 235) argues rightly that 
"[a]ll critical theories have some notion of structure: the developing unity of a 
work. ... I here assume what I think must 
be assumed for criticism effectively to 
exist: that every work is a distinct and verbally-created universe and must have a 
self-created logic or sequence for which the author is responsible. The work will 
have its own expectations and probabilities which constitute the unity of that 
universe. " 
Coherence of relationships, actions, rhetorical devices, and attitudes are part 
of this unity, as Bradbury points out. Structural analysis seeks to lay bare the 
way in which these different elements contribute to the developing 
coherence of a particular text. 
Internal (derived from the text itself) and external (derived from outside the 
text) means exist for gaining access to the coherence of a work. In chapter 
four we examined the structuralists' (external) attempt to lay bare the deep 
structures of different types of literature. This is a helpful area of research 
provided it is understood as an investigation of what lies behind a text rather 
than analysis of the text itself. For biblical interpretation the surface structure 
of the text is more important, and, insofar as the connection between deep 
and surface structures can be articulated, structuralism has much to offer. 
Discourse analysis of the way textual type shapes syntax34 is another 
example of how external means can be helpful in discerning textual 
structure. And analyses of the poetics of narrative structure have been found 
to illuminate the coherence of biblical texts in all sorts of insightful ways. 
If it is right to think of deep structure as analysis of genre then what we are 
after is the way in which a genre/ deep structure has come to the particular 
shape of the text we are examining. In the latter respect the internal means of 
deriving structure are particularly important, means such as study of the 
34See Dawson, 1994. 
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individual texts' rhetorical techniques such as inclusions, repetitions, chiasm 
and so on. Clearly these cannot be separated either from the content of the 
text or from `external' and historical studies of such techniques. Structural 
analysis will inevitably involve a dialectic between generalised notions of 
deep structure, genre, discourse-type and rhetoric and the shape of the 
individual text35. 
6. THE WORLD OF THE MESSAGE: INTERTEXTUALITY 
I am using intertextuality here not in the polemical sense of intertextuality as 
opposed to intersubjectivity36 but in the sense of pre-understanding and 
"inner-biblical" exegesis37. A communication model of biblical 
hermeneutics will involve exploring the world of the text and the world of 
the sender, and their interrelationship. In terms of genetic criticism the OT 
forms an indispensable part of the historical context of any OT text. 
However, the OT also comes to us as part of Hebrew and Christian Scripture 
and this aspect of the text cannot be ignored, as Childs has repeatedly 
pointed out38. An approach to the OT as Christian Scripture would expect a 
general understanding of the whole to be a helpful 
prejudice/preunderstanding in approaching the part. In this sense biblical 
theology and Christian doctrine should form part of the prejudice with which 
the reader comes to the text. However, particular care must be taken that this 
prejudice is not simply read into the biblical text (eisegesis) but that it allows 
the text to speak on its own terms. Inner-biblical exegesis can be of help in 
this respect in examining how a text uses parts of other biblical texts. 39 
7. THE MESSAGE OF THE TEXT: THE IMPLIED AUTHOR. 
A communication model hermeneutic alerts us to discernment of the 
message as the goal of biblical interpretation40. In literary texts, including the 
35Sternberg (1985: 56,57) notes that "[ijn most of the theoretical work that I have done, on narrative and 
other subjects, the Bible has proved a corrective to widely held doctrines about literary structure and 
analysis, often a pointer to the formation of alternatives. In my biblical work, conversely, seldom have I 
found a narrative or strategy proceeding along the theoretically expected grooves or, after the event, failing 
to illuminate a host of other corpora and traditions. " 
36See Thiselton, 1992: 41. 
37This is Fishbane's (1985) expression. See especially pp. 2-19. 
38See also Wolterstorff, 1995: 204-208. 
39See Thiselton, 1992: 39-42 for some helpful comments on Fishbane's inner-biblical exegetical method. 
40See Wolterstorff (1995: 183-222) for a very useful discussion of the relationship between interpreting the 
mediating human discourse and interpreting for the mediated divine discourse. In the hermeneutic method 
that I am outlining I have not elaborated on this second stage of interpreting the mediated divine discourse. 
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OT, the message is not always immediately obvious. This remains true even 
if we agree with Sternberg that the biblical authors adopted a foolproof 
method of composition41. The movement from the truth to the whole truth of 
a biblical text is always via the literary contours of a biblical text. A helpful 
way of getting at this overall message of the text is the notion of the implied 
author. 
The notion of the implied author is developed by Booth (1983). The implied 
author refers to where the author wants the reader to stand in the world of 
values. "In short, the author's judgement is always present, always evident to 
anyone who knows how to look for it. " (Booth, 1983: 20) "As he writes, he 
creates not simply an ideal, impersonal `man in general' but an implied 
version of `himself that is different from the implied authors we meet in 
other men's works. " (Booth, 1983: 70) Other terms for the implied author are 
the official scribe, the author's second self. (Booth, 1983: 71) The implied 
author is not to be confused with the narrator or the "I" of a work, these 
more commonly refer to the speaker in the work "who is after all only one of 
the elements created by the implied author and who may be separated from 
him by large ironies. `Narrator' is usually taken to mean the `I' of a work, 
but the `I' is seldom if ever identical with the implied image of the artist 42" 
(Booth, 1983: 73)43 "Our sense of the implied author includes not only the 
extractable meanings but also the moral and emotional content of each bit of 
action and suffering of all the characters. It includes, in short, the intuitive 
apprehension of a completed artistic whole; the chief value to which this 
implied author is committed, regardless of what party his creator belongs to 
in real life, is that which is expressed by the total form. " (Booth, 1983: 73,74) 
In his work on biblical narrative Sternberg (1985: 74,75) finds Booth's 
notion of the implied author irrelevant because in biblical narrative the 
implied author and narrator merge into each other. For Sternberg what is 
This is not because I regard it as unimportant! Rather, as Wolterstorff makes clear, one gets at the second 
stage always via the first. "The most fundamental principle, I submit, is this: the interpreter takes the stance 
and content of my appropriating discourse to be that of your appropriated discourse, unless there is good 
reason to do otherwise. " (Wolterstorff, 1995: 204) 
41See Sternberg, 1985: 230ff. In conversation with Sternberg it became clear to me that he uses foolproof 
composition to refer to the basic contours of the narrative rather than specifically to the message of the text. 
The latter may be located more at the indeterminate margins of the text, and is always arrived at via the 
poetics of the narrative. 
42As Booth (1983: 155-158) points out, "In any reading experience there is an implied dialogue among 
author, narrator, the other characters, and the reader. Each of the four can range, in relation to each of the 
others, from identification to complete opposition. " 
43mis is the mistake that Perdue (1994b: 202) makes. 
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important is that "the distance between the historical writer and the implied 
author/narrator is so marked, indeed unbridgeable, that they not only can but 
must be distinguished. " However, as we have seen, Fox has suggested that in 
Ecclesiastes the implied author may be distinct from the narrator, in which 
case Booth's distinction of the two may still have merit for biblical 
interpretation. Either way, to think in terms of an implied author or an 
implied author-narrator is helpful in focusing biblical interpretation on the 
message of the text. As Sternberg (1985: 75) points out this is inevitable: 
"[t]he author/narrator exists only as a construct, which the reader infers and fills 
out to make sense of the work as an ordered design of meaning and effect.... 
Where our interpretations differ, so do our reconstructions of his image - ways, 
means, and all. But reconstruct him according to our lights we must, all of us, not 
excluding the most dedicated geneticist. For a moment's thought will reveal that 
the very fragmentation of a biblical tale into sources, documents, etc. presupposes 
a unity distinctive of some teller, and the triumphant pointing to some version as 
the original form announces his disentanglement from the overall process of 
transmission. " 
8. THE RECEIVER/S OF THE MESSAGE: 
THE READER AND THE TEXT. 
The reader is the recipient of the message embodied in the text, according to 
a communication model hermeneutic. The notion of the implied reader fits 
well with this approach. "The author creates, in short, an image of himself 
and another image of his reader; he makes his reader, as he makes his second 
self, and the most successful reading is one in which the created selves, 
author and reader, can find complete agreement. " (Booth, 1983: 138) Each 
biblical text is historically embedded and the way to the message is via the 
first horizon. As with the sender of the message the initial readership has to 
be reconstructed mainly via the text. Although the implied author and the 
implied reader are always constructs of the reader, this approach maximises 
the constraints of the text in interpretation. Fundamental to the process of 
biblical interpretation is the attempt to hear the message of the text in this 
way. 
Current methods of interpretation have often undermined this approach to 
biblical interpretation. Clines (1993: 86,87) has gone so far as to suggest that 
this approach to interpretation may be unethical, because it may require a 
reader to position herself against her deepest beliefs. Clines has a point in 
that Booth is, I think, wrong in suggesting that the most successful reading is 
229 
always that in which the created selves find complete agreement. Ethically, 
certain texts are most successfully read when reader and implied 
author/implied reader are opposed. The point is though, that before one can 
disagree with a text one has to read it, and to do so along the grain. Feminist 
and materialist critiques, to mention only two, can follow such a reading but 
should not - indeed cannot - precede it44. 
Defending the importance of the first horizon in biblical interpretation does 
not mean ignoring the second horizon. In any textual interpretation the two 
will be in constant dynamic interaction. As the history of biblical 
interpretation demonstrates, what is brought to a text influences the way it is 
read. Subjective and communal factors play a significant role in all 
interpretation, and critical consciousness of these is vital in biblical 
interpretation. As Thiselton (1980: 15,16) has argued, biblical interpretation 
is about the fusion of two horizons, that of the biblical text and that of the 
reader. Interpretation takes place at the fusion of these horizons and the 
biblical interpreter needs to be sensitive to the elements in both horizons and 
how these affect interpretation. 
For example, Western individualism and privatised religion have regularly 
been read into biblical texts, whereas in fact they are concepts deeply alien 
to biblical religion45. I have suggested that there is a certain reader `baggage' 
which aids the objective reading of biblical texts, baggage such as a 
commitment to these texts as Christian Scripture. In this sense Bibliotropic 
exegesis is the ideal. However, in order to bring hidden baggage to light, 
interpretations within one community ought to be in dialogue with 
interpretations of the same text within other communities. In this respect 
dialogue of Christian interpreters with Enlightenment historical critical 
readings or other religious readings can be very helpful. 
44For a useful survey of the variety of approaches to the reader in literary theory see Suleiman, 1980. 
Suleiman distinguishes between positive and negative hermeneutics. The former upholds the pervasive 
notion of the unity and wholeness of the text and the existence and possibility of discovering meaning, the 
very things which negative hermeneutics deny. This denial of the unity of the text is connected with 
fragmented views of the self, i. e. with anthropology As Suleiman perceptively comments, `That there exists 
a strong correlation between theories of the self and theories of the text has not escaped the more 
perspicacious of today's literary critics; nor has the correlation between both theories of self and of text and 
larger philosophical issues. Indeed, I think it is the recognition of these correlations and of their 
consequences that accounts for the passionately polemical tone in the debate between 'positive' and 
`negative' theorists of interpretation. " (Suleiman, 1980: 42) A positive hermeneutic and the sort of view of 
the reader I argue follows from a Christian hermeneutical model, in my opinion. 
450n the issue of the modern distinction between secular and religious and its relationship to wisdom 
literature see Murphy, 1978: 40. Murphy rightly points out that this modern conceptual disjunction is not 
applicable to OT thought. 
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A Christian model of biblical interpretation should ultimately never be 
individual. Scripture can only be approached as Scripture in community, and 
this implies a system of checks and balances within the community within 
which one works. This does not mean however that academic biblical 
interpretation should all ideally be done within the institutional church. 
Academic biblical interpretation fits, in my view, within the university, as 
long as the biblical scholar is genuinely free to allow her religious 
presuppositions to shape her exegesis. 
IV READING ECCLESIASTES 
"Such texts as Job, Ecclesiastes, and the parables do not function primarily as 
raw-material for Christian doctrine. ... Their primary function is to invite or to provoke the reader to wrestle actively with the issues, in ways that may involve 
adopting a series of comparative angles of vision. " (Thiselton, 1992: 65,66) 
Our concern in this section is to apply the above communication model of 
OT exegesis to Ecclesiastes46. 
1. READING ECCLESIASTES. 
One of the legacies of modernity in the history of the interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes is that the present form of Ecclesiastes is hardly ever 
consciously read as a literary whole47. Historical criticism has made a habit 
of reconstructing Qoheleth and then reading this `earlier form' of the text, 
with the epilogue (12: 9-14) in particular always understood as a later 
addition to Qoheleth. As I demonstrated in chapter three this remains the 
dominant way of `reading' `Ecclesiastes'. A rare exception to this is Fox 
(1989) who reads Ecclesiastes as a literary unity. 
An implication of a communication model of OT exegesis is that exegesis 
must privilege Ecclesiastes rather than `Qoheleth'48, and must take the 
46It is important to note that what I am proposing are preliminary soundings. The intention of this chapter 
is not to argue in detail for a definitive interpretation of Ecclesiastes but to show the directions that my 
hermeneutic proposal might open up. 
47Note that this has nothing to do with textual criticism. Cf. Murphy (1992a: xxiv) on the faithful 
transmission of the text. If the final form of Ecclesiastes is stable, it should be noted however that "[t]he 
book is exceedingly difficult to translate ... because of our ignorance of the precise nuances of the 
terminology and of Qoheleth's thought. " (Murphy, 1990: 50) 
48I15, -1p is the Hebrew name for Ecclesiastes, but in critical scholarship this name is often used for the 
reconstructed text i. e. the words of Qoheleth, which then becomes the focus of interpretation. 
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circular "intent at totality of the interpretative process" seriously49. This, as 
we saw in chapter four is one of the great strengths of the New Critical 
approach to literary texts50. The hermeneutical circle is involved in all 
interpretation, including that, of the historical critical approach which 
reconstructs Ecclesiastes before the `real' interpretation begins. As we saw 
in chapter three this is the legacy of the application of a wooden source- 
critical method to the text which ignores its crafted literary character. Even 
in this hermeneutic, however, there has to be a move from the text in its final 
form as we have it to the reconstructed text, i. e. a move from trying to read 
the whole to a conclusion that the whole is incoherent and the text must be 
divided to be read in layers. Few scholars would still defend the way early 
historical critical readers of Ecclesiastes came to this conclusion, and yet the 
legacy of that conclusion lingers, but without the process involved in that 
initial circular attempt at totality always being made conscious. Indeed, our 
contention is that the legacy of the early historical critical readings of 
Ecclesiastes is allowed to occupy the space of that initial circular intent in 
most modem readings of Ecclesiastes. This is however unacceptable. The 
conclusion that a text cannot be read as a whole should come at the end (or 
middle) of a hermeneutic process and not at the beginning, as it so often 
does. The literary character of Ecclesiastes (see below) makes this historical 
critical short-circuiting of the circular intent at totality in its interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes particularly damaging, since it excludes the possibility of the 
full richness of the carefully crafted literary text becoming explicit. 
2. THE GENRE OF ECCLESIASTES. 
We have already given sustained attention to the genre of Ecclesiastes in 
chapter five, where we concluded that in terms of comparative historical 
genre Ecclesiastes is a developed wisdom form of the royal testament or 
fictional autobiography cast in a frame-narrative. 
49This phrase is De Man's (1983: 31). 
50De Man (1983: 27) rightly points out that "[i]t is true that American textual interpretation and 'close 
reading' have perfected techniques that allow for considerable refinement in catching the details and 
nuances of literary expression. They study texts as `forms, ' as groupings from which the constitutive parts 
cannot be isolated or separated. This gives a sense of context that is often lacking in French or in German 
interpretations. " 
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3. THE STRUCTURE OF ECCLESIASTES: LITERARY ARTISTRY. 
The more literary a text is the more important it is to attend to its structure in 
order to penetrate its message. As the quote from Thiselton at the top of 
section IV above indicates, Ecclesiastes is a text that is carefully crafted in 
order to draw us into a discussion. Consequently we will arrive at an 
understanding of its message only via its poetics. 
=5 Vj 7M in 12: 10 and 71 N, 17 ii and 77 fl in 12: 9 confirm that 
Ecclesiastes is a carefully crafted text51. Recent scholarship has started to 
recognise this, as treatment of the `contradictions' in Ecclesiastes indicates 
(Cf. for example Whybray, 1989a: 17-19). Clements (1992: 34) picks up on 
this literary character of Ecclesiastes when he writes that 
"Qoheleth marks a significant milestone in the progress of wisdom. In the first 
place there are clear signs that, although the author was accustomed to delivering 
his teaching orally, he has developed characteristically literary structures and 
woven short epigrammatic sayings into more extended compositions. Individual 
sayings have been combined into larger structures which serve to modify, and 
even challenge, the validity of the shorter individual sayings. Some sections 
display the form of asserting a thesis, seemingly outrageous, which is then 
skilfully justified. " 
Our suggestion is that Ecclesiastes is artistically crafted to a greater extent 
than Clements recognises. Certainly recognition of the literary craftedness of 
Ecclesiastes is crucial for its interpretation. In the past historical critical 
scholars have been too certain that they knew what a book is and what it is 
not. In Good's (1981: 171,172) words, they thought that a book is "a unified, 
logically argued and constructed whole. " 
"When we discover that Qoheleth as it stands does not fit the definition, we are 
baffled. We are forced to assume, therefore, either that its disunity, lack of 
construction, and failure of logic are illusions, to be dispelled if we work hard 
enough, or that somebody has been tampering with the original, which must ex 
hypothesi, have corresponded to our definition of a `book'. So we search out the 
`original', brush aside all that rings falsely with it, and bask in the warm assurance 
that once again we have justified our definition of a 'book'. " 
As Good points out, the fact is that we have before us a `work' and our 
responsibility is to permit it to speak for itself. To analyse the book's origin 
is not to solve its problem, and we "must above all avoid the modernizing 
51 Wright's mathematical analysis of Ecclesiastes (see chapter 4) and Skehan's (1976) mathematical study 
of Proverbs support the carefully crafted nature of some wisdom texts. 
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error of confusing the person of an author with the integrity of the work. In 
Qoheleth we have to do with the work, not with a hypothetically 
reconstructible author. " (Good, 1981: 172) Our proposal is that Ecclesiastes 
is a carefully crafted work and that investigation of its literary craftedness 
allows the text to speak in all its colours and shades. Research in this area is 
in its early stages, and what follows is tentative. 
a. Irony : "Wisdom" in Ecclesiastes. 
A great deal of research has been done on irony in literary studieS52. Lee 
(1987: 128,129) discerns two major categories of irony, situational and 
verbal, which can also be classified further as comic or tragic. Verbal irony, 
which is what we have to do with in Ecclesiastes53, Lee defines as, "an art of 
indirection and juxtaposition, relying for its success on such techniques as 
understatement, paradox, puns and other forms of wit in the expression of 
incongruities. " Irony is, according to Lee, a means for unifying the apparent 
contradictions of experience and is also able to assert the world's diversity. 
The common definition of irony is as saying one thing and meaning the 
opposite. Irony may be taken literally, "Yet a nagging doubt hints at a 
meaning hidden behind the mask. " (Good, 1981: 22) Irony is criticism which 
perceives an incongruity in things as they are, but it is distinguished from 
other perceptions of incongruity by two characteristics. Firstly it is stated by 
means of understatement or a method of suggestion rather than of plain 
statement. Secondly the perception comes from a supposed stance in truth. 
An ironic mode of speech dominates much of Ecclesiastes (Cf. Fisch, 1988). 
Our aim here is not to do an exhaustive study of irony in Ecclesiastes but 
merely to show through one central example how an examination of irony in 
Ecclesiastes potentially opens up the meaning of the text. Our example is 
; it ri in Ecclesiastes. 
52See Booth, 1974 and Hutcheon, 1994 plus their bibliographies for the extensive material available on 
irony. Empson (1963) and the New Critics gave sustained attention to irony, as one would expect. Within 
OT studies Good (1981) examines irony in the OT including Ecclesiastes, and Fisch (1988) has a chapter 
on Qoheleth as a "Hebrew Ironist". The standard contemporary commentaries on Ecclesiastes rarely deal 
with irony. A quick survey of Ogden (1987), Murphy (1992), Crenshaw (1988), Lohfink (1993), Perdue 
(1994), Clements (1992), Whybray (1989) and Lauha (1978) reveals that only in Lauha are there a few 
minor references to irony! 
53Studies have also been made of irony in Job (see Clines, 1989: xcvii) and to a lesser extent of irony in 
Proverbs. For the latter cf. for example Alonso Schökel, 1988: 165 for a one page discussion of irony in 
Proverbs. Fisch (1988) and Good (1981) contain preliminary discussions of irony in Ecclesiastes. 
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ri r is the specific means by which Qoheleth conducts his search for 
meaning `under the sun' (1: 13)54. Reading Qoheleth within the context of the 
OT wisdom corpus, and especially after Proverbs, one initially tends to read 
rTTDri positively as that practical and intellectual wisdom that is rooted in 
the fear of Yahweh and handed on from generation to generation. As Fox 
(1987: 82) points out, in biblical wisdom literature 711 = and Tl 1 are 
almost always ethically positive55. Indeed, some commentators assume that 
the meaning of 7 T] DR in Ecclesiastes is very much the same as it is in 
Proverbs and Job. Ogden (1987: 34), for example, says of 711=m in 1: 13 that 
"[t]he tool for this investigation was `wisdom' ... 
by which he means the 
inherited tradition of the wise men together with its method of observation 
and reflection. " Ogden never explores the precise nuance of 71=1 in 
Ecclesiastes. Even those who do not make quite such a strong equation as 
Ogden still tend to define i= in Ecclesiastes in quite general terms and 
to assume that the empiricism of Qoheleth is much the same as that in the 
other wisdom books56. 
However, as one proceeds with Ecclesiastes, it becomes apparent that i 1? ZDi1 
here means something very different from its predominantly positive usage 
in Proverbs. Fox (1987,1989) has given sustained attention to Mnnm as part 
of Qoheleth's epistemology in Ecclesiastes57. On the basis of 1: 12ff Fox 
insists that we need to carefully examine Qoheleth's epistemology. The 
problem of knowledge is central to the book, and although Qoheleth's 
epistemology is unsystematic, it is not chaotic. Qoheleth's ideas form a 
coherent whole and allow for systematic exposition. 
54For a discussion of the terminology of wisdom see Fox, 1989: 80-85. It has been suggested that 71]Mi1 is 
the object of'11i1t71 M7`15 in v13 but wisdom is best understood here as the means by which Qoheleth 
investigates life (Cf. Fox, 1989: 175). 
55Two partial exceptions which Fox mentions are Proverbs 3: 5 and 21: 30. 
56Whybray (1989a: 49) simply notes that "Qoheleth's intention is to test the adequacy of human wisdom at 
its best. " Murphy (1992a: lxi-lxiv, 13) has an extended note on wisdom in Ecclesiastes but fails to detect the 
serious difference in method between rU l1 in 1: 13 compared with most of its occurrences in Proverbs. 
Indeed, Murphy (1992a: lxiii) remarkably suggests that, "Qoheleth is often in conflict with wisdom 
teaching, but his methodology is nonetheless that of the sage. He frequently reminds the reader how he 
applied himself with 'wisdom'. " See also Gladson (1979: 20) for an example of the assumption that wisdom 
literature shares a common empirical epistemology. Those scholars like Gladson, who use 'empirical' to 
describe the general method of wisdom use it is an untechnical way to refer to the observational and 
reflective element in wisdom. 
57Cf. Nordheimer in chapter two, II. 
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Fox (1989: 79-120) examines 1T i1 in Ecclesiastes and concludes that 
Qoheleth adopted an empirical methodology; he seeks to derive knowledge 
from experience and to validate his ideas experientially. Fox applies 
`empirical' to Qoheleth's method by analogy to Western philosophical 
empiricism, although he recognises that Qoheleth does not offer a 
philosophical theory: "we can say that he holds a primitive form of the type 
of empiricism (the `weak' form) that maintains that all knowledge comes 
from experience because every proposition is either a direct report on 
experience or a report whose truth is inferred from experience. " (Fox, 
1989: 85) 
Fox does acknowledge that much that Qoheleth says comes from traditional 
learning and impulse, and that some of his ideas are formulated a priori 
(e. g., 3: 17; 8: 12b) or derive from assumptions that lack experiential 
grounding (e. g., 7: 11-12). Nevertheless, Fox maintains that the `empirical' 
label is justified, firstly, by Qoheleth's method, which looks to experience as 
the source and warrant of knowledge, and secondly, by his concept of 
knowledge, according to which knowledge is created by thought and 
dependent on perception. 58 
Qoheleth's empirical procedure of discovery is readily confirmed, in my 
opinion, by an examination of texts like 1: 12-18 and 2: 1-11.2: 1-11 is 
concerned with Qoheleth's exploration of pleasure and the process of his 
enquiry is set out in v3-9. The general process of enquiry is set out in v3 and 
the specifics in v4-9 (Fox, 1989: 178). The goal of the process is articulated 
in v3bß as: 
mmtr m nnn tzn, ' -tm trimm nmm =Ito nt-'m nwlr--Icým -iv . 
The goal is to "see", i. e. to validate through critical observation what is 
worthwhile and meaningful for humans. This goal is `achieved' through 
rational analysis (7=t7) and experience. The role of experience is clear in v3a 
and particularly in the numerous first person activities in v4-8. Isaksson, as 
58Michel (1989: 24-28,35-38; 1988: 33) notes that the verb 'see' occurs 46 times and often means critical 
observation. He thus suggests that Qoheleth is not registering an empirical datum but is critically evaluating 
what he has perceived. He argues that Qoheleth is thus not an empiricist, as Fox suggests, who engages in 
various experiences and notes them down, but a thinker, an epistemological sceptic. Murphy (1992a: xxx) 
notes that the difference between Michel and Fox may just be verbal. However Qoheleth's epistemology 
has an observatory and a validatory side to it and Michel is mistaken, I think, in restricting Qoheleth's 
method to the validatory. 
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we saw in chapter five, relates the first person Suffix Conjugation forms to 
the autobiographical nature of Ecclesiastes. This element is present here, but 
the more dominant element is that of Qoheleth's personal experience as the 
key to knowledge. The repetition of MMDi1 in v3 and v9 should also be 
noted. These two comments on wisdom function, I suggest, as an inclusion 
within which the process of inquiry is articulated, and in the process the 
readers attention is strongly alerted to the method by which this wisdom 
operates. 
For Qoheleth investigation of the world with 1=M means that he will use 
his powers of reason applied to his experience and observations rather than 
prior knowledge in his inquiry. Fox points out Qoheleth never invokes prior 
knowledge or anything he heard,, as an argument for his convictions. 
Qoheleth seeks experience, observes it, evaluates it and then reports his 
conclusions. The methodological orientation in 1: 12-13 encompasses all 
Qoheleth's teaching. 
Other scholars have also picked up on this empiricistic epistemology of 
Qoheleth, although none has examined it as thoroughly as Fox or discerned 
the ironic contrast with other wisdom literature. Hengel (1974: 126), for 
example, says of Qoheleth's thought that "[i]ts unprejudiced, detached 
observation and its strictly rational, logical thought lead to a radical criticism 
of the doctrine of retribution in traditional wisdom and thus indirectly attack 
a cornerstone of Jewish piety. " As we shall argue below the doctrine of 
retribution in traditional wisdom is more complex than Hengel suggests, but 
he has correctly identified the nature of Qoheleth's epistemology. On 2: 1 
Whybray (1989a: 52) says: "It is because `Solomon' has determined to seek 
it [happiness, contentment] independently for himself that he discovers that, 
like his corresponding attempt to rely on his own wisdom and knowledge 
(1: 13,17) it proves totally unsatisfactory. " Lohfink (1993: 24,25) is very clear 
that T11 in Ecclesiastes should not be translated as "Weisheit. " 
"»Wissen«, und nicht das übliche »Weisheit«, ist in Koh die 
sachgemässere Übersetzung des hebr. hokmah. ... Es 
handelt sich um jenes 
Wissen und Können, das sich in Technik und Herrschaft umsetzen läst, und 
um jene Bildung, die gesellschaftliche Stellung verlieht. " 
Ironically scholars either, like Murphy and Ogden, pick up that Qoheleth's 
use of 7=1 resonates with the positive use of this word in Proverbs, or 
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they, like Hengel, Lobfink and Fox, pick up that in practice this i 1f]DR is 
very different from the positive i 1n. )1i of Proverbs. However, neither group 
notices the irony in Qoheleth's use of M=M! Both meanings are crucial to 
understanding Ecclesiastes. In 12: 9 for example, it is crucial to the 
understanding of Ecclesiastes that when Qoheleth is described as 0: )M the 
reader understands him to be referred to here as in the Proverbs-type 
tradition in which wisdom is rooted in and based upon the fear of Yahweh. 
At the same time, for the epilogue to conclude Ecclesiastes, QDi'1 must also 
here remind the reader of the very unusual empiricist meaning that i inzM 
appropriated in 1: Off. And of course in 1: 13 it is crucial to the meaning of 
Ecclesiastes that i T» n first arouse in the readers mind that Proverb-type 
meaning of wisdom rooted in the fear of Yahweh, before this is undermined 
by the empiricist methodology that Qoheleth relentlessly pursues. 
The significance of Qoheleth's empiricism is strengthened by examining the 
epistemology of other wisdom literature59. Contrary to a widespread 
assumption, Wisdom's epistemology is not empirical (Fox, 1989: 90). Many 
of the sages' teachings undoubtedly derive from the observations of 
generations of wise men but always shaped in accordance with prior ethical- 
religious principles. Whatever the actual source of their teaching, the sages 
do not, according to Fox, offer their experience as the source of new 
knowledge and they rarely invoke experiential arguments. The rare appeal to 
what is seen is a rhetorical strategy and not a fundamental methodological 
procedure, as with Qoheleth. Fox refers to Proverbs 24: 30-34,7: 6-20 and 
6: 6-8 as examples. The first two passages contain references to what the 
teacher "saw, " in the one case with respect to what happened to a lazy man's 
field, and in the other he "saw" a woman enticing a youth to fornication. As 
Fox points out, in Proverbs 24: 30-34 the observation is followed by a lesson, 
but the observation calls the truth to mind rather than the truth being 
discovered or inferred from the observation. "The sage does not say that he 
saw a field gone wild, looked for the cause, and found that its owner was 
lazy, nor does he claim to have looked at lazy farmers and observed what 
59Very little work has been done in this area. Crenshaw (1981b) explores the rhetoric of wisdom along the 
lines of threefold warrant: ethos, pathos and logos. Fox (1989: 90) perceptively notes that rhetoric is an 
expression of an underlying epistemology. Ethos, pathos and logos will be present in any rhetoric, but, as 
Fox notes, the question is how they are realised in specific texts. Fox notes that Crenshaw mentions 
argument from consensus as the form of logos characteristic in wisdom literature, and thus suggests that, 
"the seemingly empirical arguments in Wisdom Literature are primarily ways of strengthening ethos by 
creating consensus. " Much work remains to be done in this area. Crenshaw mentions that he is writing a 
volume on rhetoric in wisdom literature, but it is yet to appear. 
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happens to their fields. Rather he came across a field gone wild, and this 
sparked a meditation on its causes. " (Fox, 1989: 91) 
In Proverbs 7 the teacher reports observing the seduction but makes no claim 
to have observed the consequences; these he knows already! Similarly when 
the wise man exhorts the pupil to "Go to the ant ... consider 
its ways, and be 
wise" in Proverbs 6: 6-8 the ant is being used as an illustration of diligence. 
The observation of the ant is used to make the wise man's point emphatic, 
but not to prove the point in the first place. 
Personal experience, Fox (1989: 91,92) points out, is cited more commonly 
in theodicy. Cf. Psalm 37: 25 for example: "I have been young, and now am 
old, yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken or their children begging for 
bread. " Psalm 73: 3 is another example: "For I was envious of the arrogant; I 
saw the prosperity of the wicked. " However, as Fox (1989: 92) perceptively 
points out, 
"Observation in theodicy testifies to old truths; it does not uncover or argue for 
new ones. ... Qoheleth's use of experience 
does have certain parallels in theodicy 
both in the sufferers' complaints and in the defenders' theodicy. He differs in the 
greater importance he gives to the `I' and, more significantly, in the reasons for 
which he appeals to the ego. While the sufferers and defenders try to understand 
what they observe, they, unlike Qoheleth, do not observe in order to gain 
knowledge. " 
Qoheleth makes knowledge dependent upon the knower's perceiving it. For 
Qoheleth there is no body of truth standing outside the individual and 
demanding assent, no Dame Wisdom who was in existence before mankind 
and who would exist even if all humans were fools. For Qoheleth wisdom 
must be justified through the individual's experience and reason. "Qoheleth 
alone of the sages speaks with `a voice that justifies itself by reference to the 
good sense of the individual's reflections on his experiences. "' (Fox, 
1989: 95) 
Fox does, I think, overstress what one might call `anti-realism' in Qoheleth, 
since Qoheleth's project could be thought of as an investigation of whether 
or not there is such a body of truth out there. But Fox is right about the 
strong individualism that underlies Qoheleth's empiricism60. Crenshaw 
60Cf. Fisch, 1988: 158. Fisch notes that Ecclesiastes "gives us a radically individualized statement. " This is 
evident in the autobiographical "F' that dominates Ecclesiastes and is readily seen in 1: 12,13 and 2: 3-8. 
Fisch distinguishes the "I" of Qoheleth from that of the Psalms. The latter may be subjective but it is never 
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(1981b: 19) argues that inherited tradition and individual appropriation are 
the two essential ingredients of `ethos' in wisdom's rhetoric. "This bi- 
polarity of ethos provides an important corrective to the oft-mentioned 
individualism which characterises wisdom thinking. " It is precisely this bi- 
polarity that is missing in Ecclesiastes; epistemologically the balance has 
shifted to the pole of individual assessment. In contrast to the other sages, 
for Qoheleth anything less than certainty is ignorance. "Q seems to start with 
the expectation that reason can provide certainty, and when he sees that it 
does not, he is struck by its frailty. The other sages seem more comfortable 
with the limitations of knowledge. " (Fox, 1989: 106) 
Examination of Qoheleth's epistemology and comparison of this with that of 
other wisdom literature exposes, in my opinion, the ironic use of 11nDi1 in 
Ecclesiastes. Ironically, even Fox does not recognise this! What one 
expected to be wisdom rooted in the fear of Yahweh turns out to be a quest 
for certain knowledge resulting from logical analysis of personal experience 
and observation. When Qoheleth says 71= the reader instinctively fills it 
with a positive content but ironically 7nDrl comes close to meaning folly! 61 
: 25 has also, I suggest, an ironic aspect to it in Qoheleth. The significance of 
=5 in Ecclesiastes is demonstrated by the fact that it occurs some twelve 
times in 1: 12-2: 26. A common OT word, =5 is "the richest biblical term for 
the totality of man's inner or immaterial nature. ... Wisdom and 
understanding are seated in the heart. " (Bowling, 1980: 466,467) According 
to Spykman (1992: 218) "[t]he heart represents the unifying center of man's 
entire existence, the spiritual concentration point of our total selfhood, the 
inner reflective core which sets the direction for all of our life relationships. 
It is the wellspring of all our willing, thinking, feeling, acting and every 
other life utterance. " Commenting on Proverbs 4: 23, "Keep your heart with 
all diligence, for from it flow the springs of life", Berkouwer (1962: 202,203) 
also suggests that "[t]he heart shows forth the deepest aspect of the whole 
humanness of man, not some functional localization in a part which is 
supposedly the most important. The Term `heart' deals with the total 
orientation, direction, concentration of man, his depth dimension, from 
autobiographical in Qoheleth's sense. As Fisch points out, Qoheleth could have said with Montaigne, "It is 
my portrait I draw... I am myself the subject of my book. " 
61Verheij's (1991) reading of 2: 4-6 according to which Qoheleth acts like God would strongly confirm my 
reading of 7=i1 as ironic. 
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which his full human existence is directed and formed. He who gives his 
heart to the Lord gives his full life (cf. Proverbs 23: 26). " 
Admittedly Berkouwer and Spykman are systematic theologians and their 
comments tend to be totalising rather than focused on the specific uses of 
=ý in Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, etc. 62. However their comments do do justice 
to those `heart-sayings' in Proverbs like 4: 23 which envision the heart as the 
source of life or death. According to 4: 23 the heart must be guarded `more 
than anything which needs to be guarded'63 because from it flow the 
influences that lead to `life. ' If the consistent mention of =ý in Ecclesiastes 
is juxtaposed with such Proverbs material then the question of whether 
Qoheleth's method is really `wise' becomes acute. =ý is mentioned so 
frequently in 1: 12-2: 26 because Qoheleth is reflecting on the process of 
perception and discovery and as Fox (1989: 87) says, "He is his own field of 
investigation. " Qoheleth is clearly devoting a huge amount of energy and 
attention to his =5, as it were, but is this energy directed towards "guarding 
his heart"? Ironically = t7 
, which 
is the source of genuine trust in Yahweh 
(Cf. Proverbs 3: 5) and thus the seat of 7112DR, has become the seat of 
empirical and thus largely autonomous reason. Qoheleth's understanding of 
heart becomes like that of Proverbs 28: 26 
5100 M11 1=ý = MOM. Van 
Leeuwen (1992: 34) suggests that =ý in Proverbs 28: 26 amounts to 
"autonomous `reason"', and I am suggesting that ironically the =5 in 
Ecclesiastes 1: 12ff and similar passages, which is the seat of i 112 D 1,, 
amounts to the same thing. =ý is also used in Ecclesiastes in the sense of 
inner being (Cf. 7: 3,4,10: 2) but mainly in clearly poetic passages which 
could be quotes. 
: 2ý also occurs a number of times in the concluding section of Ecclesiastes, 
11: 7ff, and it is here that I think that the irony of Qoheleth's use of =5 is 
revealed. In 11: 9 the young man is exhorted to follow his =ý and eyes. This 
deliberately alludes to 2: 10 where Qoheleth followed his eyes and heart. In 
11: 9 however, there is the reminder as it were, that the heart out of which the 
young man lives needs to be guarded because "God will hold you 
responsible for all you do. "M 
62A thorough analysis of M5 requires far more detailed consideration of its nuanced uses than these 
generalised quotes provide. The NRSV, for example, recognises these nuances by sometimes translating 
=5 in Proverbs as 'heart', sometimes as 'sense', and sometimes as 'mind. ' 
63For this translation see Whybray, 1994: 82. 
64This is how Fox (1989: 347) paraphrases 11: 9b. 
241 
I would define `wisdom' in Qoheleth as `truth derived through observation, 
experience and analysis i. e. empirically. ' This is, as we have seen, a 
crucially different nuance from Proverbs and Job. However, it is in the 
epilogue, when Qoheleth is described as `wise' and this wisdom is 
associated with fearing God and obeying his commandments, that the irony 
attached to 17 11 is finally exposed. Fisch (1988: 175) expresses this 
powerfully when he writes of the epilogue, 
"the view that would assign these closing verses of Ecclesiastes to another editor 
or author should be resisted. This skeptical rejection of skepticism is the final 
twist of Qoheleth's super-irony. It gives us an ego that has ironized itself away 
and has abdicated the self-sufficient thinking of the hakam. Qoheleth never quite 
says, like the author of Psalm 111, that the beginning of hokma is the fear of the 
Lord but his final statement seems to say that the end point of hokma is the fear of 
God! ... The proper study of mankind is man, Qoheleth seems to say. But ironically, this penultimate verse of the book explodes such a humanistic 
pretension. To fear God ... becomes the `whole of Man' or, we may say, what is left of man when his ego has been ironized away. Read in this way, the verse is 
utterly integral to the book, its final summarizing statement. " 
b. The Structure of Repetition65 in Ecclesiastes. 
Repetition is common in Proverbs66 and Ecclesiastes, and yet it has rarely 
received sustained attention. Snell (1993: 84) asserts that "[c]learly, no 
commentary ever written on Proverbs takes repetitions, cliches, and the 
shapes of the collections seriously. "67 Snell focuses on repetition in Proverbs 
but only in order to explore the genesis of Proverbs. He acknowledges that 
comparative evidence suggests the repetitions are important since no other 
collection of aphorisms from the ANE has the extensive internal repetition 
that Proverbs does. He examines the different reasons that are put forward 
for the repetitions (literary cleavage; final editing; emphasis; poetic and 
rhetorical motives) and concludes that all these reasons may have a role in 
the repetition in Proverbs: "A number of important questions remain open, 
including the questions of why verses are repeated and to what extent 
proverbial cliches can be used to study affinities within the book. " (Snell, 
1993: 83) 
65Interestingly `repetition' is a central theme in much postmodern theory. See, for example Caputo, 
1987: 11-92. This is a different issue to the formal structure of repetition of course, but there are all sorts of 
interesting parallels between the theme of repetition in Ecclesiastes and in postmodern theory that could be 
explored. 
66,111w, VI', for example, occurs fourteen times in Proverbs. 
67Whybray (1994) is the most recent English commentary on Proverbs. He does not refer to Snell, and 
although he argues for editorial 'unity' his commentary contains no detailed consideration of repetition. 
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Ecclesiastes is full of repetition as Murphy (1992a: xxix), for example, 
recognises: "While judgement about the peculiar grammatical characteristics 
of the language is still out ... there can be no doubt about the distinctiveness 
of Qoheleth's literary style. The poem on the repetition of events in 1: 4-11 is 
as it were a symbol of this style; repetition is its trademark. This repetition is 
manifest in vocabulary and also in a phraseology that is almost formulaic". 
Murphy (1992a: xxix, xxx) lists 28 favourite words of Qoheleth. Qoheleth 
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However, what Snell says of commentaries on Proverbs is true of 
commentaries on Ecclesiastes; the way in which this literary device of 
repetition manifests itself in the whole book is not generally explored. 
Sternberg (1985: 365-440) has done the most thorough work on repetition in 
biblical texts, although he limits himself to OT narrative, and clearly there 
are some important differences between the structures of repetition in 
narrative as opposed to poetic texts68. Most relevant to Ecclesiastes is 
Sternberg's point that in literary texts, the dismissal of redundancies as 
`noise' must be the last resort. There is a prima facie case in Ecclesiastes, as 
in biblical narrative, for a functional approach69. 
Unfortunately "[n]either literary not biblical study has developed the tools 
required even for a formal analysis and typology of repetition structures. " 
(Sternberg, 1985: 375) This is certainly true of repetition in Ecclesiastes. We 
will explore in detail one major type of repetition in Ecclesiastes, that of the 
carpe diem passages. (As Robert Alter commented to me, this may not be 
68See Sternberg, 1985: 386 and cf. Alter, 1985 for a consideration of repetition in Hebrew poetic texts. 
69Contra Whybray (1989b: 44,45) who maintains that "the theory that the material originated as separate, 
individual pieces ... also accounts for the 
frequent repetitions and duplications which are so characteristic of 
the book. This feature, regarded in this way, points rather to the literary disunity of the book than to its 
unity. " 
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the most appropriate term for these passages because it implies a hedonistic 
attitude which they do not necessarily teach. ) 
Let us examine each of the carpe diem passages in Ecclesiastes. 
a. 2: 24-26 is the concluding paragraph of the section 1: 12-2: 267°. Whybray 
(1992: 88,89) sees 2: 24 as the answer to the `profit' question formulated in 
2: 22,23. Whybray articulates this answer as follows: "god may give joy and 
pleasure; man can never achieve it for himself, however hard he may try. " 
The translation of this section is controversial. Murphy (1992a: 24) translates 
it as follows: 
24. There is nothing [better] for a person [than] to eat and drink and provide 
pleasure for himself in his toil - this also I saw is from the hand of God. 
25. For who can eat or rejoice, if not I? 
26. To whomever he pleases God gives wisdom and knowledge, but to the 
errant one he gives the trouble of collecting and gathering, only to give to 
whomever God pleases. This also is vanity and a chase after wind. 
Whybray (1989a: 62-65) stays with the RSV translation. The crucial 
difference is how v25 and 26 are translated. The RSV translates them as 
follows: 
25. for apart from him who can eat or who can have enjoyment? 
26. For to the man who pleases him God gives wisdom and knowledge and 
joy; but to the sinner he gives the work of gathering and heaping, only to 
give to one who pleases God. This also is vanity and a striving after wind. 
For Whybray (1989a: 65) Qoheleth in v26 accepts the orthodox view, 
realises that it contradicts the experiences he has just narrated and simply 
states the contradiction. For Murphy v26 stresses God's sovereign and 
enigmatic freedom in imparting gifts. Whybray's understanding seems 
preferable to me. 'ItiZ r' is probably better understood as "apart from 
him", with 'Mn emendated to 121M, following the Syriac and Septuagint7l. 
70Most commentators are agreed that 2: 24-26 concludes a section. Ogden thinks it concludes 1: 3 - 2: 26. 
Lohfink (1993: 30-33) is an exception. According to Lohfink 2: 24-26 begins the new section 2: 24-3: 15. 
71Following Dahood, Whitley (1979: 29) argues that the suffix on '1212M is a third person form, but 
Dahood's examples are not convincing (De Waard, 1979: 512). De Waard (1979) examines the textual 
244 
Alternatively the more difficult reading ']T could be retained with v25 
understood as a quotation of God's words. In Flit occurs only here in the 
OT, and it can either be translated, following Murphy and Crenshaw, as "if 
not", or as "apart from. " Perhaps its more usual meaning is `apart from', 
`outside of 72, and contextually "apart from him" seems to me to flow more 
naturally from the reference to "the hand of God" in v24 and to connect with 
enjoyment as the gift of God in v26. 
The translation and interpretation of v26 is the more crucial issue for 
understanding v24-26. Apart from a desire to smooth over the contradiction 
between this section and the preceding verses, there seems to be no good 
reason for translating NV1n other than as `sinner'. Although Murphy 
(1992a: 26) maintains that no moral connotation is to be given to 21D and 
1`fi Ll I i1, even he translates RV 111 as "errant one". Like Murphy, Crenshaw 
(1988: 90,91) argues that "[h]ere, the two terms mean simply `fortunate and 
unfortunate, lucky and unlucky. ' ... 
Qoheleth's observations transpose the 
motif, dear to the sages, that wicked people's wages eventually go to the 
devout 
... Since good people can and do lose their possessions to sinners, the 
disposer of goods must be indifferent to morality. " However, like Murphy, 
in his translation Crenshaw is constrained to translate these parts of v26 as 
"to the person who pleases him, but to the one who displeases him... " Thus 
it would appear that for both Murphy and Crenshaw the text appears to go in 
one direction, but the logic of the broader passage in another. This tension, 
which they resolve by forcing v24-26 into the logic of the broader text as 
they understand it, results I suggest from the failure to recognise the 
juxtaposition of opposites. Furthermore, the more natural reading of TQDj7 
=%X D`iNý 'Z is, "for to the one who pleases him" rather than as "to 
whomever he pleases". 
These interpretative issues are difficult to decide, and much depends upon 
one's sense of the whole. Murphy's translation seems to me an attempt to 
critical and interpretative issues in v25 in detail. Because 11? 3? 3 is the more difficult reading he concludes 
that it is the more original one. However, as he points out, textual critical problems have to be solved at the 
level of the principles of textual criticism and according to criteria provided by the discourse of which the 
text is a part. On the basis of both of these principles De Waard concludes that '37 is the right reading, 
but that v25 should be read as a quotation with God as the speaker. In substance this amounts to the same as 
reading 1]l]f3 with "him" referring to God. 
72This is its common meaning in the Mishnah (Cf. Whitely, 1979: 29), and Qoheleth's language is close to 
that of the Mishnah (Whybray, 1989a: 5). Delitzsch (1970: 252,253) argues that the type of translation which 
Vg, Tg (and Murphy) adopt, requires '111" instead of r1r1. 
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resolve the contradiction present in the text. Ogden follows Whybray's 
translation but smoothes out the contradiction in a different way from 
Murphy. He (1987: 48,49) argues that 2: 24-26 
"stands as the response which Qoheleth makes both to the programmatic question 
(1.3; 2.22) and the negative answer he offers to that question in 2.11. Thus from 
1.3 to 2.24 the author moves, via this ordered structure, from problem to solution. 
... Despite the fact that life has this enigmatic dimension, is fraught with problems 
and pain, to Qoheleth's mind there is only one possible attitude to adopt; enjoy 
what God gives. " 
Ogden recognises that 2: 26 contradicts 2: 21. This type of contradiction 
occurs elsewhere in Ecclesiastes. The answer is that 
"[t]he wisdom tradition knew full well that no single statement could encompass 
all truth. Thus it is most likely that 2.26 with its deliberately positive note, is 
intended to heighten the notion that on occasion the wise is actually better off than 
the fool, and this despite his occasional bad experience noted in 2.21. Neither 2.21 
nor 2.26 can represent the totality of truth, but each may be true given certain 
circumstances. " (1987: 49) 
Although Ogden covers over the contradiction too quickly, his analysis 
reveals some penetrating insights. Especially in the series of articles that he 
has written about Ecclesiastes, Ogden has alerted us to the function of 
rhetorical questions and of the =10 I'M formula in Ecclesiastes73, insights 
which inform his analysis of 2: 24-26. The M1tO JIN formula occurs four 
times in Ecclesiastes74, and each time this is as part of a carpe diem saying. 
Ogden (1979: 350) argues that 
"[t]he form's precise function is to express the advice to enjoy life in light of the 
negative response to the programmatic question 0'1&5 11"In" 71n which initiates 
Qoheleth's whole undertaking. Set in various contexts ... and with minor 
variations in expression, the question (11111' 7113) and its response (MID 1's) are 
integrally related and provide the literary framework around which these portions 
of the book are built. " 
Rhetorical questions do play an important part in Ecclesiastes75, and 
positioned where it is, 1: 3 is clearly programmatic. Ogden may well be right 
in seeing 1: 3-2: 26 as a section, and 2: 24-26 introduced as it is with =Ito 
I'M as a major response to the question posed in 1: 3. However it simply is 
73See particularly Ogden, 1979. 
74See Ecclesiastes 2: 24,3: 12,3: 22,8: 15. Variant forms occur in 5: 18 and 9: 7-10. Apart from Jeremiah 
8: 15 and 14: 19 where it is used simply in the sense of "no good", MID JIM only occurs in Ecclesiastes. See 
Ogden (1979) for an analysis of the form. 
75There are over thirty rhetorical questions in Ecclesiastes. 
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not adequate to see 2: 24-26 as the answer to the problems posed in 1: 4-2: 23, 
to which the consistent 
t7=i i conclusion is reached. The repeated references 
to ý=71 combined with the stated (2: 11) and implied (2: 22) conclusion that 
the answer to the programmatic question of 1: 3 is negative cannot somehow 
flow on to the positive a proach of 2: 24-26.2: 24-26 contradicts and stands 
in strong tension to the 
9=71 
conclusion, and this tension ought not to be 
undermined in order to smooth over the text and fill in the gap set up by the 
tension. It is more accurate to see the two approaches as juxtaposed rather 
than as an orderly progression from 1.3 to 2.24. Particularly noticeable is the 
fact that God does not feature in 2: 1-23, whereas his name occurs three times 
in 24-26. What we have here is a deliberate juxtaposition of two 
contradictory approaches. 
The hebel note at the end of 1: 3-2: 26 indicates, I suggest, Qoheleth's 
awareness of the tension between 2: 21 and 2: 26, and perhaps his realisation 
that with his epistemology even the goodness in creation that he recognises 
starts to look like 5=1. Indeed it is the tension between these two 
perspectives that gives rise to the impenetrable enigma with which Qoheleth 
is struggling. 
b. 3: 10-15 
According to Whybray (1992: 89,90), this section deals with how the human 
person should behave in the light of his ignorance of the future. V13 gives 
the answer; once again the person who accepts what God gives finds 
happiness. Ogden's interpretation is much the same; 02,13 and 04,15 are 
two positive answers to the rhetorical question in v9, each introduced by the 
marker 'D '1 1'. Murphy describes 12-15 as typical of the resigned 
conclusions found elsewhere, as for example in 2: 24. Ogden (1987: 56-58) 
reads v12-15 more positively, suggesting inter alia that vl5b be translated, 
"God requests that it be pursued, " the "it" being the enjoyment of v12,13. 
There are a number of difficult issues in these verses: Firstly, how is Qý1y 
to be understood. Is it "world" (LXX), "a sense of past and future" (NRSV), 
"a sense of duration" (Murphy), "ignorance" (Whybray) or "a consciousness 
of the eternal" (Ogden)? Secondly, should Xý `1th 'ý=n in v1 lb be 
understood as introducing a purpose clause thus indicating that the presence 
of C 7W ensures that humans will not understand what God is up to, or 
should it be understood in the sense of "without", i. e. as introducing a result 
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clause and thereby referring to the limitations of human knowledge. Thirdly 
how should the last part of v14 be understood. Is 1N1' to be understood to 
refer to fearing/standing in awe (Murphy) or seeing (Ogden). Ogden 
translates vl4b, "God has done (this) so that they might see (what proceeds) 
from him. " And finally how should 1111-i1N in vl5b be translated? 
Murphy translates vl5b, "And God seeks out what has been pursued, " 
suggesting that the reference is to the past or events of the past. On the basis 
of parallels between v14b and 15b, Ogden suggests that the nN of vl5b is a 
truncated version of 'UM P1 N (equivalent to ii in vl4b) which thus 
introduces a relative clause. V 15b should thus be translated, "God requests 
that it be pursued, " with "it" referring to the enjoyment of vl2ff. 
In our quest to understand this carpe diem section it should firstly be noted 
that 3: 9/10-15 is part of the larger unit 3: 1-1676. The structure of this unit is 
clear. 
vi an introductory comment 
V2-8 a poem on IID 
V9 a rhetorical question about the benefit of toil in such a timed world. 
V 10-11 observational response to the question 
V12-13 first confessional (I know) response to the question 
V14-15 second confessional response to the question 
The question of nV is central to this section. In vl-8 r signifies the right 
occasion for things to take place in a creation ordered by God. Scholars are 
disagreed as to how positively the author regards this order77 but there is 
agreement that as Murphy (1992: 39) puts it, "These are God's times, not our 
times. " This provides the background for the rhetorical question in v9: in 
such a timed world what is the value and purpose of human labour and toil? 
The first response in v10-11 is a negative one. Everything may have its 
divine time but the human cannot discover that time. It is very difficult to 
know how to translate &71 and there is no agreement among scholars as 
we noted above. Two contextual clues may help. Firstly, as Murphy 
(1992a: 30) notes, the contrast between r1 V and M5 DM i suggests a temporal 
761 am following Whybray's (1989) divisions here. Scholars are not agreed about where this section ends. 
77Murphy (1992a: 39) speaks of the "strong theological note of divine determinism" in these verses. Ogden 
(1987: 51-54), by contrast, sees 3: 1-8 as a description of God's good creation order. 
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meaning, something along the lines of `duration. ' Secondly, it seems to me 
that we should not ignore the recurrence of M5D in its longer form C351D in 
v14, where it characterises God's activity. These clues suggest that we 
should think of M5D 1 as something about the way God has made the human 
person. In a timed world humans recognise that `there is a time and a place' 
and that in order to discern this they need a sense of the larger picture, what 
philosophers might call origin and telos. However, they cannot get access to 
this `duration. ' 
It is very difficult to decide whether ' 5M M introduces a purpose clause or 
not78. If our understanding of D 
5v; 1 is correct then "without" is probably 
the better understanding. To translate this clause as "so that" portrays God as 
deliberately setting up this tension in human experience; an unlikely view in 
an Israelite context, especially if the author may have Genesis 1 in mind. It is 
thus the limitation of human knowledge that Qoheleth sees as making the 
human's toil enigmatic in v10-11. The `gift' (7112) of 05571 is a burden 
from this angle. 
The second and third responses to the question of v9 are introduced by 
'111DI', whereas Qoheleth's observation that the human person cannot 
discern God's works is introduced by "i1'R1. These two "I know" responses 
are very different in content to the first "I have seen" response. Here the 
opportunity that God's order of creation presents for eating, drinking and 
working is seen as a positive MIM. Murphy (1992a: 39) recognises the 
contrast, but then goes on to suggest that the gift of eating and drinking 
"seems to be a compensation for the MhV, - ." However, a number of factors 
suggest that what we have here is a juxtaposition of different responses 
rather than v 12-15 being a compensation for the negative conclusion of v 10- 
11. 
Apart from the contradictory content to which we have just referred, there is 
the fact that the knowledge in v12-15 is not arrived at by observation, 
especially that in v14. It is much more of a confessional or traditional nature. 
The tension between 9-11 and 12-15 is made even stronger if one follows 
Ogden (1987: 57) in translating the last part of v14 as "God has done (this) so 
78For the use of " ?] to introduce a purpose clause see Isaiah 5: 13 and Ezekiel 14: 15. Its more common 
OT usage, especially in Job is as "without. " See Job 4: 24,6: 6,24: 7,31: 19 and Jeremiah 2: 15,9: 9,10. 
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that they might see79 (what proceeds) from him, " since this stands in stark 
contrast to "yet they cannot find out" in vii. The juxtaposition of being 
unable to find out and yet knowing would strengthen the contrast in this 
section. However, even if one translates v14bß along the lines of "stand in 
awe before him", this still forms a strong contrast with the frustrated Nebel- 
type response of v10-11. The recurrence of the opening rhetorical question 
in v9 (Cf. 1: 3), with its implied negative answer, plus the reference to the 
harsh task (1'ßy) that God has given the human person in 00, strengthen the 
ý= 
I'l focus of v9-1180. 
V15, and especially vl5b, is not easy to interpret. On all accounts it 
expresses God's sovereignty, but should not be interpreted as a negative 
expression of this, as Whybray (1989a: 75) for example does. Whether or 
not Ogden is right in reading the last part of v15 as a reference to God 
calling humans to joy, v15 is a development of v14 and both should thus be 
seen as a positive expression of God's sovereignty. 
V12-15 is therefore an answer to v9, but it is an answer which is juxtaposed 
next to a very different and negative answer in v10-11. There is more of a 
tension in this carpe diem passage than a presentation of problem and 
answer. 
c. 3: 16-22 
This section deals with injustice in the world and not knowing whether or 
when it will be punished. Whybray notes that out of this depressing state of 
affairs Qoheleth draws a positive conclusion, humans are to enjoy their work 
because `that is their lot' and no one knows the future. The element of 
contradictory juxtaposition is present in this section in two ways. If we 
outline the content as follows the juxtapositions become clear. 
v16 statement of the problem 
v17 confessional response - God has an illy for judgement 
v18,19 '=M response to the problem 
v20,21 ignorance of what happens to humans after death 
v22a MID 1'fß saying 
791 1' could be the Qal imperfect of jIM"I (see) or of lr' (fear). 
801 agree with Murphy contra Ogden that 1'21 here, as generally in Ecclesiastes, has a negative 
connotation. 
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v22b rhetorical question 
In v18-19 the injustice of life leads to the 
5=M 
conclusion. The injustice that 
Qoheleth observes is God's means of testing humans to show them that they 
are but animals. Humans from this perspective have no advantage over 
animals; they come from dust, return to dust and no one knows what 
happens to them after that. 
V18-19 is juxtaposed in a contradictory way to v17. Both of these responses 
to injustice are what '=17= ']M but they represent radically 
opposed responses to the problem. V17 picks up on the theme of time in 3: 1- 
8 in a positive way and confesses that there will be a time for judgement 
which would resolve the problem of injustice. V18,19 concludes from 
observation of life that all is 5=71 and God is a cruel examiner whose 
purpose in the injustice is to remind humans that they are only animals. 
V20,21 mediate between the 'ii1 conclusion and the positive MID 7I N 
saying in v22. These two verses deal with the limitations of human 
knowledge and could, I suggest lead in one of two directions81. They could 
provide further support for the 
t7W1 conclusion. In the light of the animal 
analogy the rhetorical question in v21 could imply a negative answer. But 
the awareness of human limitations could also lead on to the =1O Ism 
saying. And with its close proximity to 3: 12-15 and its `better than' form, 
v22 should not just be read as a statement of positive resignation in the light 
of human enigmas. The enjoyment here is a positive, shalomic appropriation 
of the human task in creation, a recognition of the 7t71'1 that God has 
assigned humans. 
Like v17 the =lU I"N saying in v22 is juxtaposed in a contradictory way to 
v18,19. Against the idea that v22 is the answer to the problem of injustice 
is the tension between "enjoying their work" and the injustice portrayed in 
v16. V22 does not resolve this tension; how is the worker to enjoy life as his 
portion while being dragged unjustly into the law courts? Similarly the 
tensions between v17 and v18,19 are not resolved. The reader is uncertain 
how the observations leading to the `God is testing them' conclusion relate 
to the confession that there is a time appointed for judgement. Both are said 
81 Compare the previous carpe diem passage, where the limitation of human knowledge in 3: 11 ff can lead 
on to a joyful trust in God, but it can also be the basis of concluding that all is enigmatic. 
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in Qoheleth's heart/mind but do the observations deconstruct the former 
confession? One might think so, but what then of the =10 t'N saying? This 
fits closely with v17 and seems to be the conclusion of this brief discussion 
of injustice. The fact is that the juxtapositions of contradictory views set up 
gaps, and the gaps are not filled at this point82. The uncertainty with which 
the reader is left is enhanced by the rhetorical question at the end of v22. As 
with most of the rhetorical questions in Ecclesiastes, this one can be 
answered in two ways. Like v20,21 it could enhance the sense of 
meaninglessness and enigma. Alternatively, and especially in the light of 
v17, it could imply that even this enigma is under God's control83. 
d. 5: 9-19[10-20]84 
The context of this carpe diem saying is that wealth does not satisfy or last 
and may be lost more quickly than it is gained85. According to Whybray 
(1992: 89) verse 17[18] provides the answer. Ogden (1987: 87) likewise 
regards it as Qoheleth's answer to the '(r) 1' question in v15[16]. There is an 
element of `answer' in v17[18]. `Our lot' and the reference to `few days' 
support the view that Qoheleth is interacting with the problem of injustice in 
toil. However a strong tension remains between the response to the problem 
of toil that leads to darkness, vexation, sickness and resentment, and the 
`response' of eating and drinking. They represent radically different ways of 
approaching life `under the sun' in which wealth does not last, and the reader 
is left with a question mark about their relationship, as a comparison of 
v16[17] with v19[20] makes quite clear. In both v16[17] and v18[19] there 
is a reference to eating, but this common activity serves only to contrast the 
different circumstances of that `eating. ' 
As in the other carpe diem passages that we have looked at, rather than the 
carpe diem saying being the answer to the problem, we have two 
82See Fox's (1989: 336,337) paraphrase of this section, for a good example of how commentators feel the 
need to fill the gaps that juxtapositions set up. 
83Intriguingly 
commentators reflect these two options. Murphy (1992a: 37) understands v22b to refer to 
humans being unable to see any real future for themselves, whereas Ogden (1987: 62,63) sees v22b as 
another reason for Qoheleth's positive advice. It is no use inquiring into the future because there is no 
tangible evidence; nevertheless there is something 1'1R: and this is part of our 11111'. 
84Murphy includes 5: 9-19 as a section within 4: 17-6: 9, but he notes that several topics are dealt with in this 
section and that most commentators deal with these topics separately. 
85Note that this carpe diem passage lacks the M1C ''ft element present in the others that we have looked at 
so far. Ogden (1979: 341,342) notes that all the other elements of the form are present and suggests that the 
non-use of the X11 j'M may be deliberate, relating to the fact that 5: 17(18) is in a mediate position 
between 5: 12-16 (13-17) and 6: 1-6. "In the context of life which may issue in these two 'evils' stands the 
one 'good' which Qoheleth can see. " 
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contradictory responses to the problem juxtaposed and the resulting gap left 
unresolved. 6: 1-6 strengthens the tension between 5: 11[12]-16[17] and 
5: 17[18]-19[20], because although it may be our portion to enjoy life as God 
enables us to, there are some/many who are unable to enjoy life. 
e. 8: 10-15 
Scholars are not agreed about how chapter eight should be divided86. We 
follow Murphy and Whybray in seeing 8: 10-15 as a section which can be 
analysed more or less independently. This section deals with the problem of 
the wicked not being speedily punished. V15 in Whybray's (1992: 90) view 
represents Qoheleth's conclusion. Ogden (1987: 139) understands v15 as 
closing off the discussion which began in 6: 11,12.8: 15 is the last place in 
Ecclesiastes where =1V J'N occurs. Content-wise 8: 10-15 develops as 
follows: 
v 10: description of an enigmatic situation. Qoheleth observes the wicked 
buried and reflects upon their long life and acclaim within the cultus. This is 5=1. 
v11: explanation of why such a situation is 
5=71 
- because the wicked are 
not seen to be speedily punished human hearts incline towards evil which 
appears more profitable. 
v12,13 - here Qoheleth juxtaposes his confession of what he `knows' about 
God's justice next to the prolonging of the sinners' lives. The clear 
contradiction is left in tact: Compare v12a - the sinners do prolong their lives 
- with v13b - they will not prolong their days! 
v14: another description of an enigmatic situation of injustice. 
v15: recommendation of enjoyment. 
Clearly there are gaps left in the argument as a result of the juxtapositions. 
The lack of observable justice and the longevity of sinners results in people 
favouring evil, since such a lifestyle appears to bring about long life and 
security. Qoheleth is aware of this, and yet he `knows' that it will be well 
with those who fear God but sinners will be punished and will not 
experience longevity! The gap resulting from the deliberate juxtaposition of 
86Whybray (1989a: 135ff) treats 8: 10-15 as the first of a series of sections comprising 8: 10-9: 12, all of 
which question the traditional belief that righteousness and wickedness receive their due rewards. Murphy 
(1992a: 79ff) identifies 8: 1-17 as a loosely united section under the theme of authority. 8: 9-15 is one of the 
reflections in this section. Ogden (1987: 139) argues that 8: 15 closes off the discussion which began with 
the questions in 6: 11,12. Ogden deals with 8: 10-14 as a section. 
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these contradictory views is left unfilled and in v14 Qoheleth proceeds to 
another example of injustice. What makes this section particularly 
interesting is that the juxtaposition appears to be done consciously in v12, 
with vl2a drawing the reader's attention to the contradiction and thereby 
making the reader aware that the author is aware of the contradiction87. 
Similarly the WtO j"M saying in v15 is a juxtaposition firstly to v14 and to 
the earlier example and t7=M comment insofar as v15 concludes this whole 
section. *= indicates an awareness of the injustice in life, but it should 
not be thought therefore that the carpe diem saying is an answer to the 
problem of injustice. The question that the juxtaposition raises is precisely 
how one could enjoy life while evil and oppression flourish and the righteous 
are treated as though they are wicked. How could Qoheleth commend joy 
amidst all the enigma he observes. The gap created by this juxtaposition is 
deliberately left open. 
f. 9: 1-1288 
For Whybray (1992: 90,91) v3b describes a common response to the problem 
that one cannot know whether one's actions will please God (vlb) and that 
death will come to all (v2,3a). V4-10 presents an alternative and better 
response: life is God's gift and one can enjoy life because the fact that God 
has given one the opportunity for joy means that he has already approved 
one's actions. 
Ogden's (1987: 151) view is much the same. He does point out that the carpe 
diem section here is much stronger: "The most striking literary feature of this 
section is the sudden appearance of a series of imperatives bearing on 
87There is some discussion about how the 0) 'T in 8: 12b is to be interpreted. See, for example, Schoors, 
1992: 134-136. Murphy and Schoors argue for a concessive understanding of Ca 'T as "although", but 
Murphy does not try and smooth over the resulting contradiction in the way that Schoors, following Gordis, 
does. Schoors (1992: 135) comments, "Reading C] 'T as concessive fully fits the context, since. as clearly 
formulated by Gordis, VIT? introduces a restatement of a conventional idea, which Qoheleth does not 
accept. " Ogden understands Ca 'T adversatively as "however. " Either way, there is no textual reason for 
seeing v12,13 as not being representative of the view of Qoheleth, unless one is concerned to somehow 
resolve the tension that this juxtaposition introduces. V15 reaffirms the perspective of v12,13 as being that 
of Qoheleth, especially if one bears in mind that v15 is an 21110 1'N saying and that in 3: 12-15 enjoyment 
and the fear of God are held together in an WD 1'iß saying. 
88Scholars are not agreed as to how to divide up chapter nine. Murphy takes 9: 1-12 as a section which he 
entitles "Reflections" Whybray (1989a: 139) has v1-10 as a section which he is "certain" ends with verse 
10. Ogden's (1987: 143f1) analysis is preferable because it takes into account the inclusions and 
introductory phrases that Murphy (inclusions) and Whybray (introductory phrases) refer to. According to 
Ogden 9: 1-12 are closely linked, with v-6,7-10 and 11,12 forming subsections. 
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enjoyment. ... What is new, however, in this section is the move from advice 
to imperative; it gives the enjoyment theme in this case a more authoritative 
presentation. " 
9: 1-12 develops in the following way: 
vla: a confessional statement about God's sovereignty, stressing that all that 
the righteous and wise do plus the outcome of their actions is in God's 
contro189 (Cf. Ogden 1987: 144). 
vlb: an observational enigmatic statement that one does not know whether 
the future will be love or hate. This deconstructs vla; the righteous may be 
in God's hands but it is uncertain whether this means that God's love or hate 
lies ahead for them901 Murphy (1992a: 90) puts it most clearly when he 
writes, "The customary signs of blessing or curse have been displaced, since 
there is no comprehension of what God is about. " 
v2-6: All is enigmatic because ultimately all share the same destination i. e. 
death. Some respond to this with evil, a response which experience seems to 
confirm because the dead have perished and the only certainty of the living 
is that they will perish91. Life may be thought to have some advantages over 
death but that is like thinking that it is better to be a living dog than a dead 
lion92. (Cf. Ogden, 1987: 147-149 on the proverb in v4. ) 
v7-10: a very strong imperative to joy. 
v10-12 no one knows when disaster will strike 
The carpe diem section in vv7-10 opens in a particularly strong way. It looks 
very much like the other juxtaposed carpe diem sayings that we have looked 
at. The lack of introductory formulae combined with the several imperatives 
enhance the juxtaposed nature of this advice. There is no =1tß 1'iß element, 
perhaps because of the sharper, imperative nature of the exhortation. God's 
89Because 
of what follows vi, Murphy sees D'I5Nj1 `i'= as simply God's control rather than God's 
benign providence. This is an argument from context which, in my view, fails to recognise the juxtaposition 
in this section. 
90Hertzberg (1963: 176) and Lauha (1978: 166) are wrong in suggesting that human attributes are here 
referred to; in context it is God. 
91For Ogden 11i1V2 describes what one may rely on so that Qoheleth here asserts that human beings know 
only one certain thing, i. e. that they will die. As Ogden (1987: 148) points out JIM= is a rare word which 
otherwise occurs only in 2 Kings 18: 19 and Isaiah 36: 4. In the latter two verses it does have the sense of 
that which can be relied upon. 
92Crenshaw (1978: 209,210) seems to me right in reading the proverb in v4b ironically. The dog functioned 
as a opprobrious metaphor and in this light it is hard to see what advantage the knowledge that one will die 
could possibly bring. The proverb should be read ironically. 
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approval of eating and drinking is however strongly stated in v7b93, and the 
festive symbols in v8 and the positive reference to marriage in v994 further 
embody the positive approach that we are familiar with from the W to 71M 
sayings. V 10 is a reminder of how all embracing the carpe diem vision of 
Qoheleth is, because as Whybray (1989a: 145) points out, "work" here 
includes `thought, knowledge and wisdom. ' 
Significantly though, with this stronger hortatory element there is present a 
stronger deconstructive element in this carpe diem saying than in any of the 
others. In v9 the life that the reader is exhorted to enjoy is Jt7W 1 In" 5D, 
and v10b undermines vlOa by confronting it with the empty reality of 51M2- More than any other of the juxtaposed sections we have looked at, 
this one witnesses to the enormous tension in the attempt to pursue the 
logical implications of Qoheleth's epistemology, while also trying to 
acknowledge the insights of Israelite life and religion. One gets the feeling 
that the two threaten as it were, to pull each other apart. Once again the 
exhortation to enjoyment should not just be seen as the answer to the 
problem of the universality of death. The contradiction remains unresolved: 
how is one to appropriate joy if one is living like a dog? 
g. 11: 7-12: 7/895 
Whybray (1992: 90,91) notes that the advice to enjoy life comes at the 
beginning of the final section of the book and is followed by the description 
of old age leading to death, expressed in a series of subordinate clauses 
introduced by 'i th 'IV and dependent on the imperative to enjoy life. The 
description of death is indicative of Qoheleth's stress that his listeners 
should face reality but the imperative makes the overall tone positive. "It is 
imperative to enjoy life, because that is the way to `remember your Creator, ' 
that is, to do his will. " Ogden (1987: 193-207) is in basic agreement with 
Whybray. His structural analysis of this section is most helpful. He notes 
that 11: 8 introduces the two verbs that dominate this section. `Rejoice' is the 
imperative that governs 11: 9-10 and `Remember' is the imperative that 
governs 12: 1-896. 
93Cf. Ogden and Whybray. Murphy is more cautious but acknowledges that v7b refers to God's largesse. 
All agree on the festive symbolism in v8,9. 
94Whybray 
argues that the woman need not be one's wife, but see Murphy. 
95mis section is widely recognised as a distinct unit. 
961t should be noted that there are many difficulties in the interpretation of 11: 7-12: 8. In our discussion of 
this passage I have not attempted to take up all the details since that would make this chapter far too 
lengthy. 
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Up until this section the carpe diem passages have always followed 
enigmatic sections97. This shift to having the carpe diem section preface and 
structure the enigmatic section about death is significant. Previously the two 
ways of seeing life tend to have been juxtaposed without resolution. This 
allowing of the carpe diem element to shape the whole suggests the 
possibility of integration and resolution. The proverb in 11: 7 that opens this 
section already says as much. Throughout Ecclesiastes iljnmi1 Ilnn is 
mainly a negative expression disparaging life. But here, perhaps using a 
quote from Euripides98, life under the sun is assessed positively. The bridge 
element then between the ý2M and carpe diem poles would be the 
remembering of one's creator in one's youth99 before (x3) encountering the 
death and t'. iI found throughout life. 
7: )1 means here much more than intellectual acknowledgement of God as 
creator. It refers to allowing the notion of God as creator to shape one's 
handling of life's enigmas now. And, if Qoheleth has Genesis 1 in mind, as 
some scholars suggest, then it is that kind of understanding of God as creator 
by which Qoheleth calls upon his readers to allow their minds and lives to be 
shapedloo. Remembrance, as Wolterstorff (1990: 131) recognises, involves 
consciously allowing the great acts of God, remembered in the tradition, to 
shape one's perspective in the present. The days of darkness will be many 
(11: 8), but the way to joy in the midst of this darkness (12: 2-7) is to 
remember God as creator. In v8 the tension between joy and enigma is still 
present; the command to rejoice is paralleled by the command to remember 
the days of darkness. This tension is resolved by changing the object of 
remembrance in 12: 1 and putting the days of darkness in the context of such 
remembrance, as the threefold use of `before' makes clear. And just as the 
97This 
of course depends upon how one divides up the book. In some cases, as we have seen, the carpe 
diem passages may be sandwiched in between enigmatic sections. The point is that, on my understanding, a 
carpe diem section never opens a new section except here in 11: 7ff. 
98See Murphy, 1992a: 116. 
991n a complex article Lohfink (1995) argues that the address to the youth is part of an initial banquet song 
form in the poem at the end of Ecclesiastes (11: 9-12: 8). This form is broken and then taken up again in 
another form, whereby the exhortation to the young to seize life now because it gets so bad in later years is 
undermined, and all readers are exhorted to enjoy life amidst the presence of death. Whether this is so or 
not, the description of the teacher in 12: 9 indicates that Qoheleth's teaching is relevant to all ages. 
1000n 151 in the OT see Eising (1980) and on the philosophy of remembrance see Wolterstorff (1990). 
'ID? is not a common word in Ecclesiastes, and while it can be used simply in terms of remembrance as in 
9: 15 it clearly has a richer nuance in 11: 7ff, as the objects of 1DT here indicate. Note, for example 11: 8b. 
The remembrance of the days of darkness is far more than mere intellectual acknowledgement, as 12: 2-7 
makes poignantly clear! 
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description of death is metaphorical'0' so too, it seems to me, should "youth" 
not be taken too narrowly to refer to only the young. The idea is rather that 
life needs to be built upon a foundation of such remembrance. 
This theology of remembrance of God as creator potentially undermines 
Qoheleth's empiricist epistemology, because it is tantamount to making the 
fear of God102 (here = remember your creator) foundational to Qoheleth's 
search for wisdom rather than the sort of empiricism he had adopted. Indeed 
it should be noted that although the reality of death is unequivocal in this 
section the observational language is absent. Remembrance thus presents the 
possibility of the resolution of the tension in Qoheleth's juxtapositions of 
enigma and joy. Ellul (1990: 278-283) puts it this way. 
"Remember your Creator. Only here does Qoheleth call him by this name, and he does so by design! ... You may consider yourself autonomous, but you are incapable of knowing what should be done, incapable of knowing what wisdom 
is. You are a creature. ... Our problems do not stem from our failure to stay in our garden, like Candide. All the evils, and I choose my words carefully, all the evils 
of the world stem from our taking ourselves to be the Creator. "103 
I have used words like "potentially" and "possibility" deliberately in the 
above paragraph. The description of death and the 
5=71 saying in v8 
`balance' the goodness of seeing the light (11: 7) and remembrance of the 
creator with a weighty reminder of the fragility of life. Something of the 
juxtaposition remains, and the reader is compelled to look to the concluding 
verses as to whether the "potentiality" of remembrance really does provide 
the key to resolving the juxtaposition. 
Our analysis of these passages would tend thus to confirm Whybray's (1992) 
view that: 
1. these carpe diem passages are arranged to state their theme with 
increasing emphasis and solemnity. 
2. 
101 See Murphy (1992a: 115,116) for a useful discussion of different approaches to 12: 1-7. 
102Qoheleth does refer to the fear of God, but there is much discussion as to the nuance he attaches to it. 
See Murphy, 1992a: lxiv-lxvi. My point here is that "remember your creator" is similar in meaning to "the 
fear of the Lord" in a text like Proverbs 1: 1-7. On the latter text see Whybray, 1994: 36 who argues that the 
acquisition of true knowledge begins with the fear of the Lord. In the context of Ecclesiastes 12: 1 is making 
the same sort of point. 103Ellul could well be accused of reading into the text at this point, but if one bears in mind that Qohcleth 
may have had Genesis 1-3 in mind, then remembrance of one's Creator may well stress the contrast with 
wanting to become 'like God' by 'knowing good and evil'. The presence of wisdom motifs in Genesis 1.3 
has long been recognised (Cf. Blocher, 1984), and Eve's reliance upon what she saw rather than what God 
as creator said may well be part of the background here. 
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"These seven texts are clearly more than mere marginal comments or asides. They 
punctuate the whole book, forming a kind of Leitmotif; they increase steadily in 
emphasis as the book proceeds; and the last, the most elaborate of them all, 
directly addressed to the reader, introduces and dominates the concluding section 
of the book in which Qoheleth presents his final thoughts on how life should be 
lived and why. It would be arbitrary to deny that they play a significant part in the 
exposition of Qoheleth's thought. " 
However, contra Whybray, I have suggested that the juxtaposition of the 
carpe diem passages with the enigmatic passages creates gaps which have to 
be filled. I suggest that `remembrance of God as creator' potentially fills 
these gaps. For all their penetrating insight Whybray and Ogden fail to 
recognise the gaps that the juxtaposition creates. Indeed, scholars who view 
Qoheleth's message as more pessimistic tend to recognise the gaps more 
easily. The critical question though, is how one fills the gaps. Whybray and 
Ogden tend to fill in the gaps positively by seeing the carpe diem passages 
as answers. However, as we have seen again and again in our examination of 
these passages, they would be most inadequate answers. Castellino 
(1968: 15) is much closer to the truth when he insists that "one can not deny 
the presence of a series of `antitheses' that makes it difficult to assess the 
true meaning of the book. Due to these `antitheses, ' exegetes are divided 
when called upon to judge what fundamental note Qoheleth really strikes.... 
There is no denying that both sides could substantiate their judgement 
through an array of opposite quotations. " Failure to recognise the 
juxtapositions/ antitheses results in scholars endlessly trying to fill in the gap 
created by them. The gap is always then filled in by making one of the poles 
the dominant one. Thus Qoheleth either becomes mainly sceptical or mainly 
positive. Recognition of the juxtapositions grants the insight that he is 
sceptical and positive! His empiricist epistemology takes him towards 
scepticism, but his Jewish background and faith provide him with an 
undeniable, more shalomic perspective upon life. 
I have suggested that Ecclesiastes itself gives us clues as to how the gap 
between empiricistic scepticism and the carpe diem perspective is to be 
filled. The theology of remembrance in 12: 1ff is important in this respect, 
but the epilogue is, I think, crucial in indicating finally how the narrator 
intends us to fill in the gaps and, I suggest that 12: 13,14 confirm my reading 
of 12: 1 as the bridge which positively resolves the tension/gap between the 
carpe diem element and the enigma statements. 
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Other aspects of the structure of repetition in Ecclesiastes. 
As we noted above, Ecclesiastes is full of repetition; the form of the text 
illustrates the circularity spoken of in 1: 3-11. We have only investigated the 
carpe diem element of repetition. Considerably more work remains to be 
done in this area. For example "under the sun" is a motif that recurs 27 
times; "sun" occurs 33 times. It is Qoheleth's way of referring to this- 
worldly existence. During the course of Ecclesiastes it provides the context 
for deeply negative (Cf. 2: 18-23) as well as deeply positive (Cf. 5: 18) 
attitudes to life. The proverb (11: 7) which opens the `final' section of 
Qoheleth tells us that "it is good (Z1D) for the eyes to see the sun, thereby 
encapsulating in proverbial form the message of 11: 7-12: 7/8 and indicating 
the side on which Qoheleth finally stands. 
c. Juxtaposition and gaps. 
We have suggested above that the juxtaposing of contradictory perspectives 
producing gaps is very much part of the fabric of Ecclesiastes. This has 
never been consciously studied by commentators' 04, although of course they 
work with the phenomenon all the time. As we saw, those who see Qoheleth 
as ultimately positive tend to smooth over the gaps, whereas those who 
recognise the gaps tend to see Qoheleth as a pessimist with the carpe diem 
passages as hedonistic resignation or as additions. Good (1981: 195) is one of 
the few to recognise the role of gaps in Ecclesiastes, but even he writes, 
"The book is not a systematic or complete presentation of theology, a 
philosophy, an ethic, a way of life. The large gaps that remain, Qoheleth's 
sardonic wit might have filled delightfully, but we must leave them blank. " 
Why is it that the gaps in Ecclesiastes have not been attended to? The answer 
lies in the failure of commentators to take the literary nature of Ecclesiastes 
seriously. As Sternberg (1985: 186) points out a literary work is a system of 
gaps which need to be filled. Gaps are not the same as blanks; gaps are 
relevancies which demand closure. Gaps are created by opposition in 
juxtaposition: "the narrative juxtaposes two pieces of reality that bear on the 
same context but fail to harmonize either as variants of a situation or as 
104In his examination of the composition of Ecclesiastes, Eaton (1983: 41) says of the 'contradictions', It 
is surely more likely that juxtaposed contradictions (e. g. 8: 12f. ) are calculated to draw our attention to the 
viewpoint of faith in contrast to that of observation. " However, Eaton does not pursue the presence of such 
juxtapositions in Ecclesiastes as a whole. Gladson (1979: 146) notes that literary juxtaposition is one way 
the OT handles retributive paradox, and refers to the final chapter of Qoheleth as an example. 
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phases in an action. " (Sternberg, 1985: 243) Gap-filling, according to 
Sternberg, is not arbitrary but should be controlled by the text's norms and 
directives. Although they arise from a lack in the telling, gaps move the 
reader between the truth and the whole truth and thereby give rise to a 
fullness in the reading'°5. 
It is apparent how well this fits with our reading of the carpe diem passages 
in Ecclesiastes. We have shown that the gaps are in fact gaps and that they 
are created by oppositional juxtaposition. 12: 13,14 ensures a foolproof 
reading of Ecclesiastes but it is only by attending to the gaps that one moves 
from a true reading to the whole truth. 
In this section we have focused on the poetics of Ecclesiastes rather than its 
overall structure and we will not pursue the complex question of the macro 
structure of Ecclesiastes further here. However the two are closely related. 
Wright and Loader, as we saw in chapter four have done important work on 
the structure of Ecclesiastes, but clearly if our analysis of the structures of 
repetition is correct then both their analyses would have to be revised. The 
hebel sayings are part of a large and more complex structure of repetition 
which Wright's analysis doesn't take adequate account of, and Loader's 
polar pattern fails to reckon adequately with the gaps that the juxtapositions 
set up. 
4. INTERTEXTUAL ANALYSIS. 
We have already had regular recourse to comparison of Ecclesiastes with 
Proverbs, indicating the dynamic of intertextuality in all biblical 
interpretation. Indeed, Qoheleth's relationship to traditional wisdom has 
featured large in twentieth century interpretation of Ecclesiastes, with 
Qoheleth regularly seen as reacting strongly against traditional wisdom. 
Hengel (1974) for example, argues that Qoheleth's empiricism results in his 
denying the traditional Jewish doctrine of retribution. Perdue (1994b: 116) 
goes so far as to suggest that Qoheleth develops an alternative worldview to 
that of the sages: 
"in his writings the foreground is not occupied by the manifold traditional 
motives; rather, he transforms them in his extremely individualist criticism by 
105See Sternberg 1985: 186-263 for a detailed discussion of gaps and the reading process in biblical 
narrative. 
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shattering the traditional world-view of earlier wisdom, denying a fixed 
connection between action and result, and proclaiming the absolute inexplicability 
of the divine action in nature and history. " 
And Crüsemann (1984: 61) maintains that "[t]his difference between 
Koheleth and his predecessors must be taken as the starting point for 
understanding Koheleth. " This type of approach to the relationship between 
Ecclesiastes and the wisdom corpus/movement rests on a developmental 
reconstruction of wisdom in the OT in which Qoheleth becomes associated 
with a crisis in wisdom106. Preuss is an extreme example of such a position 
(Murphy, 1992a: lxi). In his view: 
i. wisdom is marginal to Israel's faith. 
ii. the God of wisdom is not Yahweh 
iii. wisdom concentrates on the orders in reality. 
iv. retribution is one of these orders. The sages sought to discover this 
mechanical correspondence between action and consequence, as reflected in 
Proverbs. 
v. a deed-consequence viewpoint is the basic dogma of early wisdom. 
Clearly if one understands early wisdom in this way, then Qoheleth will be 
seen as reacting against this mechanical understanding of retribution, and 
thereby participating with Job in a crisis of wisdom. The critical question is 
whether or not early wisdom was of this sort, and whether wisdom in 
Proverbs is of this sort. Murphy (1992a: lxi) points out that although this 
notion of a wisdom crisis looms almost as large in scholarly discussion as 
does the exile of 587 BC, the earliest tradition clearly interpreted Qoheleth 
as working within the wisdom tradition. As he (1992a: lxi) tersely puts it, 
"There is no record that the book of Ecclesiastes was received with 
consternation. "107 
The subject of the origin and development of wisdom in Israel is a complex 
one which we cannot pursue here. However, insofar as intertextuality goes, 
there are good reasons for rejecting the sort of understanding of the 
Ecclesiastes-Proverbs relationship that Preuss advocates. Gladson (1979) 
persuasively argues that "retributive paradox" occurs in all strands of OT 
literature. Taken as a whole Proverbs by no means presents a mechanical 
I06See Gese (1983) and Schmid (1966) on the crisis of wisdom. 
107For Murphy's understanding of Qoheleth's relationship to traditional wisdom see Murphy. 1992a: lxii- 
lxiv. 
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act-consequence understanding of retribution. This has been clearly 
demonstrated in an excellent article on wealth and poverty in Proverbs by 
Van Leeuwen (1992). 
Van Leeuwen points out that there are large groups of sayings in Proverbs 
that assert a simple cause and effect relationship whereby righteousness 
leads to wealth and wickedness to poverty. These are examples of the 
"character-consequence-nexus". However they do not concern concrete, 
individual acts and their consequences: "It is the long-term character and 
direction of a person or group (as `righteous' or `wicked') which determines 
life consequences and `destiny'. " (Van Leeuwen, 1992: 27; Cf. Fox, 
1989: 132,133) It is a failure to recognise this long-term character that leads 
scholars to the mechanical view of retribution in Ecclesiastes. 
"These proverbs, when taken by themselves, are the basis for the view of some 
scholars that the tidy dogmatism of Proverbs does not correspond to reality and is 
doomed to collapse under the weight of reality, as happened in Job and Qoheleth. 
Since the foregoing sayings are not always exemplified in human experience, 
their falsification presumably led to a crisis of faith in Yahweh's maintenance of a 
just world order. " (Van Leeuwen, 1992: 28,29) 
However, proverbs are by their very nature partial utterances and this type 
of mechanical approach does not do justice to the many sayings in Proverbs 
which manifest a more complex understanding of the way God works in 
creation. Particularly noteworthy in this respect are the `better-than' sayings 
in Proverbs (Cf. 15: 16-17; 16: 16,19 etc. ) The overall picture is a far more 
complex one which Van Leeuwen (1992: 32,33) sums up as follows: 
"In general, the sages clearly believed that wise and righteous behaviour did make 
life better and richer, though virtue did not guarantee those consequences. 
Conversely, injustice, sloth, and the like generally have bad consequences. The 
editor-sages who structured Proverbs sought first to teach these basic `rules of 
life, ' thus the heavy emphasis on character-consequence patterns in both Proverbs 
1-9 and 10-15. We must first learn the basic rules; the exceptions can come later. 
Though very aware of exceptions to the character-consequence rule, the sages 
insisted that righteousness is better than wickedness. The most fundamental and 
profound reason for this is that they believed that God loves the one and hates the 
other. For Israel's sages that sometimes seems the only answer. ... the sages knew 
that there are limits to human wisdom. General patterns may be discerned, but 
many particular events may be unjust, irrational, and ultimately inscrutable. " 
Van Leeuwen also notes that there is a future-oriented retribution 
perspective in Proverbs. Proverbs lacks a doctrine of resurrection and yet 
insists on the triumph of God's justice. Van Leeuwen (1992: 34) regards this 
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as a hallmark of Yahwistic faith. "The sages' stance is to maintain faith in 
God's justice, even when they personally cannot see it or touch it, even 
when the recorded past does not verify it. Here religion provides no escape 
from the pain or absurdities of existence. The book of Job was inevitable, 
not because Proverbs was too simplistic, but because life's inequities, as 
reflected in Proverbs, drive faith to argue with the Deity. " 
Once one recognises that Proverbs' understanding of retribution is more 
complex than a mechanical deed-consequence notion, then Ecclesiastes 
relationship to Proverbs and traditional wisdom has to be re-evaluated. 
Admittedly, Van Leeuwen's understanding of this greater complexity is only 
one possibility among a number. Gladson, for example, makes retributive 
paradox a function of pluralism and dissent already present in early wisdom 
traditions. For Van Leeuwen (1992: 26), by comparison, "whatever their 
historical origin, within Proverbs they have come to express one broad 
worldview which acknowledges the conflict of dogma and experience, yet 
maintains both. " Either way, it is clear that Qoheleth's empirical 
methodology demands a certainty which traditional wisdom was aware that 
it could not provide. Consequently, rather than Qoheleth representing a crisis 
in wisdom, he could be seen as focusing on the retributive paradox which 
Proverbs is aware of and perhaps subsumes under its more general long-term 
deed-consequence understanding. Because Qoheleth's empiricism is based 
on observation alone, he moves in the direction of deconstructing the 
tradition by always focusing on the individual exceptions. 
It should also be noted that Ecclesiastes, in our view, does not recommend 
Qoheleth's empiricism, but ironically deconstructs it and arrives at a 
"remembering your creator" position which is similar to that "fear of God" 
which Proverbs declares to be foundational to its wisdom. In this way the 
focus of Ecclesiastes is far more specific than Proverbs, but the views of 
wisdom and retribution are not necessarily that far apart. 
Another intertextual issue that has featured centrally in the interpretation of 
Ecclesiastes is the relationship between wisdom and law, especially as this is 
focused in chapter 12: 13b: 71ntM 1'1 31Y I 1. For many scholars the 
introduction of law is alien to the wisdom tradition in which Ecclesiastes is 
situated, thus indicting that the epilogue, or at least this part of it, is a later 
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attempt to make Qoheleth appear orthodox or to thematize a relationship 
between wisdom and the commandments in the Law'°8. 
However, we have argued that there are good reasons for resisting early 
attempts to conclude that the epilogue is a later addition'09. The genre of 
Ecclesiastes and the circular intent at totality drive us to explore other 
avenues before concluding that the reference to law must make the epilogue 
a later addition. And there are indications that the reference to law may not 
be as alien to Ecclesiastes as some suggest. As Lohfink (1990d: 633), for 
example points out, law is not alien to the fear of God in Qoheleth. He 
makes the point that 5: 6 concludes the section 4: 17-5: 6. Indeed 4: 17-5: 6 
contain a restatement of the law of Deuteronomy 23: 22-24 in 5: 3-4 and the 
background to 5: 5 is Numbers 15: 22-31. And this section with its allusions 
to the Torah concludes with the exhortation to "fear God. "' 10 
This evidence of awareness of pentateuchal cultic legislation needs to be 
combined with the vocabulary in Ecclesiastes that also appears to relate to 
the domain of torah, namely `judgement' (3: 17,11: 9), `sinner', `sin' (2: 26, 
5: 5,8: 12) `wicked' and `righteous' (3: 17). These factors, combined with the 
indications that Ecclesiastes has a strong link with Genesis and several 
strong links with Deuteronomy, make it more and more difficult to insist that 
the reference to law means that the epilogue must be a later addition, If. 
Certainly if Qoheleth had Genesis 1ff in mind, then the use of Elohim and 
the reference to "your creator" should not be set in opposition to the 
lawgiver, Yahweh, as Genesis 2 makes particularly clear with its description 
of God as Yahweh Elohim, thereby stressing that the creator Elohim is the 
Yahweh of IsraelI12. 
108See Sheppard, 1980: 121-129. 
109e introduction of law does strike the reader as strange, but strangeness is not alien to endings. This 
century considerable work has been done on the theory of endings and this may provide helpful 
insights 
with respect to the epilogue. See Kermode (1966), Rogers (1992) and for a fascinating application of this 
type of theory to Jonah see Crouch (1994). 
110There is however considerable disagreement as to how to understand Qoheleth's view of the cult. Cf. 
Perdue, 1977: 178-188 and Ogden, 1987: 75ff for two different views. In my opinion Ogden's is the more 
satisfactory view. 
11 'It is, of course, possible to argue that Qoheleth knows the Torah but is very negative towards 
it. This 
will depend upon one's understanding of the passages in which this vocabulary occurs. 
112See L'Hour (1975) and Bartholomew (1995a). 
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In OT theology the relationship between law and wisdom remains a 
controversial and difficult issue113. Murphy (1978: 38) has helpfully 
suggested that "[t]he problem of the relationship between wisdom literature 
and other portions of the Old Testament needs to be reformulated in terms of 
a shared approach to reality. " It does need to be remembered that the strong 
distinction between law and wisdom is a modem construct, and certainly by 
the third century BC it is likely that wisdom and law would not be 
considered separate paths to successful living in the minds of teachers and 
populace since both relate to ordering life in all its dimensions. This 
becomes particularly clear when one notes that "[a] relationship between 
religious and secular is not applicable to OT wisdom teaching. " (Murphy, 
1978: 40) Neither is it applicable to torah which also orders all areas of life. 
How then might these two approaches have been understood to relate to each 
other? 
This is an extremely complex issue and here I simply want to make a 
suggestion along the lines of Murphy's proposal of a shared reality. The 
wisdom and legal traditions in the OT are clearly distinct and yet they 
manifest some awareness of each other, as we have seen with Ecclesiastes 114. 
Both have in common the ordering of the life of God's people' 15. Van 
Leeuwen (1990) has analysed the root metaphors of Proverbs 1-9 and argues 
persuasively that 
"underlying the bipolar metaphorical system of positive and negative youths, 
invitations/calls, `ways', `women', and 'houses' in Proverbs 1-9, is a yet more 
fundamental reality which these images together portray. These chapters depict 
the world as the arena of human existence. This world possesses two fundamental 
characteristics. First is its structure of boundaries or limits. Second is the bi-polar 
human eros for the beauty of Wisdom , who prescribes life within limits, or for the seeming beauty of Folly, who offers bogus delights in defiance of created 
limits. " 
Van Leeuwen (1990: 118) argues that the worldview which Proverbs exhibits 
is a `carved' one in that "cultural and personal exhortation is grounded in the 
113For a useful discussion of the relationship of these two traditions which both seek to order the lives of 
God's people see Blenkinsopp, 1983. 
114See Van Leeuwen (1990: 122) for some of the links between Proverbs and Job and the Pentateuch. Van 
Leeuwen argues that certain texts in Proverbs and Job presuppose the historical tradition of the gift of the 
land. 
115Murphy (1978) is critical of the close association of wisdom with the search for order, arguing that this 
question is a modern one which focuses on a presupposition of Israel's wisdom approach. However see Van 
Leeuwen (1990) for a powerful defence of taking the tacit presupposition of cosmic order seriously in 
wisdom literature. 
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reality of the created word with its inbuilt normativity. " Justice and 
righteousness are built into the world 
This link of wisdom with creation has long been recognised. What is often 
not noted, though, is that the order that Proverbs finds in the `carved' 
creation is not and cannot be simply read out of the creation. This is the 
point that Fox makes about Israelite wisdom; it is not empirical in the way 
that Ecclesiastes is, but assumes ethical principles which it uses observation 
to support. This is the sort of position exemplified in Genesis 1ff. The 
ordering of creation is not antithetical to instruction from Elohim/Yahweh 
Elohim. Order and instruction/torah go hand-in-hand, and obedience requires 
both a good creation and instruction. The point is that wisdom literature 
assumes certain ethical principles which are not just read off creation but are 
often very similar to the principles found in the Law. Van Leeuwen 
(1990: 132), for example, argues that Proverbs 1-9 indicates that it is in "the 
liquid abandonment of married love" that healthy communitas takes place. 
As Van Leeuwen notes, "This reality has its parallel at Sinai. " 
Thus it can be argued that while wisdom is most closely related to creation it 
presupposes instruction. Similarly, when the narrative frame within which 
law always occurs in the final form of the OT is foregrounded, it becomes 
apparent that the law of Yahweh the redeemer God is also the law of the 
creator God. This link between Yahweh as creator and redeemer is central to 
covenant in the OT116, and alerts us to the link between law and creation. 
My suggestion therefore is that law and wisdom share an underlying and 
often tacit presupposition of a `carved' creation order. This is their shared 
reality. Instruction from Yahweh would therefore not be seen to conflict with 
the way he ordered his creation, but would provide the ethical principles for 
discovery of that liminality. If this is even close to the situation that 
prevailed in Israel then it would confirm our argument for caution about 
insisting that the epilogue must be an addition because it mentions "keeping 
commandments. " 
Many other aspects of biblical intertextuality in relation to Ecclesiastes could 
be considered. A strong connection between Ecclesiastes and the early 
116See Bartholomew, 1995a. 
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chapters of Genesis has long been noted (Forman, 1960; Clements, 1994)117. 
Alter (1985: 68-70) notes a connection with Psalm 39, and we have noted 
earlier the similarities between Ecclesiastes and Psalms like Psalm 73. 
Ecclesiastes cries out for detailed comparison of OT ways of handling 
theodicy and of OT views of death and the possibility of life after death. And 
so one could continue, but we cannot pursue these subjects further here. 
5. THE IMPLIED READERSHIP OF ECCLESIASTES 
The shifts in Ecclesiastes between third and first person to second person 
hortation indicate that the text is designed for instruction, as indeed 12: 9-11 
says of Qoheleth's teaching. ']M (12: 12; Cf. 11: 9) implies a young male 
readership within Israel, although it is unclear whether this is within the 
family, school or court (Cf. Whybray, 1994: 7-12). QD 1 (12: 9) alerts us to 
the fact that Qoheleth's teaching was not confined to the young males, but 
relevant to the whole people of God' 18. The implication is that Ecclesiastes is 
read within the community of God's people. This is confirmed by the 
orthodox ending. 
One assumes that the readership would identify with the empirical questions 
that Qoheleth raises and the individualism that he embodies, and the tension 
that these create with his Israelite perspective upon life. The individualism 
and empiricism are probably best accounted for by the Greek influence that 
Jews were being exposed to in the third century B. C. Fox (1989: 16) suggests 
that Qoheleth's affinities with Epicureanism is particularly significant, with 
its view that sensory experience is the ultimate source and arbiter of 
knowledge. It is notoriously difficult to pin down the specific Greek 
influences affecting Qoheleth, but I think it is right to imagine a situation in 
which Jews are increasingly being exposed to the sort of epistemologies that 
Epicureanism exhibits. Such exposure would tempt them to read their tragic 
history and present experience along empirical lines. To such Jews the 
empirical analysis that Qoheleth models, put in the mouth initially of the 
wise man par excellence, Solomon, but still only running up continually 
against the enigma of life, would speak with exceptional power. It would be 
117For example, as Robert Alter pointed out to me in conversation, much of Qoheleth has a very different 
understanding of time compared with Genesis 1: 1-2: 4. 
118Cf. Van Leeuwen (1990: 114,115) who argues that while Proverbs 1-9 are "threshold speeches to those 
on the verge of adulthood, " they also function to `remind' sages of their basic worldview and strengthen 
them in it. 
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a bomb on the playing field of those seeking a redemptive synthesis in Greek 
philosophy with the biblical tradition. 
Of course Ecclesiastes would appeal immediately to the educated Jew who 
was being exposed to and tempted by Greek philosophy. In this sense 
Lohfink may be right in seeing it as a school text book. However, parents 
and the populace would be increasingly aware of the tension between the 
pervasive Greek culture and Israelite tradition, and in this sense Ecclesiastes 
would instruct all the people, as the epilogue notes. 
6. THE GENESIS OF ECCLESIASTES. 
It is clear from our reading of Ecclesiastes that careful consideration of the 
genre and the literary shape of the text makes much of the genetic analysis of 
Ecclesiastes during this century out of date and inappropriate. Source 
criticism of Ecclesiastes needs to be revised along the lines Sternberg has 
suggested. Analysis of individual forms within Ecclesiastes and their Sitz im 
Leben will continue to be helpful to exegesis, but this work has to be related 
to the present literary shape of the text and its macro-form. The similarity of 
Ecclesiastes to fictional autobiography makes quests for the historical "I" of 
Qoheleth obsolete, and the debate about the genesis of Ecclesiastes will 
rather need to be focused upon whether with Fox we see one author as 
responsible for the whole text, or whether we maintain the substantial unity 
of Ecclesiastes but still see 12: 9-14 as the addition of a later hand. However 
Ecclesiastes reached its present formt 19, I have sought to show that it is the 
present form that the interpreter should work at understanding. If 12: 9-14 is 
to be excluded from this form, then a strong case which does not just assume 
the historical critical legacy will have to be made along these lines. 
I see no need to depart from the current consensus that Ecclesiastes reached 
its present form in the fourth or third centuries BC, although it is hard to be 
certain in this sort of area120. Our reading of Ecclesiastes also confirms that it 
fits very much within a Jewish rather than a Greek background, although the 
1191t is quite possible that Ecclesiastes has a long history of composition. But neither its genre nor its 
present shape give any indication that we will be able to recover earlier stages with strong possibility of 
success. 
' Fredericks (1988) has argued that the language of Qoheleth should not be dated later than the exilic 
period and that it could be dated earlier. But see Schoors, 1992: 14-16,222. 
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nature of Qoheleth's empirical M nD rl indicates the influence of Greek 
thought upon Israel. This influence is handled critically. 
7. THE MESSAGE OF ECCLESIASTES. 
"Nothing is further from the spirit of the sages than the idea of an autonomy of 
thinking, a humanism of the good life; in short of a wisdom in the Stoic or 
Epicurean mode founded on the self-sufficiency of thought. This is why wisdom 
is held to be a gift of God in distinction to the `knowledge of good and evil' 
promised by the Serpent. " (Ricoeur, 1980: 88) 
Our application of the proposed communication model of hermeneutics has 
as its goal the explication of the message of Ecclesiastes. However, it needs 
to be stressed that what has led up to and constitutes the following proposed 
message of Ecclesiastes is tentative, and needs to be substantiated and tested 
in much greater detail. In the light of our preceding discussion, I propose 
that the following might be the message of Ecclesiastes. 
Ecclesiastes is written for fourth/third century Israelites who lived in a 
period when Yahweh's promises seemed to have come to nothing and there 
was little empirical evidence of his purposes and promises. The Israelites 
were exposed to pervasive Greek thought and culture at this time and a 
common temptation especially among the more educated was to apply a sort 
of Greek (Epicurean) empiricism to their experience of desolation, leading 
many of their young people to conclude that God's purposes in the world are 
inscrutable and utterly enigmatic. 
Ecclesiastes is crafted by a wisdom teacher as an ironical exposure of such 
an empiricistic epistemology which seeks wisdom through personal 
experience and analysis without the `glasses' of the fear of God. This 
empiricistic epistemology keeps running up against the enigma of life when 
pursued from this direction, and it appears impossible to find a bridge 
between this enigma and the good that is visible and which the biblical 
tradition alerts one to. The resolution of this paradox is found in the fear of 
God (rejoicing and remembrance) which enables one to rejoice and apply 
oneself positively to life in the midst of all that one does not understand, 
including and especially death. Ecclesiastes exhorts Israelites struggling with 
the nature of life's meaning and God's purposes to pursue genuine wisdom 
by allowing their thinking to be shaped integrally by a recognition of God as 
Creator so that they can enjoy God's good gifts and obey his laws amidst the 
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enigma of his purposes. In this way it is an exhortation to be truly wise in 
difficult and perplexing situations. This is where the implied author wants 
the reader/s to stand in relation to the enigmas of life. 
V CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have sought to argue for a Christian hermeneutic in the 
context of a genuine pluralism in OT studies. We have argued that a 
communication model of interpretation is a natural extension of a Christian 
worldview. My argument at this point is similar to Plantinga's (1993: 194- 
215) approach to epistemology in terms of proper function. He argues that 
his approach fits with an understanding of humans as `designed artefacts, ' 
but that it does not fit with naturalism, despite the fact that many naturalists 
hold such a view. In a similar way we are arguing that a communication 
model is peculiarly appropriate from a Christian perspective. 
This may appear commonsensical. However, a cursory reading of Belsey 
(1980) will alert one to the problematic status of `common-sense' in late 
modem scholarship. I am grateful to the postmodern turn for the extent to 
which it has shown that what may appear as commonsensical is always part 
of a broader perspective, and that it is difficult to hold onto the 
`commonsensical' if you let go of the bigger picture. As Belsey (1980: 4) 
herself says 
"there is no practice without theory ... What we do when we read, however `natural' it seems, presupposes a whole theoretical discourse, even if unspoken, 
about language and about meaning, about the relationships between meaning and 
the world, meaning and people, and finally about people themselves and their 
place in the world. " 
The proof of any biblical hermeneutic is its ability to allow a text to speak on 
its own terms and thus the application of our proposed hermeneutic to 
Ecclesiastes is an important conclusion to this thesis. Our proposed reading 
of Ecclesiastes needs considerably more testing to establish it as a possible 
reading. However, we suggest that approaching it as we have done, 
analysing its genre as a literary unity along literary-historical lines, attending 
closely to its poetics, setting it in the context of the rest of the OT, does 





"The Bible deals with the whole, the sum total of reality. ... If we confess `I believe in God, the creator of heaven and earth, ' and do not take seriously that 
every creature is related to God, that God has to do with all creatures, then this 
confession is an empty phrase. If for us there is a reality which does not have to 
do with God, then we do not know God, the Creator. " (Westermann 1986: 48) 
This thesis has sought to investigate the relationship between OT exegesis 
and hermeneutical theory while using Ecclesiastes as a focus and test case 
for the investigation. In the introduction we argued that apart from its 
intrinsic importance such an investigation is particularly relevant at present 
because of the growing pluralism within OT studies. Analysis and 
understanding of this pluralism requires exploration of the different 
philosophies shaping different approaches in OT studies. 
In chapter one we surveyed the terrain of philosophical hermeneutics. This 
survey revealed the diversity within modern philosophical hermeneutics. It 
became clear that there are different approaches and these will shape 
interpretative work differently. The postmodern turn in particular has made 
this diversity apparent. Different hermeneutics work with different 
understandings of reason, history, the human person etc. We identified 
Gadamer's hermeneutic as particularly important; it bridges modern and 
postmodern hermeneutics and raises the question of the role of prejudice and 
tradition in interpretation. We concluded that if we are to understand 
different readings of Ecclesiastes and to find a way ahead in the diversity of 
contemporary OT studies, then we must attend to the different hermeneutical 
options available and their influence within OT studies. And it was noted 
from our survey that the relationship of reason to faith is a key issue in 
modern hermeneutics. Thus, for Christians busy with OT interpretation the 
question of how a Christian perspective upon reality relates to the different 
hermeneutical options is an important question. 
In chapter two we surveyed the history of the interpretation of Ecclesiastes. 
We saw that up until the Reformation Ecclesiastes tended to be interpreted 
allegorically. It was always read as Scripture and with the epilogue as 
determinative. The Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment period 
(modernity) marks the watershed in the interpretation of Ecclesiastes. Its 
effect was to reinforce literal interpretation and to bracket out the 
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constitutive role of faith in the interpretation process. The application of 
historical method to the OT in the nineteenth century lead eventually to 
source critical analysis of Ecclesiastes, and then to form critical and 
traditional critical analyses. Early twentieth century approaches to 
Ecclesiastes were strongly source critical, but the second half of the 
twentieth century has seen a recovery of a sense of the unity of Ecclesiastes. 
However the Epilogue still tends to be regarded as secondary. Newer reading 
strategies have gradually started to have an impact on the reading of 
Ecclesiastes. 
This survey demonstrated that there is a close relationship between the 
history of the interpretation of Ecclesiastes and that of hermeneutics. 
Modernity and its hermeneutical legacy were obviously particularly 
influential in the interpretation of Ecclesiastes, and yet at the end of the 
twentieth century there is no agreement about the message of Ecclesiastes. It 
was concluded that if we are to get a better understanding of Ecclesiastes 
then it is important to explore the relationship between hermeneutics and the 
reading of Ecclesiastes more closely. 
Because of the importance of modernity for hermeneutics and the 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes, in chapter three we examined the origin of the 
historical critical method in modernity and its effect upon the reading of 
Ecclesiastes. Our analysis confirmed that the historical critical method is a 
product of modernity and more particularly of nineteenth century 
philosophies of history. From Toulmin's reassessment of modernity it 
became clear that the standard account of modernity can no longer be 
assumed and that, insofar as the historical critical method has been shaped 
by modernity, we do need to be critically aware of its prejudices. Early 
twentieth century readings of Ecclesiastes tended to be historically 
reductionistic and neglected the literary and theological aspects of 
Ecclesiastes. We argued that an evaluation of historical criticism needed to 
take account of the anti-Christian nature of some of its roots in modernity. 
This, combined with the fact that diverse philosophies of history inform the 
historical critical method and its reductionistic nature led us to conclude that 
the epistemological foundations of OT studies need re-evaluation. 
In the latter half of the twentieth century there have been a number of 
important reactions to historical criticism in OT studies and we examined 
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these in chapters four and five. Childs canonical approach represents itself as 
a theological reaction to historical criticism, and NC and structuralism are 
reactions to `positivism' in literary studies. As reactions the value of these 
approaches was identified in their alerting us to the literary and theological 
dimensions of the OT texts, aspects which historical criticism tends to 
neglect. Thus Childs' canonical reading of Ecclesiastes helpfully explores 
how the epilogue affects the reading of the final form of Ecclesiastes. And 
NC and structuralism alert us to the fact that Ecclesiastes is a literary text 
and that exploration of this literary dimension is crucial to its correct 
interpretation. It was concluded that a hermeneutic is required which 
accounts for the historical, literary and theological aspects of the OT texts. 
Chapter five examined Sternberg's narrative poetics which also aims to take 
the literary dimension of OT texts seriously. Sternberg's sophisticated 
poetics was a natural bridge to Fox's analysis of Ecclesiastes as a narrative 
literary whole. We analysed Fox's narrative reading of Ecclesiastes and in 
this context focused upon the question of the genre of Ecclesiastes. Genre 
analysis tends to be regarded as more of a historical than a literary question 
but we concluded that determination of the genre of Ecclesiastes requires 
close interaction between comparative historical and literary analysis. We 
argued Ecclesiastes is a developed wisdom form of the royal testament or 
fictional autobiography cast in a frame-narrative. 
All of these reactions to historical criticism have taken place within the 
classical humanist paradigm of textuality in which hermeneutics is 
concerned with the attempt to discern the true meaning of texts. 
Postmodernism challenges the very possibility of determinate meaning, 
declares the author dead, and makes textual meaning dependent on the 
reader. Thus in chapter six we examined the postmodern turn and its 
implications for OT hermeneutics and the reading of Ecclesiastes. We 
argued that `postmodernity' should be understood philosophically as a crisis 
of foundations in late modernity. We showed that this crisis is becoming 
evident in OT studies in terms of hermeneutic pluralism and fragmentation. 
Although little postmodern work has been done on Ecclesiastes we observed 
that consistent postmodernism would have radical implications for its 
interpretation. 
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However, we demonstrated that postmodernism is not as radically new as it 
is often presented and that the hermeneutical positions its proponents 
advocate still presuppose metanarratives and epistemologies. The value of 
postmodernism is its recognition that we have to position ourselves 
somewhere from which we do our analysis. The problem of postmodernism 
is its tendency to view all positionings as of equal value or of there being no 
way of deciding where one should position oneself. Thus, it was concluded 
that the crucial question for biblical scholars is whether or not there are 
appropriate prejudices for OT interpretation, or are one set as good as 
another? 
In chapter seven it was argued that Christian OT scholars should seek to 
develop a hermeneutic which is shaped by a religious (Christian) perspective 
in the context of a genuine pluralism within OT studies. It was argued that 
an integrated communication model for hermeneutics is a logical 
development of a Christian perspective and the parameters of such a model 
were mapped out in a way which attempts to do justice to the historical, 
literary and theological dimensions of a biblical text. 
This model was then applied to Ecclesiastes. It was stressed that such a 
hermeneutic means taking the circular intent at totality seriously with respect 
to the whole of Ecclesiastes, including the epilogue. On the basis of our 
conclusions reached about the genre of Ecclesiastes particular attention was 
paid to the poetics of the text as the means by which we hear the message of 
Ecclesiastes. We did not analyse the overall structure of Ecclesiastes but 
attended to the central role of irony and the much neglected structures of 
repetition. It was argued that central to the structure of Ecclesiastes is the 
juxtaposition of the carpe diem passages with the enigmatic passages and 
that this juxtaposition creates gaps which the reader has to fill. Chapter 
twelve of Ecclesiastes is fundamental to the book in the answer it gives as to 
how the gaps should be filled, namely by remembering one's creator. 
It was concluded that Ecclesiastes is addressed to third or fourth century BC 
disillusioned Israelites who were in danger of succumbing to Greek 
scepticism. Ecclesiastes is an ironical exposure of an empiricistic 
epistemology which seeks wisdom through personal experience and analysis 
without the `glasses' of the fear of God. This empiricistic epistemology 
keeps running up against the enigma of life when pursued 
from this 
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direction, and it appears impossible to find a bridge between this enigma and 
the good that is visible and which the biblical tradition alerts one to. The 
resolution of this paradox is found in the fear of God (rejoicing and 
remembrance) which enables one to rejoice and apply oneself positively to 
life in the midst of all that one does not understand, including and especially 
death. 
We began this thesis with a quote from Sternberg about the inter-disciplinary 
task that biblical studies requires and its superhuman demands. It is well to 
recall those comments at this stage. Our exploration of the interface between 
the hermeneutic and exegetical poles of OT studies has meant that we have 
not been able to examine either pole exhaustively. Certainly our proposed 
reading of Ecclesiastes, for example, needs to be fleshed out and tested in 
greater detail. However, this thesis has demonstrated the organic relationship 
between hermeneutical theory and OT exegesis, as exemplified in the 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes and, especially in the light of the pluralism and 
fragmentation in OT studies today examination of the interrelation of the 
different elements that constitute OT interpretation needs urgent attention. 
Hermeneutical presuppositions are inescapable in exegesis and within 
modem hermeneutics there are a range of hermeneutical options which will 
shape one's interpretation differently. We have shown the fundamental role 
that philosophical hermeneutics play in OT interpretation, and yet very little 
work has been done in this area. In our opinion if OT scholars are to come to 
grips with the pluralism in OT studies and to continue to value objective 
interpretation then awareness of the way in which different hermeneutics 
shape exegesis will need to receive much greater attention. Of course 
attention also needs to be given to theological, sociological, linguistic etc. 
presuppositions, but the epistemological and ontological presuppositions 
embodied in a hermeneutic are of fundamental importance since they shape 
the entire knowledge enterprise, and it is here that many of the most 
fundamental differences among OT scholars are to be located. At the present 
time of fragmentation it is vital that these differences are made visible if we 
are to understand the present and find a way ahead. This is not to suggest 
that the OT scholar needs to become a philosopher or a theologian, but it is 
to argue for philosophical and theological awareness by OT scholars and for 
dialogue with philosophers and theologians about the task of OT 
scholarship. 
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OT scholars do also need to reconsider the relationship between faith and 
scholarship. Much OT scholarship continues to resist allowing religious faith 
to shape biblical scholarship. In the tradition of modernity faith is privatised 
and objectivity sought by excluding religious beliefs from the academy. 
However this is itself a particular prejudice and if OT scholars continue to 
operate this way they will need to account for their approach. Such an 
approach can no longer just be assumed to be the right one, and, as the quote 
from Westermann above makes clear, for those who confess God as Creator 
it is unacceptable to bracket off OT studies from the reality of God. Of 
course much thought needs to be given to how one relates biblical studies to 
God, and we have argued that such a project needs to be theoretically well 
grounded. However, all scholars bring their ultimate presuppositions to bear 
on their scholarship and if this were acknowledged then it might be possible 
to work towards a genuine pluralism in the academy and OT studies. 
Certainly we need to be wary of a liberal pluralism which presents itself as 
tolerant but excludes serious academic work shaped by religious 
presuppositions, just as we ought to be wary of a religious monism which 
excludes all other approaches. 
I would argue that Christian scholars ought to ensure that their scholarship is 
shaped by Christian presuppositions. Once bodies of OT scholarship start to 
emerge from within different traditions then the real conversations among 
different approaches can begin. This would be far more helpful than having 
presuppositions which do affect OT scholarship being forced underground 
and thus invisible in the name of objective, rational scholarship. 
From a Christian perspective it appears to me that a great challenge for OT 
studies is to articulate an integrated hermeneutic. This runs counter to many 
trends in OT studies today but remains essential if hearing the message of 
the text is to be the focus of exegesis. In chapter seven I have made some 
preliminary proposals along the lines of a communication model, but clearly 
an enormous amount of work remains to be done in this area. 
The proof of the pudding will always be in the eating, and it has been 
important to me throughout this project to be able to show how taking 
hermeneutics seriously does help in the interpretation of a perplexing book 
like Ecclesiastes. It is still common for readers to attribute the difficulties of 
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Ecclesiastes entirely to the text itself. Our research has shown that this 
perplexity is as much a product of the reader as it is of the text. Clarity 
about the extent of the text being interpreted, about what a text is and how 
the literary, historical and theological elements interrelate go a long way 
towards clearing the ground for an objective reading of Ecclesiastes. In 
particular I suggest that the literary nature of Ecclesiastes needs renewed 
attention. Sternberg and others have done great work on the poetics of 
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